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Abstract
IL,
This observational and experimental study takes the Intersubjectivity Theory
of Rogers and Pennington (1991), as the guiding line by which to investigate
imitation in autism. A deficit in imitation in early childhood is the principal aspect of
this theory which distinguishes it from other major theories such as those of Baron-
Cohen et al. (1985) and Hobson (1986).
With much debate over the existence of a general deficit in imitation, this
study aimed first to test for different types of imitation (including those
differentiated by Piaget (1962), such as vocal, immediate and deferred imitation) and
second, to examine other deficits linked to imitation in Roger and Pennington's
theory - emotion perception, joint attention, theory of mind and play. The effect of
age was also investigated. Rogers and Pennington (1991) predicted that young
autistic children would show a profile of deficits including impaired imitation,
emotion sharing, joint attention and pretend play while older children and adults
would show impaired "theory of mind", emotion sharing and language pragmatics,
relative to controls.
In an observational study autistic children and adults showed less social
interaction with peers, more manipulative play, less symbolic play in some
comparisons and less evidence of mental state understanding but few differences in
imitation, compared to children with learning disabilities and normal 3-4 year old
and 5-6 year old children.
Virtually the same samples were then tested experimentally for the ability to
imitate. This was done for (1) elicited imitation (including vocal, simple body
movements and symbolic actions, with and without objects), (2) spontaneous,
problem-solving imitation and (3) deferred imitation. In addition, spontaneous,
elicited and instructed play was tested and visual perspective-taking, joint attention,
false-belief and emotion recognition. No general deficit for imitation in school-age
autistic children and autistic adults was found, although a younger group (CA 4 - 7
years) of autistic children did significantly worse on all aspects of the task. Scores
were lower on deferred imitation and on spontaneous, problem-solving imitation for
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the autistic groups and certain categories of actions in the elicited task proved more
difficult for the autistic children, namely those requiring symbolic ability.
Previous findings on joint attention, false-belief and emotion perception
were, for the most part, confirmed, although no links between any of these
behaviours and imitation were evident from examination of individual profiles. In
addition, a picture of inconsistency across tasks emerged. However, some evidence
was found for Rogers and Pennington's theory at a crude level, in that it was the
youngest children who had most problems with imitation, symbolic play, and
emotion recognition, relative to controls. It is concluded that although imitation may
be lacking in early autistic development, Rogers and Pennington's theory may not be
an altogether satisfactory way of explaining its contribution to the autistic disorder
and is, in fact, very difficult to test.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Autism, its nature, causes and the theories surrounding it, has seen a
resurgence in interest in the past two decades from psychologists of many
disciplines. Not only has there been an increase in research on this relatively recent
discovery (first described by Kanner, 1943), the focus of the research has seen much
expansion. Some of the old ideas have been thrown out and many new ideas
introduced. On the other hand, the underlying cause of this extremely variable
disorder remains much of an enigma. It is now known that the underlying cause is
biological, possibly with a genetic connection, but researchers cannot be much more
specific than this. As a result, most research into both the understanding and the
remediation of this disorder has remained in the behavioural and cognitive domains
and diagnosis is still made by mostly behavioural means.
This thesis reports the results of both an observational study and an
experimental investigation of imitation, and its relationships with play and "theory
of mind" (used in its broadest developmental sense), in an attempt to provide
evidence for one of the current theories surrounding autism - the Intersubjectivity
Theory of Rogers and Pennington (1991), which is taken as the guiding line for this
thesis. This theory introduced a new element into the theory of autism - a deficit in
imitation. However, although a lack of imitation had been included in the diagnosis
of autism since 1987 (DSM-III-R), the evidence for such a deficit is by no means
conclusive (so much so that it is not one of the DSM-IV (1994) criteria). Clarifying
the existence of such a deficit and its possible relationships with other deficits seen
in autism as proposed by Rogers and Pennington, is the main focus of this thesis.
Rogers and Pennington (1991) predicted that a deficit in imitation, along with
deficits in affective mutuality, joint attention and symbolic play, are most important
for autistic children in early childhood. This profile changes as the child gets older
so this thesis also aims to take some account of the potential development of such
abilities by including autistic individuals of a wide age range (4 years to 34 years)
and two groups of normal children, one with an average age of 3-4 years and one
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with an average age of 5-6 years, since the age of four years has been suggested to
be a developmental watershed for many developmental abilities, particularily those
related to Theory of Mind, such as understanding false-belief
This introductory chapter is divided into four distinct parts. Part 1 begins with
a section on the nature of autism, from historical, behavioural, biological and
theoretical perspectives. Once Rogers and Pennington's theory is presented, along
with the preceding theories of Baron-Cohen et al (1985) and Hobson (1986a; b), this
chapter will then concern itself in Part 2 with issues of the nature of imitation from
the point of view of both the normal developmental pattern and the definition of
imitation. Part 3 will present the existing evidence for and against a deficit in
imitation in autism before a fuller analysis of Rogers and Pennington's theory is
given in Part 4. This final section will present the predictions these authors make
with regard to the developmental pattern seen in autism and the relationship between
imitation and other deficits, the evidence for which will be presented as concisely as
possible. This will include data from both experimental and observational studies,
specifically on social interaction, play and understanding mental states. The rationale
for the choice of the subjects used in this study will be presented before the
predictions, based on Rogers and Pennington's model and the literature review.
Despite the huge bodies of research on autism, very little work has been
conducted on what autistic children do in their natural or everyday environment,
which typically includes a structured element. A few studies to be reviewed later and
in Chapter 2, have examined social interaction and play in autistic children. Most
"naturalistic" data has come from reports by parents and care-givers, which
inevitably have problems intrinsic to retrospective questionnaires or interviews.
Chapter Two, therefore, reports an observational study examining 1) social
interaction as a general index of autism 2) play, 3) evidence of "theory of mind"
abilities and 4) imitation. This provides a background for the occurance of imitation
and other relevant activities in subjects' everyday lives and helped design
appropriate batteries of tests presented in later chapters.
This thesis employs a variety of methodological methods and following the
observational study of Chapter 2, the methodology changes to experimental
investigations of both spontaneous and elicited behaviour. Chapters Three, Four and
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Five present the main experiments on the ability to imitate, including an experiment
on elicited immediate imitation using a Do-As-I-Do- scenario (Custance, 1994;
Custance et al., 1995) and immediate spontaneous imitation of problem-solving
actions on a novel object (Whiten et al., 1996). Both of these paradigms had been
designed and tested for use with non-human primates and normal preschool children.
The present study also tests deferred spontaneous imitation of actions on a novel
object, something not before attempted with autistic children and adults. Chapter 6
will illustrate the developmental pattern of the ability to imitate, looking at the
relationships between age and imitation and between the different types of imitation.
Rogers and Pennington (1991) suggested a relationship between imitation,
emotion sharing, pretend play and "theory of mind". Chapter Seven presents an
investigation of play, of all types, but concentrating on symbolic play and the
relationships between symbolic play and imitation. Chapter Eight presents
experiments on mental state understanding using behaviours which have been
presented as existing along the continuum of a developing "Theory of Mind" -
emotion perception, visual perspective-taking, joint attention and false-belief
(Hobson, 1993). This chapter analyses the links between imitation and
understanding mental states by using individual profiles for the autistic children and
adults used for all stages of this study. The concluding chapter summarises the
findings from the perspective of both theoretical implications, implications for future
research, and possible important implications for early interventions, both at home
and in an educational environment.
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Part 1
The Nature of Autism —
The following long quotation is a series of extracts from the first ever description of
an autistic child, by Leo Kanner in 1943. The information presented here came from
Kalmer's own observations of the child and from observations by the parents.
Donald T. was one of eleven children described in this seminal paper and as I go
through this thesis I will draw on Kanner's descriptions to illustrate the main
diagnostic criteria and thus the deficits in autism, as well as how the disorder
develops with age.
"Donald T. was first seen in October, 1938, at the age of five years 	 At the age of
1 year "he could hum and sing many tunes accurately." Before he was 2 years old, he
had "an unusual memory for faces and names, knew the names of a great number of
houses" in his town.. .He became interested in pictures "and very soon knew an
inordinate number of the pictures in a set of Compton 's Encyclopedia." ...It was
observed at an early time that he was happiest when left alone, almost never cried to go
with his mother, did not seem to notice his father's homecomings, and was indifferent to
visiting relatives... "he seems almost to draw into his shell and live within himself' 	 In
his second year, he "developed a mania for spinning blocks and pans and other round
objects". At the same time, he had "a dislike for self-propelling vehicles, such as Taylor-
tots, tricycles and swings.. .He was always constantly happy and busy entertaining
himself, but resented being urged to play with certain things".
When interfered with, he had temper tantrums, during which he was destructive. He
was "dreadfully fearful of being spanked or switched" but "could not associate his
conduct with his punishment"
There was a marked limitation of spontaneous activity. He wandered about smiling,
making stereotyped movements with his fingers, crossing them about in the air. He
shook his head from side to side, whispering or humming the same three-note tune, he
spun with great pleasure anything he could seize upon to spin. He kept throwing things
on the floor, seeming to delight in the sounds they made 	 He arranged beads, sticks or
blocks in groups of differing series of colours 	 Most of his actions were
repetitious 	 If he spun a block, he must always start with the same face uppermost.
When he threaded buttons, he arranged them in a certain sequence that had no pattern to
it but happened to be the order used by the father when he had first shown them to
Donald.
He used the person pronouns for the person he was quoting, even imitating the
intonation. 	 Words to him had a specifically literal, inflexible meaning. He seemed
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unable to generalise, to transfer an expression to another similar object or situation. if he
did so occasionally, it was a substitution, which then "stood" definitely for the original
meaning
He paid no attention to the person's around him. When taken into a room, he
completely disregarded the people and went for objects, preferably those that could be
spun.. .He was never angry at the interfering person. he angrily shoved away the hand
that was in his way 	 If a child took a toy from him, he passively permitted it....
After his return home, the mother sent periodic reports about his development. ..He
could spend hours writing on the blackboard. His play became more imaginative and
varied, though quite ritualistic... .his attention and concentration were improved. He was
in better contact with his environment, and there were some direct reactions towards
people and situations. He showed disappointment when thwarted, demanded bribes
promised to him, gave evidence of pleasure when praised 	
"He is becoming resourceful, builds things with his bricks, dramatises stories,
attempts to wash the car, waters the flowers with the hose, plays store with the grocery
supply, tries to cut out pictures with the scissors. Numbers still have a great attraction for
him. While his play is definitely improving, he has never asked questions about people
and shows no interest in our conversation.. ..The first day (at school) was very trying for
them but each succeeding day he has improved very much. Don is much more
independent, wants to do many things for himself. He marches in line nicely, answers
when called upon, and is more bidable and obedient. He never voluntarily relates any of
his experiences at school and never objects to going..."
Donald was brought for another check-up in April 1941.. ..Once inside, he did not
even glance at the three physicians present but immediately made for the desk and
handled the papers and books 	 He used pronouns adequately and his sentences were
grammatically correct. The major part of his conversation consisted of questions of an
obsessive nature
He was still extremely autistic. His relation to people had developed only in so far as
he addressed them when he needed or wanted to know something. He never looked at
the person while talking and did not use communicative gestures. Even this type of
contact ceased the moment he was told or received what he had asked for...
A letter from his mother stated in ..1942: "....His literal-mindedness is still very
marked, he wants to spell words as the sound and to pronounce letters consistently.. .He
really enjoys the movies now but not with any idea of a connected story. He remembers
them in the order in which he sees them." ..."(Kanner, 1943)
Although not described clinically until 1943, autism is thought to have existed
throughout history. Frith (1989) and Happe (1994) offer historical accounts that
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point to the possible existence of autism for many centuries, such as stories of feral
children and wild boys. The cause of this developmental disorder, which is not
usually diagnosed until well into childhood, remains much of an enigma. Although
Kanner first proposed that the underlying cause was an "innate inability to form the
usual, biologically provided affective contact with people", his comment that the
parents of these children tended not to be warm-hearted, prompted some researchers
to propose that "refrigerator mothers" or bad parenting were the cause of autism
(Bettleheim, 1956, 1957). However, recent decades have seen an increase in
neuropsychological and genetic research and it is now universally agreed that the
cause is biological in nature (Rutter, 1991; Rutter et al., 1994; Morton, 1989; Frith et
al., 1991). There are still many suggestions as to the exact nature of these biological
causes and how they may be triggered: these suggestions are discussed more later.
There are three levels at which one can consider the disorder of autism (Happe,
1994) - the biological level, the behavioural level and the level that most researchers
in the area propose falls between the two - the cognitive level. This thesis will deal
with each in turn, and in doing so, introduce the possible causes of autism and the
criteria by which this disorder is diagnosed.
The Biological level.
"The organic basis of autism is no longer in dispute and is a matter of
common consent" (Rutter et al., 1994)
Although it is widely agreed that the cause of autism is biological, there is still
much controversy about what causes autism. It has seemed impossible to track down
any one particular cause. One problem is that there is such a high association
between autism and learning difficulties that it is difficult to say whether any
neurological abnormalities found are the result or cause of autism or of the
associated mental retardation. Secondly, autism seems to exist on a continuum
(Wing, 1970) with various degrees of severity, as well as various degrees of
association with mental retardation, discussed further in the next section. Thirdly,
autism is not reliably associated with any known medical disorder, as was once
thought (Rutter et al., 1994). Even perinatal problems, once thought to be quite
strongly associated with autism, are not involved in many autistic births. Rutter et al.
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(1994) conclude that there are definitely brain abnormalities in autism but very few
relate to known problems and if they do there is little c—onsistency. Those disorders
which on occasion accompany autism, include tuberous sclerosis, congenital rubella,
infantile spasms and epilepsy, phenylketonuria and Fragile X syndrome. Cerebral
Palsy and Down's Syndrome are very rarely associated with autism, which is why
the latter children make such a convenient control group for experiments.
Despite these difficulties researchers have come up with several possibilities
for the biological causes of autism.
a) Genetic: Evidence that autism is genetic is reviewed in many of the recent
text books and papers on autism (Happe, 1994; Rutter, 1991; Rutter, 1990) so only a
few of the most important findings will be presented here. In his original paper
(1943), Kanner went to great lengths to describe the background of each of his
children, including the anti-social nature or "oddness" of one or both of each child's
parents. Although he stated that the parent's nature may contribute to the disorder in
the child, he may have been hinting at the genetic nature of a disorder which he
proposed was caused by an "innate" inability to form normal affective relations with
people.
More recently, Rutter (1968) reported that 1 in every 50 siblings of autistic
children showed the autistic syndrome. Although this does not seem a very high
figure, it is much higher than in the general population and the figure is higher still
for monozygotic twins. In a later study, Rutter et al. (1990) discovered that 15-20%
of siblings of autistic children tend to have some cognitive and social disabilities,
even if not fully autistic. This compares to only 3-10% of children with Downs
Syndrome. One interesting point, important for any work on the biological nature of
autism, is that there is less concurrence of autism or social/cognitive abnormalities in
siblings of autistic children with normal nonverbal IQ, compared to the siblings of
those autistic children with lower IQs.
b) Neurochemical abnormalities: Studies on neurochemical causes have
pointed to increased levels of 5-HT or seratonin and abnormalities in dopaminergic
systems but relatively little work has been carried out in this area (see Volkmar and
Anderson, 1989 for a review). Further replication is needed to establish whether
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there is any reliable, autism specific association between these abnormalities and the
disorder itself.
c)  Brain structure abnormalities: It has been suggested that there is a "final
common pathway" in autism, and that this pathway arises from different biological
causes. Over the past few decades, several sites in the brain have been offered as the
origins of autism. These include the cerebellum, basal ganglia and limbic system, the
frontal lobes, and the brain stem and central nervous system. (Courchesne et al.,
1987, 1988; Rutter, 1990). However, CT, MRI or PET scans, neuropsychological
test batteries and autopsy studies have all been hard to replicate and as yet there is no
reliable evidence as to the nature of this final pathway (See Happe, 1994; Rutter,
1991).
Although hard evidence for the exact nature of the biological cause of autism
is not yet available, it is widely believed that there is one final common pathway.
This common pathway may be affected by many different biological causes,
including brain damage caused by perinatal problems, neurochemical abnormalities
or genetic abnormalities. There may be many other causes of which we are not yet
aware. Aitken (1991) suggests that it is the timing of the disruption to neurogenesis
which results in autism, whatever underlying pathology is responsible. The point
where development stops could dictate the exact nature of the symptoms seen in
each autistic child. This common pathway in autism leads to what I shall call a
cognitive deficit, for sake of argument, although I stress that this cognitive deficit
can be described in may different terms, such as a metarepresentational deficit (e.g.
Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985), an executive function deficit (e.g. Ozonoff &
McEvoy, 1994) or an intersubjectivity/affective deficit (e.g. Hobson, 1993; Rogers
& Pennington, 1991). Not only is the biological disorder still under investigation but
the underling cognitive problem, arising from this impaired biological pathway, is
still the subject of much debate. Before dealing with the current theories of autism it
is necessary to look at the nature of autism in more detail and I now turn to examine
autism at the behavioural level.
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The Behavioural level.
Before going on to the details of the behavioural aeficits of autism, on which
the disorder is diagnosed, some background statistics provide helpful context. The
prevalence of autism as assessed by various studies worldwide, is generally viewed
to be between 4 and 5 children per every 10,000 (Frith, 1989). One of the first
studies done on this was by Lotter in 1966 and this study put the incidence at
between 2 and 4 per 10,000. If milder cases of autism are included (see below, Wing
& Gould, 1979) the incidence rises. More boys are diagnosed autistic than girls
(approximately 3:1), although once again this difference lessens when milder cases
are taken into account (Frith, 1989).
Diagnosis is normally made on the basis of such aids as the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual (American Psychiatric Association), the Childhood Autism
Rating Scale (Schopler et al., 1988), or Wing's Triad of Impairments (Wing &
Gould, 1979). All of them, however, are based quite closely on Kanner's original
descriptions. From his clinical records, Kanner identified the following criteria,
which he saw as playing a large part in the cases he described:
a) inability to relate themselves in the ordinary way to people and situations,
resulting in autistic aloneness
b) some delay in speech acquisition
c) excellent rote memory
d) delayed echolalia
e) literalness
0 pronoun reversal
g) problems with feeding
h) abnormal reaction to loud noises and moving objects
i) repetitious actions and utterances
j) anxious obsessive desire for the maintenance of sameness
k) limitation in the variety of spontaneous activity
1) good relation to objects
m) poor relations with people
n) good cognitive potential (impression of serious-mindedness)
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o) physically normal
p) highly intelligent families, of upper middle class backgrounds.
Although some of these features are no longer associated with autism, what is
known as classic autism (See Table 1.1 below) is diagnosed by most of the features
described by Kanner. These have been summarised into three categories: 1) an
autistic aloneness; 2) an impairment in verbal and non-verbal communication and in
imaginative activity and 3) an insistence on sameness. It is now known that autism
can affect children from families of all backgrounds and intelligence and that the
children themselves are rarely without mental retardation. However, although not a
diagnostic criterion, many teachers and parents remark that they are sure their
autistic child is much more intelligent than he/she first appears. This is reflected in
Kanner's observations that the children observed had good cognitive potential. This
in turn reflects two things which we now know about autism - the non-verbal IQ is
usually higher than their verbal IQ and some autistic children do have "islets of
ability", usually of a spatial or mathematical nature, and involving an abnormally
good memory. Although all of Kanner's children seemed to have some sort of islet
of ability, it is not a necessary criterion for autism. Finally, his observations on
feeding are also coincidental in this group, and this is not now one of the diagnostic
criteria of autism.
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Table 1.1: Summary of DSM -III -R Criteria for Autism (1987):
-
A) a qualitative impairment in reciprocal interaction as manifested by the following:
1) marked lack of awareness of the existence or feelings of others;
2) no or abnormal seeking of comfort in times of distress;
3) no or impaired imitation;
4) no or abnormal social play;
5) gross impairment in the ability to make peer friendships.
B) a qualitative impairment in verbal and non-verbal communication and in
imaginative activity as manifested by the following:
1) no mode of communication, such as communicative babbling, facial expression,
gesture, mime or spoken language;
2) markedly abnormal non-verbal communication, as in the use of eye-to-eye gaze,
facial expression, body posture, or gestures to initiate or modulate social interaction;
3) absence of imaginative activity, such as play-acting of adult roles, fantasy
characters, or animals; lack of interest in stories about imaginary events;
4) marked abnormalities in the production of speech, including volume, pitch, stress,
rate, rhythm, and intonation;
5) marked abnormalities in the from or content of speech, including stereotyped and
repetitive use of speech;
6) marked impairment in the ability to initiate or sustain a conversation with others,
despite adequate speech.
C) Markedly restricted repertoire of activities and interests, as manifested by the
following:
1) stereotyped body movements;
2) persistent preoccupation with parts of objects or attachment to unusual objects;
3) marked distress over changes in trivial aspects of environment;
4) unreasonable insistence on following routines in precise detail;
5) markedly restricted range of interests and a preoccupation with one narrow
interest.
The diagnosis was widened somewhat from the classic autism described above
by Wing and Gould (1979) and Wing (1988). These studies introduced what are now
called the Triad of Impairments and the autistic continuum. The triad of impairments
are basically the same as suggested by Kanner but have been shown to really be a
triad, in that they tend to exist together in autism (Wing and Gould, 1979). They are
impairments in : 1) socialization, not just in the frequency of social interaction but in
the social skills that most of us acquire early in life; 2) communication, both verbal
and non-verbal - autistic children show severe pragmatic difficulties with language,
including as Kanner reported, echolalia, pronoun reversal, a very literal
comprehension, and a lack of mental state terms in speech (Baron-Cohen, 1988;
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Tager-Flusberg, 1981; Tager-Fusberg and Sullivan, 1994); and 3) imagination,
specifically in pretend play, creativity and other syinbolic abilities, with an
abnormally high frequency of repetitive, obsessional and stereotypic behaviours.
Looking back to Kanner's description of Donald, we can identify examples of most
of these impairments, just as for Kanner's three categories. More details of the
deficits in each aspect of the triad relevant to this thesis, will be given throughout the
remainder of the Introduction. The triad of impairments can occur at differing
degrees of severity along a continuum, from the child who might not be diagnosed
as autistic on the DSM-III-R below', but who still shows problems on each aspect of
the triad, to the child with classic autism as described by Kanner, to the very-high
functioning child, sometimes referred to as having Asperger's syndrome (See
Happe, 1994 for review on Asperger's). If the triad of impairments is used as a
diagnostic criterion, so that mild as well as classic types of autism are included, the
incidence in the population rises to approximately 20 in every 10,000 (Wing and
Gould, 1989).
Parallel to the autistic continuum runs the learning disability' continuum and
autistic children and adults can be described at different points along both continua.
Approximately 70 % of autistic children and adults have an IQ below 70, another
15% have an IQ above 70% but still below the average IQ (Frith, 1989 p54). These
figures have varied from study to study, with the highest figure for normal IQ being
33% of the sample. Almost every study has found that autistic children tend to have
a higher non-verbal, performance IQ than verbal IQ, which leads to the perception
that they might be more intelligent than the tests state, and to their generally good
spatial skills and performance on tests such as Block Design on the WISC test.
This was the current version of the DSM at the beginning of this thesis and it was what was used to
design the questionnaire described in Chapter 2. Since then a new version has been published - the
DSM-IV (1994). Very little has changed in the new version except for some rewording and the fact
that a deficit in imitation is no longer mentioned. This in itself makes this project of additional
interest for the diagnosis of autism.
2 Throughout this thesis I will use the term "learning disability" rather than "mental retardation" as
this is now generally accepted practice in the UK. For those readers who are not British, please note
that "learning disabilities" does not equate with learning difficulties such as dyslexia or attention
deficit disorder.
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Finally, in this section it is necessary to consider the timing of the diagnosis
of autism, this develomental disorder that changes but neVer disappears as the child
grows up. Although it is generally assumed that autism is present from conception,
diagnosis cannot be made reliably before 30 months of age. Until recently, many
autistic children were not diagnosed until much later, but onset of the symptoms had
been before 30 months of age. A recent study by Baron-Cohen et al. (1992) found
that certain developmental markers, such as pointing and pretend play, could be
reliably used to diagnose autism at 18 months of age, but this is not yet used in a
clinical diagnosis. Researchers are still searching for a way of diagnosing autism
earlier, and although this study is not investigating diagnosis per se, it is possible
that the use of imitation tasks in infancy may lead to an earlier diagnosis of autism or
at least to predict the possibility of autism and allow for closer monitoring of
children and earlier intervention.
The Cognitive level.
Like the biological level, there is still much debate about the primary cognitive
deficit in autism. All the theories I will present below try to offer an explanation for
the link between the still unknown biological deficit and the behavioural deficits
described above. However, although they concern themselves with each part of
Wing's Triad of Impairments, it must be noted that few theories offer satisfactory
explanations for some puzzling aspects of autism - why some have islets of ability,
while others don't, and why many have such an "insistence on sameness", to use
Kanner's term, and an obsession with stereotyped movements.
However, before moving on to consider the various theories, I will review the
type of cognitive skills that are absent and the ones that remain intact in autism.
Sigman, Ungerer, Mundy and Sherman (1989) report that discriminative learning
and short-term memory skills are not pathogenic with respect to autism. These skills
are only limited by the use of symbolic material. Some studies have found deficits in
sequencing and in cross modal transfer, but others have not. On performance IQ
tests, autistic children have deficits in cognitive processes and in stored knowledge
subtests, but these are mostly problems in the verbal domain. On verbal subtests
autistic children score best on digit span and worst on comprehension. But the
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problem is not just with language, because dysphasic children do better on three of
the verbal scales than autistic children. Autistic children do best on Block Design
subtests, better than all other performance scales. There are few specific deficits in
terms of spatial performance, perceptual organization and attentional short-term
memory. Object permanence is not impaired, relative to mental age (MA) matched
controls, nor are most other sensori-motor skills. So these cognitive difficulties are
not specific to autism but a result of the mental retardation accompanying the
autism.
Other developmental cognitive capacities, such as play, are often impaired in
autism. For example, work by Sigman and Ungerer (1984) and Ungerer and Sigman
(1981) showed that when autistic children were observed in an unstructured setting
they produced a range of behaviours from manipulative through to a few examples
of symbolic play. However, while the non-autistic children spent longer in
functional and symbolic play than other types, the autistic children spent equal
amounts of time in manipulative, relational and functional play and less time in
symbolic play. As we saw in the case described by Kanner, autistic children's' play
often consists of repetitive, obsessional use of toys but functional play can improve
with age. Other studies on the nature of play in autistic children will be described in
a later section.
Finally, categorization and classification of objects do not provide many
problems for autistic children (Sigman et al., 1989). The authors conclude that the
areas of cognitive development in which deficits were observed all involved early
forms of symbol use and social involvement. The main problems seen in autism are
with knowledge of other people and social communication and language problems.
For the most part knowledge of self remains intact.
Theories ofAutism
There are two main sets of theories which attempt to pin down the primary
"cognitive" deficit which links the biological deficit to the behavioural symptoms of
autism. These are the intersubjectivity theories such as that of Hobson (1986a) and
Rogers and Pennington (1991) and the "cognitive" theories such as the
metarepresentational theory of Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985). Within these
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two sets there are many variations, but within the scope of this thesis it would be
impossible to describe them all. For this thesis I shall creal with just three in any
detail, although I shall mention other important theories in passing. It must be borne
in mind that the theories presented here are not only theories of autism, but also
theories which refer to normal development. I shall concentrate on the theory of
Rogers and Pennington (1991) as this is the theoretical basis for this thesis.
However, it is necessary to first present the two main theories that preceded Rogers
and Pennington. In fact, Rogers and Pennington in essence combined the
Metarepresentation hypothesis of Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) and the Affective
hypothesis of Hobson (1986a) and added the new dimension of a deficit in imitation.
Although many theories of autism only attempt to explain certain aspects of autism,
all of them have been useful in inspiring continued research into autism and thus
increasing our knowledge, if not yet real understanding of this disorder.
a) The Metarepresentational hypothesis:
This theory is perhaps the best known theory of autism and it is usually called
the Metarepresentational theory or Theory of Mind theory, first proposed by Baron-
Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985). Many of the theories that followed arose in response
to this theory which was based on a relatively newly-studied area of normal
development. The term "theory of mind" was first coined by Premack and Woodruff
(1978), who were studying the mental life of non-human primates, specifically of a
chimpanzee called Sarah. It referred to the ability to impute mental states to others
and to predict their behaviour on this basis. The research on animal theory of mind
(ToM) is far too extensive to include here but useful overviews can be found in
Byrne & Whiten (1988), Whiten (1991, 1993, in press), and Byrne (1995). To return
to the child literature, Frith (1989) explained theory of mind as a tool which provides
us with the ability to mentalise, that is, to predict relationships between external
states of affairs and internal states of mind. Perner and Ogden (1988) suggested that
what distinguishes mental states from other internal states was their "intentionality"
or "aboutness": when you think, you think about something, e.g., you think that
there is a ball in the box.
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Many other terms are used interchangeably with ToM - mindreading,
understanding mental states, mentalising, are just a few examples (see Whiten (1991;
1994) for many more examples). I will use the term "mental state understanding" to
include Theory of Mind in the conventional sense as defined by Premack and
Woodruff (1978) and as referred to by Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) but I will also
include in this category some of the abilities seen as precursors to a Theory of Mind
in the narrower sense, such as visual perspective-taking, joint attention and
recognition of emotional states. Dunn (1990) describes the normal development of a
Theory of Mind, and includes behaviours which will be focused on in this study,
such as joint attention and pointing, joking (verbally and non-verbally), teasing,
pretend play, social pretend play, empathy, talking about mental states, and
manipulating others' mental states by lying or deception.
Studies on what can be viewed as one of the most complicated skills of a
theory of mind - recognising false-belief, began in 1983 with Wimmer and Perner,
who designed false-belief tasks which have been used and adapted ever since. They
discovered that normal three year old children could not predict another person's
behaviour on the basis of a simple, first-order false-belief but four year olds could.
Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) tested autistic children of a mental age
above four years on a false-belief test and found that 80% of children failed (More
details of the tasks will be given later). They proposed that autistic children had an
impaired meta-representational capacity, that is, they could not hold a representation
of a representation. Metarepresentation is made possible by what Leslie (1987) calls
a "decoupling" mechanism. (For detailed reviews, see Frith (1989), Happe (1994)
and Hobson (1993), as well as Leslie (1987) and Leslie and Frith (1987)). The
metarepresentational theory was designed to explain both pretense and Theory of
Mind deficits in autism. The mechanism can be broken down into three parts, the
main one being the decoupling process whereby a primary representation - for
example, the cup is empty is decoupled from reality, as if in quotation and in
pretense can become "the cup is full" - the secondary or meta-representation -
accompanied by a mental state qualifier - I think or I pretend "the cup is full". This
can be extended to include another person's mental state or pretend action - John
thinks "the cup is full" and that is why he is lifting it to his lips. Obviously further
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recursions can be added for second- and third-order mental state attribution: e.g.
Mary thinks that John believes that the ice-cream van is At the park, which is why
she goes to the park to find John.
Since 1985 many studies have reported similar findings on false-belief tasks
although the percentage of children passing and failing varies from study to study.
These are reviewed in detail a little later. It was proposed that this problem with
false-belief was specific to autism (Baron-Cohen, 1991) yet there was a small
percentage of autistic children who passed false-belief tests on each occasion. A
more complicated, second-order false-belief task tended to eliminate this ability to
pass in most studies (Baron-Cohen, 1989). However, some studies still have able
autistic subjects passing even the most complicated false-belief tasks (Bowler, 1992;
Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994). These later studies found that although able
autistic and Asperger's subjects could pass false-belief, they could not give
mentalistic justifications for their answers. Other studies have found that autistic
children can give good mechanical explanations for stories or events but also give a
mechanical explanation when a mentalistic explanation is most appropriate (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1986). Baron-Cohen (1989) proposed that autistic children have a
Theory of Behaviour rather than a Theory of Mind and this thought has been echoed
by other researchers but in slightly different terms, for example Perner (1993)
suggests that autistic children are "situation theorists", who don't graduate to
become "representational theorists".
It is generally accepted that autistic children have a problem with
understanding mental states, but how this arises is still under much debate, and I
shall introduce some opposing theories shortly. However, before moving away from
Baron-Cohen et al.'s theory it is important to point out that it is a decade old now
and although the mentalising deficit is still seen as the core deficit which explains
most of the behaviours seen or absent in autism, the researchers' own views have
changed somewhat. For example, Baron-Cohen (1994) has recently published some
new ideas on the origins of the Theory of Mind deficit, which he suggested lies
much further back in development with the ability to read eye gaze. Autistic children
are not impaired on visual perspective taking as such (Baron-Cohen, 1989, 1991;
Hobson, 1984; Leekam et al. 1993; Tan and Harris, 1991), but they are impaired on
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reading the mental significance of eye gaze - i.e. they are impaired in inferring
thoughts, desires, references and goals from the eyes (Baron-Cohen, in press).
Baron-Cohen (1994) suggested that four mechanisms are normally in place - Eye
Direction Detector (EDD), the Intentionality Detector, (ID), the Shared Attention
Mechanism (SAM) and the Theory of Mind Mechanism (ToMM) - although he
stresses in his reply to the commentaries that some stages can be bypassed (for
example, blind children, who obviously cannot have an EDD in place but yet can
still have the Theory of Mind Mechanism (ToMM)). Normally, EDD comes first in
the Mindreading system, to detect the presence of eyes and to detect eye behaviour,
such as movement. Parallel to EDD works ID, which interprets behaviour in terms of
goals and desires, or volitional states. These two mechanisms feed SAM, the Shared
Attention Mechanism (joint attention) which in turn feeds ToMM and the
mentalising capacity of the child. SAM is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
the development of ToMM. In autism the halt in development can occur at two
points - either SAM develops and ToMM does not, or SAM does not develop at all.
The former is the most uncommon and such autistic children have not been much
investigated; the latter is the type of autistic child most commonly studied. This
theory is still in its infancy but much interesting discussion has arisen from it. Where
and how exactly the deficit in autism disrupts the development of SAM is not
altogether clear but there is potential for much future research based on this model.
b) Other "cognitive" theories
There have been many other theories which have attempted to explain both the
social and non-social deficits of autism. Theories such as the joint attention theory
(Sigman et al., 1986), the arousal theory (Rimland, 1964; Hutt, 1965) and the central
coherence theory (Frith, 1989; Happe, 1994) are described in Happe (1994). For the
purpose of this thesis, however, I will present only a few of the other theories of
autism.
There are several other theories based on mentalising deficits but offering
different versions of the theory to that offered by Baron-Cohen et al. (1985; Leslie,
1987; Baron-Cohen, 1994). For example, Perner (1993) took issue with Leslie's use
of the term "metarepresentation" - which has become much broader than initially
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defined by Pylyshyn (1978), where representation refers to the representational
medium, not to the representational content, as it does in Leslie's theory. Pemer,
however, agreed that autistic children are impaired in their Theory of Mind but
suggested that it may not be because they lack the decoupling process: instead, they
may possess all the elements of a Theory of Mind but cannot combine them as easily
as normal children can. He suggested that autistic children are "situation theorists",
as young children are before they become "representational theorists" - that is, they
have some understanding of, but do not completely differentiate, between the
representational medium, e.g. a photo, and the representational content, someone in
the photo wearing a blue dress. Their situation theory may be more sophisticated
than young children's, as they can pass tasks like Zaitchik's photo task (Leekam and
Pemer, 1991), which requires the child to understand that what a photo represents is
not necessarily a true representation of reality, but they cannot extend the
information, which they can say the camera has seen, to another person's mental
representation.
Another approach which is not necessarily contradictory to Leslie' theory is that
of Harris (1990). Harris proposed that the lack of an understanding of psychological
states, which he admitted might play an important part in the autistic disorder, is not
a problem of failing to acquire a Theory of Mind but is instead the result of a failure
to engage in an increasingly complex process of "simulation" or imagination. He
suggested that the autistic child's impoverished pretend play results from a problem
with overriding external or habitual control, and thus they have a problem planning
actions and responses, and in essence an executive function deficit.
Rogers and McEvoy (1993) when testing able autistic children and young adults
for imitation, found that they were also impaired on "executive function" tasks.
Executive functions are described (Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994) as the cognitive
operations thought to be driven by prefrontal cortex, including planning, inhibition,
flexibility and working memory. Tests such as the Wisconsin Card sorting task and
the Tower of Hanoi tasks are examples of tests of executive function. Hughes and
Russell (1993) proposed that the difficulties faced by autistic children in false-belief
tasks are indicative of a deficit in mental disengagement from an object, rather than a
problem with Theory of Mind and metarepresentations. They offer their results as
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support for a primary deficit in executive functions, which explains both the social
and the non-social deficits seen in autism. Other studres have also found that autistic
children and adults are deficient relative to controls on executive function tasks
(Ozonoff, Pennington and Rogers, 1991). Jarrold, Boucher and Smith (1994) found
that executive function capacities involved in pretend play were not affected in
autism. However, Ozonoff et al. (1994) found that autistic subjects had problems
with cognitive flexibility, which would go a long way towards explaining the
perseverative and obsessional behaviour often seen in autism. This ability to explain
many of the behaviours normally not explained by a Theory of Mind hypothesis,
makes the executive function hypothesis particularly attractive. Ozonoff and
McEvoy (1994) found that Theory of Mind and executive function followed a
similar pattern of development in autism and they concluded that rather than being
independent modules of cognition, they may be related and interdependent and
therefore when lacking, both affect development to produce the deficits seen in
autism.
c) The Affective Hypothesis.
Hobson's theory has sometimes been called the "Affective" Theory (Baron-
Cohen, 1988) in order to contrast it to the "Cognitive" Theory of Baron-Cohen et al.
(1985). I shall continue to use this term here to differentiate it from the
Intersubjectivity theory of Rogers and Pennington. It is, however, a theory
concerning the absence of the ability to form intersubjective relations in autism. I
cannot possibly attempt to do justice to this theory in the scope of this introduction
and I would advise readers to read Hobson (1993) for an interesting and in-depth
discussion of his and other theories of autism. However, I will try to summarise what
I see as the most important aspects of this theory with regard to this thesis. The very
premise of Hobson's theory was based on the original observation by Kanner (1943)
that the children he had observed lacked the innate ability to interact emotionally
with others. Intersubjective or interpersonal communication is widely believed to be
the most formative influence in an infant's life and it begins the moment he/she is
born. Many researchers (especially Trevarthen, 1979 and Hobson, 1986a, 1986b,
1993) believe that interpersonal relatedness is emotionally mediated and if this
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ability to establish interpersonal relatedness is disrupted by autism, one can see how
many of the social and language difficulties could arise. The best way to summarise
Hobson's theory is to quote what he himself says:
"There are many levels of interpersonal understanding. I shall be arguing that the very
concept of "persons" with minds is founded upon preconceptual forms of awareness that
people are different from things in affording intersubjective contact 	 infants are
biologically "prewired" to relate to people in ways that are special to people, and that it is
through the experience of reciprocal, affectively patterned interpersonal contact that a
young child comes to apprehend and eventually to conceptualise the nature of persons
with a mental life". (Hobson, 1993 p104)
Hobson supported his theory by a plethora of evidence ranging from pronoun
reversal to emotion perception, the latter being the most researched. Autistic children
are generally known to not express themselves emotionally in the same way as
normal children. When they do produce emotionally charged reactions they are often
inappropriate or incomprehensible. Hobson has shown that autistic subjects have
problems recognizing emotions from facial expressions, sounds, gestures and body
postures, but few problems recognizing non-emotionally charged stimuli (1986a and
b; 1991). Some researchers have found similar results on emotion recognition and
sharing (Mundy, Sigman, Ungerer and Sherman, 1986; Snow, Hertzig and Shapiro,
1987; Weeks and Hobson, 1987; Hobson, Ouston and Lee, 1988 and 1989; and
Ozonoff, Pennington and Rogers, 1991) while others have not been able to replicate
the results (Prior et al., 1990). More details on emotion recognition will be given
later in the Introduction.
With regard to other aspects of interpersonal understanding, Hobson suggested
that by the end of the first year of life, children have grasped not only that people are
beings with whom affective experiences can be shared, implying that there exists a
basis for commonality between self and others, but also that people are differentiated
from the self in their attitudes vis-à-vis the world. They can register emotional
meanings and "subjective background" to bodily expressions of other people; they
can perceive the directness of another person's psychological attitudes; they can
relate to the same things and events as does their care-giver, as shared things or
events, but are aware that others can have different "attitudes" to the same event; and
a child can identify with another person and assume as well as respond to the other's
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attitude. These abilities set the scene for reflective self-awareness and eventually not
just other person awareness but other "mind" awaren g-s. By the end of the second
year or so a child can understand that another person represents something as
frightening, for example, but still does not understand that a person holds a
representation to be a representation of reality (i.e. as being true), important to an
understanding of knowledge, belief and false-belief. Before the child can have this
advanced stage of "theory of mind", Hobson suggests that she must, first of all, grasp
that if an individual has a true version of reality then they will act appropriately; if
they have a false version they will act inappropriately. Secondly, she must grasp that
truth corresponds with what anyone would give as a description of a state of affairs,
if that person were in an appropriate position to pass judgment, e.g. had seen what
had happened.
Hobson suggested that autism is a severe disturbance in intersubjective
personal engagement with others but that the homogeneity and depth of this affective
disability may not be universal. He proposed that "they are relatively successful in
following the I-It (i.e. self/object) developmental pathway, and they can even respond
to aspects of people when such exchanges are not intrinsically "intersubjective" in
nature. It is especially in I-Thou interpersonal relatedness that we find the
abnormalities characteristic of "autism"....". (page 197). One criticism that has been
levied at Hobson's theory is that some autistic children seem to develop normally in
early childhood and abnormalities have not been picked up until 18 months of age,
when there is a lack of pretend play and joint attention behaviours, both precursors to
a Theory of Mind in Baron-Cohen et al.'s (1985) theory (Happe, 1994). Of course,
the difficulty in testing Hobson's theory is that autism can still only be diagnosed
reliably at 18 months at the earliest. One piece of evidence that autistic children do
not show some of the very early emerging social behaviours when their MA suggests
that they should show these behaviours, comes from a paper by Klin, Volkmar and
Sparrow (1992). They tested 29 children with autism with a CA below seven years
(mean 4.31) and a mean MA of less than 2 years, on the first twenty items of the
Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scales, examining interpersonal relationships and play
and leisure time activities. They found that nine of the twenty items clearly
differentiated autistic from non-autistic children (p<0.01) and suggested that autistic
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children are severely impaired in many of the early emerging social behaviours.
These included: anticipation of being picked up; affection towards familiar people;
interest in other children; other than siblings; reaching for familiar people; engaging
in simple interaction games; interest in the activities of others; imitation of simple
adult movements; laughing or smiling appropriately in response to positive
statements; and addressing at least two familiar people by name.
d) The Intersubjectivity Theory
Finally, I move on to present Rogers and Pennington's (1991) Intersubjectivity
Model of autism. They focus on imitation but combine it with the two theories
already mentioned. The deficit in imitation is the only truly testable aspect of this
theory that really differentiates it from the other two. Rogers and Pennington (1991)
wanted to find a way of looking at autism within the framework of normal
development and chose Stern's (1985) theory of interpersonal development. Rogers
and Pennington chose to focus on imitation as it had the potential to severely disrupt
the normal development of interpersonal skills. However, as in Stern's theory, they
chose to combine imitation with emotion sharing and mental state understanding or
"Theory of Mind", which are the main deficits proposed by Hobson and Baron-
Cohen et al., presented in the previous sections section. Rogers and Pennington
reviewed the literature on social behaviours such as attachment and self/other
recognition, which for the most part are intact in autism and they suggested that
these intact social processes do not require imitation, emotion sharing or awareness
of mental states - three skills that Stern (1985) suggested are essential in normal
interpersonal development.
After a review of the literature on imitation Rogers and Pennington
concluded that there did indeed seem to be evidence of a deficit in imitation in
autism and not just, as Baron-Cohen (1988) had suggested, in higher (symbolic)
imitation but also in simple gestural imitation. There are other studies not reviewed
by Rogers and Pennington which have not found deficits in imitation in autism and
still others that did find a deficit in some aspect of imitation. In general, the picture
of imitation in autism is still rather foggy.
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As we saw in the review of Hobson's (1986) theory, there is evidence for a
deficit in emotion sharing and I shall present more literature in this area. Stern
(1985) linked imitation with the development of affect sharing, affective
communication and affect attunement, while both Stern (1985) and Hobson (1993)
linked the development of affective mutuality with the awareness of other minds.
This leads us to the final part of Rogers and Pennington's review -
metarepresentation, joint attention, language pragmatics and symbolic play, all
aspects of Baron-Cohen et al.'s theory. Rogers and Pennington suggested flaws in
the metarepresentational account of autism, the main two being an inability to
account for early deficits such as the imitation deficit (although it should be
remembered that the evidence presented by Rogers and Pennington (1991) for a
deficit in imitation, is not necessarily evidence of an early deficit) and the proposal
of a sharp discontinuity in the development of a theory of other minds. Other
theories, Stern (1985) in particular, suggest a more continuous developmental
course. Rogers and Pennington stress the need to regard autism as a developmental
disorder and therefore to bear in mind that deficits in specific tasks will not be
constant across development. In fact, they propose that deficits will lessen over time
to different degrees for each individual.
Stern's model of infant development suggested an integration of the affective
and metarepresentational positions along a continuum. Based on Stern's theory of
the emergent self, core self, subjective self, and verbal self, Rogers and Pennington
proposed what they called a cascade model of autism. They proposed that a lack of
certain aspects of interpersonal development at each stage disrupts certain
developments at the next stage. They viewed imitation, emotion sharing and "theory
of mind" as increasingly complex expressions of the ability to form and coordinate
certain representations of self and others and the ability to use those representations
to plan and guide behaviour (Rogers and Pennington's model is represented in
Figure 1 below, along with a representation of the two previous theories of autism).
The final aspect of their theory is a proposal that human infants are biologically
prepared to develop these early social behaviours. This idea is of course in keeping
with Kanner's (1943) original observations and Hobson's (1986 and 1993) theory.
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Imitation
\l/ 
Impaired
Emotion
Sharing
Impaired
Theory of
Mind
Joint attention and
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Figure 2: Current Theories of Autism:
(redrawn from Rogers and Pennington,1991)
1) The Affective Theory (Hobson, 1986)
	
2) The Cognitive Theory (Baron-Cohen et
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A recent paper by Smith and Bryson (1994) offered an alternative explanation
for the deficit of imitation in autism. They suggested that although a deficit in
imitation may be very important in autism, the underlying problem may be non-
social rather than the social/intersubjective deficits proposed by Rogers and
Pennington (1991). Smith and Bryson, in a critical review of the literature on both
imitation and action in autism, proposed that the problem of a deficit in imitation in
autism may be due in part to "an impairment in the perceptual organisation of
movements, manifested in abnormal representation of actions". In other words, a
problem with perceiving how movements are made up and processing that
perception means that the actions are not represented properly and are therefore
reproduced inaccurately. The problem may be more a non-social problem of
information-processing in a social environment which affects the social skills
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including imitation in children with autism. This type of view explaining both the
social and non-social deficits is similar to those merftioned earlier such as the
executive function theory (Hughes and Russell, 1993) and the central coherence
theory (Frith, 1992; Happe, 1994).
According to Smith and Bryson, the problem with understanding the role of
imitation in autism is that first of all, the concept of imitation in autism has not been
well defined or described in previous work, in that few studies have manipulated
actions in such a way as to produce a comprehensive picture of imitation in autism
and secondly, that few studies have used adequate controls to show whether any
deficit in imitation is specific to autism. Smith and Bryson's suggestions for future
research are presented in more detail in Part 3 of this Chapter.
However, in order to truly analyse Rogers and Pennington's theory or any other
theory involving imitation, it is essential to consider some of the issues surrounding
the concept of imitation before moving on to the evidence that imitation is lacking in
autistic children. In the next section I will present a brief review of the literature on
the normal development of imitation, and some of the issues involved in defining
imitation, followed by a review of the literature on the existence of a deficit in
imitation in autism.
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Part 2
The nature of imitation. *
Within the realm of child development a definition of imitation is not readily
available. It is in animal research where we find imitation defined, although these
definitions tend to be relatively narrow and restrictive due to the scepticism
surrounding the investigation of "human" behaviours in non-human primates (See
Whiten & Ham (1992), Tomasello et al. (1993), and Whiten and Custance (in press)
for work on non-human imitation). To enable definition, it is essential to examine
how imitation has been viewed and investigated in normal development. Before
presenting the definition that I will use in this thesis, I feel it is essential to examine
some of the other issues surrounding imitation as a concept.
Evidence from the literature on normal development.
For the most part, previous research has dealt with the first 4 years of life and
we know little about what happens as the child develops further and becomes an
adult. Rogers and Pennington predicted that it would be the younger children who
would be most impaired in imitation. However, since this thesis will be examining
older children and adults as well as younger children, it is essential to look at how
imitation develops normally in older people. One theory which did deal with
imitative behaviour in older children and adults was the social learning formulation
of Bandura (for a review see Yando, Seitz and Zigler, 1978). Bandura proposed that,
while witnessing the actions of another person, people build up a mental image of
that scene (acquisition) which can then be retrieved at a later time to aid performance
of the modeled action (imitation), thus increasing social skills, knowledge or other
abilities. However, although this acquisition of a mental photograph is important, it
is not the only factor affecting the imitation of an action. Reward is also very
important. In fact, in his 1977 paper Bandura proposed 4 factors that are important in
acquisition and imitation of a modeled action: attention, retention, motor
reproduction and motivation. I will come back to look at these in the next section on
definition of imitation. Yando et al. (1978) proposed that although Bandura's theory
concentrated on older children and adults, in some ways it could be applied to earlier
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stages of development. The main problem was that Bandura's formulation required
the existence of some very sophisticated cognitive abilities which would probably
not be available to very young children.
Piaget (1962) was probably the first to detail the normal development of
imitation. Piaget followed the development of imitation in his own children just as
he studied sensori-motor development, and other aspects of development. Because
his subject group was so small, it is difficult to accept his theories as definite, and
later studies have somewhat discredited his work on imitation especially concerning
imitation in newborn children (Meltzoff and Moore, 1987; Meltzoff, 1988).
However, it is still important to consider the stages of the development of imitation
that he proposed, even if his timescale may not be correct.
Piaget viewed imitation as an active process, not automatic or non-intentional. It
is a continuation of the effort to accommodate (i.e. modify the internal schemas to fit
a changing cognizance of reality) and part of the child's intelligence. He proposed
that imitative ability develops along the same path as sensori-motor abilities and is
linked to the ability to form representations. At different stages it becomes more
complex and incorporates other abilities. The development of imitation begins with
the reflex action in the first month of life but at this stage are not actually imitation
according to Piaget. From the end of the first month Piaget proposed that children
begin to imitate sporadically. Within this stage Piaget saw three types of vocal
imitation progressing from vocal contagion to mutual imitation of familiar sounds to
sporadic imitation of unfamiliar sounds. For action imitation the beginnings are at
this stage when the child can imitate certain familiar actions of other hands.
Stage 3 of imitation development involves the systematic imitation of sounds
and movements already made and seen by the child. Imitation of facial actions does
not yet occur unless training is provided. This stage emerges around four months of
age. Four to five months later the child progresses to the next stage and begins to
imitate movements not visible to the child but already made by the child. Then, at
about 10-11 months the child starts to attempt to imitate new auditory and visual
stimuli. From one year onwards the child systematically imitates new models
including those movements not visible to the child and as the 2nd year progresses
imitation becomes more accurate. Stage 6, which occurs around 2 years of age, finds
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the child beginning to produce representative imitation and further develops to
imitation after a delay (usually called "deferred imitatio'n"). Although Piaget deals
principally with the first 2 years of life, he does note that from 2 until 7 or 8 years of
age imitation develops further, being used spontaneously and often unconsciously.
Piaget notes that in children from 2 to 7 years old imitation tends to be of a general
nature and there is little attempt to imitate details; they imitate the immediate plan of
actions but are easily satisfied about the details. At about 8 years of age, imitation
becomes deliberate and takes its place in intelligence as a whole and execution
becomes more accurate.
One very influential set of studies on imitation is that of Trevarthen on mother
infant interactions. Trevarthen (1979) suggested that mother-infant imitative
interactions form the basis for the development of affective understanding and
mutuality and also the communication of affect. Much of the child's grasp of
language comes from this interaction as well. Often what is most important at this
stage is the mother's imitation of the child's facial expressions, actions and
vocalizations, as she labels them. Pawlby, in an observational study on imitative
interaction (1977), looked at imitative sequences as one form of communication in
which one of the two partners reproduced the same act as performed by the other
partner. She observed that these sequences could be combined into strings of actions
and imitations and distinguished five main categories of actions - face/head
movements, hand/body movements, speech sounds, non-speech sounds and
manipulation of objects. Speech sounds were, for most partners, the most frequent
type of act imitated; facial actions were least frequently imitated. For a few pairs,
object manipulation was most important. Pawlby commented that this encouraged
turn-taking in the child and that when the child was younger, imitation was
performed more by the mother, but as the child grew older, the frequency of
imitation by the child increased. The importance of the mother/infant imitative
interactions seems to be that the mother is giving the child the ability to associate his
interoceptive information about his own movements with their visual external
representation (Papousek and Papousek, 1977).
In his book on the interpersonal world of the infant, Stern (1985) also suggests a
prominent role of early imitation in the development of affect sharing, affective
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communication and affect attunement. Stern's model for normal development
proposed a relationship between imitation, affect sharing and theory of mind and, as
we have seen, it is on this that Rogers and Pennington (1991) based their model for
the deficits in the development of autistic children.
Although Piaget's views on imitation have much merit, they have since been
discredited to some extent by various studies. Evidence from studies by Meltzoff
(1988), Meltzoff and Moore (1987; 1989), and Kugiumutzakis (1993a and b; in
press) among others (e.g. Abravanel et al., 1976) has shown that new born babies
have the ability to imitate simple body actions and sounds, even when the
demonstrator has stopped modeling. Such imitation includes facial actions such as
tongue protrusion, which Piaget argued was not real imitation but the result of
training. At nine months, infants can demonstrate deferred imitation, i.e. they
reproduced the modeled action at least 24 hours after modeling (Meltzoff, 1988).
This implies that they were able to store the representation of that action and then
reproduce it. Melzoff suggested that imitation in infancy can span wide enough
delays to be of service in social development. Since Piaget, Trevarthen and Stern
there have been many other researchers who have been convinced that imitation
plays an important role in the learning of language, and in the establishment of skills
such as understanding emotions and social skills. Hay, Stimson and Castle (1991)
considered observational learning, modeling and imitation as means by which
children learn to explore the environment around them and to interact socially. They
also suggested that imitation is involved in helping the child understand emotion and
mental states, since mental state terms are used frequently with the child before the
child is verbal.
Tomasello et al. (1993) saw imitative learning as the earliest and most
fundamental stage in the cultural learning process, true imitation appearing around 9
months (the other stages being Instructed and Collaborative learning). Imitative
learning at this stage involves the establishment of object-directed actions and the
use of communicative symbols - i.e. the foundations of language. The social-
cognitive ability displayed at this stage is perspective-taking, for example, joint
attention and social referencing. The child's concept of a person is as an intentional
agent and as such requires only basic ( 0-order) representation. The later stages in
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cultural learning progress from and expand on this initial stage - until children have
grasped this perspective-taking ability they cannot move —on to intersubjectivity or
any concept of a person as a reflective agent as well as a mental one. Tomasello et
al. suggest that autistic children are delayed in the imitative learning stage and
therefore cannot progress to any higher understanding of the social world. Autistic
children do not demonstrate collaborative learning and although they are capable of
learning through instruction, they do not seem to internalise it and then reproduce
that knowledge at a later stage, as normal children do.
Meltzoff & Gopnik (1993) made the role of imitation in infancy more explicit
and suggested what might lie behind such an ability. They argued "that the bedrock
on which a common sense psychology is constructed is the apprehension that others
are similar to the self Infants are launched on their career of interpersonal relations
with the primary perceptual judgment: "Here is something like me". Meltzoff and
Gopnik suggested that this process requires an infant to understand similarities (or
cross modal equivalence) between "body movements-as-felt in the self and body
movements-as-seen in others". This produces the ability to imitate and to understand
being imitated, especially where facial imitation is concerned, since the infant cannot
make a direct visual comparison between their own faces and those of adults, as they
can do with most body movements. Meltzoff and Gopnik argued that early imitation
is relevant to developing "theories of mind" because it provides the infant with the
initial opportunity to make a connection between the visible world of others and its
own internal states, the way they "feel" themselves to be. It also provides a
mechanism for infants to learn about other people and distinguish them from things
since they suggest that the "like me" test for people is that people can be imitated
and can imitate the infant. This concurs with Hobson's theory although the latter
might express it a little differently.
We have already seen evidence from other studies by Meltzoff that infants can
imitate from as early as 12 days old (Meltzoff and Moore 1977). Meltzoff has also
shown than an infant recognises when he/she is being imitated (1990b). Meltzoff
and Gopnik also suggest that as the child gets older, imitation then begins to be used
as a mechanism for learning about how things work before language can be used.
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Finally, the work of Nadel reveals to us a slightly later use for imitation in
children between 2 and 4 years of age as a preverbal medium for (Mertan & Nadel,
1991; Nadel & Fontaine, 1989; Nadel et al., 1988; Nadel, 1986; Mertan et al., 1991;
Nadel-Brulfert & Baudonnier, 1982; Nadel, 1987). In several different experiments
employing basically the same paradigm, Nadel observed pairs or triads of normal
toddlers in a room furnished with 2 or 3 groups of identical objects and a hidden
camera. She found that the most prevalent form of play usually was imitation - if one
child took up a toy, the other(s) generally took up the same toy and did similar
things with the object. She also found that this was accompanied by laughing and
smiling, and often involved one child taking the role of leader (self-elected) and then
waiting on the other child(-ren) to imitate. The role of the leader alternated between
the children at different times in the session.
In summary, imitation plays an important role in early infancy, particularily in
the ability to perspective-take, in the learning of language, in the establishment of
social relationships and the learning of social rules, in the understanding of affect
and mental states, and even in the process of symbolic play. As the child gets older
imitation becomes an important method of communication until superseded by
verbal communication. At this point, at about four years of age, imitation primarily
becomes a learning tool again, used to pick up more social skills and knowledge, as
well as intellectual and practical skills. It then develops with age, becoming more
sophisticated and accurate as the child grows older.
If the autistic child does have a deficit in imitation then the rich learning
experience that the normal infant gains from the imitative interactions with the
carers would be lacking. This, as Tomasello et al.(1993) point out, would lead to
problems with perspective-taking, which would be reflected in skills such as joint
attention. There is evidence (Baron-Cohen, 1989) that autistic children do have
problems with joint attention, especially lower functioning individuals, although
perspective-taking itself tends to be relatively unimpaired.
A deficit in imitation could also manifest itself in the problems with social skills
which all autistic individuals tend to exhibit to varying degrees and in an inability to
understand or appreciate the emotional or mental state of another individual, which
would in itself affect social behaviour (Hobson, 1993). This is as yet unproved and it
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can only be hypothesised that a lack of appropriate social use of imitation could be
one of the causes behind such intense social disabilities-:Another behaviour which
could be affected is symbolic play, which Piaget (1962) proposed evolved out of
three abilities - the ability to show deferred imitation, the capacity for referential
thought and the capacity for representational thought. There is some evidence that
autistic children show increased symbolic play when instructed to do so (Lewis &
Boucher, 1988) and imitation of the child by the mother can also increase play and
social responsiveness ( Dawson & Galpett, 1990).
Finally, it is well documented (Kanner, 1945; Tager-Flusberg, 1981; Baron-
Cohen, 1988) that autistic children have problems with language and only higher-
functioning individuals can communicate to any extent using language. They
especially have problems with the pragmatics of language and with comprehension.
They rarely if ever use mental state terms and they show specific problems such as
pronoun reversal, specifically a difficulty with "I" and "you", which Tomasello et al.
(1993) suggested requires a special type of imitative learning in childhood. As
mentioned before, much language, for example, vocabulary and pragmatics, is
learned by some form of imitation or observational learning in infancy and
childhood, as are rules of the local language.
Before moving on it is essential to point out at this stage that a deficit in
imitation alone could not cause all these problems but it could be an important
contributing factor which combines with the other primary deficits in autism to bring
about these problems. Tomasello et al. (1993) acknowledged this and we have seen
that this was the basis for Rogers and Pennington's (1991) developmental model of
autism.
Defining the concept of imitation.
There is still much debate over whether imitation is a unitary concept and we
have seen that it manifests itself in different ways at different stages of development.
Previous developmental research can be summarised as investigating imitation on
one or several levels. Some research has mentioned different classes of imitation,
involving different underlying deficits. Some research has investigated imitation as
one aspect of social learning while other have identified different manifestations of
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imitation at different stages in development. Finally, some research has involved the
proposal of different functions of imitation at different stages of development. Each
of these levels should be considered before defining imitation.
1) Classes of imitation:
Firstly several authors have proposed different classes of imitation, arising from
different underlying capacities. Hobson (1993a) proposed two distinct classes - the
first is described as the "relatively automatic mechanisms" by which normal infants,
children and adults "perceive and assume the actions and attitudes of others. Here
imitation leads to interpersonal correspondences in action and attitude, but does not
itself require a prior awareness on the infant's part that they are attempting to copy
another person, conceptualised as such. The second class entails that the infant both
identifies the goal-directed actions and/or attitudes of the other person, and identifies
with the person in a deliberate attempt to copy the other. Autistic individuals are
probably abnormal with respect to both forms of imitation: They seldom engage
with others in such a way as to "find themselves" identifying with others and very
rarely do they strive to adopt the stance of someone else".
This suggestion closely resembles that proposed by Whiten (1992) when
considering both child and animal imitation. Whiten (1992) saw imitation as related
to a type of mindreading, which could take one of two forms: "a) to imitate certain
acts the imitator needs to be able to recognise the model's purpose in doing what
they do, or b) the imitator needs to be able to translate, in three dimensional space,
between the action done from the other's point of view (seen from their viewpoint)
and what it is to perform it from their own point of view". In simpler terms imitation
needs either the ability to understand another's intentions or the ability to understand
and translate across self-other differences. The first of these two forms would be that
upheld by Baron-Cohen et al.'s theory while the second would be encompassed by
Rogers and Pennington's theory.
2) Imitation as a type of social learning
Although Bandura (1962, 1977) used the terms imitation and social learning
almost interchangeably, researchers studying animals have made a distinction
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between imitation and other forms of social or observational learning such as
emulation (imitating the end product of an action but with-out using the same method
to reach the end product), social facilitation (performing an action on an object after
having one's attention drawn to that object but not necessarily performing the same
action as the model) and contagion (where an idea catches on but can be performed
differently by each individual, for example, laughing). Mimicry is also often
differentiated from other imitation because it is thought that mimicry does not
require the understanding of intentions that, for example, Tomasello et al. (1993)
suggested is fundamental to the ability to imitate. This stricter definition has arisen
from the need for much stricter controls in this area of research to counter the
scepticism that non-human primates can imitate at all. As a result the occurance of
imitation may well be underestimated.
Within the developmental literature, imitation has been called by many
different names such as observational learning, identification, matching behaviour,
modeling, to name just a few. In many studies the concepts which have been
differentiated from imitation in the animal literature have been used interchangeably
with imitation in the developmental literature. Although Piaget, Meltzoff and other
researchers usually failed to define imitation in their work with human infants, many
seemed to accept imitation as a unitary concept, albeit manifested in different ways
at different stages of development. One definition can be found in the developmental
literature and this is a very broad definition of imitation, encompassing other types
of social learning and allowing theories to be united under one definition. Yando et
al. (1978) define imitation as follows: "imitation is defined as the motoric or verbal
performance of specific acts or sounds that are like those previously performed by a
model". They suggest that this broad definition allows it to be used in connection
with the different manifestations of imitation in development. For example, Piaget
(1962) proposed that vocal contagion is one of the earliest signs of the development
of an imitative capacity.
This study employed a slightly narrower definition (page 37) as there were two
possible hypotheses: since imitation or social learning in any format involves social
skills and some degree of social interaction, it may be that autistic children are
impaired in them all. On the other hand, if it is the ability to imitate (according to the
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stricter definition) that is impaired then autistic children might be more able or more
inclined to emulate or take advantage of social facilitation. One of the tasks to be
used in the present set of experiments was designed specifically to test the tendency
to emulate versus the tendency to imitate (the artificial fruit).
Mimicry is, as I mentioned, often discriminated from other types of imitation
because it does not require an understanding of the person's intentions or other
mental states. It is possible that a child may mimic without much understanding of
the social world. As such autistic children might be more inclined to mimic than to
produce other types of imitation. Mimicry does, however, need some of the same
motoric and cognitive capacities. As such it is intrinsically social in nature. Thus the
definition adopted for this study includes mimicry (although a note was made during
observations if imitation appeared to be mimicry). This of course, was based on
subjective judgements of mimicry.
Finally, previous studies using the artificial fruit task and DAID scenario
(Custance, 1994; Whiten et al. in press), were designed for use with non-human
primates. As such they used a narrower definition of imitation. For later comparisons
with the data from these studies, it was essential to adopt a definition that excluded
emulation, social facilitation and other forms of social learning.
3) Developmental manifestations of the ability to imitate.
At different stages of development, the ability to imitate manifests itself in
different ways and as the child gets older he or she can imitate more complex
actions, can imitate after a delay and can improve the accuracy of the imitation.
Piaget (1962) proposed that imitation starts with vocal contagion and moves through
imitation of sounds, familiar then new, to imitation of actions (familiar/novel and
visible/invisible) to imitation of symbolic actions and finally to deferred imitation.
From about two years on imitation increases in accuracy and complexity. Smith and
Bryson (1994) emphasised the need to investigate imitation of different types of
actions in order to truly understand imitation and the role it plays in autism. They
suggested that future research should examine various manifestations of imitation
including distinctions between symbolic and non-symbolic actions, between actions
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with objects and actions without objects, between one-handed actions and two-
handed actions, and between facial and manual actions.
This thesis aimed to test these different manifestations of imitation. If a
developmental perspective is the correct one then it should be possible to show that
not only do the younger children perform relatively poorly on imitation (as Rogers
and Pennington would predict) but that those who pass tests of deferred and
symbolic imitation should also pass the simple tasks of body actions and simple
actions with objects. Those who fail the simple ones should not pass the more
complex ones.
However, it is not just the ability to imitate that might affect children's
performance. Although Piaget did not discuss the abilities that combine with
imitation at the different stages to increase its complexity, it is essential to mention
that there are confounding factors when studying imitation. The first is motivation:
When the child is young he or she must be motivated to imitate and rewards usually
come in a social form. As the child gets older rewards may be social or they may
become more physical such as getting a toy to work by imitating the actions of
another. The second important confounding factor is symbolic capacity. In order to
imitate action involving pretense, it seems reasonable that children should be able to
pretend on their own. As such it also seems reasonable that autistic children will be
less able to produce good imitations of actions involving pretense than their non-
autistic peers. Finally, memory plays an important role in the ability to imitate after
a delay.
Although these are confounding factors and may lessen the impact of results, it
is important to study these types of imitation. It should be clear whether the children
are motivated to imitate or not by whether they attempt to imitate. If autistic children
are only impaired in those actions which require symbolic ability (pretense) or
memory then we cannot say that they are impaired in their ability to imitate. It may
be the need to combine different abilities with the ability to imitate that prevents
imitation at this more complicated level, although Rogers and Pennington would
predict that this will develop later providing there are no deeper memory problems.
4) The function of imitation.
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As well as the possibility that the actual manifestation and underlying deficit
are different at different stages in development, there is some evidence that the
function of imitation differs with age. Meltzoff and Gopnik (1993) proposed that the
function of imitation in very young children is to aid identification with others as
living things and to come to an understanding of their own and others bodies. Both
Stern (1985) and Hobson (1993) proposed something similar - imitating helps
children come to an understanding of themselves and others in terms of body,
emotions and mind. Trevarthen (1979) saw imitation as an important factor in
establishing mother-infant interaction.
Nadel (Nadel and Camaioni, 1993) argued that imitation is not just a form of
identification but also a form of communication for pre-school children. By
imitating each other they are saying "Look at me, I'm like you. I'm your friend" etc.
Once they go to school the need for imitation as a form of communication is
lessened by the development of sophisticated language. As older children and adults
we may imitate people in order to be like them or to flatter them.
So there are many different aspects of imitation to consider when embarking
on a study of this nature. However, it is desirable to adopt a unitary definition that
will take into account many of the factors described above and allow identification
of imitation whatever the manifestation. In studies by Meltzoff (see pages 25 and
26), the reproduction of actions did not have to be exact and in the work of Nadel
and colleagues (see Nadel and Camaioni, 1993, for a review) the child only had to
pick up the same objects and do similar things to be coded as imitating. Such
behaviour could have been the result of other types of social learning such as social
facilitation. To summarise, then, we need a definition and coding system that will be
wide enough to accept attempts at imitation even though not completely accurate but
narrow enough to allow differentiation between imitation and other forms of social
learning. This can be achieved by using a scoring system that records the accuracy of
reproduction. For example, if the child picks up the object and does something
completely different this could be thought of as social facilitation. The main type of
social learning I want to distinguish from imitation is the use of emulation.
Emulation implies creativity and the ability to experiment and usually occurs in
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older children and adults. In this sense autistic children and adults may be impaired.
On the other hand, emulation requires less social understanding than imitation and
may thus be intact in autism. Additionally, if imitation develops in autism as it does
in normal children, although more slowly, as Rogers and Pennington predicted, then
the autistic adults might show more emulation just as normal adults would.
Emulation will be investigated mainly in the artificial fruit experiment (Chapter 4).
The definition also needs to be able to encompass the different manifestations of
imitation including deferred imitation.
Bearing all these factors in mind, I will use the following definition in this
thesis: imitation occurs when the person reproduces with some accuracy the
actions or vocalisations of another child or adult, having physically observed the
actions of the model. Reproduction can be immediate or deferred. By the end of this
thesis I hope I will be in a position to assess the efficacy of this definition and to
judge whether it really is possible to adopt a unitary definition of such a complex
concept as imitation.
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Part 3
Imitation in autism - Is there evidence fof a deficit?
In the last few sections of this Chapter, we have seen that theoretically and
developmentally it would seem very reasonable to conclude that if there is a deficit
in imitation then this could be a very important causal factor in autism. So is there a
deficit? Unfortunately the picture is not as clear as one might hope. Some studies
have concluded that there is a deficit in autism; others have found that there is no
deficit, at least relative to MA matched controls. Table 1.2 is a summary of the
findings to date on imitation in autism, given in chronological order. Some of these
studies did not set out to examine imitation per se but to examine the sensori-motor
skills of which imitation is just one. Most of the studies presented here were used by
Rogers and Pennington (1991) as evidence for a deficit in imitation, but the picture
is by no means so clear cut. Heimann et al.(1992) have attempted a fairly
comprehensive but preliminary study of different types of imitation but
unfortunately the full study has not yet been published.
Previous studies of imitation in autism can be identified as falling into one of
three categories. These categories relate to some extent to the different types of
imitation mentioned in the previous section: first, those that looked at gestural and
vocal imitation, mostly using tests of sensorimotor skills (based on Piaget's (1952)
stages of development); second, those that looked at procedural imitation - using
actions with objects; and finally, I will look at what are called pantomime actions -
where no objects are used but a meaningful or pretend action is performed. The main
studies are summarised in Table 1.2.
a) Vocal and gestural Imitation:
This is the area that has been investigated most frequently with regard to
autism. Some studies have looked at imitation as one of the sensori-motor abilities,
using tests such as the Uzgiris and Hunt Scale (1975). These tests examined a variety
of actions along Piaget's continuum: from simple familiar actions to combinations of
actions to unfamiliar actions; from actions visible to the imitator to actions invisible
to the child. Two studies found that autistic children performed worse on imitation,
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both vocal and gestural, than non-autistic children (Sigman & Ungerer, 1984;
Herzig, Snow & Sherman, 1989) and a third study found that imitation was the least
mastered sensori-motor skill and dependent on verbal ability, but did not use any
controls (Abrahamsen & Mitchell, 1990). Two studies found no deficits in gestural
and vocal imitation, relative to controls (Thatcher, 1977; Morgan et al., 1989) and
Charman and Baron-Cohen (1994) also found no deficit in gestural imitation using a
task based on the Uzgiris & Hunt Scale (1975).
DeMyer et al. (1972), the first to study imitation in autism, found that autistic
children were impaired in body imitation relative to schizophrenic and non-autistic,
but subnormal, controls. Although as we will see, DeMyer et al.'s study looked at
several aspects of autism, their subject numbers were relatively small with just 9
autistic, 3 schizophrenic and 5 control subjects. Although the psychotic subjects
(autistic plus schizophrenic) were fairly closely matched on chronological age with
the non-psychotic, they were not matched on mental age of any description
(although the verbal ages are presented in the subject information). Conversely,
some of the control children suffered from motor problems which, especially in body
imitation, could have lowered their performance and reduced any differences
between psychotic and non-psychotic groups.
Jones and Prior (1985) found that autistic children did significantly worse than
controls on imitation of both gestures and dynamic body movements, mostly
involving hand and arm movements, with high variability from child to child. In
general, they found that 6-10 year old autistic children were not even performing at
pre-school level on these tasks. They still performed worse than their MA-matched
counterparts. Jones and Prior suggested that the poor performance on imitation may
be due to inadequate neuromotor development - an inability to coordinate their limbs
when an appreciation of height and depth are necessary. However, an extra control
where the children were asked to perform an action, or instructed to do so, could
have gone a long way to backing up this suggestion.
Ohta (1987) looked specifically at gestural imitation and found deficits for
autistic children. Those children who attempted the more difficult actions tended to
produce what Ohta called "partial imitations", such as a reversal of the hands or a
change in orientation. Ohta suggested that if they can show partial imitation then it is
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evidence that it may be a disorder in, rather than a delayed competence of, gestural
imitation. She proposed that this problem was sited in the —ability for mental imaging,
especially concerning body images, and that it was therefore possible that there was
an impairment in symbolic representational functioning in autism.
Other studies looked at gestural imitation as one of several imitation abilities.
Stone et al. (1990) examined body/gestural imitation using a battery of tasks based
on DeMyer et al.'s (1972) study and found that autistic children were impaired in
imitation relative to several different control groups. Another study which
unfortunately is still preliminary, by Heimann et al. (1992), attempted a
comprehensive investigation of imitation, including object manipulation, vocal
imitation, facial imitation, motor imitation and object substitution with five autistic
children. They compared the results from this study to the results from three normal
four year olds and 28 twelve month old infants and found that all but one autistic
child showed some imitation on the object manipulation tasks but only one or two
showed imitation on the other tasks, with more difficulty experienced on motor and
substitution tasks. The children in the other groups displayed an overall higher
tendency to imitate.
In addition to investigating communication via imitation in normal toddlers,
Nadel and Fontaine (1989) observed autistic children in a similar situation to the
paradigm described earlier (page 27). They tested 16 autistic children, 8 of which
were echolalic and showed some gestural imitation and eight who did not. They
conducted a second-by-second analysis of social performance for four of the
echolalic and gestural imitative children. They found that none of the four children
attained the 3 year old level of social performance based on spontaneous imitations
of the partner's gestures or verbal utterances. The non-imitative autistic children
were not able to show any social involvement.
A study of imitation and executive function in high-functioning persons with
autism was recently carried out by Rogers and McEvoy (1993). Seventeen subjects
with autism were compared to 15 subjects with learning difficulties on executive
function tasks and imitation tasks which varied with visibility, sequentiality and
meaningfulness. They found that the autistic subjects performed worse on all praxis
tasks except imitations of meaningful single hand and arm movements and
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meaningful facial expressions. They were also impaired on executive function tasks,
the performance on which was found to correlate witli the performance on the
imitation tasks. However, the authors suggested that the deficits in imitation could
not be solely attributed to executive functioning problems, since the subjects
appeared more dependent on visual feedback to carry out motor movements,
especially single facial movements, than the controls.
b) Object imitation:
Some of the studies already mentioned above also examined actions with
objects. Heimann et al's (1992) study found deficits with all types of imitation
except for simple manipulation of objects. Imitating the functional or symbolic use
of objects posed problems for most of the autistic children, although Heimann et al.
noted that one or two children did show imitation on some of the categories. In
contrast, the normal children had few problems with these tasks.
Secondly, in addition to testing four body movements, Stone et al. (1990)
tested 8 actions involving objects but not entailing any pretense. Again they found
that autistic children were worse than controls at imitating these actions. This study
focused on imitation, play and the diagnosis of autism and the authors concluded
that both skills could be important in distinguishing autism from the many other
disorders with which it is often confused. Stone et al.'s study replicated the results of
DeMyer et al. (1972), who found that autistic (psychotic) children were impaired on
imitating actions on objects but not on spontaneous object use. The autistic children
did perform slightly better on the actions on objects tasks than the body imitation
tasks but on both were worse than controls. They also noted that when the actions
with objects required some pantomime or symbolic quality the autistic children did
worse still. DeMyer et al. concluded that autistic children had more difficulty with
body imitation and symbolic imitation because they did not have a constant point of
reference as they did in the action on object tasks. Once the action was complete
there was no visible clue for the children. They suggested that the impairment
affecting imitation might be some sort of specific agnosia about body parts or proxy,
also recently suggested by Smith and Bryson (1994).
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Charman & Baron-Cohen (1994) also examined what they called "procedural"
imitation which consisted of four tasks involving actions O'n objects, based on tasks
used by Meltzoff (1988b). As for gestural imitation, they found no deficits for
autistic children relative to controls although their results showed a tendency for the
autistic children to find the procedural task harder than the gestural imitation task,
since 8 out of 20 subjects did not score 4 out of 4 on the procedural task but only 2
children failed to do so on the gestural tasks. Only one child did not score 3 out of 4
imitations on both tasks. While the children in this study did not seem to have a
problem with imitation, it must be remembered that the tasks used can be
successfully completed by 9 month old normal children (Meltzoff 1988b) and one
must ask how autistic children would cope on tasks that older normal children can
pass.
Hammes and Langdell (1981) investigated imitation of actions with objects
and found that autistic children had few problems with non-symbolic actions, such
as giving the doll a drink, when cup and doll are both present (although it could be
argued that this still needs imagination, even if not the capacity to symbolise).
However, when a real object was coupled with an imaginary object or when the task
was fully symbolic, the autistic children had more problems. In addition to lower
levels of imitation, Hammes and Langdell also found that those children who
attempted to imitate, produced partial imitations, such as using a body part as object,
e.g. stirring their finger in a cup.
Finally, Curchio and Piserchia (1978) tested 24 psychotic children (not
necessarily autistic, although they compared their results to those of DeMyer et al.,
1972). They tested these children on non-symbolic tasks as a control for pantomimic
tasks and found that the children were 96% successful on the non-symbolic tasks.
They found no difference between body and object directed actions.
c) Pantomime/symbolic action imitation:
The only study to really investigate this type of action was the Curchio and
Piserchia (1978) study described immediately above. They found that, although few
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children completely failed pantomimic tasks (only 8-9% failed to give any
response), there was a huge majority of partial imitations. They found that the ability
to imitate correlated with language ability and that if the demonstrator stopped
demonstrating, the child could no longer imitate the action. In other words it is as
DeMyer et al. (1972) suggested, that not having a point of reference affects the
ability to imitate. Curchio and Piserchia concluded that the problem for autistic and
psychotic children lies in a lack of a representational ability.
Because of the delay in diagnosing autism, it is not known whether autistic
children show very early imitation. All the above studies have used autistic children
above 3 years of age although a few studies have attempted to ask parents about their
child's early behaviour. Klin et al. (1992) investigated early social behaviours and
found that parents of autistic children consistently describe their children as lacking
the elicited imitation skills usually seen in normally developing children who are one
year old. Le Couteur et al. (1989) found that 94% of autistic children were described
by their parents as having little or no spontaneous imitation, compared to only 9 %
of non-autistic IQ matched children with learning disabilities. On the other hand,
Lord (1991) found that a significant minority of parents reported evidence of
imitation during infancy in autistic children who at a later age were quite unable to
reproduce actions upon demand.
There are a few more studies which did not investigate the deficit in imitation
but actually used imitation to improve the abilities of autistic subjects. These studies
looked at the effects of imitation on behaviour and also the factors affecting
imitation in autistic children. Tryon and Keane (1986) investigated the use of
observational learning, using normal peer models, to promote imitative play. They
tested 3 boys who watched a peer playing with a toy and then were allowed to play
with that toy among others. They found that through observational learning the three
autistic-like boys tested showed an increase in imitative play and a decrease in self-
stimulation. An increase in appropriate play with novel toys was also recorded, over
the experimental session. To begin with the subjects had shown very little evidence
of imitation but by the end Tryon & Keane said it was clear that these boys were
imitating. With only three subjects it is difficult to assess the significance of these
findings. The boys did have a mental age of over 4 years and this could be seen as
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evidence that perhaps even with an early deficit in imitation, autistic children can
pick it up later, with a little help from those around them. '
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There has also been some success in using models to teach language, for
Moo
example, to autistic children (Charlop, Schreibman & Tryon, 1983). Both peer and
adult models have been used. Can & Darcy (1990) used peer models to teach the
game of Follow-the-leader. Charlop et al. suggested that peer modeling was more
effective. But Ihrig and Wolchik (1988) compared the effectiveness of a peer and
adult model in teaching expressive language, and found no significant difference -
the autistic children learned independent of who was modeling.
Another interesting and potentially very important finding comes from the work
of Dawson. In two studies, one with Galpert (1990), and one with Adams (1984),
she has shown that the use of imitation of the behaviour of the child, by the
experimenter, helped to make the child more socially responsive, produced more eye
contact and decreased perseverative play, than when the experimenter modeled
either a familiar or a novel action (Dawson and Adams, 1984). This would tie in
with evidence from normal development, since the largest part of interactions with
the mother in infancy, consists of the mother imitating the actions of the child - it is
as the child increases in age that he/she imitates the actions of the mother
(Trevarthen, 1979; Stem, 1985). Dawson and Galpert (1990) carried out a similar
experiment except this time they used the mother as the model/imitator. They
showed an increase in gaze at the mother's face and actions, when the mother
imitated the child's use of the toys. Over the 2-week intervention period, they found
a significant increase in these measures during the free-play sessions. Imitation also
increased toy play over this period. Parent questionnaires showed that the parents
felt their child's behaviour at home had improved at least slightly over the two
weeks.
Finally, a study by Nadel and Peze (1992) used an adult model in a repeated
therapeutic session of imitating and being imitated. They found an increase in social
behaviour with the exchanges at first being mostly imitative, controlled by the
experimenter but later becoming spontaneous, with the autistic child switching from
imitating to modeling but not vice-versa. Overall, there was an increase in
cooperative exchanges and a decrease in imitative exchanges over the period of the
treatment. It was concluded (Nadel and Camaioni, 1993) that "this suggests that
imitative structures of interaction do not only generate imitative structures but can
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serve as a template for other forms of exchanges as well. It also supports the idea
NO.
that imitative exchanges are earlier and simpler than other interactive formats, in
autistic children as in normal toddlers".
Summary of evidence:
First of all, it must be noted that the issue of imitation in autism is still very
unclear. Ten studies found problems with body or gestural imitation. Three studies
did not. Three studies found problems with imitating actions with objects that did
not involve pretense, while three studies found no problem with non-symbolic
actions. Five studies, in addition, found problems with symbolic actions with objects
and pantomimic actions. So while more studies found evidence for a deficit in at
least some aspects of imitation than found evidence against a deficit, the amount of
evidence against each type of imitation is enough to make it extremely difficult to
conclude whether a specific deficit really exists. The exception to this is symbolic
imitation, in which all studies found autistic children and adults to have deficits.
This is not surprising considering autistic children generally have problems with
pretend play and other symbolic abilities.
In addition to the lack of clarity on the picture of evidence, there are many
inconsistencies within the methodology used in previous studies. Some studies
quoted here used very small samples, some used not just autistic children, but
psychotic children. Other studies did not have any control subjects, and some that
did had matched their controls on chronological age (CA), rather than mental age
(MA). Few studies have looked at more than two aspects of imitation, e.g. gestural
and vocal, or gestural and actions with objects, or action with objects, both non-
symbolic and symbolic. Only one study attempted such a comprehensive
investigation (Heimann et al., 1992) and we are still waiting for publication of the
full study. Finally, only one study has looked at spontaneous imitation, in a
naturalistic environment (Nadel & Fontaine, 1989) - all the other studies have
examined immediate imitation in an experimental situation. No one has looked at
the autistic child's ability for deferred imitation or their ability to problem-solve with
a novel object, by imitation, both of which Piaget's theory suggested might be more
developmentally difficult.
Chapter 1: Introduction	 56
Finally, whether there is a general deficit in the ability to imitate or not, it
seems probable that imitation of the autistic child by the caretaker or an
experimenter can increase basic social interaction abilities such as mutual eye gaze,
social responsiveness and appropriate behaviour, especially play behaviour. It is
possible that interventions of this type at an earlier stage in development, combined
with encouragement to imitate and the use of imitation as a teaching tool, may help
to improve child/care-giver interaction, interpersonal relations, lessen the effect of
later emerging deficits and thus improve prognosis at least for some autistic
children.
Smith and Bryson (1994) in their critical review of imitation and action in
autism mentioned earlier, suggested that several things are necessary in a future
study of imitation in order to provide a better description of the imitative deficit.
Firstly, as already mentioned above, better controls need to be adopted to test the
specificity of imitation deficits to autism. Secondly, further manipulation of test
variables are needed to test distinctions between visible and invisible actions,
between actions with and without objects, between oral (facial) and manual
movements, between one-handed and two-handed actions and between symbolic and
non-symbolic actions. Thirdly, older children and adults who fall at different points
of the continuum or with varying degree of disability need to be examined - only
then can we build up a fuller picture of imitation in autism.
The main aim of this thesis was thus to conduct a comprehensive study into
imitation, taking into account the different types of actions as well as adding in the
developmental perspective and other distinctions such as the spontaneous/elicited
distinction and the deferred/immediate distinction discussed in the previous section
and also in the next section.
Now that I have examined the concept of imitation in both normal and autistic
development and the evidence for and against a deficit in imitation specific to
autism, it is time to present further analysis of the theory of Rogers and Pennington,
bearing in mind the literature and those theoretical and conceptual issues which I
have reviewed in the past two sections.
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Part 4
Analysis of Rogers and Pennington's theory
So far we have seen that Rogers and Pennington's theory seems to be a very
important one. There is some evidence that some types of imitation is deficient in
some autistic children and that emotion perception and the ability to use a theory of
mind is also deficient. Rogers and Pennington's theory appears to be well founded in
normal development and a deficit in early imitation, combined with later deficits in
the other abilities proposed, would seem to be a good explanation for the problems
experienced by autistic children. However, I have a few concerns or rather
reservations about this theory. I shall attempt here to deal with these as
comprehensively but as concisely as possible.
1) As already mentioned the only aspect that differentiated Rogers and
Pennington's theory from other theories is the presence of a deficit in autism.
However, Rogers and Pennington do not define imitation or deal with the difficulties
of testing imitation as a unitary concept. For the most part previous studies only
examined immediate elicited imitation of one or two types of action. We saw how
Piaget proposed that imitation develops through different types of actions. Although
the ability to imitate may be a unitary phenomenon, imitation at different stages of
development requires other abilities such as representation, pretense, memory and
usually requires motivation. In addition to these problems with previous studies, we
have seen that there is still some debate about whether a deficit in even immediate,
elicited imitation exists.
Rogers and Pennington proposed that a deficit in imitation would be most
noticeable and handicapping in young autistic children. Unfortunately they did not
specify what they meant by "young", nor whether it was chronological or mental age
that was most important. They used some of the previous studies described above as
evidence for their theory yet the children in these studies were mostly described in
terms of only chronological age and diagnosis. Those studies that did use mental age
varied in the ages they used. In general, all the children tested were above 3 years
chronologically and varied in mental age. This makes it extremely hard to 1)
Chapter 1: Introduction 	 58
interpret previous findings in terms of Rogers and Pennington's theory and 2) make
predictions for the present study, at least not in specific terms.
2) As in most theories, Rogers and Pennington only explain some aspects of
autism, although they do suggest that, especially in adults, the deficits they propose
would be related to executive function tasks. Executive function tasks may explain
the insistence on sameness and obsession with routines and lack of an ability to plan
ahead or cope with new routines.
3) As mentioned in 1) above, Rogers and Pennington did not define imitation
nor did they discuss the methodological difficulties of studying imitation. The
confounding issues of motivation and memory are important, as are the differing
manifestations of the ability to imitate at different stages in development. Piaget
proposed that vocal imitation was the first "type" of imitation to emerge, followed
by familiar actions and then unfamiliar actions, then actions involving representation
and memory such as symbolic imitation and deferred imitation. If autistic children
only show problems with deferred symbolic and problem-solving types of tasks,
then it cannot be said that they have a general deficit in imitation. Piaget also made a
distinction between imitation of visible and invisible actions. Rogers and Pennington
did not acknowledge any of these issues and talk about imitation as a unitary
concept, although as we have seen Smith and Bryson (1994) proposed that an
thorough examination of imitation of different types of actions is essential to the true
understanding of both imitation and autism. Rogers and Pennington did, however,
propose a differentiation between vocal and gestural imitation which was found in
many of the studies of sensorimotor skills in autistic children. It is also important to
differentiate between spontaneous and elicited imitation for it may be that autistic
children can imitate if asked but chose not to imitate in everyday life. Ambitious as
it may seem, this thesis will attempt to make each of these differentiations.
4) Another suggestion from Rogers and Pennington was that the first
symptoms of autism in infancy would be a subtle lack of imitation, affective
mutuality and joint attention. Indeed Klin et al (1992) and Le Couteur (1989) found
that parents reported a lack of both elicited and spontaneous imitation in their young
autistic children. Lord (1991), on the other hand, found that autistic children who
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imitated spontaneously according to the parents in early childhood, were not
alI
necessarily able to imitate when asked at a later stage.
5) Apart from the difficulties of testing imitation itself, it is very difficult to
test the underlying problem in a way that would differentiate this theory from that of
Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) or Hobson (1986; 1993). Rogers and Pennington did
acknowledge that it would be very difficult to test their theory of early infant
development because of the age of diagnosis but they suggested that any such an
attempt should take the form of a longitudinal study. However, it is hard to visualise
how even a longitudinal study would distinguish between an underlying problem of
the formation and coordination of specific self-other representation, a deficit in the
innate ability to form affective relations or a deficit in metarepresentation, all of
which produce similar behavioural syriptoms.
Rogers and Pennington proposed, however, that the important thing was not
that imitation was deficient but how imitation interacts with the other deficits. This
is the true test of their theory. They predicted that in a "longitudinal study of
normally developing infants there would be positive, predictive correlations between
imitation, emotion sharing, joint attention and later performance on theory of mind
tasks". In addition, they predicted similar positive correlations in both longitudinal
and cross-sectional studies of young autistic children. In young autistic children they
predicted a profile involving related deficits in imitation, affect sharing, joint
attention and symbolic play. For older autistic children and adults, they predicted
relationships between theory of mind, affect praxis and pragmatics of language, with
additional relationships between these deficits and executive function deficits.
As in all theories of autism the links between abilities are only hypothetical.
Although the main focus of the present thesis is to examine imitation in autism, it is
desirable to test at least some of the other deficits in order to examine Rogers and
Pennington's theory. It was not possible within the scope of this thesis to conduct a
longitudinal study so a cross-sectional study of autistic children of varying ages was
conducted. The autistic individuals used in this study ranged from 4 to 34 years of
age, with a mental age range of 18 months to 11 years. With this subject pool, I
could attempt to investigate any developmental trend in autism. Such a
comprehensive study of autism has never before been attempted.
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Associated Deficits in Autism
To recap, Rogers and Pennington (1991) predicted that association with a
deficit in imitation at an early stage would be deficits in emotion sharing and "theory
of mind". For young children the later would be evident in problems with joint
attention and pretend play, while in older children and adults, "higher" theory of
mind abilities such as deception and false-belief would be impaired as well as
pragmatic aspects of language. In the following section I will briefly present the
existing evidence for each of these deficits followed by a short section on deficits in
social interaction which will be used as a general index of autism in the
observational study reported in Chapter 2.
1) Emotion perception and sharing:
"Typically, there is no display of affection..." (Kanner, 1943)
"Peter had outbursts of hilarity, and occasionally violent temper tantrums, although it
was very hard to understand why he had them." (Frith, 1989; page 3)
We have already looked at some of the evidence for emotion perception
deficits in autism when considering Hobson's theory. However, there are many
other studies to consider. Deficits in emotion perception, using tests of matching
facial expressions to other types of expression, namely sounds, gestures, body
posture, and contexts in stories, have been carried out mostly by Hobson and his
colleagues. Deficits in emotion perception have been found in the majority of
studies (Hobson, 1986a, 1986b; Weeks and Hobson, 1987; Hobson, Ouston and
Lee, 1988, 1989; Ozonoff, Pennington and Rogers, 1991). Additionally, Hobson,
Ouston and Lee (1988) found that autistic children recognised faces better if they
were presented upside-down. They proposed that the autistic children were
recognizing a perceptual pattern rather than the face as a whole, meaningful entity.
(See also Langdell, 1978). Hobson, Ouston and Lee (1988) also found that autistic
children were better at recognizing emotionally spoken meaningless utterances than
emotionally spoken real sentences. A third study along the same lines by Weeks
and Hobson (1987), found that emotional expression had little salience for autistic
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children in a sorting task. Autistic children tended to sort by hat worn and sex
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before expression whereas non-autistic children sorted by expression before hat.
Finally, in evidence for an emotion perception deficit in autism, Loveland et
al (1994a) found that, in a test of cross-modal perception of affect, both autistic and
Downs Syndrome children did better when rhythmic synchrony information was
available, i.e. when the soundtrack was synchronised with the video of the animated
emotional faces. When there was no synchrony, the autistic children did worse than
the Downs Syndrome children, who still were able to match the soundtrack to the
correct face. They concluded that there was a problem in matching sounds to faces,
especially when the information available was non-synchronous. However, they did
not test their children on recognizing facial expression per se. It could have been
that the autistic children were even poorer at just recognizing the facial expression
in the first place, and were actually better when they had more information to go on.
i.e. utterances. A second study by Loveland et al. (1994b) looked at imitation and
expression of facial affect in autism. They found that children with autism did
produce some recognizable expressions in both tasks but fewer than Downs
Syndrome children on the expression tasks. Autistic children performed similarly
on the two tasks, i.e. imitation of and elicited expression of facial emotion, but the
Down's Syndrome children did much better on expression of emotions.
There are two studies at least which do not provide us with evidence for a
deficit in autism. Prior et al. (1991) attempted to replicate Hobson's 1986 study,
with groups of autistic and control children matched on verbal MA and language
ability. They failed, however, to find any deficit in emotion perception in autistic
children relative to control children.
Secondly, a study by Davies, Bishop, Manstead and Tantam (1994) on face
perception found that autistic children performed worse on both facial and non-
facial tasks. Furthermore, the deficits in face recognition were not emotion specific
- autistic children were just as bad on facial identity. However, this finding was
only for those of higher ability. There were no differences between the control
children and autistic children of lower ability. They made two proposals: 1) when
autistic children are better at recognizing facial expression it is because of a delay in
development. In normal development, children below ten years can recognise faces
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and facial expressions equally well upside-down. However, once they reach ten
years, they do much better when faces are the right way up. Autistic children have
not reached this point in development where faces are much more salient when
presented the right way up. 2) The deficits seen in high functioning autistic children
on the facial recognition tasks may be due to executive function problems, namely
being able to apply different categories to the same picture.
Finally, Rutter (1990) points out that there are problems in the production and
perception of emotional expression in all modalities but some more able children
are able to pass on one or two modalities. Therefore, emotion perception difficulties
cannot be used as diagnostic criteria of autism, since not universal. However, this is
an important piece of evidence when considering theories of autism, although one
most remember that the primary affective problem, according to Hobson (1993),
should be most important in infancy. It is quite possible that although autistic
children have problems at this stage, they can learn to recognise most emotions, at
least those that for the most part are externally observable, e.g. from facial
expressions.
Little evidence of empathy is available but it is suggested that without being
able to recognise emotions, empathizing would also be extremely difficult. Mundy
(1986) and Snow et al (1987) both showed deficits in affective expression and affect
sharing, which would suggest that empathy would be impaired in autism.
2) Theory of mind
(i) Pretend Play:
" 	 In his second year, he "developed a mania for spinning blocks and pans and
other round objects". At the same time, he had "a dislike for self-propelling vehicles,
such as Taylor-tots, tricycles and swings...He was always constantly happy and busy
entertaining himself, but resented being urged to play with certain things"....
There was a marked limitation of spontaneous activity. He wandered about smiling,
making stereotyped movements with his fingers, crossing them about in the air. He
shook his head from side to side, whispering or humming the same three-note tune. he
spun with great pleasure anything he could seize upon to spin. He kept throwing things
on the floor, seeming to delight in the sounds they made 	 He arranged beads, sticks or
blocks in groups of differing series of colours 	 Most of his actions were
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repetitious 	 If he spun a block, he must always start with the same face uppermost.
When he threaded buttons, he arranged them in a certain sequence that had no pattern to
it but happened to be the order used by the father when he had first shown them to
Donald." (Kanner 1943)
Once again, as we see above, lack of spontaneous activity is one of the things
Kanner noted in all the children he described. The autistic children produced only
manipulative, repetitive and obsessional play, especially at a young age. However,
Kanner does note that some of the children he had seen improved with age and
produced a reasonably high level of functional play with objects, in addition to the
manipulative or repetitive play. However, there was always a severe lack of
imaginative play, or pretend play.
More recent studies have tended to concentrate on pretend play, although a
few studies have looked at functional play, too. However, while many of these
studies set out to examine symbolic play, most of them provide comment on the
types of play autistic children produce in place of symbolic play. Wing, Gould
Yeates and Brierley (1977) was one of the first studies to look at symbolic play.
Using the same children from the Camberwell study as produced the triad of
impairments and types of autistic child, they examined play behaviours and found
that the group of children could be divided on the basis of play types into exactly
the same groups as when social interaction was used to categorise them - those
showing the triad of impairments, and therefore autism, showed less symbolic play
than those without the social deficits, indicative of autism.
Ungerer and Sigman (1981) examined both functional and symbolic play in
an observational study and found that non-autistic children tended to engage in
relatively more frequent, more varied and more integrated actions in both functional
and symbolic play categories than their autistic counterparts. Autistic children were
less likely to produce object-directed and doll-directed play. This finding is
reflected in a study by Mundy et al. (1987 and Sigman and Mundy, 1987) who
looked at joint attention, play and language and found that in general those who
showed joint attention did produce more elaborate symbolic play. There were a
number of children who engaged in some functional and symbolic play but not in
joint attention and visa-versa. Although the autistic children did engage in some
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functional and pretend play, they rarely used a doll as an agent nor did they direct
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play to other people or dolls.
Gould (1986), Mundy et al (1986) and Sigman and Ungerer (1984c) assessed
autistic children's capacity for symbolic play in both a free play session and in a
structured or prompted situation and found that they produce much more pretense
when a prompt is used, than they do spontaneously. Baron-Cohen (1987) also found
that autistic children could engage in some symbolic play but that this was much
impoverished compared to the play of non-autistic children.
Finally, a further study in this vein by Lewis and Boucher (1988) found that
autistic children produce little if any pretend play spontaneously and also produce
less functional play than controls. However, they do seem to perform better when
the pretend play is elicited from them and even better when they are given an
instruction. Lewis and Boucher identified five categories of behaviour: no play,
manipulative play, functional play, intermediate play and symbolic play. They
found that autistic children spent less time playing functionally and that as many
autistic children produced at least one act of spontaneous symbolic play as non-
autistic children. They also found that functional and symbolic play assessed
together was as complex as that of controls. They admitted, however, that the
quality of the behaviours required further examination. More details are given about
this study in Chapter 6, as Lewis and Boucher's study was used as the basis for the
experiments on play in the present thesis.
ii) Joint Attention
"Peter was fascinated by the noise of the buses that passed by on the street. He never
failed to rush to the window when he heard the familiar engine noise. When he did this
he never pointed to the bus, or shouted excitedly, in order to attract somebody's
attention." (Frith, 1989 page 3).
Joint attention, sometimes called shared attention, and sometimes used
interchangeably with the term "visual perspective taking", is one of the earliest
abilities that can be noticed as deficient in autism. For the most part, autistic children
show relatively intact visual-perspective taking, i.e. they can identify the target of
someone's visual attention when asked to do so (Hobson, 1984; Baron-Cohen, 1989,
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1991, 1994; Leekam et al., 1993; Tan and Harris, 1991). The ability to spontaneously
eV
follow another person's eye gaze or centre of attention, is generally found to be
impaired (Curcio, 1978; Mundy et al. 1990; Baron-Cohen, 1989; Leekam et al,
1993). Mundy et al. (1990) found deficits in joint attention in autistic children with
an MA below 30 months of age. In normal development, joint attention emerges
between 6 and 12 months. Mundy et al. also reported that joint attention does seem to
precede the development in pretend play and pretend play in turn precedes the
development of Theory of Mind as explicit in the ability to attribute false-belief.
Curcio found that autistic children displayed fewer joint attention gestures as
opposed to requesting gestures and these findings were replicated by Baron-Cohen
(1989) when he looked at joint attention in the light of protodeclarative versus
protoimperative pointing. Leekam et al (1993) also tested joint attention using head
direction and eye gaze and found that compared to non-autistic controls, autistic
children were worse at spontaneously following eye gaze/head direction, although
they could identify the object of attention when asked to do so.
Finally, a recent study reported by Mundy, Sigman and Kasari (1993)
examined joint attention in very young autistic children and found that only those
children with an MA below 20 months did significantly worse than normal controls
and retarded controls. Those of an MA above 20 months showed responses to joint
attention, at a similar level to the control children. They observed the children in a
play session with the experimenter and assessed requesting behaviours and social
interaction behaviours as well as joint attention behaviours. There were two levels of
behaviours and they found that those children above 20 months, although better at
lower level joint attention behaviours, were not as good at higher level behaviours.
In general, most people agree that autistic children are impaired to some extent
on tests of joint attention. But Mundy et al.'s (1993) study suggests that a deficit in
joint attention might be more important at a younger age, i.e. before 18 months of
age.
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iii) Use of mental state understanding - evidence of deception, teasing, joking.
"Peter did not appreciate teasing. It just made him cross.. .He liked to watch television,
and was glad to sit I in front of the set with others for company. When there was
slapstick comedy, he joined in the laughter. As for soap operas, ...he could not fathom
the plots. Yet he knew all the characters' names and the actors who portrayed them. He
liked the goodies to be good and the baddies to be bad, but was confused if somebody
was a bit of both.. .Peter is still totally naive and does not understand the ways of the
world, for instance, why people lie or cheat." (Frith, 1989; page 5-6).
It is difficult to find evidence of these types of behaviours in autism. However,
there have been a few experimental studies, which have tested some of these abilities.
Frith & Sodian (1993) tested autistic children's abilities to deceive a puppet. They
used two types of scenario, one based on sabotage, where the child only had to
attempt to change the behaviour of the antagonist and one based on deception, where
a mental state had to be manipulated. They found that autistic children were as good
as controls on the sabotage condition but could not deceive the puppet. Other
evidence comes from one of the false-belief paradigms, the deceptive contents task
(Wimmer et al., 1983) where the autistic child cannot transfer their own experience
of deception onto another person.
St.James & Tager-Flusberg (1994) conducted an observational study of humour
in children with autism and Downs Syndrome. They observed six children in each
group at home, over one year (6 sessions of one hour) and found that during
interaction with the mother autistic children produced much fewer episodes of
humour. Downs syndrome children not only produced more episodes overall, but
more complicated humour and they accounted for more of the intentionality
episodes. However, there was high variability between each visit and all children
produced some examples of humour. As far as jokes were concerned, only two
children (and both of these were children with Downs Syndrome) told even simple
jokes.
Leekam and Prior (1994) looked at whether autistic children could distinguish
lies from jokes and whether this was harder or easier than understanding beliefs and
intentions. Although there is little evidence that autistic children can use joking and
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lying in real life, autistic children have been shown to have problems with both first
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and second order beliefs (Baron-Cohen, 1989; Ozonoff, Pennington and Rogers,
1991). However, there have been studies that have shown that some autistic children
can pass even second order belief tests (Bowler, 1992; Happe, 1991) but still do not
show better understanding of mental states in an everyday situation. Leekam and
Prior found that neither normal children nor autistic children found second order
intention easier than belief. However, normal children did find belief easier than
saying whether a person was lying or joking, while autistic children showed no
differences between the two judgments. Finally, only those autistic children who
passed first order false-belief, also gave consistently correct answers to second-order
mental state questions.
Finally, a study by Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1986), presented autistic
children with cartoon strips each of which had a story line which could be described
as either mechanical, behavioural or mentalistic. The children had to put the pictures
in the correct order so as to make up a story and then tell the story in their own
words. I shall present the results of the later part in the next section, but for the
picture-sequencing part of the task, it was found that the autistic children could
handle the mechanical and behavioural picture sequences but not those requiring an
mentalistic understanding of events.
This category of behaviour was investigated in the observational study as was
the next.
iv) Language pragmatics
"He used the person pronouns for the person he was quoting, even imitating the
intonation. ...Words to him had a specifically literal, inflexible meaning. He seemed
unable to generalise, to transfer an expression to another similar object or situation. if
he did so occasionally, it was a substitution, which then "stood" definitely for the
original meaning 	 "(Kanner, 1943 page 219)
"He has a wonderful memory for words. Vocabulary is good, except for pronouns. He
never initiates conversation, and conversation is limited, extensive only as far as objects
go". (Kanner, 1943 page 236)
"...His language showed marked improvement, though he continued to echo phrases
and to use them inappropriately. He spoke in a strange singsong voice when he was not
parroting what other people said. His understanding of language seemed strangely
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limited. He knew some quite rare words and their meaning, and was able to name all
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shades of colours. He knew what a dodecahedron was, but he did not seem to know the
meaning of such a common word as `think'.." (Frith, 1989 page 4)
Rogers and Pennington predicted that the older autistic children and adults
would show deficits in pragmatics of language and there are several ways in which
language ties into evidence on "theory of mind" deficits in autism. Firstly, it has
been remarked, ever since Kanner (1943) that autistic children have problems with
personal pronouns, specifically with "I" and "You". By 2 years of age, normal
children have mastered the use of "I/You" and "mine/yours" (Hobson, 1993).
Autistic children, however, remain inept at these distinctions for many years (Tager-
Flusberg, 1989; Lee, Hobson and Chiat, 1993). Hobson (1993) proposed that this
deficit is an early sign that there is a problem making or appreciating the self/other
distinction necessary to progress to the next level of intersubjectivity and ultimately a
theory of others minds and mental states. In addition, Tomasello et al. (1993)
suggested that the appropriate use of "I/You" required a special, more complex
imitation capacity.
Secondly, autistic children show a poverty of mental state language, not seen in
other clinical groups (Tager-Flusberg, 1989). Autistic children, when they do use
mental state terms, tend to do so in an egocentric manner, (i.e. self-referencing) or
using idiomatic phrases such as "I think so" and "I don't know" (Table 1.3 below
shows the words used in Tager-Flusberg's study). Mundy et al (1990) found that
there was no significant difference for mental state language referring to desire and
perception and actual references to mental states but significant differences were
found for attention and mental state references to cognition. They also found that
when any of the cognitive terms were used by autistic children, not one was
elaborated in any way. Subjects talked more about their own cognitions, perceptions
and desires, although there was no differences between self-reference and other-
reference for emotional mental states. Baron-Cohen et al. (1986) found that autistic
children could give mechanical accounts of a picture story but could not give
mentalistic accounts when these were more appropriate. Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan
(1994) found that autistic children failed to give appropriate explanations for
behaviour, with less use of terms of emotion, desire or cognition. Happê (1994a)
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reported that autistic subjects used as many mental state terms as controls but did not
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use these appropriately for the story context. Finally Bowler (1992) found similar
results with Aspergers subjects - a lack of appropriate mental state explanations.
Table 1.3: Lists of psychological state terms used by autistic and Down Syndrome Subjects in
Tager-Flusberg (1992). It was from this list that words were chosen for use in the observational part
of this study and on the questionnaire.
Psychological
state
Words	 used	 by
children	 in	 both
groups
Words used by
Downs Syndrome
children only
Words used by
autistic children
only
Desire care, want wish
Perception Vision look, see, watch
Hearing hear, listen, noise loud
Touch cold, hard, hot, hurt,
ouch, touch, wet
feel,	 messy,
yucky
dry, soak
Smell smell
Taste taste,	 sour,
yucky
Emotion Behaviour cry, hug, kiss, smile laugh, scream
Emotion calm,	 fun,	 happy,
hate, like, love, sad,
scare,
angry,	 better,
good,	 mad,
surprise
bad,	 upset,
worry
Cognition dream,	 know,
pretend,	 remember,
think,	 understand,
wonder
believe,	 figure,
forget,	 guess,
idea, mean, trick
make believe
v) False-belief.
I have already made mention several times of false-belief tests. It is thought
that the ability to predict behaviour on the basis of a false belief is the most
developmentally advanced ability of an understanding of mental states and the first
indication that a person has a fully developed "theory of mind". It develops further
with age, for example in the number of recursions possible. There are different levels
of false-belief - first-order (She believes that the ball is in the basket), second-order
(She believes that he thinks that the ball is in the box), although in this case the
belief in each case is mistaken because the believer has not been party to a specific
piece of information. One of the first studies of false-belief was done by Wimmer &
Perner (1983) with normal children and they found that normal children are capable
of attributing first order false-belief at approximately 4 years of age. Second order
Chapter 1: Introduction 	 70
false-belief is possibly in the 5-6 year old and higher levels are possible as the
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children increases in age. However, the basic ability seems to be there by four years
of age. Two different scenarios have been used to test for false-belief - the displaced
or disappearing contents task (Max and the Chocolate box, Wimmer Pemer, 1983;
Sally/Anne task, Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) and the mistaken or deceptive contents
task (Pencils in the Smarties box, Pemer, Frith, Leslie and Leekam (1989). These
have been done using picture stories, using dolls and using real people as actors.
The first study done on the autistic child's understanding of false-belief was
carried out by Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985). This study was the inspiration
for the Metarepresentational Hypothesis of autism and sparked off many studies on
false-belief in autism. This first study used the Sally/Anne Scenario (See Baron-
Cohen et al, 1985; Frith, 1989; Happê, 1994 for descriptions and illustrations) and
they found that 80% of autistic children failed a first-order false-belief task. Leslie
and Frith (1986) replicated this finding using real people instead of dolls in the
Hidden Coin paradigm and again in 1989 with Pemer and Leekam using the Pencils
in the Smartie tube task. Baron-Cohen (1989) tested the children who passed the
first-order false-belief task on a second-order task and found that these children now
failed on false-belief Leekam and Pemer (1991) tested autistic children on two
different types of representation tasks - false-belief and Zaitchik's (1990) false
photographs. They found that normal children found the two tasks equally difficult
but that autistic children did much better on the false-photo task than on the false-
belief task.
A few studies have not replicated Baron-Cohen et al.'s results. Prior et al.
(1990) found problems but only for 50% of the autistic subjects, compared to 16% in
the original study. Brandt & Zubris (1994) found that the autistic children in their
study did not differ from controls on tests of false-belief Ozonoff, Pennington and
Rogers (1991) found that high functioning autistic subjects showed selective deficits
in false-belief, executive functioning, emotion perception and verbal memory.
Executive function and second order false-belief deficits were more widespread in
the autistic group but first order false-belief deficit was only present in a subset of
the group.
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Other studies have found that there are autistic subjects who can pass both first
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and second order false-belief, albeit high functioning autistic subjects, and that the
ability to do this is correlated highly with other abilities such as the ability to use
mental state justifications (Bowler, 1992; Leekam and Prior, 1993; Tager-Flusberg
and Sullivan, 1994; see Happe, 1994 for a review).
A recent and very comprehensive study on Theory of Mind had been carried
out by Van der Wees and Buitelaar (1994). They tested autistic subjects on 6 first-
order tasks, 6 second-order tasks and 2 emotion perception tasks. They found that
there was a lack of constancy over the six first order tasks. The performance on
second order tasks and emotion recognition depended on both IQ and CA. Some of
the tasks were also highly correlated with verbal and visual memory skills. They also
tested overt social behaviour using Matson Evaluation of Social Skills (1985) and
found that there was no relationship between either Theory of Mind or emotion
perception and overt social behaviour. The autistic children were worse than normal
children, however, on all Theory of Mind tasks and emotion perception tasks. There
were no differences between children with autism and children with other pervasive
developmental disorders (PDD) but the PDD groups were much worse than the non-
PDD group. However, verbal memory, IQ and CA explained more variance than
diagnostic group.
In summary, it has to be said that although there is much evidence of a
problem with "theory of mind" and specifically with understanding mental states,
there is also still some uncertainty as to the universality and specificity of these
deficits in autism. There seem to be a subgroup of autistic subjects who can pass
complicated tests of Theory of Mind, yet observations of the same subjects do not
show evidence of such an ability being applied to everyday life. The most
convincing evidence seems to be of an inability to use mental state language, or to
do so in a very limited, egocentric or inappropriate manner, even when they can pass
second order false-belief tasks (discussed in Happa, 1994). However, most
researchers would agree that autistic children and adults do seem to be impaired in
their ability, at least in everyday life, to understand mental states.
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Social interaction:
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"It was observed at an early time that he was happiest when left alone, almost never
cried to go with his mother, did not seem to notice his father's homecomings, and was
indifferent to visiting relatives.... "he seems almost to draw into his shell and live
within himself' 	 He paid no attention to the persons around him. When taken into a
room, he completely disregarded the people and went for objects, preferably those
that could be spun.. .He was never angry at the interfering person... he angrily shoved
away the hand that was in his way 	 If a child took a toy from him, he passively
permitted it...." (Kanner, 1943)
Such behaviours cannot really be classed into one category for they affect play,
language and include behaviours such as joint attention, which will be dealt with in
the section on "theory of mind". For now some evidence on general social
interaction will be considered, since this is the category that will be used as a
general index of imitation in the observational study. This is probably, along with
language, the most noticeable and best-known to the layman, of the autistic
impairments and evidence for such a problem is strong and undisputed (for example,
Rutter & Schopler, 1988; Wing, 1976). As the quotation above illustrates, it was
something that Kanner noted in all the subjects that he called autistic (1943). The
very term "autistic" means "alone", itself indicative of the child's lack of social
interaction from these children. In fact he notes it over and over again in each case
study, at several points in the child's development.
I will therefore only present a few illustrations of studies on social interaction
(this category included physical contact, verbal contact, eye-contact, joint attention).
First of all, I will mention the studies of Nadel and colleagues once again to remind
the reader that even in the second and third year of life contact with a peer is the
normal state of affairs. Contact with adults is ingrained into a child's behaviour from
birth, usually due to the fact that a child is completely dependent on an adult. There
is evidence that autistic children tend to show normal attachment behaviours, and
many do enjoy interactions with adults (Sigman and Ungerer, 1984b), especially
rough and tumble play, to take but one example (Frith, 1989). However, it is well
documented that interaction with peers is greatly lacking. A study by Richer (1976)
looked at the social avoidance behaviour of autistic children and confirmed that
autistic children don't just fail to seek attention from others, they actively avoid it.
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He quotes studies by Hutt & Ounsted (1966), Hutt & Vaisey (1966), Currie &
Brannigan (1970) and Richer & Nicol (1971), all of which showed avoidance of eye
contact, more time spent on the edge of a group and predominance of "flight"
behaviour. Richer observed 8 autistic subjects and two non-autistic control groups,
during morning and afternoon breaks in the playground. He found that they engage
in very few social interactions; they often act to reduce the approaches of others;
frequently move away from others; are rarely aggressive and react to approaches by
other children with avoidance or flight behaviour, even when the approach is not
threatening.
This, in a way, was a preemption of Wing et al.'s (1979) suggestion that there
are three types of autistic children as far a social interaction is concerned - aloof
children, who resemble those described above by Richer, passive children, who
don't avoid contact and don't react to others picking them up either with pleasure or
with protest, and finally the odd child who often actively seeks contact but whose
behaviour, especially their verbal behaviour is noticeably abnormal. These are the
autistic children who come up to you, may say hello, and then proceed to ask you
your age, address, shoe size and the route on which you travelled to get to them
(Wing and Gould, 1979; Happe, 1994; Frith, 1989).
A final study in this section is one by Lord & McGill (1989). They note in their
beginning paragraph that although "autistic children's social skills with adults
improve as they grow older, interactions with other children and with adolescent
age-mates remain significantly impaired (Baltaxe & Simmons, 1983; Cantwell,
Baker & Rutter, 1977 - in Lord & McGill, 1989)". This is a very comprehensive
review of social interaction in autistic children and it also discusses many of the
methodological issues which must be borne in mind when investigating a topic like
social interaction. It offers further examples of studies which have shown that
autistic children fail to interact socially, at least with their peers.
This category of behaviour was only used as a general index of autism in the
observational study presented in Chapter 2.
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To return to Rogers and Pennington's model (1991), we can see that from
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previous literature, the areas of impairment they propose seem to be backed by some
sound evidence. Only the evidence for a deficit in imitation remains controversial.
The majority of research points to a problem with emotion expression, recognition
and sharing. There is an almost unanimous agreement that autistic children have
problems mindreading or mentalising and thus in using a Theory of Mind. The
origins of this disability are still under debate and intersubjectivity problems are just
one of the many proposals. Pretend play certainly is impaired at least when
spontaneous - a structured environment can increase the amount of pretend play
produced by autistic children. Social interaction is generally agreed to be impaired,
and there seems evidence that at least in early childhood, joint attention is impaired
as are other means of non-verbal communication, such as showing and pointing.
Language pragmatics are unequivocally impaired, specifically the use of personal
pronouns and mental state language. The most important thing, however, is to look
at how each of these behaviours are linked - only then, if a deficit in imitation is
found, can Rogers and Pennington's theory really be compared and preferred to
other theories of autism. This is what this thesis attempts to do.
Aims and Predictions
The main, overall aim of this thesis is to examine the evidence for a theory of
autism such as was proposed by Rogers and Pennington (1991). In achieving this
overall aim, the thesis examines the existence of a deficit in imitation. Unlike
previous research, this thesis aims to test imitation comprehensively - as it emerges
at different stages in development, following the theories of Piaget, in both
spontaneous and elicited situations and as it combines with other abilities such as
problem-solving abilities, memory and symbolic capacity. Performance on tests of
joint attention, emotion perception, pretend play and false-belief will also be tested
in order to examine any links which may exist between these abilities or deficits in
the case of autism and thus to further test Rogers and Pennington's (1991) theory.
Not only is this examined using a mixture of experiments designed specifically for
this study and experiments based on existing studies, but it is also examined using
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observations in a naturalistic environment of the spontaneous activity of this
particular group of subjects. 	 n•••
In order to examine the development of the abilities under scrutiny, a cross-
sectional study of autistic individuals was conducted, as suggested by Rogers and
Pennington. For most of the experiments, a group of 12 autistic children and 12
autistic adults were used with a CA range of 7 to 33 years. For the imitation
experiments a third group of six autistic children were used and these were young
children aged between 4 and 8 years of age. This wide CA range also represented a
wide range of verbal MAs and developmental ages, from 18 months to 11 years. The
control groups were also chosen with this issue of development in mind. For
example, there were two groups of normal children, one aged 3-4 years and one aged
5-6 years. These groups were chosen to represent the change in many aspects of
development around 4 years of age (Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Nadel and Camioni,
1993). In addition, since my choice of autistic subjects was limited, it was necessary
to have a younger group of children against which those autistic children who had an
MA below four years could be compared. Finally, a group of children with mild to
moderate learning difficulties were included so as to establish whether any deficits
found in autism were specific to autism or whether they were a result of general
learning difficulties. Again due to difficulties in recruiting subjects, it was not
possible for this group to be matched identically with either of the autistic groups.
However, a subset of non-autistic children were matched identically with a subset of
autistic subjects on the basis of chronological age, mental age on the British Picture
Vocabulary Scale and on the raw score for the Test for Reception of Grammar, a
more stringent test of verbal ability.'
Few studies have used autistic adults, except when they have been very high
functioning (Bowler, 1992; Happe, 1994b) so seeing how autistic adults perform on
these tasks, in comparison to autistic children should prove very interesting. It is
therefore very difficult to predict the results for the present study from previous
literature. However, we must recap that Rogers and Pennington (1991) predicted that
3 It had been intended to also test for non-verbal mental age after the school holidays, but on
preparing to do so, I discovered that almost a third of my experimental group at the autistic school
had left to go elsewhere. Since these children were from all over Scotland it was not possible to
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young autistic children would show a profile of deficits in elicited imitation, joint
attention, pretend play and emotion sharing. Older —children and adults, on the other
hand, would show a profile of deficits in theory of mind (false-belief), affect praxis
and language pragmatics. Unfortunately, Rogers and Pennington did not specify
what they meant by young so it is only possible to make some general predictions
for the three groups.
As far as imitation is concerned, the autistic adults should be reasonably able
on the tests of elicited imitation although they may have more problems with
deferred and problem-solving behaviour, since these involve other abilities as well
as imitation. The group of young autistic children would for the most part have the
most problems with imitation. Within the school age group there should be positive
relationships between age and elicited imitation. The amount of imitation showed
spontaneously should be negatively related to age, as Nadel proposed. Deferred
imitation and imitation as a problem-solving tool on a novel object have not been
examined before in autistic subjects, so it is not possible to make predictions. I
would also predict that imitation involving any form of pretense (Stone et al., 1990;
Heinmann et al., 1992; Curcio and Piscerchia, 1978), should be affected while others
remain intact, at least in the older children. With regard to the other distinctions
between imitation of different actions (Smith and Bryson, 1994), few predictions can
be made as no one has examined this before.
Other more specific predictions are as follows:
1) In the observational study, autistic subjects should show less social
interaction, especially with peers (Richer, 1986; Strain and Cooke, 1976; Lord and
McGill, 1989); less imitation, pretend play, and evidence of a "theory of mind", e.g.
joint attention, use of mental state language, empathy and teasing, lying, joking and
deception. Autistic subjects should also show more manipulative and relational play
than non-autistic subjects (Kanner, 1943; Wing and Gould, 1979; Lewis and
Boucher, 1988; Baron-Cohen, 1987 and 1989; Frith 1989; Tager-Flusberg, 1989).
follow them up to complete testing, so testing for non-verbal mental age was abandoned, although it
is acknowledged that this would have been an invaluable addition to this thesis.
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2) On the false-belief task, autistic children and adults should do significantly
—
worse than non-autistic children, although it is expected that some of the autistic
subjects might pass (16-20% in Baron-Cohen et al. 1985).
3) Autistic subjects (especially the younger children) should be more likely to
show problems with joint attention tasks but not with visual perspective-taking tasks
(Baron-Cohen, 1989; Leekam et al., 1993; Tan and Harris, 1991).
4) Emotion perception tasks are likely to prove more difficult for autistic
subjects than non-autistic subjects (e.g. Hobson, 1986a).
The next chapter will look at all these behaviours as they occur spontaneously
in a naturalistic setting.
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CHAPTER 2
IMITATION, THEORY OF MIND AND PLAY IN AUTISM - AN
OBSERVATIONAL STUDY
INTRODUCTION:
As was discussed in Chapter 1, the underlying cause of autism is now
considered to be biological (Morton, 1989; Frith et a!., 1991) but where the precise
problem lies is still a long way from being established. Theories of what underlies the
disorder have concentrated on behavioural and psychological characteristics. This
study uses as a guiding line the Intersubjectivity Theory of Rogers and Pennington
(1991). Rogers and Pennington have drawn together two earlier theories - the
Affective Theory of Hobson (1986) and the Cognitive Theory of Baron-Cohen, Leslie
and Frith (1985) but have incorporated an additional factor - a deficit in imitation.
Although the researchers involved have somewhat changed or expanded their original
theories (See for example, Hobson, 1993; Frith, 1992; Baron-Cohen, 1994), the basis
of these theories have remained either respectively intersubjective or cognitive in
nature, the latter still advocating mentalising as the main deficit seen in autism.
It is well known that imitation, the new focus in Rogers and Pennington's
(1991) theory, plays an important part in normal children's development, for example,
in acquisition of language and social skills (Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner, 1993).
Imitation has been shown to function in normal development when the child is very
young, in fact as soon as the child is born (Meltzoff, 1988; Meltzoff and Moore, 1989;
Kugiumutzakis, in press). As the infant grows up imitation becomes an important
aspect of mother-infant interactions (Trevarthen, 1977, 1979; Stern, 1985). Meltzoff
& Gopnik (1993) proposed that imitation is essential in establishing primary
intersubjectivity as described by Hobson (1993b) - through imitation an infant comes
to learn the similarities between other persons and itself. In later childhood, imitation
becomes an important tool for pre-schoolers, as a way of playing and communicating
with peers (See Nadel, 1986 and Nadel and Camioni, 1993 for reviews). After four
years of age, language becomes an efficient means of communication and imitation is
then mostly used for learning, both consciously and unconsciously or for being funny
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or naughty, as, for example, in mimicking (Nadel and Camioni, 1993; personal
observations).
As was described in chapter 1, there is as yet little conclusive support for Rogers
and Pennington's theory, as there are ambiguities and disagreements in the evidence
that autistic individuals show a deficit in imitation, and that such a deficit is specific
to autism. Some studies used no control children, some had small sample groups.
Only one study by Heimann et al (1992) promised a comprehensive look at immediate
imitation but this was only a preliminary study and the full study is still awaited.
Some studies found that autistic children had problems with gestural and vocal
imitation as one of the sensorimotor skills (Jones and Prior, 1985; Sigman and
Ungerer, 1984; Herzig, Snow and Sherman, 1989; Abrahamsen and Mitchell, 1990),
while others found no deficits using tests of sensorimotor skills (Morgan et al., 1989;
Thatcher, 1977). Other studies looking at gestural imitation found deficits (DeMyer et
al, 1972; Ohta, 1987; Stone et al., 1990; Heimann et al, 1992) while, once again,
others found no deficits in simple gestural imitation (Charman and Baron-Cohen,
1994; Curcio and Piserchia, 1978). Most studies found that autistic children had no
problems with imitation of actions with objects, unless the actions were of a symbolic
nature - all those studies that examined imitation of symbolic actions agree that there
is a deficit, which is consistent with the poor pretend play skills of autistic children.
(DeMyer et al., 1972; Curcio and Pischeria, 1978; Hammes and Langdell, 1981;
Heimann et al., 1992; Rogers and McEvoy, 1993; Charman and Baron-Cohen, 1994).
Stone et al. (1990), on the other hand, did find some impairments in imitation of
actions with objects, but this was the only study to do so. Finally, there is also
evidence that, even if autistic children cannot imitate, they can benefit from being
imitated. Imitation of the child can increase mutual eye gaze, social interaction and
appropriate behaviours (Dawson and Adams, 1984; Dawson and Galpert, 1990).
The main aim of the study reported in this chapter was to conduct observations
of spontaneous behaviour in four major categories - (1) Play, (2) Evidence of "theory
of mind", (3) Imitation and (4) Social Interaction, this final category being used as a
general index of behavioural differences in autism. The behaviours for which the
children were observed within these categories were designed to correspond to deficits
proposed by Rogers and Pennington (based on the theory of Stern, 1985) as linked to
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imitation in development, although not all the categories observed mapped directly
onto Rogers and Pennington's model. Subcategories of b—ehaviours within the category
of evidence of "theory of mind", for example, included joint attention, use of mental
state language, empathy and evidence of mental state understanding and manipulation
such as teasing, joking, lying and deception. Rogers and Pennington only mentioned
joint attention and lump the others together under "Theory of Mind", emotion
perception and sharing, and social pragmatic problems. Only the deficit in pretend
play was mentioned in Rogers and Pennington's theory but it was felt interesting to
observe other types of play too, especially to aid with the design of later experiments.
Different types of imitation were observed such as vocal, gestural, and actions with
objects, both non-symbolic and symbolic. These categories were designed to map
unto the different manifestations of an ability to imitate such as proposed by Piaget.
Finally, different levels of play were observed from manipulative and relational play
to symbolic play.
The observational study reported here was carried out in the spirit of ethology,
the main aim being to establish the natural frequency of some of the behaviours to be
tested for experimentally in later studies. Given the fact that it was not feasible to
bring the children into the unnatural environment of a laboratory (or in the case of
many autistic subjects, into any standardised and thus alarmingly novel setting) this
study was necessarily not an attempt to directly compare the behaviours between
groups It was instead a quantified examination of what the autistic children and adults
chose to do in the natural situation in which they spent most of their lives. This must
be born in mind when interpreting the results.
Such an observational study is important for several reasons. Firstly, remarkably
few naturalistic data are available for any of the categories described above, except for
social interaction (Richer, 1976; Strain & Cooke ,1976; McHale, 1983; Lord and
McGill, 1989). A number of studies have looked at the spontaneous behaviour of
autistic children, especially with regard to play behaviours, but most of these have
been conducted in an experimental setting, i.e. in a separate room, usually with the
experimenter present (Lewis and Boucher, 1988; Baron-Cohen, 1987; Mundy et al.,
1986; Gould, 1986; Sigman & Ungerer, 1984c). There have been two studies to my
knowledge that have looked at autistic children in a naturalistic environment. Firstly,
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Wing, Gould, Yeates and Brierly (1977) report data mostly of an observational nature
from the Camberwell study. Secondly, Ungerer and Siginan (1981) observed autistic
and non-autistic children at home for 6 x 16 minute sessions over the course of a year.
The second reason for conducting an observational study of an ethological
nature was that observational data would provide a profile of everyday behaviour
against which the significance of later experimental results could be evaluated.
Additionally, observations of the autistic children have allowed confirmation of a
diagnosis of autism and aided the design of imitation tasks for use in the later
experimental battery. Finally, the observational study allowed the experimenter to
become familiar with each child (and vice-versa), with whom experiments would later
be conducted.
Rogers and Pennington (1991) predicted that there would be a dissociation
between vocal and body imitation, with any impairment being in body imitation. It is
well known that autistic children engage in a form of vocal imitation called echolalia.
They also predicted a different pattern of deficits for young autistic children and
adults as is described in Chapter 1. To recap, they predicted that autistic children
would show deficits in imitation, joint attention, symbolic play and emotion sharing,
while older autistic children and adults would show deficits in theory of mind, affect
praxis and language pragmatics. Unfortunately, we can not be sure at what age Rogers
and Pennington felt this change would become noticeable. The broad aim of this study
was therefore descriptive and open-ended, in the spirit of ethology. However, review
of the literature on autism and Rogers and Pennington's theory permitted a number of
predictions, as follows:
• Young autistic individuals would show less imitation of actions than older autistic
children and adults (Rogers and Pennington, 1991) and than the comparison
groups ( De Myer et al., 1972; Jones and Prior, 1985; Stone et al., 1990.) The
vocal imitation known as echolalia, the "mindless" repetition of a word or phrase
is a well-known product of the disorder of autism, and was coded separately where
possible. Rogers and Pennington predicted that vocal imitation in autistic
individuals would not differ from that of controls because of ccholalia.
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• Autistic individuals would show more manipulative and relational play/activity
than other groups (Kanner 1945; Wing, 1976; Frith, 1989 among others), but less
symbolic play (Baron-Cohen, 1987; Lewis and Boucher, 1988) and less functional
play (Lewis and Boucher, 1988).
• Contact with adults would be relatively equal across groups but contact with peers
would be impaired in the autistic groups (Richer, 1986; Lord and McGill, 1989;
Strain & Cooke, 1976).
• A Theory of Mind would be less in evidence in autistic individuals (Baron-Cohen
et al., 1985; see Happe, 1994 and Frith 1989 for reviews). Problems with joint
attention would be more noticeable in younger autistic children, while autistic
adults would show more problems with other aspects of theory of mind such as
deception and less empathy relative to controls.
Methods.
Subjects:
Table 2.1 shows the subjects in each group. All subjects were tested on the
British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) and all except some of the youngest normal
children were tested on the Test for Reception on Grammar (TROG), which is
considered a more stringent test of verbal ability. The TROG raw scores are only age-
calibrated for those scoring higher than five, with this equalling a verbal mental age
(MA) of 4 years. Since most of those 3-4 year olds who were tested, and some of the
autistic children, did not manage to score 5 on the TROG, the raw scores were used
for comparison purposes rather than the age equivalents. The CA of each group and
the mean raw score on the TROG and Mean raw score and verbal MA on the BPVS
are presented in Table 2.1 below. In addition to the group of autistic children (CA
12;1 MA: 4;9) and the group of autistic adults (CA 24;8; MA 6;9), two groups of
normal children, one aged between 3-4 years of age (CA: 3;4 MA: 3;6) and one
between 5-6 years of age (CA:5;4, MA 5;7) were observed. These ages were chosen
for two reasons. It was mentioned in Chapter 1 that the age of 4 years seems to be a
magical age in development. It is at this age that the purpose of imitation changes
(Nadel, 1986; Nadel and Camioni, 1993), false-belief ability emerges (Wimmer &
Perner, 1983) and the children first begin to go to school. The age of four years has
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often been called the Theory of Mind "watershed" and because of this most studies
intending to examine Theory of Mind related behaviours save chosen autistic children
above 4 years in mental age. Unfortunately, I could not be quite so selective with the
subjects in this study and so this study had to use some children and adults of a verbal
age less than four, but whom the experimenter was satisfied could understand the
instructions to be used in later experiments. This was the second reason for including
the two normal groups so that comparisons could later be made. Finally, a group of
children with mild to moderate learning disabilities (MLD - CA:11;8 MA 6;2) were
used as a comparison group. Although the children with learning disabilities had a
higher MA than the autistic children, they performed on the mental age tests at a
similar level to the autistic adults. In the following experimental studies, subgroups of
children from the autistic and non-autistic groups were able to be matched on CA,
MA and TROG raw score.
The autistic children were all attending the same special school for children
with autism and communication disorders (Struan House School in Alloa). They had
all been assessed by the headmaster of the school as autistic, having been referred by
clinical or educational psychologist. All but one child in the study group, who lived
locally, were residential at the school during the week but went home to their parents
at the weekend. The full clinical background for the autistic group was not madde
available to the author but a series of initial observations satisfied the first author that
all the children in the autistic group met the DSM-111-R criteria for autism and did
not have any noticeable motor problems, which might affect imitation. Additionally, a
questionnaire, designed around both the DSM-111-R and the Childhood Autism
Rating Scale, (See Appendix 2.2) was given to the parents and care staff of the autistic
children, to confirm the diagnosis and to indicate whether the observations in the
school situation were consistent with the rest of the autistic children's life. All the care
staff returned their questionnaires and these confirmed the autistic symptoms
displayed by the children. Of the 6 parents who replied (50%) all reported that their
child had been diagnosed as autistic and they described an onset of symptoms roughly
around 30 months, commenting that they had become worried about their child
sometime between birth and 2 years of age.
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Table 2.1: Subject groups used in the observational study, with mean chronological age (CA), Mental
age on British Picture Vocabulary Scale (MABPVS) and mean raw score on the Test for Reception of
Grammar (TROG).
GROUP TROG SCORE MA BPVS CA
autistic children 6 4;8 12;6
n=12 (3.9) (1;8) (2;9)
(1 -> 12) (2,2 -> 8,3) (7,2 ->15,10)
autistic adults 7 6;9 24;11
n=12 (3.8) (1;10) (4;7)
(2->14) (4,10->10,2) (17,5-33,11)
MLD 6.5 5;7 11;5
n=12 (2.3) (3;2) (2;10)
(2 -> 10) (2,2 -> 13) (8,2 -> 16,0)
5-6 year olds 11 5;7 5;4
n=12 (3.8) (1;8) (0;4)
(5 -> 17) (3,2 - > 7,9) (5 -> 6,2)
3-4	 year	 olds 4 (N=8) 3;6 3;7
n=12 (1.7) (1;1) (0;3)
(2->6) (2,6 -> 4;5) (3;3 -> 3;11)
The autistic adults were all attending a residential training centre (Balmyre
Training Centre, Alloa) and varied in the amount of independence they had - most of
them lived in the residential house but some of them were able enough to live in flats
of four people with a carer. During the day they engaged, depending on their abilities,
in various activities such as woodwork, pottery, glasswork, computer studies, general
studies, music, drama, art and crafts, community based work and sports. Once again
the medical records were not made available but staff provided the necessary
information and initial observations satisfied the author that all the adults to be studied
were autistic.
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There were problems recruiting children with learning disabilities who did not
show any autistic tendencies. In the end it was necessary to recruit from the special
education units of three local schools - one primary and two secondary schools. In the
selection process, the author was given, by the headmaster or headmistress of each
school, a list of children who were not diagnosed as autistic. The author then observed
the children during their normal school activities and selected those not showing
autistic tendencies. The children were of mixed aetiology, but in general they had
mild to moderate learning disabilities. One boy had Down's Syndrome.
The 3-4 year old children all attended the Puffin Playgroup, attached to the
School of Psychology at the University of St.Andrews. The attendance of each child
varied from two mornings a week to 5 mornings a week. The 5-6 year old children all
attended Preprep 1 at New Park School, St. Andrews.
Procedure:
All the groups except the 3-4 year old children were observed in their school/training
centre situation, in as naturalistic a way as possible. Six sessions of direct
observations were taken per child using a one-zero sampling method, with a time
interval of one minute. Each session lasted 15 minutes so that the total time each child
was observed was 90 minutes. Each child was observed in broadly similar situations,
for example at academic activities, in gym, at music, and at free play. Behaviour was
scored as spontaneous when it was initiated by the child and not prompted by any
adults, although if the child continued a behaviour for more than one minute after
being prompted and without further prompting, then this behaviour was noted as
spontaneous. (This usually occurred in the category of functional activity). Each
category was divided into subcategories, illustrated in Figure 1. Full definitions of
each category and subcategory can be found in Appendix 2.1. Examples of the types
of behaviour coded for each subcategory are available in Appendix 2.3.
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Figure 2.1: Categories and subcategories for the observational study, with keys for Figures 2.2-2.11
(See Appendix 2.1 for definitions of categories and subcategories).
Categories	 Subcategories	 Graph codes
Studyl Study 2
Play	 General Motor	 (GM)	 1
Manipulative	 (Man) 2
Relational	 (Re!)	 3
Functional
	
(Func) 4
Symbolic	 (Sym)	 5
Social Interaction	 With Adult	 (Adt)	 6
With Peer
	
(Peer)	 7
Evidence of Theory
	
Mental State Language 	 (MSL)
of Mind	 Joint Attention	 (JA)	 8
Empathy	 (EMP) 9
Use of Mental State Understanding(UMS) 10
Imitation	 Vocal - speech
	
(VI)	 11
- non-speech
Body/gestural	 (BIG)	 12
Non-Symbolic actions with objects (NSO) 13
Symbolic actions with objects.
	 (SO)	 14
A video-taped sample of a fifteen minute observation for six children in three
groups (autistic children, 3-4 year olds and 5-6 year olds) was independently coded by
a second observer, i.e. 18 children were coded independently, with a total observation
time of 270 minutes. The total scores for each group (6 children in each group), over
all 17 behaviours as coded by the two observers (i.e. 17 pairs of numbers), were
compared using a Pearson's product moment correlation. Inter-observer reliability
was high, with an average r value of 0.87 over the three correlation's (Pearsons
Product Moment Correlation, range = 0.77 to 0.96)
Data Analysis:
One-way Analyses of Variance and Newman-Keuls post-hoc tests were used to
compare behavioural frequencies between groups of subjects on each general category
and each major sub-category of behaviour. Since a large number of ANOVAs had to
be conducted in this analysis, only those where the main effect was significant at 0.01
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level will be reported. The degrees of freedom were the same for each analysis -
between groups = 4; within groups = 57. All F-values reported are for the main effect
analysis. Differences between groups are reported when the Newman-Keules posthoc
tests were significant at 0.05 level.
Results:
The Questionnaire:
Because the questionnaire was intended mainly as a tool by which to confirm
the autistic diagnosis of these children and to provide extra anecdotal evidence of
behaviours present or absent in autism, the results from the questionnaires were not
analysed statistically. However, there are a few interesting points that should be
mentioned. A copy of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix 2.2.
There was a 50% return rate from the parents and a 100% return rate from the
care staff at the residential part of the school. For the six children for whom two
questionnaires were available, there was an average agreement between what parents
and care-staff said on only 51% of the questions (agreement was coded as when both
the parents and care staff reported that the child never did something, or when they
both said they child did a behaviour at least sometimes). The differences between the
parents and school staff were accounted for by the fact that parents were more likely
to say that their child did the behaviours which a specific question was targeting.
Parents also tended to provide more information and examples of their children's
behaviour and also tended to attempt to paint a better picture of their children than the
care staff did. For example, the parents were more likely to say their children never
lied or deceived them, whereas the care staff provided some examples of simple
deception and lies. Some of the examples given by care staff are presented along with
other observational case records in Appendix 2.4.
The questionnaire confirmed a diagnosis of autism or at least the presence of
severe autistic tendencies for all the children assessed. On a few of the questions the
judgement of either the parents or care staff or both did not agree with what was
observed in the present study. For example, within the category of social interaction,
six of the children were scored as interacting often with other children (50%),
although many of these instances were rough and tumble play. Two children used
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verbal means to communicate and interact socially. Within the category of imitation,
seven children showed vocal imitation, six showed body/gestural imitation, four
imitate facial expressions and five imitated actions with objects (out of 12 children).
However, what cannot be ascertained by questionnaire was the exact definition the
parents and staff were using for imitation. Echolalia could have accounted for most of
the actions with objects and social facilitation for the imiation of actions with objects.
Within the category of play, seven children were considered as never engaging in any
manipulative or relational play, which is very different from the picture seen in the
schooltime observation - again this may have been a problem with definitions. Within
the category of evidence of "theory of mind", judgements agreed with what was
observed, although seven children were scored as comforting people who were upset
(an example of empathy) and one as getting upset when someone else was upset. The
parents were more likely to score positively on this.
However, for the most part, judgements about specific categories of behaviour
agreed with the observational results to be reported in the remainder of this chapter,
although this tended to be the judgements of the care staff. There are two possible
explanations of the descrepencies between the reports of the parents and care staff.
Firstly, perhaps autistic children do behave differently at home than at school, even at
residential school. Perhaps the home environment does make their autistic symptoms
appear less severe. Secondly, it is also possible that parents were doing one of two
things when answering the questionnaire - they could either have been interpreting the
questions differently than intended when the questionnaire was designed or they could
have been using a form of positive thinking or optimism as a way of coping with their
child's disorder. Either way, this is an interesting question which should spark further
research.
D 3-4 years
•
5-6 years
D MLD
Aut Ch
D Aut adt
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Observational results: Major Behaviour Categories:
Figure 2.2: Mean number of minutes (and standard error) in which each category of behaviour was observed
at least once during 90 minute session, for each group during the schooltime (ToM = Evidence of Theory of Mind,
W/O ech = imitation without echolalia).
Mean number of minutes
80 —
Play	 Contact	 ToM
	
Imitation	 W/O ech
Figure 2.2 summarises comparisons between the four samples of children and
one sample of autistic adults for the main behaviour categories. An ANOVA found a
main effect within the category of play (F=5.64 p<0.001) and post hoc tests revealed
this to be accounted for by the 3-4 year old group, who showed more play than all
other groups. The autistic adults also showed more spontaneous play/activity than the
autistic children. There was also a group difference within the category of social
interaction (F=23.05 p<0.001) - the 3-4 year olds and the 5-6 year olds showed more
social interaction than all other groups but the MLD group also showed significantly
more social interaction than the autistic children and adults. On evidence of Theory of
Mind there was a main effect (F=4.91 p<0.01), with the 3-4 year old group and the
MLD group both showing more evidence than both autistic groups. There were no
differences between control groups. There was no difference between the four
"school" groups on imitation: only the 3-4 year olds in the play group showed more
imitation than all other groups (main effect with echolalia: F=6.02 p<0.001; main
effect without echolalia F=13.79 p<0.001). Overall in these everyday contexts,
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evidence of ToM and imitation was rare relative to the frequency of play and (for the
non-autistic groups) social behaviour.
Subcategories of behaviour:
Play
Figure 2.3: Mean number of minutes (and standard errors) in which each subcategory of
behaviour within the main category of PLAY, was observed at least once within the 90 minute session for
each group during schoolstausbulmemtkopation.
Mean number of minutes
50 —
Groups
N.B. G/M = General motor play
Man/Rdl = Manipulative or relational play.
Funct = Functional play.
Symb = Symbolic play.
Within the category of play (Figure 2.3) there were main effects on ANOVAs for
manipulative/relational play (F=5.44 p<0.001) and symbolic play (F=8.77 p<0.001).
In manipulative/relational activity, the autistic children and adults both showed more
of this type of this type of behaviour than all control groups. In functional activity
there was a difference between both the 3-4 year old children and autistic children,
and the autistic adults and the autistic children but this was only significant at 0.05
level (main effect F=5.44). The final difference was between the 3-4 year olds and all
other groups on symbolic activity.
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10.
Social Interaction
Figure 2.4: Mean number of minutes (and standard errors) in which social interaction with adult's and peers, was
observed at least once during 90 minute session for each group during
Mean number of minutes
	 schooltime observations.
40 —
Figure 2.4 illustrates the results within the category of social interaction. There were
no group differences for social interaction with adults, but all control groups showed
more social interaction with their peers than the two autistic groups. There was also a
difference between the normal groups and the MLD children (Main effect: F=29.52
p<0.001).
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Theory of Mind
Figure 2.5: Mean number of minutes (and standard errors) in which each subcategory within the
category of Evidence of Theory of Mind, was observed at least once, during 90 minute session for each
observation	 group during schooltime observations.
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N.B. MLS = Mental State Languge
JA = Joint Attention
Emp = Empathy
UMS = Use of mental state understanding.
Within the category of evidence of Theory of Mind (see Figure 2.5) there was no
difference between groups for Mental State language but the was a main effect within
the category of joint attention (F=4.76 p<0.01). The 3-4 year olds and MLD groups
showed more Joint Attention than both autistic groups There were no significant
differences for either empathy (which was rarely observed) or use of mental state
understanding.
AONS AOSB/G
93
Imitation
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Figure 2.6: mean number of minutes (and standard errors) in which each subcategory of
IMITATION was observed for each group during 90 minutes of schooltime observations
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N.B. Vocal = vocal imitation
W/O Ech = vocal imitation disregarding clear examples of echolalia.
BIG = Body/gestural imitation
AONS = Actions with objects - non-symbolic.
AOS = Actions with objects - symbolic.
Finally, within the category of imitation (See Figure 2.6) there were main effects for
vocal imitation when echolalia was discarded (F=8.96 p<0.001) and body/gestural
imitation (F=9.08 P<0.001). It was the 3-4 year olds who showed more vocal
imitation than the other groups and also more body/gestural imitation.
Table 2.2 summarises the percentage of each group showing each subcategory of
behaviour for the schooltime observations. Fisher tests were carried out for the
number of children in each group carrying out each behaviour at least once. The
results of these Fisher tests are also presented in Table 2.2. The most striking results
are for symbolic play, interaction with peers and joint attention.
Chapter 2: An Observational Study
To examine the relationship between the abilities observed and both the mental
age and the chronological age of the autistic children, a series of Pearson Product
Moment correlations between childrens behaviour score and their CA, MA BPVS and
TROG raw score were carried out. When the correlations were caned out across all
groups there were three correlations significant between chronological age and contact
with peer (r = 0.65 p<0.001), vocal imitation without echolalia (r = -0.36 p<0.01) and
symbolic play (r = -0.48 p<0.01). Although only significant at 0.05 level, there was
also a trend for other negative correlations between CA and body/gestural imitation
(r = -0.38) and joint attention (r = -0.29). Because of the extreme ages of the autistic
adults, the analysis was repeated without the adults - most of the relationship with CA
remained. In addition to relationships with symbolic play, contact with peers, vocal
imitation without echolalia, symbolic play, joint attention and body gestural imitation,
there was also a trend towards a negative relationship between CA and both
functional play (r = -0.36) and imitation of non-speech sounds (r = -0.33), although
both of these were only significant at the 0.05 level. There is a trend for children with
lower TROG scores to produce more relational play (r = -0.30 p<0.05) and for those
with higher a MA (on the BPVS) to show more evidence of mental state
understanding (r = 0.30 p<0.05). When the autistic groups only are analysed the only
significant correlation is a nigative one between TROG score and the amount of
manipulative play produced (r = -0.42 p<0.05). This relationship is not found when
just the autistic children and analsyed.
Because of previous findings (Nadel, 1993) and the comments given by parents
on the questionnaires, it was decided to look in a little more detail at imitation and
symbolic play. When the autistic group was divided into two groups, above and below
the median age for the group (done for both MA and CA: Median MA = 4;0; median
CA = 12;7), and a series of Fisher tests carried out and it was found that those below
the median CA tended to imitate at least once, while those above the median CA
tended not to imitate (p<0.01). For symbolic play, those above the median age on both
CA and MA did not engage in any symbolic play, while those below the median age
tended to do so (p<0.05 for both CA and MA). To summarise, the pattern seen in this
group of autistic children seems to reflect normal development in that it is the
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youngest children in the group (with an MA below 4 years) who engage in imitation
lige
and symbolic play. The CA of those children who show imitation is much higher than
the normal children but it is the youngest children in the group who tend to show
these behaviours. They do not do so as prolifically as normal 3-4 year olds but there is
a "normal" developmental trend for at least these behaviours in autism.
STUDY 2:
During observations it was recognised that there were many differences between
groups' typical environments, particularly between school and play group, which
could have affected some play behaviours, social interaction with peers (frowned
upon in some settings), imitation and evidence of Theory of Mind. Thus, a second
study was carried out on the same autistic children, the same 5-6 year old children and
a new group of three year old children but observed in the same Playgroup as those
children in the first study. This time the children were observed at morning break and
dinner time, to avoid the direct constraints of the school situation and make the groups
more comparable environmentally. One hour's observation was taken for each group
using video recordings and each hour was analysed in two ways. Firstly, the whole
group was coded for each behaviour, so that when one of the twelve children in each
group initiated one of the target behaviours, that behaviour was coded as occurring.
The number of minutes during which each behaviour was observed once was recoded
a percentage of the total time observed, in order to make comparisons. Secondly, six
children in each group were focused on and their behaviour was coded as a percentage
of the total time observed (each child was observable for different lengths of time). An
ANOVA showed no statistical difference between these two methods so only the
results of the six focal observations per group are presented in the figures below.
Two time intervals were used in the coding of this study. To compare the play
situation with the school situation an interval of one minute was used, as well as an
interval of 10 seconds to allow more detailed analysis. The check sheet was divided
into 10 second intervals for the coding of the video-taped sessions and then recoded
into which behaviours appeared at least once in every 6 10 second intervals.
Interobserver reliability was tested using Pearson's product moment
correlations. An independent observer watched video-taped observations of the six
133-4 yrs
•5-6 yrs
0Aut Ch
Play Contact ToM Imitation
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focal children in the 5-6 year old group and the autistic group. The average scores of
the six children in each group were calculated for the two observers and these were
compared in an overall correlation across all fourteen behaviours. An r value of 0.63
(p<0.01) for the autistic group and 0.99 (p<0.01) for the 5-6 year olds, confirmed that
interobserver reliability was high.
Results of Playtime observations:
Results for the general categories of behaviour:
Figure 2.7: Mean time (and standard errors) in which each major category of behaviour was observed once
during 90 minutes of playtime observations (expressed as the sum of the subcategories, which were expressed as
as a percentage of total time observed).
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In the general categories of behaviours (See Figure 2.7), there were significant
group differences for play (F=3.78 p<0.05), social interaction (F= 7.10 p<0.01), and
evidence of theory of mind (F=13.77 p<0.001; within groups df. = 17, between groups
= 17 for all analyses in this part of study 2). Autistic children showed less play than
the two control groups and less social interaction than the 5-6 year old group as did
the 3-4 year old children. The autistic and 3-4 year old children also showed less
evidence of Theory of Mind than the 5-6 year olds. There were no significant
differences for imitation.
For the analysis of the 10 sec intervals, the results followed a similar pattern to
the one-minute-interval analysis. There were significant group differences within the
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categories of play F=11.04 p<0.01), social interaction (F=21.85 p<0.001) and
evidence of Theory of Mind (F=4.45 p<0.05). The autistic children showed less of all
three categories than the 5-6 year old children (Newman-Keuls p<0.05). Within the
subcategories of behaviour, the same pattern also emerged as for the one-minute
interval. The only difference was that, as indicated by larger F-ratios, there was an
accentuation of the group differences in the 10 second interval analysis. One possible
explanation is that the 5-6 year old children engage, for example, in social interaction
with peers for longer periods of time - i.e. for more than one 10 second interval in
every minute. The autistic group might engage in each behaviour once in the minute
but the other groups would engage in the behaviour 3 or 4 times in a minute.
Results from subcategories of behaviour:
In the subcategories there were significant differences in functional play
(F=7.503 p<0.01), contact with peers (F=8.71 p<0.01) and joint attention (F=13.77
p<0.001). The autistic children showed less functional play than both the control
groups. The autistic children showed less interaction with peers than the 5-6 year olds.
Finally, joint attention was seen much more prominently in the 5-6 year olds.
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Figure 2.8a: Mean percentage of minutes and standard errors in which each category of actions was
observed once during SCHOOLTIME obTervations.
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N.B. 1 = general motor play; 2 = manipulative play; 3 = relational play; 4 = functional play; 5 = symbolic play; 6 = social
interaction with adults; 7 = social interaction with peers; 8 = joint attention; 9 = Empathy; 10 = use of mental state
understanding; 11 = vocal imitation; 12 = body/gestural imitation; 13 = imitation of actions with objects (non-symbolic); and
14 = imitation of actions with objects (symbolic).
There were no statistical differences overall between the two 3-4 year old
groups, who were, after all, observed in the same Playgroup. Therefore, no further
detailed analysis was warranted on the subcategories for this age group ( the analysis
for the Playgroup situation has already been described above).
Figure 2.8a is a summary of the results of the school time observations for the
autistic and 5-6 year old children. It reminds us that the autistic children showed more
manipulative play, less functional activity and less contact with peers than the 5-6
year olds. Figure 2.8b summarises what was found for the two groups at play - the
autistic children show less functional play, less contact with peer and less joint
attention than the 5-6 year old groups.
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Figure 2.8b: Mean percentage of minutes spent in which each Igbcategory of behaviour was observed once
during PLAYTIME observations.
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N.B. 1 = general motor play; 2 = manipulative play; 3 = relational play; 4 = functional play; 5 = symbolic play; 6 = social
interaction with adults; 7 = social interaction with peers; 8 = joint attention; 9 = Empathy; 10 = use of mental state
understanding; 11 = vocal imitation; 12 = body/gestural imitation; 13 = imitation of actions with objects (non-symbolic); and
14 = imitation of actions with objects (symbolic).
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Comparing the two situations via Figures 2.8a and 2.8b, it can be seen that the
main difference is an accentuation of the group differences in the play situation.
However, there is a similar pattern of differences in both situations (there were also a
few differences between the two situations for each group, explained further in the
discussion below). Within the subcategory of joint attention (F=25.28 p<0.001 within
subjects df = 23, between subjects = 3), the 5-6 year old children showed more joint
attention at play than at school. Within social interaction with peers (13.05 p<0.001),
both the 5-6 year olds and autistic children showed more contact with peers at play
than schools. The 5-6 year olds also showed more functional activity at play (main
effect: F=7.82 p<0.01). These are summarised in Figures 2.9a and 2.9b.
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Figure 2.9a: Mean Percentage of minutes spent by the autistic. children in each subcategory of
behaviour during school and playtime observations (see Figure 2.1 for key to subcategories).
Mean percentage of minutes
N.B. 1 = general motor play; 2 = manipulative play; 3 = relational play; 4 = functional play; 5 = symbolic play; 6 = social
interaction with adults; 7 = social interaction with peers; 8 = joint attention; 9 = Empathy; 10 = use of mental state
understanding; 11 = vocal imitation; 12 = body/gestural imitation; 13 = imitation of actions with objects (non-symbolic); and
14 = imitation of actions with objects (symbolic).
Figure 2.9b: Mean percentage of minutes for the 5-6 year old children in which each subcategory of behaviour
was observed once during school and playtime observations.
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N.B. 1 = general motor play; 2 = manipulative play; 3 = relational play; 4 = functional play; 5 = symbolic play; 6 = social
interaction with adults; 7 = social interaction with peers; 8 = joint attention; 9 = Empathy; 10 = use of mental state
understanding; 11 = vocal imitation; 12 = body/gestural imitation; 13 = imitation of actions with objects (non-symbolic); and
14 = imitation of actions with objects (symbolic).
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To further compare the two situations, the percentage of total play for each
subcategory of play was calculated. This was only done for PLAY since this was
where the main group differences lay. In the School situation there were significant
differences for the categories of manipulative play(F= 8.85 p<0.001) and symbolic
play (F=6.32 p<0.05). The 3-4 year olds showed significantly more symbolic play as a
percentage of total play observed and the autistic children showed a significantly
higher percentage of manipulative play. In the playtime observations, there were no
group differences for general motor play, functional or symbolic play. The autistic
children showed a higher percentage of manipulative play (main effect: F=4.65
p<0.05) and the second group of 3 year olds showed more relational play than the
other groups. The 3-4 year olds used in the second study were less sociable and more
timid than those used in the first study which may explain why there is more relational
play and less symbolic play in the second group (See Table 2.3 for a summary of
these percentages). However, overall, the amount of play between the two groups of
3-4 year olds did not differ significantly. As we can see below, the amount of overall
spontaneous activity is almost doubled in playtime observations for the 5-6 year olds
and autistic children.
Table 2.3: Percentage of total time spent by each group in each subcategory within the main category
of PLAY during the school (Study 1) and playtime (Study 2) observations.
	Behaviour	 3-4 year olds	 5-6 year olds	 autistic children
Study 1	 Study 2	 School	 Play	 School	 Play
	
G/M	 14.3	 1.4	 20.5	 23.4	 7.9	 22.2
	
Man	 7.1	 10.1	 7.3	 13.6	 31.3	 33.1
	
Rel	 4.0
	
17.8	 5.3	 4.8
	
10.6	 4.7
	
Func	 57.6	 61.7	 56.4	 46.5	 44.7	 36.1
	
Symb	 17.0	 8.9	 10.6	 11.7	 5.5	 3.7
	
Total n	 877	 847	 334.9	 838.1	 362.4	 648.2
Note. n = total number of minutes (expressed as a percentage of total time observed) in which play was
observed at least once.
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In summary, there is a similar pattern of results for the school and play
MI
situations. Both groups do certain activities more when at play, such as interaction
with peers, functional play, and joint attention for the 5-6 year olds and interaction
with peer and action-with-object imitation for the autistic group, than in class.
However, the differences which were observed between groups were within the same
categories as for the school situation.
Discussion:
Before discussing the significance of the observed differences between subjects,
it is important to reiterate the initial premise of this study. These observations were
carried out in the spirit of ethology and therefore I acknowledge that there is a lack of
direct compatibility between groups. The significance of observed differences
between groups is thus at the level of the relative frequency of their behaviour in their
everyday experiences and I am not attempting to answer the confounding questions of
whether these differences are because of differences between the subjects or the
settings they typically experience.
I will now discuss the findings from each of the main categories observed,
starting with social interaction, which was used as a general index of autism.
Social Interaction:
Within the category of Social Interaction, autistic children and adults showed
less peer interaction than the MLD group, who showed less than the 5-6 year olds.
This is as predicted from previous literature (Kanner, 1943; Strain and Cooke, 1976;
Rivher, 1986; Lord and McGill, 1989) and confirms that these samples show the basic
behavioural profiles required to make the other categories of behaviour of interest.
Play:
In the category of play, autistic groups showed more relational and manipulative
activity than the comparison groups, which was predicted as a sign of the limited
repertoire of activities seen in autism. This is in keeping with Kanner's original
observations (1943). The autistic adults showed less symbolic activity than the 5-6
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year olds but there was no difference between the autistic children and the 5-6 year
a.
olds and MLD children for either functional or symbolic activity. There was generally
a paucity of symbolic play in all groups but the 3-4 year old children. This may be
linked to the age-appropriateness of pretend play. One of the parents of an autistic
boy, for example, commented in the questionnaire that her son was "too old to pretend
play". The autistic children and some of the MLD children had chronological ages far
above the normal age when pretend play is most prominent. However, it is likely that
qualitative differences exist between samples within certain categories, especially
what we coded as symbolic play (See Appendix 2.3 and 2.4 for some examples of
what was coded as symbolic play). Play coded as "symbolic" in the autistic children
was often very limited, in that little expansion of an initial theme occurred, unlike in
the normal children. It was also often repetitive in nature. On many occasions it was
ambiguous whether the behaviour was symbolic for the child or not, due to a lack of
language accompanying the actions. Examples coded here as symbolic (mostly play
with dolls - dressing the doll, making the doll sit up, talk etc. - and with toy animals -
making them roar, fight etc.) often expressed the conventional actions which people
do with these toys. There is therefore a real problem in identifying symbolic activity
in these situations and this difficulty is encountered in some of the experimental
studies as well. In Chapter 3 there is further discussion on this problem from an
experimental point of view.
As such these results do not show the clear differences between autistic and
non-autistic children that one would have expected from other studies such as those of
Lewis and Boucher (1988) and Baron-Cohen (1987). This may be because the present
study used a truely spontaneous situation, where environment cannot be controlled.
The other two studies both tested spontaneous pretend play within an experimental set
up.
Evidence of Theory of Mind:
The autistic children and adults showed less evidence of Theory of Mind than
the other groups and in particular they showed less joint attention (JA) than the MLD
group. As with pretend play, use of mental state language indicated differences in
quality, with language used by autistic children being almost always self-referencing
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and/or idiomatic. The few examples seen of JA and use of mental state understanding
•••
also appeared different in quality than the examples seen in the 5-6 year olds. To
illustrate this, I describe two incidents - first, one in the 5-6 year old group and one in
the autistic group. In the first incident, Child A approached child B to see which page
he was working on. Child B told him that he could not do the page he is on. Child A
had already completed this task and took child B's book, giving him his own book. He
sat in his own seat and filled in the answers in B's book while B leant over child A's
book, pretending to write. When A has finished they quietly swapped books again,
and B went up to get the teacher to mark the work. The teacher had seen none of this.
The second incident involved a 15 year old autistic boy, who got up from his
chair and approached the observer, saying "those are lovely boots". When the teacher,
who had spotted him up "wandering", asked him what he was doing, he immediately
picked up some books and said "Putting these books away". This was one of the more
convincing examples of deception/lying seen in the autistic children.
Although few examples of lying or deception were observed directly, the
questionnaires completed by the care staff suggested that this type of behaviour is
quite common and some of these examples are quoted in Appendix 2.4. However, all
the incidents quoted could have been simple, learned routines for the avoidance of
immediate punishment/disapproval, or gaining of immediate rewards. For example,
subjects would say they had brushed their teeth when they hadn't; they would say they
had done their chores so that they could watch T.V; or they would complain of
earache so that they could go to the doctor's and read the magazines in the waiting
room. Of course, it could be said that this is what the other children were also trying
to achieve with lying and deception.
The differences between the autistic and non-autistic groups could be
summarised as blatant versus subtle. The examples seen in the normal children were
not only more complicated but much more subtle attempts to avoid punishment or to
get their own way (or, in the example quoted above, to help someone else avoid
punishment/disapproval). In the autistic groups, the goal of their deception (e.g. to
watch T.V.) is more blatant and usually limited to concrete and relatively immediate
goals like reading their favourite magazine, or watching their favourite T.V.
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programme, as distinct from pleasing their teacher or keeping in their goodbooks, or
impressing their friends, which seemed to be the goals of the normal children.
There seems little evidence that the autistic children attempted to change the
mental state of another person - the examples of deception seen in this autistic group
do not necessarily require a theory of mind - in fact they could be explained more
easily by a theory of/understanding of another's behaviour, which can be learned by
trial and error (As Byrne and Whiten, 1988 and 1991, suggest is the case for the
examples of deception seen in most non-human primates). This idea is also in keeping
with Baron-Cohen's (1989) view of autistic children as "behaviourists" and Perner's
(1993) use of the term "situation theorists". In the absence of sophisticated language,
coding of these types of incidents, normally signs of understanding and attempting to
change other's mental states, becomes difficult and ambiguous. One cannot even be
sure that these behaviour subcategories are actually satisfactory ways of diagnosing a
Theory of Mind, at least not in a spontaneous situation.
Imitation:
Finally, turning to imitation, the main focus of this study, only the 3-4 year olds
showed much spontaneous imitation. This may have been due to a situational factor,
associated with the Playgroup setting, which Study 2 did not rule out. Alternatively it
may reflect the fact that 3 year olds tend to use imitation as a method of
communication, before sophisticated language takes over as discussed in Chapter 1
(Nadel and Camioni, 1993).
The results from the play situation of study 2 suggested that the school situation
had a general effect on the quantity of most behaviours within the groups, rather than
which behaviours were performed more by each group. Those behaviours most
affected by the school situation were those which we would expect from the
limitations imposed by a structured, school environment. The most surprising finding
was an almost complete absence of imitation in any form in the 5-6 year old group. In
the first study, imitation emerged in gym class for example, and often was a way of
misbehaving in class. At play, it is possible, as Nadel and colleagues (1982-1993)
suggest, that there is no need for the older children to use imitation as speech has
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superseded the need to use imitation to communicate. The 3-4 year olds showed most
MI
imitation, at least once they started to settle into play group. The time of year at which
they were observed (during the first term) probably affected the type of play
produced, specifically, increasing the amount of relational play and decreasing the
amount of symbolic play. Because their play was less social, they also produced less
imitation. However, none of these differences were significant in this case.
This study found that the frequency of several behaviours of interest, including
imitation, evidence of ToM and symbolic play, was quite low even in the non-autistic
control groups. Observing the children at play did not increase the frequency of most
of these behaviours; in fact, as we have seen above, the 5-6 year olds showed less
imitation during play than in class. The age of the children may also be an important
factor in that some behaviours may be seen as not age appropriate and therefore not
encouraged.
Despite the infrequency of some behaviours there did seem to be a relationship
between chronological age and pretend play, in a negative direction. This is not so
surprising bearing in mind the fact that children who pretend most prolifically tend to
be aged between 3 and 5. This is the age at which pretend play is encouraged both at
home and in school. Once the children get older, pretend play seems to be frowned
upon as "babyish" - i.e. not age appropriate. Feedback of this nature was received via
the questionnaires. There also seemed to be a relationship between both mental age
and chronological age and body/gestural imitation, in a negative direction. This result
is consistent with the idea that body/gestural imitation may be most prominent in
those children who have not yet acquired a more sophisticated language ability (Nadel
and colleagues, 1982 - 1993). The 5-6 year olds, MLD children and some of the
autistic adults had, for the most part, this sophisticated language ability which
relegates imitation to the lower levels of a tool for learning and being funny, as
described above.
It must also be noted that evidence of Theory of Mind, imitation and symbolic
play was not altogether missing from the autistic group. In fact, on imitation, the
MLD group produced even fewer imitations than the autistic groups. Therefore, we
cannot at this stage say that a deficit in spontaneous imitation is autism specific.
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Almost half the autistic children were of the same MA as the three year olds,
and indeed it is these younger autistic children who shoed any imitation at all, but
they do not show the same amount of imitation as their normal counterparts. Perhaps,
then, there is a problem with imitation for autistic individuals, possibly in using it
spontaneously to communicate, as Nadel suggested is its function in young children.
However, it is still unclear from this study whether the majority of these autistic
children are just too old for using imitation to communicate, or whether there is a real
deficit in the ability. However, imitation may still be used in other ways, for example
to aid learning both academically and of appropriate behaviour. It is also unclear as to
whether a problem with imitation is specific to autism. Although the MLD children
showed a lack of imitation, they mostly had an MA over 4 years and so on the basis of
age changes in the normal group, less imitation might be expected. A study on
younger autistic children is required to check if imitation is used spontaneously by
younger children, as could be predicted from normal development. On the other hand,
Rogers and Pennington would predict that the younger children should show less
imitation at least in an elicited situation. There seems that there may be some
dissociation between spontaneous imitation and elicited imitation. A different pattern
is emerging for spontaneous imitation than that predicted by Rogers and Pennington
(1991), although this pattern follows the normal developmental pattern as proposed by
Nadel and colleagues (See Nadel and Camioni, 1993).
Finally, the infrequency of imitation and theory of mind behaviours made it
impossible to really examine the profiles that Rogers and Pennington (1991)
suggested would occur. The possibility of a dissociation between spontaneous and
elicited imitation also makes it extremely difficult to speculate on Rogers and
Pennington's predicitions. The only result that should be mentioned here was that it
did seem to be the autistic children who showed less joint attention and the difference
between the 3-4 year olds and autistic children of a similar mental age was significant.
The autistic adults did not show significant impairments in joint attention relative to
the MLD group or 5-6 year old group.
So, from the results of this study, we cannot offer any strong evidence for
Rogers and Pennington's (1991) theory. There certainly seems to be a developmental
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trend in autism as they proposed and indeed this trend is similar to that seen in normal
development, but in the oposite direction to some extent Than what they predicited for
elicited imitation. However, due to the lack of specificity to autism, we cannot say
that a lack of imitation plays the primary role in autsim that Rogers and Pennington
would propose. Further studies of imitation in an experimental situation are clearly
needed to test whether the ability itself is present even if used little spontaneously and
it is to this purpose that I now address the following chapter.
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Chapter 3
Imitation - can it be elicited from autistic children and adults?
Introduction.
For centuries, people have been interested in the role imitation plays in the
development of normal children (Kugiumutzakis, in press), but it is only in the last
three decades that researchers have focused on atypical populations such as those
with autism. Much is known about the role of imitation in normal development, in
language acquisition, social interactions, communication, play and appropriate social
behaviours (Piaget, 1962, Trevarthen, 1979; Tomasello et al., 1993; Nadel and
Camaioni, 1993). So much so, that it would be easy to accept that if there is a
problem with imitation, many of the main deficits in autism could be explained.
Indeed, in 1991, Rogers and Pennington proposed a general, primary deficit for
imitation in autism. They combined this deficit in imitation with deficits in emotion
sharing and theory of mind (thus integrating two of the previous theories of autism)
along a developmental continuum based on the intersubjectivity model proposed by
Stern (1985). Rogers and Pennington's model is discussed in much greater detail in
Chapter 1. They predicted that on imitation tasks, it would be the youngest autistic
children for whom a deficit in imitation would be most noticeable and most
handicapping. Older autsitic children and adults would for the most part have few
problems with imitation and more problesm with "theory of mind" and language
pragmatics.
Convenient as a deficit in imitation would be for accounting for at least early
deficits in autism, there are many problems with Rogers and Pennington's model
and as such there is a need for more work on this area. Firstly, Rogers and
Pennington (1991) did not specify the age at which they felt imitation would emerge,
nor did they take into account the fact that imitation is used in different ways and
manifests itself in different forms at different stages of development. Piaget (1962)
followed the development of imitation through the sensorimotor stages of
development to the beginning of the preoperational stage. The first imitation he
noticed in his children was vocal imitation, followed by imitation of familiar actions,
then unfamiliar actions (with visible actions being first imitated then invisible
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actions) and then eventually symbolic and deferred imitation, the later emerging
about 2 years of age. Since Piaget, researchers ha'Ve shown that although children
may go through the stages Piaget suggested, his time scale was wrong. Melzoff and
Moore (1978) showed that even neonates could produce simple imitations of actions
already in their routine. By 9 months of age many infants can show imitation after a
delay of 24 hours (Meltzoff, 1988).
Nadel and colleagues (reviewed in nadel and Camaioni, 1993) found that
normal toddlers engaged prolifically in imitation during spontaneous play sessions
with peers. They proposed that at this stage imitation acts as a form of
communication before being replaced by sophisticated language. Like Nadel and
Camaioni, Meltzoff and Gopnik (1993) proposed that imitation in very young
children is used as a means of identifying people as like themselves and as familiar.
It can be seen as a means of communication and as a means to learning both about
people and about themselves. This is also similar to the arguments put forward by
Hobson (1993). Once the child goes to school, imitation becomes more acurate but
still used unconsciously to learn and to be like others. By about 8 years of age,
imitation becomes more conscious and becomes a tool that can be chosen to help
master certain situations or problems.
Secondly, Rogers and Pennington did not take into account imitation of
different types of actions, except for vocal imitation in the form of echolalia and
body imitations, for which they predicted a dissociation, with less impairment in
vocal imitation. Smith and Bryson (1994) suggested that studies of imitation needed
to take into account imitation of different types of actions in order to be able to fully
describe the deficit in autism or to propose theoretical models involving imitation.
They suggested that it was important to examine actions with and without objects,
actions that were visible and those not visible, actions that were symbolic and those
involving no symbolic understanding, actions that used one one hand compared to
those that used two hands and oral versus manual actions. This is what this study
aimed to do, along with examining the development of imitation using Piaget's
theory as a guide.
Thirdly, there is still much debate about whether there is a deficit in imitation.
As we saw in Chapter 1, nine studies found problems with body or gestural imitation
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(DeMyer et al., 1972; Sigman & Ungerer, 1984; Jones and Prior, 1985; Ohta, 1987;
Herzig, Snow & Sherman, 1989; Abrahamsen & Mitchell, 1990; Stone et al., 1990;
Heimann et al., 1992; Rogers and McEvoy, 1993). Three studies did not
(Thatcher, 1977; Morgan et al, 1990; and Charman and Baron-Cohen, 1994). Three
studies found problems with imitating actions with objects that did not involve
pretense (Stone et al, 1990; DeMyer et al., 1972; Heimann et al, 1992), while three
studies found no problem with non-symbolic actions (Charman & Baron-Cohen,
1994; Hammes & Langdell, 1981; Curcio & Piserchia, 1978). Five studies, in
addition, found problems with symbolic actions with objects and pantomimic actions
(De Myer et al., 1972; Heimann et al, 1992; Curcio & Piserchia, 1978; Stone et al.,
1990; Hammes & Langdell, 1981). So while more studies found evidence for a
deficit in at least some aspects of imitation than found evidence against a deficit, the
amount of evidence against each type of imitation is enough to make it extremely
difficult to conclude whether a specific deficit really exists. The exception to this is
symbolic imitation, in which all studies found autistic children and adults to have
deficits. This is not surprising considering autistic children generally have problems
with pretend play and other symbolic abilities.
However, most of the studies included either insufficient controls, or examined
only one or two types of imitation, investigating, for example, only vocal and
gestural imitation (using, for example, the Uzgiris and Hunt Scales, 1975) or
imitation of symbolic actions. Few studies tested imitation of actions with objects.
Most studies used either small numbers of children or only a few actions in each
category and no study tested older autistic children and adults on harder tasks of
imitation such as problem-solving tasks or deferred imitation.
In addition to these methodological problems, many teachers and clinical
psychologists are surprised at the theory of Rogers and Pennington because they use
imitation as a learning tool with autistic children and they feel that it works.
However, although teachers do use imitation as a learning tool, personal
observations indicate that it is often accompanied by instructions or even physical
guidance to help the child complete the task. Whether imitation can be elicited from
the children, without such specific instructions, remains to be seen.
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The main aim of this part of the study was, therefore, to conduct a
comprehensive study of elicited imitation. Nine different categories were used to
examine the idea that only certain types of imitation might be affected in autism.
These nine categories also helped to examine Piaget's developmental model and the
distinction between vocal and gestural imitation and symbolic/non-symbolic
imitation will help to clarify the postition of Rogers and Pennington's theory. The
nine categories also map unto some of the suggestions made by Smith and Bryson.
The action categories were vocal (both speech and non-speech sounds), facial
(mostly oral, all invisible), body related (some visible and some invisible), one-
handed actions, two-handed actions, whole body actions, meaningful/symbolic
actions (no objects), symbolic actions (objects present) and non-symbolic acttions
with objects. The actions in each category were compiled from those used in the
previous literature both from studies with autistic children (such as Heimann et al.,
1992; DeMyer et al., 1972) normal children (Meltzoff, 1988; Piaget, 1962) and with
non-human primates (Custance, 1994) and a list of the actions and their sources can
be found in Appendix A.
Therefore, on the basis of normal development, previous research and Rogers
and Pennington's theory, we would expect that in general the youngest autistic
children will be those that will show most problems with accurate elicited imitation.
The older autistic children and adults will generally be able to imitate. The 3-4 year
old children will produce less accurate responses on the elicited imitation than the
older normal children and possibly the older non-autsitic children with learning
disabilities. As far as types of imitation are concerned, I predict that vocal imitation
will not be impaired in the autistic groups relative to other groups because of the
presence of echolalia (Rogers and Pennington, 1991). Most previous studies found
that imitation of actions with objects was only impaired when pretense was involved
(Hammes and Langdell, 1981; Heimann et al., 1992). It is also well known that
autistic children have problems with pretense in general (Wing et al., 1977; Baron-
Cohen, 1987; Lewis and Boucher, 1988). Therefore, I predict that autistic children
will be most impaired on actions that require pretense but not on non-symbolic
actions with objects.
Chapter Three: Elicited imitation
	 113
Finally, it is essential to remind ourselves of the definition which was used in
this study of imitation. The rationale behind the definition was explained in Chapter
1. The definition was as follows: imitation occurs when the person reproduces or
attempts to reproduce with some accuracy the actions or vocalisations of another
child or adult, having physically observed the actions of the model. Reproduction
can be immediate or deferred. The coding system described below was designed to
allow coding of the accuracy of imitation as previous research suggested that this
might be where the differentiation between autistic and non-autistic exists (Ohta,
1987; Curcio and Piserchia, 1978). Normal development would also predict that
accuracy would increase with age (Piaget, 1962).
Methods.
Subjects:
The subjects used in this experiment were drawn from those described in
Chapter 2, (see Table 2.1 for subject characteristics). However, three subjects were
tested but their results discarded since it was impossible to show them more than 20
actions. These included one subject from each of the autistic groups. One other
autistic adult refused to cooperate and so was not tested. Two of the 3-4 year olds
also refused to participate. This left the following numbers in each group:
All the children in the present study had an MA greater than 18 months of age,
the age when symbolic play first begins to be noticed in normal children.
Table 3.1: Numbers of subjects and summary of age characteristics in each group for the elicited
imitation experiment (Ages presented in years and months).
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Group CA Means MA means Number of subjects
Autistic adults 24;8 6;9.- 10
Autistic children 12;1 4;9 11
Young autistic children 5;8 n/a 6
MLD 11;8 6;2 11
5-6 year olds 5;4 5;7 12
3-4 year olds 3;4 3;6 11
Procedure:
(I) Test presentation:
All actions to be imitated were presented with the child sitting opposite the
experimenter. The session began with explaining to the child that they were going to
play a game with the experimenter and that they were to do whatever the
experimenter did. For the first few actions the child was prompted to "do what I did"
(Hence the "Do-As-I-Do" or DAID test), if they did not do it spontaneously. The
prompts were faded out as the session proceeded. However, if at any point the child
did not respond to the first presentation then the action was presented again with a
further prompt. If the child did not respond a second time then a "no response" was
coded and the next action presented. In general the actions were presented only once.
However, if the experimenter felt that the child was not paying attention when first
presented, the action was shown a second time. If no problems with motivation arose
(see below) then the actions were presented in the order seen in Appendix 3.1.
(2) Actions for Imitation:
The imitation test battery consisted of ninety-three actions altogether and these
included "easy" actions, "more difficult" actions, and "motivating" actions, in mixed
sequence. Easy actions were those that had been used in previous literature with
younger normal children and those that were familiar to the children. Also during the
observational study the author had a feel for what was within the children's
capabilities, so in the design of the task this was kept in mind. Obviously there
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would be actions that were difficult for the younger children but still easy for the
older children. There were nine different categt5ries of actions (Verbal speech
sounds, non-verbal sounds, facial actions, one-handed actions, two-handed actions,
whole body actions, symbolic/meaningful actions, non-symbolic actions with
objects and symbolic actions with objects). These were also dispersed throughout
the session. The actions are listed and described in Appendix 3.1. Some of the
actions used by Meltzoff (1988) with nine-month old infants and by Charman and
Baron-Cohen (1994) with autistic children were included to allow comparison with
these authors' results. The other actions were drawn from both the human and
animal literature with the addition of "motivating" actions. The motivating actions
were actions which, on the basis of the observational study, were seen as interesting
(or even obsessional in some cases) to at least one child. These actions included
playing a xylophone, shining a torch, and turning clock hands to the correct time.
Flexibility in procedures:
Not every child saw every action. It was necessary for the actions to be
presented according to the children's level of interest, motivation and ability. For the
3-4 year old children and the autistic children, the actions were presented in several
shorter sessions to keep motivation as high as possible. Motivating actions were
normally interspersed with the other actions but were also used opportunistically at
any point in the session where the child seemed to be losing interest. If the child
refused to respond on more than 10 actions consecutively, the session was
abandoned and tried again the next day, or later the same day. One or two sessions
were sufficient for all groups except the very young autistic children who needed
shorter, more frequent sessions.
Some of the older and more able children were very self-conscious about
doing the DAID, so only the most difficult actions were presented. Three of the
actions were adapted to be more appropriate for the older children and adults. For
example, one action for the younger children involved stringing three beads
together; this was adapted to allow five or six beads to be strung together by the
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older children. On the other hand some of the actions were very difficult for the 3-4
year old children, (for example, tearing a piece of pSper to make a spyhole), but this
was taken into account on the scoring of these actions - if the child attempted the
correct action, then this was still coded as some level of imitation, even if the child
had to be helped to actually tear the hole.
Data analysis and coding:
A six point score system was developed to measure children's imitative
response. When a child was judged to have reproduced an accurate imitation, down
to the fine details, such as the finger used to push the button, then a score of six
points was awarded. Partial imitations, including reversals of actions (e.g. reversing
hands when doing "peekaboo" or "grasp thumb"- see photographs in Appendix 3.2)
or using body parts as objects - e.g. using a hand as a saw, or a finger as a spoon -
were given a score between 3 and 5 depending on how complete or accurate they
were. If the child picked up the object or used the hands, for example, in any way
but not resembling the target action, a score of 2 was awarded. A score of one was
given if no response or a refusal followed the presentation of the target.
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Table 3.2: Three examples of how the children's responses were coded on the six-point scale.
Action
Score Grasp thumb Pretend to saw Make spyhole
six Hold's up one hand,
palm facing away, curls
other hand around
thumb of first hand,
palm of second hand
also facing away from
body. See Appendix
3.2 for illustration,
Holds board with one
hand, on its longer
edge, and holds hand,
fingers curled as if
holding saw and makes
a sawing movement,
back and forth across
board but without
touching board.
Child folds paper in
half, smooths folded
edge, attempts to tear a
small hole in middle of
folded edge and then
opens and looks
through hole.
five Holds up one hand
palm facing away, curls
other hand around
thumb but palm of
second hand is towards
the child,
Holds hand straight
out, using hand as saw
and makes sawing
motion on board,
which is held on long
end by other hand, but
without touching board
Child folds paper, tears
a hole on the non-
folded side and opens
up and puts to eye.
four Reverses first hand so
that palm is facing
child and then grasps
thumb either way. See
Appendix 3.2 for
illustration.
As above, except child
touches board with
sawing hand.
Child folds paper and
tries to poke hole in
middle - not on folded
edge. Looks through if
successful.
three Holds up hands and
combines them in any
way - one example is to
put closed hand against
side of other hand but
with palm facing
towards child, so that
thumb is on the
opposite side to closed
hand. See Appendix
3.3 for illustration.
Puts board down flat
and touches with hand,
or chops as if with an
axe.
Child doesn't fold
paper but attempts to
pull or poke hole in
middle of paper.
two Waves hands around or
bangs on knees
Pushed in nail or
throws board
Throws piece of paper
away.
one No reponse No reponse No response
Of the ninety-three actions, fifteen were discarded altogether, since there were
more than two groups in which six or more children did not see the action. If six or
more children in one or two groups did not see the action then this/these groups were
not included in the analysis for that particular action. Of the 78 actions used, 35 were
seen by at least 70 % of the children in each group (except the young autistic
children) and the score for these actions was calculated and analysed separately.
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Medians were used as the descriptive statistics, since the scale was ordinal
rather than interval. Kruskall-Wallis one-way indePendent ANOVAS were used to
test for sample differences in (1) medians for each of the nine categories of actions,
(2) medians of all the actions (n=78) together, (3) medians of the 35 actions seen by
70% in each group and (4) the score for each individual action. Since this involved a
large number of analyses being carried out and therefore an elevated risk of finding a
significant difference by chance, significance was set at 0.01 within the main effects.
To determine where the group differences lay, Kruskall-Wallis multiple comparison
post-hoc tests were carried out. The K-W value presented is for the main effect.
Group differences on these post-hoc tests were reported when significant at the 0.05
level.
For a more basic view of whether the autistic groups either imitated or did
not imitate, an additional analysis was conducted on the individual actions - the data
were recoded using a strict definition of imitation where the child had to score 6 to
be said to have imitated. This was analysed using a chi-square for those actions
which produced significant differences at the 0.05 level but not the 0.01 level on the
Kruskal-Wallis analysis. Two less stringent definitions of imitation were also used
for each of these 12 actions, namely 1) imitation = score of 5 or 6 and 2) imitation =
any score above 3. Finally, the analyses were repeated for subgroups of children. In
one pair of subgroups, autistic and non-autistic children were matched on CA, in
another they were matched on MA using BPVS and on the third, they were matched
on the raw score of the TROG (See Table 3.3).
Table 3.3. Means and ranges for two subgroups matched on chronological age (Years; months),
mental age using the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) and the Raw Scores for the Test for
Reception of Grammar (TROG).
Group CA MA BPVS TROG Score
(n=8) (n=20) (n=16)
Autistic 12;8 5;10 7.4
7;11-16;4 2;2-10;2 1-14
Non-autistic 12;6 5;9 7.7
8;9-16,4 2;2-10;2 2-13
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Observer reliability:	 ...
A subset of actions was independently coded by a second observer, who was trained
to recognise the actions and how to score the response. This was done for twenty
actions and two children from each group. The scores for the children in each group
were averaged and the statistics carried out on these averages for each of the twenty
actions. The resulting Pearson's Product Moment Correlations for each group
(therefore six correlations) produced an average r value of 0.67 (range 0.34 to 0.88)
which is significant at the 0.01 level. The correlation for one group, the autistic
adults, just failed to reach significance. When the scoring was carefully examined
for this group it is evident that the first coder had coded the reactions of the adults
slightly higher than the second coder, except on one occasion. However, the
differences between the coders was very small - e.g. if the first coder scored an
average score for the two adults of 6, the second scorer, did not rate it less than a 5.
If the average score for the first coder was 5.5, the second coder generally scored a 5.
The largest difference, on one occasion, was between 5.5 and 4.
Results.
Overall scores and general categories:
The only analysis where all 93 actions were used was concerned with the
percentage of 6s, 5s, 4s, 3s, 2s, and is scored by each child. The group medians for
each score are illustrated in Figure 3.1. The most important point to note is that for
most groups the trend is towards high scores. More than 50% of responses were 6s
for the autistic children and adults, as well as the 5-6 year olds and MLD children.
Only the 3-4 year olds and young autistic children did not score a 6 on 50% of the
actions. As can be seen from the graph the trend for the young autistic group was
towards refusal/no response or an alternative action (scores 1 and 2). They showed
significantly more is than all other groups except the 3-4 year olds (K-W=24.43,
p<0.001). However, there were no other group differences on the number of is
scored and this remains the case if the young autistic children are discarded. In order
to ensure that the low results of the young autistic children did not bias the results of
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other group comparisons, each analysis was repeated without the young autistic
children.	 Se
For the number of 2s shown, both the young autistic children and the three-
four year old children produced more than the five-six year old and the MLD
children (K-W=26.17 p<0.001). Some qualitative differences should also be noted
here.When young autistic children produced a 2 score, it was usually by mouthing or
throwing the object to be used, therefore producing a manipulative behaviour as
described in Chapter 2. The 3-4 year olds tended to use the object functionally but
did not perform the target action. For example, when shown "bang spoons", they
might put the spoons in their mouth as if eating or when shown "draw line on paper"
they would take the pencil and draw a picture of a house. When the young autistic
children were discarded from this analysis the older autistic children also showed
more 2s than the MLD children (K-W=20.73 p<0.001). The quality of their response
tended towards another functional use of the object, rather than the sensorimotor
response seen in the young autistic children, although some instances of this were
noted.
With the number of 3s scored, we are beginning to look at the lowest level of
partial imitations. Here the young autistic children still showed more of these low
scores than the 5-6 year old and MLD groups but in addition the 3-4 year olds and
the older autistic children showed more 3s than the five to six year old children (K-
W=24.64 p<0.001). This latter result remained basically unchanged when the young
autistic children were discarded. The number of 4s scored produced a significant
difference between the 3-4 year old children (whose scores mostly fall below 4) and
the 5-6 year olds and between the older autistic children (whose scores mostly fall
above 4) and the 5-6 year olds (K-W=17.39 p<0.01). When the young autistic
children were discarded the older autistic children also showed more 4s than the
MLD children (K-W=16.93, p=0.002).
When we move on to the number of 5s scored there was an interesting set of
differences. Firstly, the 3-4 year olds showed more 5s than both the young autistic
children (for whom there is a tendency for the majority of the responses to fall below
4), and the 5-6 year olds (for whom the majority of responses tend to be 6s). Also
the autistic adults showed more 5s than the 5-6 year old children (K-W=18.63,
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p<0.01). However, when the young autistic children were removed from the
analysis, only the 3-4 year olds show more 5s thafi the 5-6 year olds (K-W=18.85
p=0.0008).
Finally, as already suggested, the number of 6s produced was greatest in the
5-6 year olds group and the MLD group, who both showed more than the 3-4 year
olds and the young autistic children. The autistic adults also showed more 6s than
the young autistic children (K-W=34.52, p<0.0001). When the young autistic
children were discarded, the 5-6 year olds showed more than both the 3-4 year olds
and the older autistic children. The MLD children still showed more than the 3-4
year olds (K-W=25.21, p<0.0001).
Figure 3.1:Median percentages ( and interquartile ranges) of responses alloted to each
possible response score from one to six, for each group.Percentage of responses 93-4 yrs
. 5-6 yrs
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ClYng Aut
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When each of the nine categories were examined in this way, there were some
interesting results. Table 3.4 (in Appendix 3.4) presents the mean percentage of
actions on which the children were coded as scoring 6,5,4,3,2 and 1 over all 93
actions, and also for three categories of actions, of special theoretical interest as
explained later in the chapter. The nine categories were analysed using oneway
ANOVAs and student Newman-Keuls post hoc tests.
Most of the nine categories of actions showed a similar pattern to the overall
pattern described above.
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Body/gestural - whole body
Whole body actions produce the now familiar picture of the the young autistic
children scoring more is and less 6s than all other groups and the 5-6 year olds also
score more 6s than the 3-4 year olds. (F=10.84, p<0.0001 and F=7.68 p<0.0001).
Meaningful/symbolic gestures
The mean percentages for the meaningful/symbolic actions are contained in
Table 3.4 (Appendix 3.4). The young autistic children score more is and 2s than all
other groups (F=8.76 and F=8.08 p<0.0001). The older autistic children score more
4s, which represent mostly reversals of actions or using body parts as objects, than
the 5-6 year old and MLD children and the autistic adults (F=4.408 p<0.01). Finally
the 5-6 year olds, the MLD children and autistic adults all score more 6s than the
young autistic children, 3-4 year olds and older autistic children (F=7.79 p<0.0001).
Non-symbolic actions with objects
Finally, to look at the actions with objects, the non-symbolic actions show the
young autistic children producing more is than all other groups (F=6.1774 p<0.001),
more 2s (F=7.317 p<0.0001) and more 3s than the 5-6 year olds, MLD children
older autistic children and autistic adults (F=7.137 p<0.0001). The 3-4 year olds also
show more 3s than the 5-6 year olds, the MLD children and the autistic adults and
they show more 5s than the same groups (F=4.31 p<0.01). On the number of 6s all
groups scored more than the young autistic children and the 3-4 year olds. The 5-6
year year olds also scored more 6s than the autistic children (F=13.067 p<0.0001).
Symbolic actions with objects
Table 3.4 (Appnedix 3.4) shows the mean percentages for the symbolic actions with
objects. On these actions the differences between groups were not so large. The
young autistic children still showed slightly more is (F=3.11 p<0.05), 2s (F=2.54
p<0.05), fewer 5s than the 3-4 year olds and autistic adults (F=3.85 p<0.01) and
fewer 6s than the 5-6 year olds and MLD groups (F=5.79 p<0.001). The autistic
children showed more 4s than the 5-6 year old and MLD children (F=2.57 p<0.05).
The 5-6 year olds show more 6s than the autistic children (F=5.79 p<0.001). The 3-4
year olds show more 5s than the two groups of autistic children and the adults more
than the young autistic children (F=3.85 p<0.01).
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Verbal speech sounds	 —
In the category of verbal speech sounds, only four of the groups were
compared - the autistic children and the three control groups. In this category there
were no significant differences between groups on any of the scores at 0.01 level.
Verbal non-speech sounds
For the non-speech sounds the young autistic children showed more is - i.e.
refusals - than all other groups (F=13.98 p<0.0001). There was also a significant
difference at the higher end with all groups scoring more 6s than the young autistic
children and the 5-6 year olds scoring more than the autistic adults and 3-4 year olds
(F=8.33 p<0.0001).
Facial actions
For facial actions the pattern was as for the non-verbal speech sounds - the
young autistic children show more is (F=7.67 p<0.0001) and slightly more 2s
(F=3.294 p<0.05). All groups show more 6s than the young autistic children and the
5-6 year olds show more than all other groups (F=8.02 p<0.0001).
Body/gestural - one-handed actions
If we move on to the body/gestural categories and look at the one-handed
actions, the young autistic subjects showed more is than all groups except the 3-4
year olds (F=4.49 p<0.01) and also more 3s than all groups (F=5.096 p<0.001). The
adults and 3-4 year olds showed more 5s than the young autistic children (F=3.45
p<0.01). All groups scored more 6s than the young autistic children and the 5-6 year
olds scored more than the 3-4 year olds (F=7.398 p<0.0001). As can be seen from
Table 3.4 the young autistic children again showed mostly refusals and this was
significant (F=12.99 p<0.0001).
Body/gestural - two-handed actions.
What is interesting is that in this category the autistic children showed more
threes (i.e. most innacurate imitation) than the 5-6 year olds, MLD children and
autistic adults (F=3.63 p<0.01). All groups again scored more 6s than the young
autistic children, the 5-6 year olds, MLD children and autistic adults all scored more
than the 3-4 year olds and the 5-6 year olds also scored more than the autistic
children (F=13.74 p<0.0001).
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To summarise these results, it can be said that the principal trend is towards
the higher scores for all groups except the young aiftistic children. The older autistic
children and the 3-4 year olds show a very similar pattern with respect to the other
groups, scoring more on the lower partial imitations than the older control groups.
Except for the young autistic children and the 3-4 year olds, all groups produced 6s
on more than 50% of the actions seen; the 5-6 year olds produced a 6 on 81% of the
trials. The scores by the 3-4 year olds tended to be more evenly distributed across
the scale but with a gradual increase up to 6. The other groups made a sharper jump
up to 6. The same trends were apparent in most of the categories of actions, except
for the three included in Table 3.4. In these actions we see the autistic children doing
worse than the older control groups and the autistic adults - producing more partial
imitations and less accurately than the 3-4 year olds. In general, on these three
actions, the adults do better, scoring more 6s than the autistic children, although on
symbolic actions with objects, the autistic adults do not do significantly better than
the autistic children but the trend is for more 5s for the autistic adults, while the
autistic children score more 4s. We will see this trend repeated for other analysis.
Since the young autistic children seemed to be showing a tendency for refusal/non-
response, it was decided that each of the following analyses should be conducted
both with and without the young autistic children, to account for any differences
their high frequencies of refusals might be making to the results.
Results for the subset of actions seen by almost all children.
On the thirty-five actions where 70 % of each group of children (except the
young autistic children) saw the actions, there was a significant difference between
both the 5-6 year olds and autistic adults and the 3-4 year old children, with the
former both showing higher median scores than the 3-4 year old children (K-W
=17.74 p<0.001). There were no other group differences, as Figure 3.2 illustrates.
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Figure 3.2: Median Scores and interquartile ranges over all actions seen by at least
70% each group.
3-4 yrs	 6-6 yrs	 MLD	 Aut Ch	 Aut Adt
Groups
Results from all actions shown.
Over all seventy-eight actions (ninety-three minus the fifteen that less than half
of two groups saw), and including the young autistic children, the 5-6 year olds,
MLD children and Autistic adults all showed higher medians and therefore better
imitation than the young autistic children (K-W=22.55, p<0.001 See Figure 3.3).
When the young autistic group were discarded there were no significant differences
between groups on this overall measure.
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Figure 3.3: Median Scores and interquartile ranges for all groups over all 78 actions.
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Results from each category of actions.
If we go on to examine separately the nine categories of actions (using all 78
actions), we find that the differences mostly lay between the five-six year old
children and the young autistic children. This was true for:1) verbal non-speech
sounds, where the MLD and autistic adults also showed higher scores than the young
autistic children (K-W=18.23, P<0.01); 2) Body/gestural two handed actions, with
5-6 year olds and autistic adults performing better than the young autistic children
(K-W=18.27, P<0.01); 3) Whole body actions, with only the 5-6 year olds doing
better than the young autistic children (K-W=16.25, P<0.01); 4) Actions with
objects, non-symbolic, with both the 5-6 year olds and autistic adults doing better
than the young autistic children (K-W=21.58, P<0.001; and 5) Meaningful/symbolic
gestures, where the 5-6 year olds showed more than both the young autistic children
and the older autistic children (K-W=19.21, P<0.01). When the young autistic
children are discarded from this analysis most of the significant differences
disappear. However, one difference at 0.01 level remains and that is for
body/gestural meaningful actions, when the 5-6 year olds still show better imitation
than the autistic children (K-W=14.09, P<0.01). There were two significant
differences at the 0.05 level and these were between the 5-6 year olds and the 3-4
Figure 3.4: Median Scores and interquartile ranges for the categories of verbal speech sounds, non-
verbal speech sounds and facial actions.
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year olds on two-handed gestures and on non-symbolic actions with objects. These
results are summarised in Table 3.5 and Figures 3.4 -to 3.6.
Figure 3.5: Median Scores and intergartile ranges for each group on one-handed actions, two-
handed actions, whole body actions and meaningful/symbolic action (M/S).
Figure 3.6: Median Scores and interquartile ranges for each group for the actions with object
categories - non-symbolic actions and symbolic actions.Median Score
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The most general finding is that the young autistic children performed worse
on most actions. However, this may not be because-of a lack of ability to imitate but
of a high level of distraction and non-compliance, suggested by the higher
percentage of ones and twos being scored than for the other 'groups (Figure 3.1
above and Table 3.4 - Appendix 3.4). In order to examine this point, an additional
analysis was run for all the actions within the categories of one-handed and two-
handed gestures, discarding the results of those children who had a score of one. In
other words only those children who responded to the demonstration were
considered. For these nineteen actions, there were differences on the same actions
for both analyses - i.e. both with and without the children who refused to respond.
Obviously the differences were greater when refusals were included but the main
effect differences were evident for both analyses. Perhaps the more noticeable
finding of this analysis is that the 2 groups of autistic children do significantly worse
at imitating actions that require pretence and do not involve an object, than the 5-6
year olds. The trend is that they perform worse than all the groups but only the
difference with the 5-6 year olds is significant. On symbolic use of objects they also
perform poorly but this is not statistically significant.
03-4 re
. 5-6 yrs
DMLD
DYng Aut
E Aut Ch
• Aut adt
Category of action
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Table 3.5 Summary of results from the general categories and overall score measures on a Kruskal-
Wallis analysis with a significance level of 0.01; a) for all groups including young autistic children
and b) excluding young autistic children. * indicates a significant result at 0.01 level, ** indicates
significance at 0.001 level).
Action Result Post-hoc result
Overall Score a) * 5-6> young autistic
MLD	 >	 young
autistic
Adults>young
autistics
b) Not significant
Over 35 actions a) N/A
b) ** 5-6> 3-4 year olds
Adults	 >	 3-4	 year
olds
Individual
categories
Vocal - speech	 a) Not significant
b) Not significant
Vocal - non-speech a) * 5-6 > young autistic
MLD	 >	 young
autistic
Adults	 >	 young
autistic
b) Not significant
Facial	 a) Not significant
b) Not significant
One-hand	 a) Not significant
b) Not significant
Two-hands
	 a) * 5-6> young autistic
Adult	 >	 young
autistic
b) * 5-6> 3-4 year olds
Whole body	 a) * 5-6 > young autistic
b) Not significant
Meaningful actions a) * 5-6 > young autistic
5-6 > autistic
b) * 5-6 > autistic
Objects - non-symb a) * Adults>young
autistic
5-6 > young autistic
b) Not significant
Objects - symbolic	 a) Not significant
b) Not significant
Chapter Three: Elicited imitation	 130
Results for subgroups matched on CA, MA BPVS and TROG raw score.
To control for both mental and chronological age effects, a subset of the
autistic subjects was matched with a subset of the non-autistic subjects on CA, MA
on BPVS and TROG raw score (c.f. Table 3.3). There were no significant
differences on imitation scores for each of the groups of actions when the two
subsets matched for MA on BPVS were compared. When matched on TROG raw
score, there were two differences at the 0.05 significance level - the non-autistic
children showed better scores than the autistic individuals on verbal speech sounds
and body/gestural meaningful actions. When the groups were matched for CA, the
non-autistic group showed significantly better imitation at the 0.05 level for
symbolic actions on objects and meaningful body/gestural actions.
Individual Actions:
Due to the large number of actions which were used, the results have been
organised into Table 3.7 below. The results presented here are for differences
significant at 0.01 level on the Kruskal-Wallis analysis. Only those of special
interest due to the principal results already presented above will be discussed in
further detail, namely those within the categories of body/gestural meaningful
actions, symbolic actions with objects and body/gestural two handed actions. Further
details on individual categories are presented in Appendix 3.4 (Figures 3.7 - 3.9 and
Table 3.8 and 3.9). To summarise these results there were very few actions where
there were differences between the older autistic and the older non-autistic groups.
The young autistic children and the 3-4 year old normal children, both imitated less
often than the non-autistic groups on almost all actions. In some actions, the autistic
adults also had better scores than both the young autistic (Peekaboo, Mime brush
teeth) and 3-4 year old children (T-sign, two-finger clap).
There was one action where the school-age autistic children imitated
significantly less than the 5-6 year old children - grasp thumb. This is one of the
actions where a reversal of the hands was noted as the most common mistake by all
groups but more so for the younger autistic children. The difference between the
autistic and non-autistic group on this action was not explained by mental age on the
Chapter Three: Elicited imitation 	 131
BPVS, although the difference was reduced to just below significance level when the
groups were matched on the TROG. Table 3.8 — (Appendix 3.4) illustrates the
significant results from the matched samples for individual actions.
Although the autistic children were not significantly worse on any of the
body/gestural meaningful actions, as we have already seen, their lower scores
combined to show a significant difference over all the actions in this category. Also
on the actions within the symbolic action category, the scores were lower for the
autistic children, although not significantly so
Chapter Three: Elicited imitation 	 132
Table 3.7. Specific actions which account for significant diffferences on the Kruskal-Wallis analysis
described above (a) including young autistic children; (b) excluding young autistic children.
(** denotes significance at 0.001 level, * denotes significance at 0.01 level). Definitions in Appendix
3.1.
Action Result Posthoc result
Finger wiggle	 a) ** 5-6 > 3-4
5-6> Young autistic
MLD > Young autistic
b) not significant
Peekaboo	 a) * MLD >
5-6	 > Young autistic
Adults >
b) not significant
T-sign (T)
	
a) * MLD >
5-6	 >3-4 year olds
Adults >
b) ** as for (a)
T-sign (--I)
	
a) not significant
b) * 5-6 >3-4 year olds
Two-finger clap	 a) * MLD	 > 3-4 year olds
5-6	 >
b) * All groups > 3-4 year olds
Grasp Thumb	 a) * 5-6> autistic
b) * as for (a)
Turn (ballet)	 a) * 5-6	 > 3-4 year olds
autistic >
b) * as for (a)
Sit and rock	 a) * 5-6 > young autistic
b) * 5-6 > 3-4 year olds
Mime brush teeth	 a) * MLD	 > young autistic
Adults >
b) not significant
Mime rope pull	 a) * 5-6 > young autistic
b) not significant
Make spy hole	 a) ** 5-6 > young autistic
MLD > young autistic
MLD > 3-4 year olds
b) ** 5-6 > 3-4 year olds
MLD > 3-4 year olds
MLD > autistic
Roll and flick	 a) ** 5-6 > young autistic
MLD > young autistic
b) not significant
Baa!	 a) * MLD > young autistic
5-6	 > young autistic
b) not significant
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Discussion.	 S.
Performance of different samples: 
I predicted in the introduction to this chapter that it would be the youngest
autistic children who would have most problems with imitation in general and this
certainly was the case for almost every action tested. Unfortunately, it is difficult to
form clear conclusions about the young autistic children because of the high level of
distraction that they showed, illustrated by the number of refusals and "actions not
resembling target action" which they produced. The two children in this group who
did respond to the demonstrations for the most part, were the two oldest children,
both with a CA over 7 years. They both seemed to enjoy "the game" and performed
at much the same level as some of the 3-4 year old children. However, although firm
conclusions cannot be drawn, the results found here for the younger autistic children
may point to the fact that it is earlier in development that autistic children are
impaired in imitation and that this ability improves with age and experience. This is
what Rogers and Pennington (1991) predicted in their model of autistic
development. Rogers and Pennington did not specify what age they expected the
ability to imitate to emerge. I will deal in a later chapter (Chapter 6) with the
development of imitation in autism and the relationship with age. For now I will
concentrate on the group specific results.
The 3-4 year old children, despite often using imitation spontaneously in
play and in learning (See Chapters 1 and 2 for details), were poor at imitating most
of the actions presented to them. Some of them were very keen and highly motivated
to take part, others were not. Some wanted to play but also wanted to choose which
actions to imitate. However, the number of refusals produced by this group was not
more than for the other groups and so it is safe to say that this group of normal
children performed poorly on many tasks in comparison to older normal children
and often in comparison to children with learning difficulties and autistic adults. On
several actions they even did worse than the autistic children. However, for the most
part there were few significant differences between the autistic children and the 3-4
year olds. Not only were the errors produced the same for both groups (indeed for all
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groups) but they were just as common in both these groups. These included
reversing the hands when performing an action such as peekaboo or grasp thumb,
using a body part as the object (e.g. the hand as a saw or the finger as a spoon) or not
"allowing room" for the pretend object in the hand when miming an action. As far as
overall performance goes, the autistic children's scores tended to be higher than the
3-4 year old children's, but not significantly so. Since the average mental age of the
autistic group was 4 years 6 months (on BPVS), with half the children falling below
4 years and half above, then it could be said that the autistic children were
performing broadly at a mental age-appropriate level.
The autistic adults consistently performed at a higher level than the autistic
children, although not significantly so. There are no significant differences between
the performance of the adults and the two older control groups. The adults often
joined the 5-6 year olds and MLD children in showing better imitations than the 3-4
year old children. Although some of the same errors occured in the adult group, they
were often self-corrected, without any prompts and the frequency of inaccurate
imitations was much lower as the number of 6s scored illustrates.
When the identically matched subgroups were compared on the action
categories there were also interesting results which suggested that there were a few
types of actions which autistic children and adults were less able to imitate than
mental age matched controls. There were no significant differences for those
matched on MABPVS but for children matched on TROG score, the non-autistic
groups showed better imitation on meaningful/symbolic actions and on vocal speech
sounds. This latter result was surprising given that there is a prevalence of echolalia
in autism but may be explained by the fact that the sound was presented with an
action - the autistic children often chose to do either the sound only or the action
only, therefore not receiving a perfect score. Perhaps two actions at once is
confusing for the autistic children, in the same way that longer sequences may be.
The significant difference on meaningful/symbolic actions, despite being identically
matched on TROG raw score, proves that this is one area where autistic children
may have difficulties. Finally, when matched on Chronological age, although the
adults were not included here, the autistic children did worse on
meaningful/symbolic actions and symbolic actions with objects. This, of course,
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strengthens the finding that autistic children, in general, do worse on these actions,
especially in comparison to 5-6 year old children. This deficit then is not a result of a
higher MA or CA on the part of the non-autistic children.
Islets of difficulty in autism: 
The principal finding was that younger autistic children have more problems
with imitation than older autistic children and adults, who, at least those used in this
study, do not show a general deficit in elicited imitation. Both the schoolage autistic
children and autistic adults operated at mental age appropriate levels, performing
slightly better than the normal 3-4 year old children. There were very few individual
actions where the school-aged autistic children did worse than any of the control
groups and none where they do worse than both the older control groups. However,
there were a few actions were the school age autistic children did have poorer scores
than non-autistic children, although for the most part this was not significantly so.
The most striking example was the grasp thumb action where most autistic children
performed more poorly than the 5-6 year old children, although this difference was
reduced when TROG raw score was controlled for. However, even on this action
there was no differences between the autistic children and the 3-4 year olds and also
no difference between the autistic children and the children with learning
disabilities. The three groups of actions where the autistic children seemed to have
some difficulties were 1) body/gestural two handed actions, although out of 12
actions only one (Grasp thumb) showed a significantly worse performance and the
overall category produced no significant differences; 2) symbolic actions with
objects, where the autistic children had lower scores for most actions but not
significantly so. When matched for chronological age the non-autistic children
performed better than the autistic children, although this difference was wiped out
when subgroups matched on mental age were compared; and 3)
Meaningful/symbolic gestures produced the only really significant difference
between school aged autistic and non-autistic children.
All these actions have something in common - the need for symbolic capacity.
In many of the two-handed actions the difficulty may arise in the time needed to
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make the mental rotation from what the child sees to what the child does. In a small
pilot study conducted the children would often crOrrect themselves if shown the
action again or the action was held for longer. Since these mistakes were most
common among the younger autistic children, younger MLD children and the 3-4
year olds, then perhaps the problem is not with "cannot do" but with the time needed
to make the more difficult transformations. The symbolic actions with objects
involved the use of one object, in combination with an imaginary object - in the
spirit of pretend play. Finally, the meaningful/symbolic gestures used no object so
there was no concrete point of reference for the child - pure pantomime was
required. This, of course, requires the child not only to transpose the action from the
opposite perspective to his/her own but also requires the ability to pretend in what
may be the hardest circumstances - with no objects present. For the two familiar
actions that were meaningful but did not require pretense - the thumbs up and okay
sign - the autistic children did not have a problem.
This problem with symbolic imitation ties into what we know of the normal
development of imitation and indeed normal development in general. Piaget (1951)
suggested that symbolic imitation (and deferred imitation) were the final two basic
manifestations of imitation in early development. These are the last to develop and
after this it is only really the accuracy of the imitations that changes. If symbolic
imitation is the most advanced form of early imitation then it is not surprising that
some of the older autistic children had problems with these actions, even when they
could imitate the developmentally easier actions such as vocal, body actions and
non-symbolic actions with objects. The very fact that they involved symbolic
capactiy of course, also ties in with their inability to engage in pretend play.
In general then my predictions regarding imitation of symbolic actions were
correct - this was the type of imitation with which autistic children, even those who
were older and showed no general deficit in imitation, showed most problems.
Comparisons with previous literature. 
This study supported different aspects of the previous literature. In finding no
general deficit, this study is consistent with results found by Morgan et al (1990),
Thatcher (1977) and Charman and Baron-Cohen (1994). These previous studies
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found no deficits on either gestural imitation or procedural imitation. Although there
was not a general deficit in gestural imitation in thintudy, some actions were found
to be harder and produced partial imitations. These results tend to fall more in line
with studies like those by Ohta (1980), who found partial imitations of gestures such
as T-signs; Curcio and Piserchia (1978), who found no deficits on simple body
actions but a large percentage of partial imitations when imitating symbolic actions;
and Hammes and Langdell (1981) who found that all autistic children could copy
non-symbolic actions with objects, but half of them did not copy symbolic actions
with objects and those who did produced partial imitations, such as using body parts
as objects or closed gestures.
The results from this study did not support the deficit in imitation seen in most
of those studies which looked at gestural and vocal imitation (Abrahamsen and
Litchell, 1990; Sigman and Ungerer, 1984; Jones and Prior, 1985), except for the
results from the present group of very young autistic children, who did have more
problems with all types of imitation but also tended to refuse to attempt the task.
More work on this younger autistic group could prove important in confirming
whether there is a deficit in imitating simple gestures at a younger stage or whether
this group is simply harder to motivate. The results reported here did not find a
problem with non-symbolic actions with objects, unlike the study by Stone et al.
(1990). As already seen, this study replicated results of problems with symbolic
actions, particularily when fully symbolic or pantomimic in nature (Hammes and
Langdell, 1981; Curcio and Pisercheria, 1978). However, there were also some
problems for autistic children when objects were used in a symbolic manner
(Hammes and Langdell, 1981; Heimann et al., 1992; Curcio and Piserchia, 1978).
It should be noted that this study differed from some of the previous studies in
that imitation was much more explicitly elicited, while some previous studies could
be said to have examined more spontaneous imitation. However, it is impossible to
establish the exact nature of this difference because some studies did not explicitly
state what instructions children were given, or how their attention was drawn to the
task in hand. This is especially true of those studies which examined gestural and
vocal imitation as one of the sensori-motor skills. Those that did explicitly state the
instructions given include the following studies: Ohta (1987), who instructed
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children to watch the action being modelled and then "mimic" it; Hammes and
Langdel (1981), who instructed their subjects to "'Watch the boy, and do what he
does"; Rogers and McEvoy (1993), who asked their older, more able subjects to
imitate the actions presented; and Stone et al (1990) who modeled the action and
then gave a verbal such as "Do this" or a non-verbal prompt, such as giving the child
the object. Heimann et al. (1992) stated that the imitation tasks they used were
elicited but did not say how the response was elicited from the children. Charman
and Baron-Cohen (1994) did not verbally instruct the children to imitate, but, if the
child failed to lift the object, the experimenter handed the object to the child and/or
gave a non-specific prompt such as "what can you do with this?". Finally, DeMyer
et al (1972) did not verbally instruct children to imitate, but gave the children five
trials in which to repond. They attracted subjects' attention by saying "Look!" along
with the child's name.
In the present study, instructions were kept to a minimum. However, the
children were prompted to "Do As I Do" to begin with, and again during the session
if they refused to attempt to imitate (Using prompts such as "Look! Do this!" or "It's
your turn now"). They were, however, only shown the action a maximum of three
times, and then only, when they had not been paying attention on the first
presentation. The actions were also only shown again if there was no reponse on the
first presentation. The children had an opportunity to refuse to imitate and this
opportunity was taken by most of the young autistic children, for example. So
although the actual testing scenario may have encouraged the children to at least
attempt to imitate, more than a less instructed scenario, this in itself is important for
three reasons: first, some previous studies used a very similar scenario to the one
used here and found similar results. Second, a few very specific deficits were found,
despite the instructions, with regard to symbolic imitation and some of the two-
handed actions which required a more complex reversal of perspective. Third, these
results illustrated that autistic children may be able to learn by imitation, when it is
accompanied by minimal instructions.
Finally, although the results were not analysed in a way that relates directly to
Smith and Bryson's (1994) suggestions of distinguishing imitation of different types
of actions such as actions with and without objects, non-symbolic and symbolic
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actions, one-handed and two-handed actions, visible and invisible actions etc.
Although the 9 categories were not directly compaired with each other, it is possible
to say that scores were higher for most of the actions with objects than the actions
without objects, non-symbolic actions were easier compared to symbolic actions and
one-handed actions produced slightly higher scores than two handed actions. The
results for visible and invisible actions were not analysed separately although this
would be possible and may be done for future papers. As such then I will refrain
from speculating on the possible implications for Smith and Bryson's theory, except
to say that there does seem to be some dissociation between imitation of different
types of actions, even for older autistic children and some adults, the theoretical
implications of which need much deeper analysis than I can possibly provide in this
thesis.
Conclusions and implications:
To summarise the results, then, young autistic children did show less imitation
than all the other groups involved in the study. This is as Rogers and Pennington
(1991) predicted, although we must be careful in interpreting the present results
because of a general problem with motivation and a setting that was different for this
younger group of children. However, both of the older autistic groups showed no
general deficit in imitation. In fact the autistic adults generally had higher scores
than the school-age autistic children, although not significantly so. In general,
neither autistic group had problems with actions on objects, when no pretence was
required. Nor with vocal imitation or body/gestural imitation, unless these involved
pretense or a more difficult mental rotation, such as needed to imitate two-handed
actions compared to one-handed actions. In general, both groups performed at high
levels on all the actions presented to them.
Apart from the very young autistic children, there were no problems
motivating the autistic subjects. In fact of all groups, the autistic children seemed to
enjoy their sessions most. It was felt that in sessions with the autistic children,
something very close to a normal social interaction was engaged in. Although this
was not studied formally, it may be important for future interventions. Encouraging
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the child to imitate, perhaps in addition to imitating the child, may be instrumental in
helping to increase and expand the autistic chird's ability to engage in social
interaction. This has been already been suggested by other researchers, e.g. Dawson
and Adams (1984), and Nadel (in press). Whether it would improve peer interaction
remains to be seen but if introduced at a very early stage in the home, one might
follow from the other, as it does in normal development.
From a theoretical point of view, these findings seem to point towards support
for Rogers and Pennington's theory to some extent. However, it must always be
remembered that Rogers and Pennington's theory was very non-specific in its
predictions and is difficult to test due to the nature of the underlying deficit. The
only aspect which differentiates it from other theories of autism is imitation, but
whether that is strong enough proof remains doubtful. Intersubjective
communications may well be important at an earlier stage of development (Meltzoff
and Gopnik, 1994). The results from the younger autistic children in this study,
suggest that if a satisfactory way of testing very young children can be found, it is
these and even younger autistic children who might have problems with imitation.
Unfortunately, the lack of an early diagnosis makes this very difficult to test and
only a longitudinal study will really be able to answer questions about the early
development of imitation in autistic children.
These issues will be discussed further in later chapters when all the other
behaviours have been examined and any links between them can be analysed.
Chapter 6 will examine in more detail the development of imitation and the
relationship with age, while Chapters 7 and 8 will look at the relationship between
imitation and other abilities as predicted by Rogers and Pennington (1991).
However, the investigation of imitation itself should not stop with elicited imitation.
Several questions remain to be answered. Can autistic children imitate an action on
an object after a delay (e.g. as long as 24 hours)? Do they spontaneously imitate a
sequence of problem-solving actions carried out by another person on a novel
object? Does the ability to imitate that we have seen in immediate elicited imitation
generalise to other types of imitation and other developmentally similar behaviours?
These questions will be answered in the following chapters of this thesis.
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Chapter 4
Spontaneous imitation on a novel object - artificial fruit task
Introduction.
The rationale behind this experiment was to investigate the autistic child's
ability to imitate spontaneously on a task that involved solving a problem. In 1991
Rogers and Pennington proposed that a deficit in imitation in young autistic children
could be important in understanding autism. Although they made a distinction between
vocal and gestural imitation, they did not distinguish between spontaneous and elicited
imitation or consider the different manifestations of imitation that emerge at different
stages in development such as immediate imitation of gestures, delayed imitation,
imitation of actions with objects, both symbolic and non-symbolic and using imitation
as a problem-solving tool. Chapter 2 looked at imitation in the spontaneous, everyday
environment of autistic children and adults, while Chapter 3 examined autistic children
and adults ability to produce elicited imitation. In Chapter 3, it was seen that imitation
could be elicited from older autistic children and adults to a high level, so that, except
in isolated cases of pretence, there were no significant differences between autistic
individuals and older control children. Younger autistic children, on the other hand,
had more problems in general with imitation. At a very general level, this was as
Rogers and Pennington (1991) had predicted. In addition, the normal 3-4 year old
children performed poorly on elicited imitation, yet the observational study reported in
Chapter 2 showed that they imitated the most in a spontaneous situation, while the
autistic individuals and older non-autistic children imitated rarely. Those there was a
dissociation between spontaneous and elicited imitation. These results are consistent
with those of Nadel and colleagues (1982-1993), who on many occasions found that
three year old children prolifically imitate peers in a spontaneous situation. They found
that autistic children did not imitate as much spontaneously, but that imitation could be
elicited from autistic children by the right type of model in certain circumstances. The
observational results of this study did not show any differences between autistic and
control children but rather a general paucity of imitation. It was therefore important to
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examine spontaneous imitation in a systematic experimental context. In addition the
experiment was designed to distinguish imitation and emulation. Emulation has been
defined as reproduction of the end product but using different means (see Tomasello et
al. 1993 for a fuller discussion on the differences between imitation and emulation). If,
through observation, the child succeeded in the task, but without using the same
method which the experimenter used, then the child would be emulating. If the child
attempted to reproduce the modelled action, then they could be said to be imitating.
If we think back to Chapter 1 again, we can extrapolate from normal
development. Piaget (1962) proposed that imitation of novel actions on novel objects
was a more advanced type of imitation than either vocal imitation or imitation of
familiar actions. Problem-solving itself comes at a much later stage in development so
we might expect that problem-solving by imitation would fall somewhere in between.
Piaget found that his children imitated unfamiliar actions with objects at about one
year onwards. Meltzoff (1988) would place it earlier in development (at about 9
months). However, at whatever point in development this ability may emerge, all the
children in this study had a higher mental age than either estimation. Since, however,
this task is conceptually more difficult than the imitation of simple body actions or
even actions on objects, it is expected that the younger autistic children will have as
many problems imitating the actions necessary as they did in the elicited imitation
task. In fact it may be possible that some of the older autistic children may also have
problems with this task for the same reason.
On the other hand, work by Nadel (Nadel and Camioni, 1993) would suggest
that since this is a task of spontaneous imitation, it is the children with a mental age
around 3-4 years who would be more likely to imitate on this task, while those who are
older will use their advanced skills to find their own way to solve the task.
The artificial fruit experiment which was used here was first tested by Custance
(1994) and is reported in Whiten et al. (in press). Custance used a "plastic fruit", (see
photographs in Appendix 4.1 and the description of each action in Table 4.1. More
details of the equipment and methods used can be found in Whiten et al, in press) with
normal 2 year old, 3 year old and 4 year old children, as well as chimpanzees.
In those experiments the box was presented closed, the lid held either by a
handle and pin, or by two bolts. Half the children saw one method of opening each
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component part and half the children saw the other method. So, for example, half the
children saw the pin turned and the handle pulled straight out and the other half saw
the pin spun and the handle turned 180 0. On the bolts, half saw the bolts poked from
front to back with index finger and half saw the bolts twisted and pulled from the front.
No child nor animal saw all three, pin, handle and bolts. It is important to note (and
this also applies to the present study) that the turning, spinning and twisting motions
were not necessary to remove the relevant component parts. Thus if the child
reproduced something of these irrelevant actions, they could be said to be imitating. If
they pulled out the part without any turning/twisting or used any other method,
emulation would be a more relevant description. It was found that all groups of
children were coded as imitating faithfully at least on some of the components of the
fruit. They also showed large amounts of less faithful imitation, in particular on the
pin. The chimpanzees produced less faithful imitation than children in general but did
imitate enough that the coders were able to say which action they had seen, in the case
of the bolts. Of the children the 2 year olds were less likely to produce faithful
imitations and the 3 year olds most likely to do so. Custance also tested capuchin
monkeys, who as a group did not respond much at all to the artificial fruit - when they
opened it, they did it extremely fast but no significant resemblance to the target action
was demonstrated (Custance, 1994).
In the present experiment several changes were made from the original
methodology. Firstly, the fruit was presented with all the pin, handle and bolts in place
(not separately as in the previous studies) and the manipulation of the pin, handle and
bolts were presented in that order. This was to examine whether the children would
manipulate these in the order presented. Whiten and Custance (in press) note that that
was one thing the fruit was originally designed to do, but in their first experiments with
primates they simplified the task because of recent findings that apes show less
imitative ability than previously thought (Whiten and Ham, 1992). Whiten and
Custance suggest that sequence imitation is one measure of program-level imitation as
discussed by Byrne (1994). Byrne suggests that the program-level imitation gives us a
different level at which to judge whether subjects, either human or non-human, are
imitating. This would be imitation of the "logical structure" of an act, without slavishly
copying each component in the sequence.
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Secondly, on the handle, the turn method was changed so that the handle was
Mme
turned 180° and then pulled out. Thirdly, on the poke method, the bolts were pushed
out from the back instead of the front and then pulled out the last bit from the front.
The principal actions were the same, but these two alterations allowed us to control
more strictly for emulation, since the end product is the same for both methods used -
the pin is removed, the handle is lifted up and out, and the bolts are removed towards
the model and child.
Rogers and Pennignton (1991) did not make specific predictions about the
autistic person's ability to spontaneously imitate actions on a novel object. It is
difficult therefore to know how this type of imitation would fit into their model.
However, since they are predicting that it is the youngest children who are generally
impaired in the ability to imitate, they would presumably predict that the case would
be the same for any imitation task. In this case, as we see in normal development, we
would expect the youngest groups of children to show less imitation on this task.
Those children who have a mental age above 5 (i.e. school age) would on the other
hand also show less imitation. as they do not use it as much spontaneously (Nadel and
Camioni, 1993). Finally, those in the middle group with a mental age between 3 and 4,
will use imitation more than both the youngest and oldest children and adults (Nadel
and Camioini, 1993). This chapter will only look at the three groups of autistic
children and adults (development with age will be dealt with in a later chapter). The
youngest autistic children were not tested on the same tests as the older children and
adults but they had a mean approximate developmental age of 	  (21 months for 3 at
Paris). The mean MA of the school age autistic children was 4;9 on the BPVS. The
mean MA of the autistic adults was 6;9 on the BPVS. As such the three groups fall
roughly into the three stages of development described above.
Method
Subjects.
The subjects used for this part of the experiment were as for Chapter 3 except
that nine of the MLD children took part in the experiments. Six young autistic
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children, twelve autistic children, eleven autistic adults, thirteen 3-4 year olds and
ON.
twelve 5-6 year olds acted as subjects.
Procedure.
The artificial fruit was closed using all three components out of sight of the child.
Inside the perspex fruit, and therefore visible to the child, was a sticker or a sweet or
some appropriate reward to motivate the child. The child was instructed to watch while
the experimenter opened the box, slowly and deliberately performing each action and
then opening the lid and taking out a reward to show the child. The fruit was then re-
closed, as before, out of sight of the child, then presented to the child with the
instruction "Now it is your turn. Can you open the box?". No reference was made to
imitating the actions of the model. The aim made clear to the child was simply to open
the box. Once the child succeeded in opening the box, they were allowed to touch the
reward but were asked not to take it and the box was reclosed so that the experimenter
could open it again, using the same method as before. The child was re-presented with
the closed box and this time was allowed to take the reward if they opened the box.
The instructions between the first and second presentations were that both the
experimenter and child would have another go at opening the box. Most of the children
saw two presentations. A few of the children were only shown the box once as they
were either very distracted during the first presentation or obviously did not want to do
any more. Some of the children saw the action three times if they failed to open the
box on the first or second attempt; however, it was only the first two attempts that
were included in analysis.
If the child failed then they were helped to open the box, stage by stage, so that
they got the reward in the end and went away from the test session happy. Table 4.1
summarises the two action sequences shown to the children - with half of each group
seeing one sequence and the rest seeing the other sequence. All children saw the same
method of opening the lid - the index and third fingers were hooked through the set of
hoops on the lid and the lid was pulled open in this way.
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Table 4.1 Actions shown to the children on each part of the box with brief description. Photographs of
each method can be found in Appendix 4.1
Part of
box
Method 1 Description Method 2 Description
Pin Turn (T) Pin is held between the
thumb and index finger
and turned several times
using a wrist rotating
movement (usually six)
in a clockwise direction,
and then pulled out.
Spin (S) Pin is spun in a
clockwise
direction, using tip
of index finger and
then is pulled out.
Handle Pull (P) Handle is pulled straight
up and out of the holder,
using index and third
fingers
Turn (T) Handle is turned
1800, so that flat
part is facing
model/child and
then lifted out.
Bolt Poke (P) Bolts are poked out most
of the way, one at a time,
from the back of box to
the front using the index
finger. They are then
pulled out the rest of the
way from the front.
Twist (T) Bolts are grasped
with right hand
and turned in a
clockwise
direction, using a
wrist twisting
motion, while
being pulling out
from the front.
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Coding/Analysis
As for the deferred imitation analysis, two independent, naive observers coded
video recordings of the children's responses to the box. Both coders were asked to
code both the first and second attempts by the children and coded the response on the
pin, the handle and the bolts separately. The interobserver reliability was significant
and high on all the actions/presentations (average r value on Pearson's Product
Moment Correlation over 12 correlations (each method for each component for each
presentation) of 0.80). The results of the two coders were averaged for the rest of the
analysis, so that there was only one set of data per child per attempt on each
component of the box.
The coding was done on the basis shown below in Table 4.2 and was achieved
in two stages - (1) a decision of which action the child saw and (2) the certainty with
which the coder made the decision. This was then re-coded onto a five point scale so
that 1 = very like one method; 3 = could not really tell - a guess in one direction or
another; and 5 = very like the second method. Table 4.2 below illustrates this for the
actions on the pin.
Two questions needed to be answered. Firstly, was spontaneous imitation
evident for each group? Would each child reproduce an action like the action shown by
the demonstrator, more than an action not shown? For example, on the pin, would
those children who were shown spin produce more actions that resembled spin than
resembled turn? To answer this question in a way that would allow comparison to the
original Whiten et al. (in press) study, a Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test was carried out
to compare the scores of those who saw one method with those who saw another
method for each component part of the fruit.
It must be noted that the group of young autistic children was very small in size
(n- =5) and therefore could not be compared using the method described above. They
were, however, included in the second analysis described below.
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Table 4.2: The three stages of coding used to answer the experimental questions. Here the example used
is for the actions on the pin.
1) First coding by observers (Figures in brackets are the certainty rating):
Turn
	
Turn	 Not Sure	 Spin	 Spin
(2) (1) (0) (1) (2)
I I I 1 1
2) First re-coding by experimenter - Similarity of response.
Very like	 Quite like	 not like either/	 Quite like	 Very like
turn	 turn	 mixture both	 spin	 spin
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
3) Second re-coding by experimenter - Imitation Index (action demonstrated = spin)
Very like action Quite like	 Not like either/	 Quite like
	
Very like
not seen	 action not seen	 mixture of both	 action seen	 action
seen
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Secondly, the experiment aimed to establish whether there were any differences
between groups - would autistic children and adults perform worse or better than any
of the other groups? To allow a response to this question the scores on the five point
scale were recoded for one of the two actions in each pair, i.e. turn pin, pull handle and
poke bolts, in such a way as to reverse the scales. In this second re-coding (Featured in
Table 4.2) a score of 5 always corresponded to imitating the action seen; a score of 1
always corresponded to the action not seen and a score of 3 signified a tendency to
produce either a mixture of the two actions or a completely different action. This was
again analysed using a Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test. If no differences were found
between the three autistic groups and between the three non-autistic groups, then these
two sets were collapsed into an autistic and a non-autistic group for additional analysis.
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In interpretation of this additional analysis, the results between the individual groups
and the results of the analysis when the autistic and non-autistic groups were matched
on CA, MA on the BPVS and the raw score on the TROG, must be borne in mind at
all times. The autistic/non-autistic comparison, was intended as a baseline measure
against which the CA, MA and TROG matched analysis could be considered (Mann-
Whitney tests were chosen in order to allow comparisons with the Whiten et al. study
(in press) at a later date).
Results.
Of the sixty-four children and adults who saw the box on at least one occasion,
only three refused to open the box. Two of these children did not even touch the box,
one young autistic child tried to throw it. In addition to these three, one child could not
be coded on either presentation due to an editing problem on the video tape (the coders
were able to see which actions the child was shown). Similarly for a few other children
the coders could not code one part of the box, because they could see the action that the
children had watched. This, however, occurred rarely. The percentage of each sample
that completed the opening of the box is shown in Table 4.3 below.
Table 4.3 Percentage of children/adults in each group who succeeded in opening the box on the first
attempt (not including those children who did not respond at all).
Group Percentage of children opening box
Young autistic children 60 (n=5)
Autistic children 75 (n=12)
Autistic adults 73 (n-11)
MLD 89 (n=9)
3-4 year olds 92 (n=12)
5-6 year olds 100 (n=12)
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Is there a tendency to imitate?
Figure 4.1 illustrates the median scores on the imitation index (recoding 3) for
each group of children on first and second presentations. There were no significant
differences between the first and second responses, although the general trend was for a
higher imitation score on the second response. In general terms the scores were highest
for the three to four year olds, then the 5-6 and MLD children, then the autistic adults,
and finally the young autistic children.
Median score
15 	
13
11
9
7
5
3
Figure 4.1: Median Score and interquartile ranges for the overall scores of each group across all
three components of the plastic fruit - pin, handle and bolt (filled bar = score on reponse to first
presentation, empty bar = score on response to second presentation).
3-4 yrs	 5-6 yrs	 MLD	 Yng Aut.	 Aut Ch.	 Aut Adts.
Group on tirst and second attempt
When the subsets of autistic and non-autistic subjects were matched identically
on chronological age or mental age on BPVS and TROG raw score, the differences
were as illustrated in Table 4.4. When matched on CA (n=9 in each group) the
autistic children had higher scores than the autistic children for the second response but
not the first response (z = -0.482 p>0.05 for first response; z = -2.586 p<0.01 for
second response). When matched on mental age, either on BPVS (n=12 in each group)
and TROG (n=10 in each group), there were no differences between the autistic and
non-autistic groups on either first or second responses.
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Table 4.4: Summary of results for overall performance on artificial fruit imitation experiment for the
autistic versus non-autistic group, when matched on chronological age, mental age on BPVS and TROG
raw score. The results for the Mann-Whitney, which tested whether the non-autistic children showed
more imitation than the autistic children, are shown in the shaded columns, opposite the non-autistic
groups.
Group Matched Mann-
	
Matched Mann-	 Matched Mann-
on CA	 Whitney
	
on BPVS Whitney on	 Whitney
results	 results	 TROG	 results
Medians	 Medians	 Medians
Autistic
	 7.25	 7.5	 9.5
First
attempt
Second	 9.5	 11	 11
attempt
Non-	 9.75	 N.S.	 11	 N.S.	 10.75	 N.S.
autistic
1st
attempt
second	 13.75	 higher score	 13	 N.S.	 11.5	 N.S.
attempt	 than autistic
second attempt
z = 2.59
p<0.01
When each of the six groups were compared using a Kruska1-Wallis test on median
overall scores, it was found that on the first attempt the 3-4 year old children showed
higher levels of imitation than both the young autistic children and the autistic adults
(K-W = 12.67 P<0.05). On the second attempt it was the MILD children who improved
their performance so that they showed higher imitation scores than the young autistic
children (K-W = 15.40 p<0.01). There were no other group differences evident.
Figure 4.2: Median scores and interquartile ranges for each group on the PIN. filled bar= saw spin, empty
bar = saw turn (N.B. A score of live = very like spin, 1 = very like turn, 3 = a mixture of both or not like
either action).
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Individual components of the box: 
Results for actions on pin.
Groups and action seen
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 illustrate the median scores and interquartile ranges for the
children's responses to the pin. None of the groups who had watched spin showed a
significantly higher score for spin than turn, which should have been the case if the
children were imitating. (N.B. Although featured on the graph, the young autistic
children were not included in the data analysis, for the reasons described on page 171)
The overall imitation scores for spin were much lower than the scores for turn and this
was significant on a Mann-Whitney at 0.05 level (z = 3.53). All groups clearly found
spin more difficult - those shown spin tended to turn the pin, rather than spin it.
2.5 -
1.5
5-6 years	 MLD Group Yng Aut Ant Ch	 Aut adt3-4 years
5
4.5
3.5
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Figure 4.3 Median Score and interquartile ranges for eack.group on the imitation index on the
Pin (N.B. A score above three = like action seen and therefore, imitation; A score of three = not like either
either action; less than three = like other action not shown.
Median Score
There were no differences between groups when divided into autistic and non-autistic
and no differences between first and second responses, although the 5-6 year old and
autistic children both had a median overall score of 4, which was the highest score.
These are illustrated in Table 4.5 below. One interesting anecdotal result with regard to
the pin, is that many of the children shown either method tended to keep spinning or
turning for much longer than the model had demonstrated. This was also evident in
Whiten et al (in press). It may be that they were expecting the pin to be threaded. The
younger children especially take much longer to discover that the pin needs to be
pulled out. This discovery is often made by accident, when a change in hand position
while turning the pin results in the pin coming out part of the way. On the other hand
some of the older children just pull the pin straight out, realising perhaps that this
turning is not necessary.
Figure 4.4: Median Scores and interquartile ranges for each groups on the HANDLE. filled bar = saw
pull, empty bar = saw turn. (N.B. A score of five = very like turn, a score of 1 = very like pull).
Median Score
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Results for actions on handle.
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Group and actions seen
For the handle the picture is a little different as Figures 5.4 and 5.5 illustrate.
Over all the children, irrespective of group, those who saw turn scored significantly
higher than those who saw pull, which is as we would expect if imitation was being
used (z = -3.51, P<0.001). However, when the groups are taken separately, none of the
autistic children or adults show a significant difference between the scores of those
shown pull and those shown turn. The same occurred in the MLD group (although for
both the MLD and autistic children then tendency was towards higher scores for turn
than pull). It is the 3-4 year old children and the 5-6 year old children who both had
significantly higher scores for turn than for pull (Significant on Mann-Whitney at 0.01
level and 0.001 level respectively), illustrating that they are more likely to produce an
action like turn if shown turn and an action like pull if shown pull (N.B. this analysis
not done for young autistic children).
The autistic and MLD groups appeared to perform well on turn, however, they
also tended to turn when shown pull. The autistic and MLD children seem then to have
Median Score
5
4.5 -
3.5
3
2.5
1.5
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been using their own method to accomplish the task for the pull method. This method
resembled turn, for the most part, thus the lack of a significant difference on the
statistics.
Figure 4.5: Median scores and interquartile ranges for each group on imitation index
on the handle. ( N.B. a score of more than 3 = like action shown; a score of less than 3 = like action not
shown; a score of 3 = not like either action ).
3-4 years	 5-6 years MLD	 Yng Aut	 Aut Ch	 Aut adt
Group
When collapsed autistic and non-autistic groups (c.f. page 143-144) were
compared across imitative score the non-autistic children had higher imitation scores
than the autistic children/adults (z = 2.05, p<0.05), as the above results would suggest.
The median scores for each of the six groups combined over pull and turn can be seen
in Table 4.5. The basic picture is that the young autistic children and adults have a
median score of three, suggesting that the coders found it hard to label the action one
way or the other. The autistic children and MLD children have medians close together,
nearer the 4 mark, suggesting that more children tend towards imitating the action
shown than the action not shown but some children still use their own method. Finally,
the two normal groups both have a median score of five, illustrating that at least on this
action they tend to use the method demonstrated rather than any other method.
It was observed that, as in the Whiten et al (in press) study, the subject turned the
handle more rotations than had been demonstrated. Many of the younger children kept
I P	 I P	 T	 P	 T
Young aut.	 Aut. Ch.	 Aut. Adults
, 
P
5-6 yr olds
T
MLD
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3-4 yr olds
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turning and turning and once again it often seemed to be by accident that they
discovered that the handle could be pulled upwards to be lifted out.
Results for actions on bolts.
Figure 4.6: Median Scores and interquartile ranges for each group on the BOLTS. Filled bar = saw poke,
empty bar = saw twist (N.B. A score of five = very like twist, a score of one = very like poke).
Median Score
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Groups and action seen
On the bolts the general picture was the same as for the handle. Over all the children
there was a tendency for subjects who saw twist to score higher for twist than for poke,
which would suggest an overall tendency to imitate the action demonstrated (z = 3.12
p<0.01). Again, however, only the 3-4 year olds and 5-6 year olds produced
significantly higher scores for twist than poke at 0.05 level (N.B. Young autistic
children not included in this part of the analysis). For overall imitation scores (see
Figure 4.7) the picture is similar to the pin, poke seems to be more difficult for the
autistic children/adults than for the non-autistic children. On twist, all groups showed a
median of five so there was a strong tendency to produce an action like twist when
shown twist. But poke, often produced an action more like twist because the child
tended to pull the bolts straight out from the front, pointing perhaps to a tendency to
emulate rather than imitate. For the MLD group there is a wide variation in the scores
for both twist and poke. However, like the autistic groups, the MLD children performed
3-4 years
	
5-6 years
	
MLD
	
Yng Aut
	
Aut
	
Aut adt
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quite well on twist but also tended to perform an Vion more like twist when shown
poke.
Figure 4.7: Median Scores and interquartile ranges on the imitation index for the BOLTS. ( A
score greater than 3 = like action shown i.e imitation; a score less than 3 = like action not shown;
a score of 3 = not like either action - no imitation ).
Groups
When the groups were divided on the autistic/non-autistic basis (c.f. page 143-
144), the non-autistic children showed significantly higher scores on the imitation score
than the autistic children (z = 2.12 p<0.05). From the median scores for each of the six
groups (See Table 4.5), all groups except the young autistic children and autistic adults
score between four and five on the scale, suggesting a high overall tendency to imitate.
The non-significant result for the autistic and MLD groups, along with the large
interquartile ranges seen on Figures 4.6 and 5.7, emphasise the large variability within
groups. Some children can be clearly coded as reproducing the modelled actions while
some children can clearly be coded as producing the action not modelled to those
children.
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Table 4.5. Median Imitation Index Scores for each group when the scores for the two methods are
NO
combined - turn plus spin for the pin, turn plus pull for the handle and poke plus twist for the bolts. (**
denotes a significant difference between collapsed autistic (n=29) and non-autistic (n=34) groups at 0.01
level on a Mann-Whitney test, in the direction of non-autistic groups having higher scores than autistic
groups; *** denotes a significant difference at 0.001 level; n.s. = not significant).
Part of Box Result on Mann-
Whitney test
Median Scores Groups
Pin n.s 3 Young autistic
2.75 Adults
4 Autistic
2.5 MLD
4 5-6 year olds
2 3-4 year olds
Handle *** 3 Young autistic
3 Adults
3.75 Autistic
4 MLD
5 5-6 year olds
5 3-4 year olds
Bolt ** 2 Young autistic
3.5 Adults
4 Autistic
4 MLD
5 5-6 year olds
5 3-4 year olds
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Table 4.6: Summary of results for each part of the box showing the Mann-Whitney results for each
group for 1) the pin, with spin having higher score than turn, 2) handle, with turn having higher score
than pull and 3) bolts, with twist having a higher score than poke. (n.s. = not significant, * =
significant at 0.05 level, ** = significant at 0.01 level and *** = significant at 0.001 level). When the
scores are significantly higher in the directions described above this implies a tendency to imitate the
action which was used by the model.
Group Pin Handle Bolts
Young autistic not tested n=5 not tested n= 4 not tested	 n=3
Aut adults n.s. n=10 n.s. n=11 n.s. n=10
Autistic children n.s. n=11 n.s. n=12 n.s. n=11
MLD n.s. n=9 n.s. n=9 n.s. n=9
5-6 year olds n.s. n=10 *** n=12 * n=12
3-4 year olds n.s. n=11 ** n=12 * n=12
Sequence imitation: 
Finally, the children's responses were scored for the order in which they
attempted the sequence of actions - a 2 for attempting the pin and then the handle (and
then the bolts - although this last part of the sequence was not scored since there was no
other choice for the child to take); a score of 1 was given if the pin was attempted first
but followed by the bolts and a zero indicated that either the handle or the bolts was
attempted first.
Table 4.7 shows the mean score on the order scale for each group. Figure 4.8
illustrates the percentage of children in each group scoring 2, 1 and 0. It is important
to note that although the handle could not be removed with the pin still there, some
children did attempt to pull out the handle before removing pin. This had to be
scored as 0 since the chance of finding the right sequence after this due to trial and
error increased. Some children took out the pin, then the bolts and finally the handle
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at the end. However, most of the children attempted the box in the sequence
presented.
Table 4.7 Mean and median scores for each group for the order in which the child attempted each task
in opening the box after the first presentation. (A score of 2 = in correct order, pin, then handle (then
bolts); 1 = pin attempted first but not followed by handle before bolts; 0 = pin not attempted first).
Also shown is the mean and median overall scores on imitation.
Group Mean score on
order of task
(out of 2)
Mean Score
on imitation
(out of 15)
Median score
on order
Median Score
on imitation
Young autistic
children
1.4 6.8 2 7
Autistic adults 1.36 8.23 2 9.5
Autistic
children
1.5 9.95 2 10.5
MLD 1.78 9.72 2 11
5-6 year olds 1.92 10.62 2 11
3-4 year olds 1.58 11.92 2 11.25
Table 4.7 shows that the median scores are the same for each group and there
seems to be no link between the score on imitation of all the components, and the
order in which the task is attempted. From the mean scores the autistic groups and 3-
4 year old children tended to make more errors in the sequence attempted but it is
difficult to say if this was due to a memory or attention problem or just a larger
extent of emulation. From the results previously discussed, the latter could be the
case for the autistic children, since in general, they often found their own ways of
opening the box, rather than imitating what the model did. The 3-4 year old children,
on the other hand, did imitate the box actions very closely, so for them it may have
been a problem with memory for the actual sequence. This is emphasised by the fact
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that a few of the youngest children in each group followed the sequence on the
component parts perfectly but when they came to opening the lid, seemed to have
forgotten the way to do it. Some of the children managed to open the lid themselves
but after trying to touch different parts of the lid. Some of these children attempted to
pull on the first set of hoops, i.e. those attached to the side of the box, not the lid, and
then tried the right set of hoops.
When the results are looked at in more detail, on response to the first
presentation, the only groups to show significantly more full scores (2) than any
other scores were the 5-6 year old and MLD children (X 2 = 7.36, p< 0.01 and X2 =-
5.44 p< 0.05, receptively). On the second presentation, however, the 3-4 year olds
and autistic children also showed more 2s than any other score (X 2 = 7.36 and 8.33
receptively, p<0.01). The autistic adult's results were almost significant on the
second presentation (p = 0.058).
There was no correlation between score on order and score on imitation of
actions (n=63) but when the results were grouped into those above and below a score
of 9 (children who scored more than 9, were averaging more than 3 on each
component and therefore must have imitated at least on one component) then a
higher percentage of those scoring 9 or less fail on the order task (do not score 2)
than those scoring above 9 (30 % and 25 % respectively). If an overall score of 12
(child scoring at on average 4 on each component and therefore imitating on at least
two components) is taken as the cut-off point then the differences between a score of
two and a score less than two on the order task is significant at 0.01 level (X 2 = 8.42).
Discussion
Motivational Factors:
All the children taking part in this experiment seemed to enjoy using the box.
Even the 5-6 year old children found it motivating and asked to do it again in other
sessions. The reward of the sweet or a sticker seemed to motivate all children except
the young French autistic children who did not particularly want the sticker or sweet.
The two oldest of this group were the exception but one of the youngest of this group
was very motivated when a toy that made a bu7zing noise was put inside the box - this
Chapter 4: Spontaneous imitation on a novel object	 162
was his favourite toy. The autistic adults were also given a sweet, usually an Opal Fruit
or Quality Street. The subjects were not allowed to take the reward after the first
presentation, so that the motivation was still there for the second presentation.
However, it is possible that the motivation to change to a more exact imitation of the
modelled action, in the case of the normal and MLD children, did not come solely from
the desire to get the reward but from the implication that the first attempt could not
have been completely correct since they were asked to do the task again.
Differences between first and second attempts: 
There were few statistical differences between first and second attempts within
groups. There was a tendency for all groups except the young autistic children to
improve at least slightly on the second attempt, although this was not statistically
significant. This held for both the overall scores and the scores for each component of
the box. Between groups there was a slight difference in that the 3-4 year old children
performed higher on the first attempt than both the young autistic children and the
autistic adults. On the second attempt this was not the case - the 3-4 year olds did not
improve their performance on the second attempt in proportion to the improvement
seen in the other groups. The MLD children - some of the oldest and most able children
- improved so much on the second attempt that they then showed significantly better
imitation than the young autistic children, which they didn't do on the first attempt.
How the results are related to age will be discussed a little further on.
Individual components:
a) The pin: The most notable result here was that no group significantly imitated
the action of spin - in response to being shown spin, most children produced a turning
action. This may not be due to a lack of ability or inclination to imitate but to the fact
that spin may be a much more difficult action for a child to reproduce. On the other
hand there were several children, including two autistic children, who produced spin
when shown turn. This was also evident in the previous studies (Whiten et al., in
press). So spin cannot be said to be outwith all the children's repertoire. This point
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serves to emphasise that many of the autistic children, in particular, were using their
own methods to open the box, and not paying attention to what they were shown.
b) The handle: The handle showed the greatest significant differences between
presentation conditions and therefore significantly higher levels of imitation of the
three components. However, the differences lay within only two groups - the normal 3-
4 year olds and the normal 5-6 year old children. Both these groups tended to imitate
the action shown to them. The autistic children, adults and the MLD children all
produced what looked like high levels of imitation when shown turn but yet also
produced an action like turn when they were shown pull. It is possible that, in their
experience most handles are threaded and therefore need to be turned before being
removed. This, of course, could also be true of the normal children but they seemed
able and willing to imitate what was shown to them, despite what they may have
experienced with handles in the past. This speculation is also supported by the extreme
turning that some children in all groups used on the pin, handle and bolts. This was also
a finding made in the Whiten et al. (in press) study.
c) The bolts: The picture here is a combination of the results seen with the pin
and the handle. Again the normal groups both tended to imitate the action modelled for
them while the other groups tended to "do their own thing". The autistic children and
adults seemed to imitate twist on the bolts but not poke. This can be explained by the
fact that many of the autistic children just pulled out the bolts straight from the front.
The action of pulling the bolts straight out is more likely to be coded as a twisting
movement by the observers, since the child does not touch the back of the bolts as in
poking through. What may have been happening, therefore, was that the autistic child
was ignoring what the model had done and simply removed the bolts in the way that
seemed most efficient to them - by pulling straight out from the front. As with all the
components there was huge variability within groups. From the individual differences
seen in the imitation index scores, some children appeared to imitate strongly and some
children seemed to emulate. Although more of the children in the control groups
imitated, there were still some children who tended to emulate, rather than imitate. In
future studies it is essential that a third condition is introduced for a third group of
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subjects, where they are presented with the box, without any action being modelled.
This way one can be sure that the children who do imitate are actually imitating and
that they would not have produced that action by chance.
The whole box:
The overall scores, combining all the components of the box and all the methods
shown, illustrate that it was the young autistic children who did most poorly on the
box. However, the same problems discussed in chapter 3 apply here, with regard to this
group, in that the children were easily distracted and unmotivated to do this task. The
adults also had low scores overall, (scores around the 3 mark which suggests they, like
the young autistic children, were difficult to code because the action produced was not
like any of the actions modelled or was a mixture of both). Unlike the elicited
imitation, the autistic children generally had higher imitation indices than the autistic
adults on this task, although with high variability and without statistical significance.
The MLD children tended to have slightly higher imitation indices than the autistic
children but not significantly. In fact, no group imitates significantly more on the
overall imitation index than the autistic children. We therefore cannot say that autistic
children did worse on imitation assessed in this way, than any control groups.
When all the autistic subjects were compared to all the non-autistic subjects on
overall imitation score for each component the autistic children had lower scores than
the non-autistic children on all components except the pin. This reflects the fact that the
autistic groups tend to emulate more on the individual tasks, while the non-autistic
groups tend to imitate. This also suggests an important paradox in the performance of
the autistic children - From Figure 4.1 and other results presented, one can say that
there is no significant evidence of imitation, yet no group imitates significantly more
than the autistic children on overall imitation index, and their median overall score
suggests that there is a tendency to imitate more than the younger children and adults.
This pattern is reflected if we look at Figures 4.3, 4.5 and 4.7 - the autistic children
tend to have a median score greater than three, suggesting that there is a tendency for
imitation. However, the paradox may be accounted for by the fact that most of the high
Chapter 4: Spontaneous imitation on a novel object 	 165
scores on the imitation index in each case comes frg ,in one method of opening the box.
To clarify this issue, it is essential to include another control group where they are
given the artificial fruit without any demonstration. Without such a control it is
impossible to say whether they are really imitating one method and not another
method, or whether what seems like imitation is what they would have done without
any demonstration.
Emulation versus imitation, and sequence adherence: 
Most of the children tested adhered to the sequence in which the actions were
presented. Those children who did not, were for the most part either autistic children or
3-4 year old children. The autistic adults had the lowest mean score when the order was
coded, perhaps reflecting their tendency to emulate rather than imitate even at the
"program" level. Only one child in each of the 5-6 year old and MLD groups did not
attempt the box in the order presented. If program-level imitation (Byrne 1995)
involves the individual following a sequence of actions in the correct order then the
measure used here could be important as a way of quantifying program-level imitation.
This task, like the food processing tasks of the gorillas in Byrne's account, could be
attempted in any order but could only be successfully completed if at least one
requirement was fulfilled - i.e. the pin had to be removed before the handle could be
removed and both had to be done before the box could be opened. The bolts also have
to be removed before the box can be opened. Although the lid was not included in the
sequence for the purpose of this analysis, it should be for any further work in this area,
since there were several children who followed the sequence to this point and then tried
several methods to open the lid.
But can we say that the child was only truly imitating when they attempted the
box in the correct order and imitated the action shown to them? Although there was no
correlation between those who scored low on the order score and those who scored low
on imitation, this can be thought of in another light. Since there were children who
scored high on the imitation (up to 14 points) but did not follow the correct sequence,
should these children be viewed as imitating or are they part imitating and part
emulating? The same question could be asked for those that followed the sequence but
did not "slavishly copy" (Byrne 1995) the component actions in the sequence. Byrne
Chapter 4: Spontaneous imitation on a novel object 	 166
would call this programme level imitation, but could it also be programme level
emulation, rather than imitation?. Those children who opened the box, but who used a
method not resembling the method shown and not in the right sequence could be said
to have been emulating, but only if they would not have done the same action by
chance, i.e. without seeing the model opening the box. Although for the purposes of
this experiment the results reported here will stand, future analysis of both human and
non-human action imitation may be more precisely analysed using these methods of
the combined sequence following and imitation scores. It must however, be
remembered that in any sequence some sections can be discovered by trial and error,
for example that the pin must be removed before the handle can be removed, or by
chance, for example, if the pin and handle have been removed then the only logical
final step is to remove the bolts. It is also difficult to tell whether a failure to follow the
sequence may be due to a problem with memory or a tendency to emulate. Finally, to
control for what the imitator would do by chance a further condition of no model
should be incorporated.
To summarise this chapter, then, there is some evidence that autistic children and
adults and even MLD children tend to emulate rather than imitate, in a spontaneous
situation. This tendency is stronger for the young autistic children, who would match
the 2 year old children from the Whiten et al. study (in press), and for the autistic adults
more than for the MLD children and autistic children. It is only the normal children of
both age groups who tend to imitate the actions shown to them. It seems probable that
these tendencies are linked to age and experience, specifically the school experience.
Previous research had not tested this type of imitation before, and Rogers and
Pennington (1991) did not make specific predictions for this type of imitation.
However, what can be said is that it is obvious that there is a dissociation between
spontaneous imitation and elicited imitation along those lines which were suggested by
Nadel and colleagues. Just because older autistic children and adults can imitate,
doesn't necessarily mean that they do it when given a choice. Autistic children of all
ages show a reasonably normal pattern of development as far as spontaneous imitation
is concerned.
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Although we can say that autistic children shg.w a normal developmental pattern
with regard to spontaneous imitation and it is the youngest autistic children who are
impaired in tasks of elicited imitation, there is, as with many abilities/deficits in autism,
a wide range of exceptions and high variability. The next chapter will look at one final
type of imitation as described in Chapter 1 - of which this is the first experimental
investigations - deferred imitation. From this we will have an even fuller picture of
imitation in autism. In Chapter 6, the relationship between imitation and age and
between types of imitation will be analysed further.
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Chapter 5
Deferred Imitation
Introduction.
As in the previous three chapters, this experiment was designed to test one
type or manifestation of imitation. In response to Rogers and Pennington's theory
(1991), Chapter 2 examined spontaneous imitation, chapter 3 examined elicited
imitation of many different types of actions and chapter 4 again looked at
spontaneous imtiation but this time in an experimental set-up. In research on
imitation to date, autistic individuals have generally not been tested for their ability
to reproduce an action on an object after a delay. Piaget (1962) proposed that
deferred imitation was the last type of imitation to develop and did so about 18
months of age, along with the emergence of pretend play. However, it has since been
shown that normal infants as young as nine-months old can reproduce a simple
action after a delay of 24 hours (Meltzoff, 1988). Whether older normal children
and autistic children can reproduce a more difficult action after a similar delay
remains to be seen. None of the studies reported in Chapter 1 included a delayed
imitation condition. Only immediate imitation was tested and usually using
sensorimotor tasks such as the Uzgiris-Hunt Scale (1975). It was therefore decided
that this study on imitation should take some account of deferred imitation in order
to be more comprehensive.
The ability to imitate after a long delay is extremely important in everyday
life, especially with regard to social skills and knowledge. It is also important for
working with children in an educational environment, if we want to be sure that if
children are shown an action at one point, they can retain and reproduce that action
at a later stage. Rogers and Pennington (1991) did not deal with deferred imitation as
a separate type of imitation so from their theory and from normal development it
would seem that it should once again be the youngest autistic children who would
show least deferred imitation. More of the older autistic children might show a
problem with this type of imitation because it is a more advanced ability and is
intrinsically related to memory and recall abilities. However, this is also a test of
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spontaneous imitation. It is possible that the younger children will be the ones who
will at least attempt to imitate, even if unsuccessfUl, while the older ones use their
own method to complete the task - not because they cannot remember what to do but
because they tend to emulate rather than imitate as older normal children do.
Unfortunately because memory is so bound up with the concept of deferred
imitation, it will be difficult to put non-imitation down to either emulation or lack of
memory. However, it seems possible that if the child attempts to open the object in
any way then they must remember something of what they saw the day before.
Method.
Subjects and Procedure:
The subjects used were the same as for the elicited imitation study but with 12
children in all groups except the MLD group, which had eight children, who saw the
action; the autistic adults, which had 11 members; and the young autistic group
which had 7 children. The subject groups were divided into two subgroups and each
subgroup was presented with a different action which could be used to open a
drawer-like object to gain a reward inside. This can be seen, along with the actions
used, in Appendix 5.1. Thirty-three children saw Wiggle and Pull (W&P), thirty-one
saw the Push to Side (PtoS) method. Each of these methods are described in Table
5.1.
Table 5.1: Description of the actions demonstrated on drawer object, to test for deferred imitation.
Action Description	 (see	 also	 photographs	 in
Appendix 5.1)
Wiggle and pull The drawer was placed on the ground,
between child and experimenter. The left
hand was used to steady the box by
putting pressure on the top surface and
the right hand was placed on the brass
handle. The handle was wiggled from
side to side and then pulled straight out to
reveal a sweet in the drawer. The child
was allowed to take the sweet out of the
drawer but was not allowed to touch the
object.
Push to side
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The drawer was placed on the ground and
the left—hand used to steady the box. The
demonstrator did not touch the handle but
using the tips of all fingers of the right
hand, palm upwards, pushed on the side
of the box so that the drawer slid out
towards the child to reveal the sweet.
Demonstration:
The action was presented to the children at the end of another session, either
an imitation session or a play session (Chapters 3 and 6). The action was
demonstrated twice and after the second demonstration they were allowed to take the
sweet out of the drawer. They were prevented from touching the object after the
demonstration and they did not see the object again until the next time they came to
the experimental room, when they were tested for their response to the drawer.
Test:
At the beginning of the next session the subjects were presented with the
drawer and allowed to play with it. As far as possible the child/adult was presented
with the object 24 hours after presentation of the target action. However, this was
impossible with some of the children, mainly the 3-4 year olds who did not attend
play group every day. The delay for these groups was 48 hours and this must be born
in mind when interpreting the results. Except for one or two children who were off
school the next day but were tested as soon as possible thereafter, the rest of the
children were presented with the action after 24 hours. No specific instructions were
given - the subjects were given the object and asked if they would like to play with
it. If the child did not respond they were prompted to play with the object. If the
child continued to do nothing or tried but could not open the drawer, which was
quite stiff for the young children, then they were asked if they remembered what had
been shown to them and they were helped, physically or with instructions, to open
the drawer and retrieve the sweet. Obviously only the child's first response, before
further prompting or help, was coded.
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Coding and data analysis:
Two independent observers were shown eachinethod used to open the drawer.
They were then asked to watch video-taped sessions of the child playing with the
box. They had to judge to the best of their ability which action, Wiggle-and-Pull
(W&P) or Push-to-Side (PtoS), they thought the children had seen and score their
certainty on a two point scale. For example, if they were sure the child had seen
Wiggle-and-Pull they would code it as W&P (2). If they were not at all sure and
were just guessing that the child may have seen wiggle and pull then they would
score it as W&P (0). These codings were then transcribed to a five point scale as
illustrated below:
W&P(2)	 W&P(1)	 W&P/PtoS(0)	 PtoS (1)	 Pto S(2)
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Scale:
A Pearson's product-moment correlation was carried out between the two
observers' scores on the five point scale and providing there was a high correlation
the scores were averaged for further analysis.
Two questions needed to be answered. Firstly, was deferred imitation evident
for each group? If the child saw W&P would the child produce an action like W&P
more than the children who saw PtoS? To answer this question a Wilcoxin Mann-
Whitney test was carried out to compare the scores of those who saw W&P with
those who saw PtoS.
Secondly, are there any differences between groups? For example, do autistic
children/adults perform worse or better than any of the other groups? To tackle this
question the scores on the five point scale were recoded for one action i.e. PtoS, in
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such a way as reversed the scales. This produced an index of the extent of imitation
and the groups could be compared on the tendency Co imitate after a delay.
Results:
Of the 61 children who were shown the action, only two children did not
respond to the drawer at all. In addition one child did not attempt to open the box
and just lifted and tried to throw it. Four could not be included because both the
coders said they saw the action that was presented. So out of 61 children, scores
were possible for 55 children.
The interobserver reliability on a Pearson's product moment correlation was
significant at 0.01 level (r =0.67 for W&P method and r =0.64 for PtoS). One
autistic child who saw W&P and one adult who saw PtoS, produced conflicting
results from the two coders, one coder coding definitely one way and one coding
definitely the other way. If these two results are discarded the r values increase to
0.92 and 0.76 respectively. However, for the rest of the analysis these two results are
included because when averaged they produce a score of three, which represents the
difficulty in coding (i.e no clear response).
1) Did autistic children show deferred imitation?
As an overall measure, across all subjects of all groups, the scores for those
children shown PtoS were higher than for those who saw W&P and this difference is
significant on a Mann-Whitney test (Z=5.79 p<0.001). Thus there seems to be a
general tendency to reproduce something like the method shown ( See Figure 5.1)
Figure 5.1 Medians and interquartile ranges of coders' scores for the two methods of opening the
drawer comparing acroS5 groups.Median Score
PtoS
4.5
4-
3.5
3 	
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2
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Each group was examined separately (the young autistic children could not be
compared since only two children responded to the drawer for the PtoS method).
The Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney tests were carried out by hand for these comparisons
as the numbers in each group were less than 10. Figures 4.2 illustrates the results for
the five groups. The autistic children, autistic adults, and 3-4 year old children did
not show significantly higher scores for PtoS than for W&P (although the trend was
in that direction), which should have been the case if imitation was being used to
open the drawer (P>0.05 in all cases). The lack of a significant difference between
methods is due to large variability for the PtoS method. Those who saw W&P
performed very consistently. For the MLD group, the children shown PtoS had a
higher score than those shown W&P (P<0.05). The 5-6 year old children also
showed a similar trend (P<0.01). So only the MLD children and the 5-6 year olds
seem to be clearly imitating the method shown them the day before.
W&P
	
PtoS
I
W&P	 PtoStPtoS	 W&P PtoSW&PPtoS
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Figure 5.2 Median scores and interquartile ranges for each group, when shown each method.
Median score
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2) Group Differences in index of deferred imitation:
Figure 5.3 Medians and interquartile ranges as an index of deferred imitation ability for each
group, irrespective of the action seen. (N.B. a score of three represents no obvious matching of response to
demonstration ; a score below three represents a response resembling the action not seen).
Median Score
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4.5
4
3.5
3
25
2
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3 4 years	 5-6 years	 MLD	 Young nut	 Ant Child	 Aut adt
Groups
Figure 5.3 shows that the medians of the three control groups are very similar
(4.75, 5 and 4.75). The medians of the three autistic groups (4, 3.5 and 4.5) are not
quite as close together, which together with the larger interquartile ranges suggest
more variablility. Although not featured here, the mean scores of the autistic groups
are very similar - 3.65, 3.6 and 3.6. These mean scores of little more than 3 suggest
that these children/adults tend to produce neither method clearly, use a mixture of
the two methods or do their own action altogether. On the otherhand, the mean
scores for the non-autistic groups (4.4, 4.25 and 4.5) illustrate how much more
clearly these children reproduce the method shown to them. The differences between
the three non-autistic groups were tested using Mann-Whitney tests and found
almost non inexistant, as were the differences between the autistic groups, so they
were combined in each case and Figure 5.4 illustrates the autistic versus non-autistic
comparison. The group differences here were significant at 0.05 level on a Mann-
Whitney test - the non-autistic subjects showed a slightly better ability for deferred
imitation than the autistic subjects (z = -2.26).
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Figure 5.4 Median scores and interquartile ranges as an index of imitative ability, irrespective of
action seen, for the autistic and non-autistic groups.
Overall median Score
Non-Aut	 Autistic
Groups
Finally, it was felt that perhaps the handle on the drawer provided a cue for
the children, especially if they did not remember exactly what had been shown to
them the day before. So when presented with the drawer there may well have been a
tendency to reach for the handle even if shown PtoS method, simple because the
handle was prominent and most children are used to opening things by the handle. If
this is true then the scores for all children and for each group will be higher for W&P
than for PtoS method. Comparing all children there was no significant difference (z
= 1.07 p>0.05) between the scores on PtoS and W&P (see Figure 5.5).The median
scores were exactly the same for both methods, although PtoS had a higher
variablity.
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Figure 5.5 Median Scores and Interquartile Ranges over all children for the two methods used to
Median Overall imitation score
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When each group was analysed separately, there were again no differences for any
group on the scores for the two methods. So it seems that the presence of the handle
did not significantly effect the way the child chose to open the drawer. In fact,
although not significant, with the control groups the scores on the PtoS method were
higher but perhaps this was because it was easier for the coders to be sure that this
was what these children were trying to do. For the autistic groups the scores were
slightly higher for the Wiggle-and-Pull than for Push-to-Side.
Discussion.
The two older control groups showed significantly better deferred imitation when
analysed on their own. If shown "Push-to-Side", then they tended to reproduce
"Push-to-Side" or something closely resembling it. However, on an overall score of
deferred imitation, independent of the action modelled, there was a significant
difference between the autistic groups and the control groups, in the direction of
worse performance by autistic subjects. It seems, then, that autistic individuals are
worse at deferred, spontaneous imitation than non-autistic children. However, there
is still a tendency to imitate rather than not imitate for the older autistic children on
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overall imitation scores. The results from the younger autistic children could not be
analysed due to the small numbers of children in ibis group who even attempted the
task. As such we cannot say whether the same pattern as seen in the preceding
chapters occurs and therefore we cannot say whether the younger autistic children
are worse than the older autistic children on deferred imitation. Although there was
no specific deficit in spontaneous imitation, the autistic groups (especially the older
children and adults) did tend towards not imitating much more than the non-autistic
groups did. This chapter has shown that in addition to this tendency not to imitate
sponantaneously, a delay heightens this tendency. Whether this is due to a problem
with imitation or a problem with memory itself cannot be decided on the basis of
this experiment, although most subjects in all groups at least attempted to open the
drawer in some way. As such they must have remembered something of what they
had seen. Further research should include a control for memory such as asking the
children to watch a video clip of the two methods and then report which one they
were shown.
In addition to controlling for memory in further research it would be
interesting to design another object where one method of opening is not more salient
or obvious than the second method. Another possibility would be to do something
unusual with a familiar object, where half the children saw the action and half did
not see any action with the object but their attention was drawn to it. This would
provide a baseline measurement for what would be produced by the children when
not observing a model.
Finally, Chapter 6 will look at the relationship between deferred imitation
and other types of imitation. If autistic development follows a normal developmental
pattern with regard to imitation, then we would expect that those children who show
imitation on the deferred task should also show imitation of all other types, since
deferred imitation is considered to be the latest emerging manifestation of imitation
(Piaget, 1962).
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Chapter 6
Mb.
Summary of findings on imitation and the developmental trend of
imitation in autism.
As we saw in Chapter 1, Rogers and Pennington's (1991) model of autism
was a developmental one, proposing that it is the youngest autistic children who
would be most impaired and that imitative capacity would increase with age. They
proposed that autistic adults would show a more noticeable impairment in "theory of
mind" and language skills than in imitation. From normal development we would
predict that this would be the case for elicited imitation, that is the capacity for
imitation would increase. However, Nadel (see Nadel and Camaioni (1993) for
review) found that preschool children showed prolific imitation spontaneously, and
they proposed that imitation is used by toddlers as a means of communication until
superseded by sophisticated language. This function of imitation may not so obvious
as the child gets older. Instead imitation continues as a tool for learning but becomes
much more accurate than the imitation seen in younger children. It may not be so
noticeable when observed because it often takes the form of deferred imitation.
The previous four chapters have attempted to clarify the rather muddy picture
of imitation in autism. Before going on to look at the existence of relationships
between the various tests of imitation, I will summarise the results we have found so
far and deal with the development with age. Table 6.1 below presents a summary of
the results. In essence what the previous four chapters have found is that there seems
to be no general deficit in elicited imitation for older autistic children and adults.
However, as Rogers and Pennington predicted, the younger autistic children do have
a problem with elicited imitation. On types of imitation that develop later in normal
development and require extra capacities such as symbolic imitation, memory, and
more complicated mental rotation or perspective-taking (such as two-handed actions
and symbolic actions), some of the older autistic children were also impaired
(Chapter 3). The autistic adults showed no less imitation than non-autistic controls
and usually showed more than both the young autistic children and the 3-4 year old
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children. In general their imitation was much more accurate than that seen in the
younger children, both autistic and non-autistic.
So the results from the elicited experiments do provide some support for
Rogers and Pennington's model and also seem to follow the same pattern as normal
development at least in terms of Piaget's (1962) theory. However, we were not just
interested in elicited imitation but also how autistic individuals used imitation in
more spontaneous situations. The results from these experiments and the
observational study showed a different picture to that suggested by either Rogers and
Pennington (1991) or Piaget (1962) but in keeping with theories of Nadel and
colleagues (See Nadel and Camaioni, 1993). What was found for spontaneous
imitation was that it was the younger children - those around 3 years of age who
tended to imitate most prolifically in a natural situation. In an experimental situation
where they could choose how to perform an action they tended to chose imitation of
the model's actions.
The young autistic children were not observed in this naturalistic setting but
on the experimental tasks they did show least imitation. This was in keeping with the
original Whiten et al. (1996) study, which found that normal 2 year olds show less
imitation than 3-4 year olds. The older children with learning disabilities still
imitated to some extent but more of them tended to find their own way of doing
things. The 5-6 year old children in this study did tend to. Piaget (1962) proposed
that children continued to use imitation quite unconsciously until about 7 years and
then it became a conscious decision whether to imitate or not. Older children do not
use imitation in the communicative way that Nadel and colleagues suggested (1982-
1994) but they do use it to learn new tasks and their imitation becomes more
accurate with age. In this study, most of the older autistic children, the MLD
children and all the autistic adults were older than 10 years chronologically, so even
though language was not sophisticated the communicative function of imitation may
have been . Although they showed they could imitate very well when asked to do so,
these older children tended not to imitate spontaneously even to solve a task. They
did not refuse to attempt the task but rather used their own methods (i.e. emulated)
to succeed.
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Further relationships between imitative ability and age.
The summary above has compared three grouFs of autistic individuals at the
crude level of age group differences. However, in several of the chapters, more
detailed analysis of the developmental trend of imitation was impossible. 1) In
Chapter 2, the observational study, it was found that, although the trend was not
significant, it was indeed the younger children in the autistic group who did any
spontaneous imitation.
2) In the experiment on elicited imitation (chapter 3), it was possible to
explore this trend in quite some detail. Correlations were carried out between each
category score and CA, MA and TROG raw score, 1) over all children and 2) over all
the autistic children/adults. For the analysis of the general categories of actions,
correlations were carried out between imitation scores and CA, MA and TROG raw
scores (33 correlations in all). Over all the samples (n=61) one correlation was
significant at 0.01 level. This was between TROG raw score and two-handed actions
(r = 0.49). At 0.05 level, there was also a positive correlation between both BPVS and
CA and two-handed actions (r = 0.31 and r = 0.29 respectively). TROG score was
positively correlated with the score on Body/gestural meaningful actions (r = 0.31).
Finally both MA measures were positively correlated with the score over the 35
actions seen by 70 % of children (r = 0.33 for BPVS and r = 0.31 for TROG).
When the correlations were carried out for just the autistic children and adults
(n=28) the results were somewhat different. In this case there was a positive
correlation between CA and two-handed actions (r = 0.57) and meaningful actions (r
= 0.64) at 0.01 level and between CA and non-symbolic actions on objects at 0.05
level (r = 0.47). In addition there was a positive correlation between CA and overall
score (r = 0.48) at 0.05 level. There was also a significant positive correlation between
TROG raw score and two-handed actions (r = 0.55, p=0.01) and Meaningful actions (r
= 0.47, p=0.03). The results of the correlation analysis are represented in Table 3.6
below.
In general then, there was a trend for those who were older in both
chronological and mental age to perform better on elicited imitation tasks. In other
words, they produced more accurate imitations of the actions modeled. This was true
of all categories, including those with which the autistic subjects had most difficulty
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(i.e. meaningful symbolic actions). This is in keeping both with Rogers and
Pennington's predictions and with evidence from normal development (Piaget, 1962).
Table 3.6: Results of correlation analysis (r value and significance level) for imitation score (on overall
actions, on the 35 actions seen by all children and on the nine categories of actions) and chronological
and mental age as measured by TROG and BPVS. This was done 1) over all samples of children 2)
over the autistic samples. (* denotes significance at 0.05 level; ** denotes significance at 0.01 level).
Category CA MA BPVS TROG score
Overall Score 1
2 0.48 *
35 actions 1 0.33 * 0.31 *
2
Individual
categories
VS	 1
VS	 2
VNS	 1
VNS	 2
Face	 1
Face	 2
One-hand 1
One hand 2
Two-hands 1 0.29 * 0.31 * 0.49 **
Two hands 2 0 . 57** 0.55**
Whole body 1
Whole body 2
MIS	 1 0.31 *
M/S	 2 0 . 64** 0.47*
AONS	 1
AONS 2 0.47 *
AOS	 1
AOS	 2
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3) In the artificial fruit task the relationships between performance on the task and
MA and CA were examined but in a more general way than in the elicited experiment.
As was seen when samples were matched on both BPVS and TROG Measures of mental
age, there were no significant differences between autistic and non-autistic groups on
overall imitation score. On chronological age-matched comparisons there was a
significant difference, with non-autistic children having a slightly higher score than
autistic children. So independent of age there was a tendency for non-autistic children to
imitate more than autistic children.
An interesting age difference occurred when performance on first and second
responses were compared. When all the children were divided into those 4 years and
below on BPVS and those above 4 years mentally, there were no significant differences
between first and second responses for the children below four years (z = -0.9049
p>0.05). However, the children above four years did show significantly better second
responses than first responses on the imitation score (z = -2.7849 p<0.01). On each of the
individual objects @in, handle and bolts), there were no differences within groups on the
first and second attempts. Perhaps being asked to perform the action again made some
children think they had done it poorly the first time so they made an effort to imitate
more closely the second time. It is interesting that none of the autistic groups showed
this tendency for a better score on the second attempt - only the 5-6 year old and MLD
children.
When the pattern of results from this experiment was compared to the pattern seen
in the elicited tasks, we find an apparant "reversal" of results. The young autistic
children, the 5-6 year olds and, to a lesser degree, the school-aged autistic children do
not change their performance. The autistic adults, on the other hand, were good when
asked to imitate, often imitating so faithfully that they imitated the unconscious actions
of the model, such as scratching the cheek (Chapter 3). However, in the present
experiment when they had the choice themselves of what to do, they tended to emulate.
This may be an age-related issue since the MLD children show a similar pattern, with
high scores on elicited imitation but lower spontaneous scores. In addition, the 3-4 year
old children imitate much more faithfully in the spontaneous situation than in the elicited
situation. All of these results reflect those from the observational study of Chapter Two.
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Finally, although the 5-6 year olds usually produced higher scores than the autistic
children, this was rarely significant. In fact, the pattern Ecross these two groups is very
similar. In the elicited imitation, the autistic children performed reasonably well, and
with few significant differences between them and controls. The pattern was similar in
the spontaneous imitation. The 5-6 year olds' performance in both spontaneous and
elicited imitation was also very similar and the two groups produced very similar figures
in the observational study.
Perhaps these two groups are at a stage in development where the school situation
has begun to affect them in such a way that they are willing to comply with instructions
and do as they are asked (the 5-6 year olds more than the autistic children) but that they
have not completely surpassed the need to use imitation rather than emulation to
complete novel tasks. Although more experimental than the younger children, they have
not completely stopped wanting to be like adults and wanting to please them by
imitating them. The younger, 3-4 year old children have not had the school experience to
change their use of imitation and to train them in how to use imitation in conjunction
with instruction to learn. They seem to use imitation unconsciously both to communicate
and to learn. On the other hand, the older MLD children and the autistic adults have had
more experience using imitation to learn. The emphasis for these individuals is to find
their own way of doing things - to experiment and to learn. They learn how to make use
of even subtle forms of feedback and can change their actions to achieve the desired
result. Imitation is not needed to communicate as language is in general more
sophisticated and spontaneous imitation is often seen by care-takers and teachers as bad
or annoying behaviour and inappropriate for the age group and therefore discouraged.
All in all, the age of the individuals involved, and therefore the school/life
experiences undergone, could effect the child's inclination to imitate spontaneously, but
not the ability to imitate per se. It would be interesting to see if children who have not
been educated, at least not in a disciplined school environment, would follow a similar
trend. Alternatively would they remain more like the 3-4 year olds for longer?
In addition to these analyses specific to each chapter, further analysis was
carried out and this included the results from the deferred imitation experiment. In this
analysis, the relationship between the scores of those children and adults above the
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median CA and MA were compared with those below the median CA and MA. These
results are plotted on the profile graphs (Figures 6.1-61) and examined using Fisher
Exact tests. The figures were also designed to illustrate the relationships between both
the overall DAID score and the score on three of the types of elicited imitation (two-
handed actions, meaningful/symbolic actions and symbolic actions with objects -
three actions which were more difficult for the autistic children and which are indeed
more developmentally advanced (Piaget, 1962)) and performance on other imitation
tasks such as the deferred imitation and the artificial fruit tasks, as well as CA and
MA. I shall discuss the consistency across imitation tasks below but first I turn my
attention to the relationship with age. Each line on the graphs represents one child,
although the first line on each graph does not represent the same child every time. The
children used for this analysis were the school-aged autistic children as we did not
have comparable mental or developmental ages for the very young autistic children.
Analyses were also carried out for the adults but these have not been plotted on profile
graphs.
Comparisons (one-way ANOVAs) between the autistic adults and children for
the DAID scores showed no differences at the 0.01 level between the two groups.
There were differences at 0.05 level for imitation of two-handed actions (F=5.26
p=0.03) and meaningful/symbolic actions (F=7.45 p=0.01), with the adults scoring
higher than the children.
There were, therefore, relationships between elicited imitation and both mental
and chronological age as the correlations described above show. But what about
performance on other imitation tasks? A simplified analysis of the relationship
between elicited imitation and mental and chronological age was conducted using
Fisher tests for those above and below the median CA and MA who passed and failed
each of the tasks. Examining Figures 6.1 to 6.4 there appears to be no obvious trend
for the autistic children and this was confirmed by the Fisher test, with none of the
comparisons being significant at 0.05 level. The same was true for the adults. So there
seems to be no interaction between performance on the artificial fruit experiment or
the deferred imitation task and either mental or chronological age. This may have
been because the artificial fruit experiment tested spontaneous imitation and it very
much depended on the individual whether they wanted to imitate or to emulate. All
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the children and adults may have been "too old" for age to make a noticeable
—
difference in performance. Perhaps if it had been possible to use the young autistic
children in this analysis, this is where we would have seen an age effect.
Consistency across tasks:
It is also important to look at the consistency across the tasks since the tasks
vary in their appropriateness to normal development and in the level of difficulty.
From Piaget (1962) and even work by Meltzoff (1988), one would expect that if a
child can engage in and become proficient in symbolic and deferred imitation, then he
would also be able to imitate sounds, simple body actions and actions with objects,
both familiar and unfamiliar and visible/invisible. So far the picture of imitation in
autism seems to follow the same path as imitation in normal development. If imitation
follows a stage development in autism as Piaget suggests for normal development,
then there should be some consistency for tasks passed and tasks failed.
To investigate this, the profile graphs (Figures 6.1 - 6.4) plotted for each of the
autistic children were examined. Their ranked performance on the elicited imitation
task (using the overall score on the Do-As-I-Do task (DAID), the score on the two-
handed actions, meaningful/symbolic actions and symbolic actions with objects) was
compared to their performance on spontaneous imitation, the artificial fruit and the
deferred imitation task. This relationship was then tested using a Fisher test to
compare the number of children who scored above the median score (on the DAID)
who passed or failed each task, and the number of children below the median score
who passed or failed each of the other tasks.
Spontaneous imitation was simply judged by those who did and did not do it.
For the artificial fruit, two measures were used - firstly, those who scored at least four
out of five were said to have passed the task by showing imitation; and secondly,
those who had a score of two on the order task were said to have passed that part of
the task. On deferred imitation, a score of at least four out of five was used as a pass.
Although the graphs are not shown here, the same analysis was carried out for the
autistic adults.
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Results.
Figures 6.1 to 6.4 below illustrate the relationships between score on DAID and
the other imitation tasks, such as deferred imitation, spontaneous imitation during
observations and spontaneous imitation on the artificial fruit task. For the autistic
children, there is a trend for a high overall score on DAID and a high score on
symbolic-actions-with-objects to be accompanied by a pass on the order task for the
artificial fruit experiment. However, using above the median as a high score and equal
to or below the median as a low score, these trends were not significant on a Fisher
test. Since the deferred and artificial fruit tasks were both tests of spontaneous
imitation, it is perhaps not surprising that no specific relationship was found for
elicited imitation, given the differentiations already made between the two situations.
For consistency within the elicited imitation tasks, the group of autistic
children, showed strong correlations between meaningful/symbolic actions and both
symbolic-actions-with-objects (r = 0.7095 p< 0.001) and two-handed actions (r =
0.615 p<0.01). When MA and CA were controlled for in a partial correlation, these
latter correlations remained significant for meaningful/symbolic actions and the other
two categories (r = 0.652 p<0.01 for AOS and r = 0.61 p<0.05 for two-handed
actions). Thus the picture seems to be of some consistency across the more difficult
DAID categories, at least for the autistic children.
Fisher tests were carried out to examine the relationship between each of the
other imitation tasks - deferred imitation, spontaneous imitation, imitation on the
artificial fruit task and the order task. Only one analysis was significant and that was
for the performance on the artificial fruit task and the production of spontaneous
imitation during the observations (p<0.05). This, of course, makes sense as they are
both tests of spontaneous imitation.
For the autistic adults, the picture was a little different. There was a trend for
those adults who passed the order part of the artificial fruit task, to also score high on
some of the categories of actions on the DAID. For both two-handed actions and
symbolic actions with objects, the interaction was not quite significant (Fisher test,
p=0.08), although the trend was in a positive direction for symbolic actions. For
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meaningful/symbolic actions, there was a significant difference but in a negative
direction between those who pass and those who fail: with those who fail the order
task more likely to score above the median score on the DAID (P<0.05). This may be
because they are the older or more experienced individuals, who will do as they are
asked but tend not to use imitation spontaneously. Those who imitate spontaneously
on the artificial fruit may be those who do worse on the elicited imitation, as
suggested in Chapter 5. Finally, there is also a trend in the direction of a negative
correlation for deferred imitation and symbolic actions with objects - those who pass
the deferred task tend to score below the median on the DAID score. Statistically, this
trend is not quite significant (P=0.09). Finally, when comparing performance across
the other imitation tasks - deferred imitation, spontaneous imitation in the
observational study and performance on the artificial fruit spontaneous imitation task,
there are no relationships between any two tasks for the autistic adults (Fisher test:
p>0 .05).
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Figure 6.1: Graph to illustrate the relationship between overall score on the DAID task (ranked
..-
performance) and the other imitation tasks - spontaneous imitation, artificial fruit, order on artificial
fruit task and deferred imitation - and CA and MA for the autistic children (a solid point means the
child failed on the task and an empty point means the child passed; for the ages, a solid point means on
or below the median group age, an empty point means above the median age).
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Ix,
Figure 6.2: Graph to illustrate the relationship, for the autistic children, between the ranked score on
two-handed actions during the DAID task and the other imitation tasks - spontaneous imitation,
artificial fruit task, order score on artificial fruit and deferred imitation, and CA and MA (a solid point
means the child failed on the task and an empty point means the child passed; for the ages, a solid point
means below the median group age, an empty point means above the median age).
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N.B. The children ranked 5 and 6 both had the same high score.
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O.
Figure 6.3: Graph to show the relationship, for the autistic children, between ranked score on
meaningful/symbolic actions of DAID test and the other imitation tasks - spontaneous imitation,
artificial fruit task, order score on artificial fruit and deferred imitation, and CA and MA (a solid point
means the child failed on the task and an empty point means the child passed; for the ages, a solid point
means below the median group age, an empty point means above the median age).
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ale
Figure 6.4: Graph to illustrate, for the autistic children, the relationship between ranked score on
symbolic actions with objects from the DAM task and the other imitation tasks - spontaneous
imitation, artificial fruit task, order score on artificial fruit and deferred imitation, and CA and MA (a
solid point means the child failed on the task and an empty point means the child passed; for the ages, a
solid point means below the median group age, an empty point means above the median age).
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0-0---e	 0 0 0
•	0 0 • • • •
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N.B. The children ranked 6 and 7, both had the same score on the DAID, symbolic actions with
objects.
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Conclusions
We can see then that the picture is not as clear'as one had hoped. Although in
general terms it seemed that the pattern of development of imitation seen in autistic
individuals was similar to that seen in normal development, the consistency one might
have expected across tasks, at least when the more difficult tasks had been
successfully completed, was not found. If a child or adult produced deferred imitation
then that did not necessarily mean that he scored high on the elicited tasks or the
artificial fruit task. I have already hinted at what I would propose could lie behind this
inconsistency. Firstly, the fact that some of the tasks were assessed spontaneously
while others were elicited is an important factor. We have already seen evidence of
the dissociation between spontaneous and elicited imitation with regard to the effect
of age. I would predict that if the children and adults had been specifically asked to
copy the actions in the artificial fruit task or had been prompted in the deferred
imitation task to remember what they had been shown the day before, the pattern of
scores would closely resemble those in the elicited task. Conversely, if the
observations reported in Chapter 2 had been for longer and with more subjects, it is
likely that more incidents of imitation may have been observed. In this way, there
may have been more of a relationship between imitation produced in every day life
and performance on at least the artificial fruit experiment.
Secondly, the spontaneous actions also involved more complex skills, such as
memory, problem-solving abilities, and comprehending and interpreting what was
required from them in the task. Future research should find a way to control for
memory, comprehension and information processing deficits in order to truly examine
spontaneous imitation of an immediate or a deferred nature.
Of course, there is still the possibility that autistic children and adults cannot, in
general, imitate spontaneously rather, than that they will not. In everyday life,
imitation is accompanied by many, often complex, social factors. However, in the test
situation, even the artificial fruit task, there are not as many variables for the autistic
individuals to cope with. On the other hand, since some of the younger school aged
autistic children did imitate spontaneously, and so much of the normal pattern was
seen in the autistic performance on these tasks, I feel it is more likely that the older
children and adults chose not to imitate and were in fact performing quite normally as
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far as imitation was concerned. It is only the younger autistic children, in whom the
development is delayed, who have problems with this important social learning skill.
This, of course, is what Rogers and Pennington (1991) predicted and as such there
seems to be some evidence for their theory. However, it is essential to emphasise one
finding that Rogers and Pennington did not predict and that is the dissociation
between spontaneous and elicited imitation. It does on the other hand seem to be the
case that this too resembles the pattern seen in normal development and as such is
indirect evidence for a delayed acquisition of imitation, rather than a complete
absence of this ability in autism.
In the next two chapters I am going to attempt to examine the relationships
between imitation and other abilities such as were proposed by Rogers and
Pennington (1991). These will include pretend play, joint attention, emotion
perception and sharing, and theory of mind (false-belief) attribution.
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Chapter 7
Spontaneous, elicited and instructed play and the relationship
between play and imitation.
Introduction.
It is well established that autistic children engage in very little symbolic
activity spontaneously. Kanner (1943) noted that one of the characteristics of the
children he called autistic was a lack of imaginative activity. This lack of
imaginative activity is used as one of the diagnostic criteria for autism by the
Autistic Society itself, in the DSM-IV (1994) and in most other diagnostic systems.
Leslie (1987) suggested that pretend play may be a precursor for a "Theory of Mind"
ability which emerges fully developed around the age of four years. Pretend play is
thought to emerge around the age of 18-24 months of age (Dunn, 1991) Thus,
according to Leslie, a problem with pretense can be explained by a problem in
metarepresentational ability and a failure to decouple the pretend situation from
reality (See Chapter 1 for more information on Leslie's theory).
In the observational study, discussed in Chapter 2, it was found that there was
no difference in functional activity between groups although some of the behaviour
classed as functional in my study perhaps cannot be equated with play. Also, some
of the autistic children produced some symbolic play, although rather limited. In
fact, there was no significant difference between groups for spontaneous symbolic
play. However, this may have been a situational affect, due to the school situation in
which they were observed. The results of a playtime-only observation have shown
that this effect remains when the autistic and 5-6 year old children are observed at
playtime, with little difference in the amount of pretend play produced. It was
therefore important to investigate experimentally the ability of each of the present
subject groups to play spontaneously and also whether play activity, specifically
pretend play, can be elicited from them or produced through instruction.
Rogers and Pennington (1991) suggested that the problem with symbolic play
seen in autism arises from a deficit in imitation combined with deficits in early
"theory of mind" abilities. They predicted that it would be the young autistic
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children for whom a deficit in symbolic play would be most noticeable and that it
would be part of the young autistic profile, aloTig with deficits in imitation, joint
attention and emotion sharing. Autistic adults on the other hand would not show a
deficit in symbolic play relative to controls mainly because it is not an age
appropriate behaviour. On the other hand, I was interested in finding out whether
autistic adults could engage in symbolic activity, even if it wasn't age appropriate in
a spontaneous situation. Imitation ability seems to improve with age but does
symbolic capacity also improves with age? To fully investigate Rogers and
Pennington's theory it was necessary to look at symbolic play and how it relates to
imitation. This was done with both autistic children and adults, although a slightly
different scenario was used with the adults as will be described later.
Although this study was most interested in symbolic play, all types of play
were observed in a scenario that tested spontaneous, elicited and instructed play. The
experiment was based on the scenario used by Lewis and Boucher (1988), which is
described both in Chapter 1 and below. Where relevant I will include details on play
other than symbolic play, but for the most part, this chapter will present only the
most relevant results on symbolic play. The additional results can be found in
Appendix 7.3.
Baron-Cohen (1987) has shown that autistic children show significantly less
pretend play than controls when given a set of toys to play with. Lewis and Boucher
(1988), however, proposed that autistic children's problem lies not in an inadequate
symbol system but in a failure to use an adequate system due to some conative
abnormality. (They refer to this as the "the symbol deficit hypothesis" and the
"conative hypothesis"). They tested autistic children on free-play, elicited play, and
instructed play. They found that functional play was much reduced in the autistic
groups but that little symbolic play was produced by any group spontaneously. They
suggest that had a different set of objects been used they might have had an effect
for symbolic play in the freeplay condition. No impairments were found in the
autistic children's instructed symbolic play nor in their elicited play relative to the
controls used.
It was decided that this study should follow a scenario like that carried out by
Lewis and Boucher (1988), with a few changes. These will be presented at a later
stage in the procedure.
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First of all, it is important to define what is meant by symbolic play. Baron-
Cohen (1987) uses Leslie's (1985) definition whiCh refers to:
1) "deviant reference" - objects are substituted for one another.
or 2) "deviant truth" - 'false' properties are attributed to objects.
or 3) "deviant existence" - absent objects are present.
Baron-Cohen summarised this definition of pretend play as follows:
"Pretend play can be said to occur if there is evidence that:
1) the subject is using an object as if it were another object, and/or
2) the subject is attributing properties to an object which it doesn't have, and/or
3) the subject is referring to absent objects as if they were present."
Lewis and Boucher (1988) used Baron-Cohen's definition although they
refered to it as "symbolic play" rather than "pretend play" because they saw pretend
play as referring to any type of imaginative play, including some instances of
functional play. They defined functional play, as does Baron-Cohen, as "play in
which objects (including miniature representations of real objects) are used in ways
appropriate to their conventional function". As such they included examples of play
such as stifling a toy spoon in a toy saucepan as functional. It may be, however, that
the children are pretending that there is soup in the saucepan, and as such would this
not fit into category 3 of the symbolic play definition? Lewis and Boucher included
a category which they called intermediate play, for actions which fall between
functional and symbolic. However, they did not give any examples of what they
would include in this category, so it is difficult to know what exactly they meant by
it.
For the purpose of this study it was decided to use Baron-Cohen's definition of
symbolic play and of functional play in order to be able to compare the results with
those found by Baron-Cohen and by Lewis and Boucher. Behaviours such as are
mentioned above, which could be interpreted as either functional or symbolic, were
coded by an additional category - functional/symbolic mixtures. A sixth category
was used to code all play sequences that were a mixture of two or more of the main
categories (other than functional and symbolic mixture). Language was a vital clue
which helped to identify a play action as one or other category. When absent it was
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difficult to be certain what category the behaviour should fall into. So to summarise
the six categories used were as follows (See Chapter 2 for further definitions):
1) manipulative
2) relational
3) functional
4) symbolic
5) functional/symbolic
6) Other mixtures - these were originally coded as relational/functional or
relational/symbolic (e.g.when the hairbrush was used to play the xylophone), or
manipulative/functional (when the child spent five minutes bending the arms of the
soft plastic orang-utan, in many different ways), but collapsed into this one category
for analysis.
In addition to Rogers and Pennington's (1991) prediction that it would be the
younger autistic children in whom an impairment in symbolic play would be most
noticeable, the following predictions can be made based on the observational study
and previous literature:
1) Functional play would not be impaired in autistic children and adults,
relative to non-autistic children (despite Lewis and Boucher's findings).
2) Chronological age might affect the overall amount of play and the
production of certain types of play. Specifically, the autistic adults and oldest MLD
children might not respond in the same way to this situation as younger children.
3) Autistic individuals would produce more manipulative style play than non-
autistic individuals.
4) There might be a difference between the different test sessions, as described
below, with more manipulative and exploratory play being produced when the
children first met the objects, compared to their second and third encounters.
Finally, as far as the autistic adults are concerned, it is difficult to make
predictions as no one has tried to elicit pretend play from autistic adutls before.
However, on the basis of Rogers and Pennington's predictions, it is possible to say
that they should show a similar pattern of behaviour to that seen in the older children
of the MLD group.
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Methods:
OP
Subjects:
The subjects for the most part were drawn from those described in Chapter 2,
although a few changes had to be made. The experimental groups (approximately 6-
9 months older than when observed for spontaneous activity) are described in
Chapter 3. Those children used in the experiment are summarised below.
All the children (except some of the young autistic children, whose mental age
(MA) could not be tested by the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS)) had an
MA of more than 18 months of age, which is the age at which pretend play is
thought to emerge (Dunn, 1991; Baron-Cohen, 1987). The lowest MA of the whole
group was 26 months of age (on BPVS) and this was in one autistic boy and one
MLD boy. Chronological age may be important as to what the children do
spontaneously - for example, it is not seen as age appropriate by parents and
teachers, for the older autistic and MLD children to be playing at pretence, nor for
the autistic adults. A subset of the autistic children (n=16) was individually matched
on the Test for Reception of Grammar (TROG) raw score with a subset of the non-
autistic children (n=16) and another subset on BPVS age equivalence (n=18 in each
group). A smaller subset of each group was also matched on chronological age (CA)
for the warm-up sessions (n=14 in each group). Table 7.1 below presents the number
of children in each group for this experiment with the mean CA, MA on the BPVS
and the raw score on the TROG.
Table 7.1: Mean ages, mental and chronological for each group of subjects used in the Play
experiments.
Group --> 3-4 year
olds
5-6 year
olds
MLD
childre
n
Young
Autistic
children
autistic
children
autistic
adults
number in
group
10 12 12 8 11 11
Mean CA 3;5 5;2 12;6 5;8 12;7 24;10
Mean MA
on BPVS
3;8 6;0 6;0 not available 4;6 7;0
Mean
TROG
score
5.8
(n=5)
11.75 9 not available 6.2 8.2
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The young autistic children were only tesied on the initial warm-up session,
which was used as a familiarisation session before the imitation tasks of Chapter 3
were presented. The elicited and instructional sessions were not presented due to the
language difficulties these French children, and the experimenter faced! For the most
part, the numbers for each part of the experiment were as described above. However,
the video recordings for five of the twelve 5-6 year olds were misplaced so, although
a description for the play produced in the first warm-up session was available, this
could not be timed to acheive the data necessary to be analysed. Therefore, the
number of children in the 5-6 year old group was only seven on the warm-up session
but twelve thereafter. In addition, the procedure was quite lengthy and some children
refused to complete the experiment, and several children were either not available
for testing, or just refused to come with the experimenter for one of the sessions.
One 3-4 year old boy was keen to begin the second session and played quite
contentedly until the first set of objects were presented in the elicited condition. He
then walked out of the experimenting room. The number of children included in
each analysis will be noted, when they differ from Table 7.1
Procedure:
1) Warm-up session:
The purpose of this was to allow the children to familiarise themselves with
the toys and become familiar with the elicited and instructed conditions using toys
not included in the test set of objects. Lewis and Boucher (1988) included a
familiarisation session, but only with mechanical toys, not included in the test phase.
They had 2 test sessions, however, and found that there was a significant increase in
symbolic play between the two sessions, which they suggest was due to the children
having become familiar with the toys. It was decided for this study, just to have one
test session (The two half hour sessions used by Lewis and Boucher, was felt to be
too much for this group of autistic individuals and too disruptive to the school, since
the children would have to be taken from class for other experiments), but to allow
the children to familiarise themselves with the toys in a freeplay situation several
days before the test session. This warm-up session occured at the end of a session
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testing for emotion perception and joint attention and lasted for a maximum of 10
minutes, although if a child was in the middle of a play action when the ten minutes
were over, they were allowed to continue until there was a pause in their play. Not
all subjects played for ten minutes, but they were encouraged and prompted to play
for at least five. Most of the adults and the oldest MLD children could not be
encouraged to experiment with the objects for very long, so they were asked "What
else can you do?" twice, after the intitial instruction, and if there was no response,
the session was abandonned. At the end of the freeplay, the experimenter took
several of the non-test objects and gave them to the child saying, "what can you do
with this?". After a pause for the child's response, the experimenter then gave an
instruction involving the object. This was to familiarise the children with the elicited
and instructed conditions.
2) Test session - freeplay.
Lewis and Boucher used a minimum time of 5 minutes in this session but no
maximum time. It was decided that for these experiments a maximum time of 10
minutes would be imposed. If the subject stopped before this then they were given
two prompts to continue before the experimenter moved on to the elicited condition.
They were encouraged as far as possible to play for at least five minutes. During the
freeplay session the experimenter sat with a clipboard, and told the child "I have
some writing to do - you play with these toys for a few minutes and then I will play
with you". While the child was playing the experimenter made a shorthand account
of what the child was doing. The whole process is recorded on video camera. If the
child was distracted by what the experimenter was writing then the experimenter
stopped writing and just completed the observations from the video recording.
3)Test session - elicited play.
At the end of the freeplay time, the experimenter got on the floor beside the
child and put all the objects to one side. She then took one set of objects and asks the
child "What can you do with these?". If the child made no response after 2 such
prompts the experimenter moved to the instructed condition for that set of objects. If
the child did respond then he/she was allowed to continue to do so for a maximum of
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5 minutes. If the child responded once then stopped, he or she was prompted with
"What else can you do with these?". If there was 410 response after 2 prompts then
the experimenter moved to the instructed condition. Four sets of objects were used in
the elicited condition for both children and adults.
4)Test session - instructed play.
After play had been elicited as described above, a set of instructions was given
for each set of objects. This depended on which actions the children had performed
during the freeplay and elicited conditions and included instructions for symbolic
and functional actions, as described above and in Appendices 7.1 and 7.2. A
minimum of eight instructions were given (i.e. two per set of objects), unless the
action had occurred in the other conditions.
5) Freeplay
A further freeplay session then followed for as many children as possible. For
the oldest subjects this was not done as some of them were already bored and asking
them to play with the objects again was not feasible. However, the final freeplay was
done with as many children as possible.
Objects used and instructions given:
Tirt objeets ustd in this study were taken from the lists of objects used by
Baron-Cohen and by Lewis & Boucher. Other objects, which were not used by these
two previous studies were included as a result of observations on the behaviour of
the children involved. Lewis and Boucher commented that they may have found a
significant difference in symbolic play if different objects had been used. They did
not elaborate on this, however, so it is difficult to know which objects they felt did
not work well. What they did do was to use 4 sets of objects - 2 sets were toy/toy
pairs, 2 were toy/junk pairs. The two main toys were a car and a doll and these were
presented either with a toy accessory, e.g. a petrol pump, or a junk accessory, e.g. a
cardboard box. Only one accessory was given, so it may have been that when the
child was asked to show how the car goes into the garage, they were able to deduce
that the box should be used as the garage. A final point was that the two toys they
used - the car and the doll - are very conventional toys and it may be that the
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children had learned or been taught to use these toys and later repeated what they
had seen another person do with the object. The-list of instructions used by Lewis
and Boucher was very long and may have caused problems for the attention span of
the autistic children. The sets of objects in the list used by Baron-Cohen for free-
play experiments could not all be used for both symbolic and functional play. This
was felt important in order to attempt to replicate the Lewis and Boucher study.
However, some of the objects in the second set of objects in Baron-Cohen's study
were used in the present study - the spoon, doll, toy telephone, and small pieces of
sponge.
In the present study it was decided to present, in the elicited and instructed
conditions, groups of objects which could be used both functionally and
symbolically. In addition a much greater range of toys were presented than in the
Lewis and Boucher study. This was intended to give the children more choice in the
elicited condition, since they could use the objects together or separately and also
helped to eliminate the forced choice response in the instructed condition. For the
instructed condition, the form took that used by Lewis and Boucher - "show me how
	 " or "make the 	 " Where the same objects were used the same instructions
were given as in the Lewis & Boucher study. Sometimes the instruction was
prefixed by a statement, for example, "dolly's face is dirty. Show me how you wash
her face."
A list of the objects used and the instructions given are presented in Appendix
7.1, along with some photographs of the sets of objects used.
For the older children and adults a more age appropriate set of objects and
instructions were given. For this group of subjects - those over 12 years of age (13+)
- the emphasis was put on the objects as props in the drama class, usually with
themselves as the actor. Again in each set of objects some could be used functionally
and some could be used symbolically. Some of the objects did appear in both the
children's set and the adults' set, and the same instructions were used for these, in
both conditions. This would hopefully illustrate whether a set of age appropriate
toys, used in an age appropriate way (even the autistic adults did attend drama
classes), would make any difference, at least in the spontaneous and elicited
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conditions. A list of objects and instructions, for this group of subjects is included in
Appendix 7.2.
The instructions for both the younger and older children were originally
classed into three types - those predominantly functional, those predominantly
symbolic and those that could easily be interpreted either way. There were not equal
numbers of each and all three types of instruction were not necessarily given for
each set of objects. One set of objects was more conducive to functional behaviour,
one set was more conducive to symbolic behaviour and the other two sets were a
mixture of both, with some instructions that could be interpreted either way. Not all
children were given four instructions per set of objects - it depended on the play that
had been produced in the elicited and freeplay sessions and on the time available and
the interest of the child.
Coding and data analysis:
1) Freeplay - The number of objects used and the type of object was recorded.
The type of play in which the child used the object(s) was scored as for the
observational study - i.e. whether it was : manipulative (this can include
sensorimotor movements such as mouthing, throwing, swinging etc.), relational,
functional, symbolic or one of the mixtures described above. The experimenter,
where possible scored the types of play at the time of the session and then
completed the scoring and timed each action from the video recordings. The video
recordings were also scored for each type of play by an independent observer who
was trained to recognise each type of play.
The total duration of play, the total time available for play and the length of
time spent in each action was timed from the video tape. The total duration of play,
was calculated as a percentage of the total time available for play - since each
subject played for a different length of time. Knowing the number of objects used
and the number of actions produced, then the average time per action and per object
was calculated. The figures used in analyses were the average percentage of the total
time played per object and per action. The number of actions and objects per minute
was also calculated to illustrate whether some of the children played with more
objects for a shorter time or with fewer objects for a longer time. The total time
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spent in each type of play was also converted to a percentage of the total time
played, to illustrate the balance in the play of each group. The frequency of each
type of play produced was also calculated as a percentage of the total number of
actions produced. So the measures analysed for each of the freeplay sessions were as
follows:
a) Percentage of total time available in which child played with an object.
b) Percentage of total time played spent in manipulative play, relational play,
functional play, symbolic play, functional/symbolic play and other mixtures of the
four main categories.
2) Elicited session:
Basically the same procedure as for the freeplay session was used and the
same measures were analysed. However, the data for each child was an average over
the number of sets presented to them. This had to be at least three out of the four sets
and to be included the child had to be allowed at least 20 seconds and two prompts
before moving on to the instructions.
3) Instructed play:
The response to each instruction was coded as follows (similar to system used
by Lewis and Boucher):
Example: Show me how you park the car in the garage:
5) Child places box on its side, drives the car up to the box, drives inside box
and closes down the lid of the box, or puts card in front as door.
4) Child places box on end or builds a wall of bricks and drives the car inside
the box/wall,
3) Child places box, opening up, lifts car into box, having driven to the box.
2) Child lifts box and car and puts car inside box or drives box on to a piece of
card or beside box and stops.
1) Child stops car somewhere on roadway.
0) No response to instruction.
The scores of each child were analysed as the average score over the number
of instructions given, so that each child, even if they did not completely finish the
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task, could still be in included in the results.. This was also important because the
number of instructions given ultimately depended tin what each child did in the free-
play and elicited conditions. So for example, if the child produced two of the
intended instructions in the elicited situation, then their instructed score was the
average of their score over two instructions. If they were given all four instructions
then their score was the average of their score on all four instructions. It was
expected that the normal children might produce some of the instructed behaviours
spontaneously but it was still necessary to have a measure of how they performed on
the instructed conditions to compare with the performance of the autistic groups. So
each child had an average score on functional instructions, symbolic instructions and
functional/symbolic instructions.
Several other measures were also taken on the quality of play. The percentage
of objects used in the second freeplay session, which were also used in the first
session was calculated and compared across groups, using a Kruskall-Wallis one-
way analysis of variance. Secondly, the number of children in each group who
reproduced actions from the instructed or elicited session in the final freeplay
session, was anlysed using a chi-square analysis.
Kruskall-Wallis ANOVAs were used to analyse each of the measures and
scores within each of the conditions. It is the results of these main effect analyses
that are reported in the results section. Due to the number of analyses which had to
be conducted (36 when comparing the six groups for the warm-up and the five
groups for the other conditions), only those significant at the 0.01 level were
considered significant (Some of the most interesting results significant at 0.05 will
also be mentioned but not used as concrete evidence of any group differences). Once
a main effect at 0.01 level was found, Kruskall-Wallis post-hoc tests were then
carried out to establish where the group differences lay and differences are then
reported if significant at the 0.05 level on the post hoc analysis. The K-W values
presented are for the main effect.
To compare the data produced in each of the sessions, in order to consider
whether there is a novelty effect, a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test was carried out to
compare performance by each child in the categories of manipulative, functional,
symbolic and functional/symbolic play during the warm-up session, the second
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freeplay and the elicited sessions. Also compared was the total percentage of time
during which the children played. Four sets of analyses were done -1) for all
children, 2) for the autistic groups together, 3) for the non-autistic children together
and 4) for each of the five groups, with 15 paired comparisons in each set. Since this
is quite a large number of analyses, only those significant at 0.02 level or lower will
be considered.
As mentioned earlier, subgroups of the autistic and non-autistic groups were
matched on MA, CA and TROG raw score and the Kruskall-Wallis analyses were
repeated for these matched groups. Again only those significant at 0.01 level were
considered significant. CA matched groups were only compared for the warm-up
session, as most of the autistic children included were in the young autistic group.
Finally, Spearman's Rank Correlations were carried out for the relationship
hewieen each cif line age measures and performance on different phases of the task.
This was done specifically to analyse whether a higher chronological age may play
an important role in inhibiting spontaneous symbolic play but not elicited or
instructed play, which these individuals may do because an adult has asked them to
do so.
Interobserver reliability:
A second independent coder watched video recordings for 10 subjects (from
both autistic and non-autistic groups) in the freeplay session, 10 subjects in the
elicited session and 11 subjects in the instructed sessions. For the spontaneous and
elicited section the number of each category of play (manipulative, relational,
functional, functional/symbolic, symbolic, no action and other mixes plus the
number of objects and the number of actions) produced by each child was totalled
over all children. There were therefore two sets of numbers for 9
categories/measures of play and these were compared across the two coders using
Pearson product moment correlations. For the freeplay session, there was high
reliability with an r value of 0.98 (p<0.0001). For the elicited session comparison
there was an r value of 0.97 (p<0.0001). For the instructed session, the correlation
was done on the average score for the number of instructions given, for the 11
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children observed by both coders. There was therefore 11 pairs of numbers
compared using the Pearson product moment -correlations. The results was a
relatively high interobserver agreement, with an r value of 0.72 (p<0.001).
Results.
Total time played and types of play engaged in during warm-up and second
freeplay sessions.
Figure 6.1: Median time spent playing as a percentage of total time available to play by each group during
an ti	
warm-
Medi
	
	
up (1) and 2nd freeplay (2) sessions.me
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05-6 years
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During the warm-up session, and comparing all groups, the only difference
statistically significant at 0.01 level was the difference between the 3-4 year olds and
the autistic adults on the percentage of time (K-W = 16.07 p<0.01) and the
percentage of actions (K-W=15.59 p<0.01) spent on other mixtures of the four main
categories (i.e. not functional/symbolic) (See Figures 7.1 to 7.4). Since there were no
differences between the three autistic groups and the three non-autistic groups, these
were collapsed into two groups and compared. There were no significant difference
between the two groups and this held true for the CA, MA and TROG matched
subgroups. There were a few behaviours where there were differences at 0.05 level,
such as the non-autistic individuals matched on MA and also those matched on
TROG raw score, played for a higher percentage of the time available than the
autistic groups. Those matched on MA also spent longer in symbolic play than the
g3-4 years
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Figure 6.3: Median time spent in Functional and symbolic play (and interquartile ranges) by all groups during
warm-up play session and 2nd freeplay session.
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autistic subjects and those matched on TROG spent longer in functional/symbolic
play.	 NO.
There was a paucity of symbolic play in all groups during the warm-up
session. Only the 3-4 year olds showed any tendency for symbolic play but as we
have seen this was not significant.	 -
Figure 6.2: Median time, expressed as a percentage of the total time played, and interquartile ranges for eachMedian time group, during the Warm-up session (1) and during the 2nd freeplay session (2) for manipulative (Man) and
100	 relational (Rel) play.
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Second freeplay session:
The results from this session are also portrayed in Figures 7.1 to 7.4. When
analysed statistically, none of the groups performed significantly better or worse
than another on any type of play. When the three autistic and three non-autistic
groups were collapsed into two groups - autistic and non-autistic, there was only a
significant difference for time spent in relational play (main effect, K-W=6.15
p<0.01), with the non-autistic children spending more time in relational play than
the autistic children. This difference was reduced to 0.05 level when MA and TROG
were controlled for but did not disappear altogether.
As in the warm-up session, it was mostly the normal groups who showed any
symbolic play and also functional/symbolic mixtures. However, once again, this
difference was not significant.
Figure 7.4: Median time ( and interquartile ranges) spent by each group engaging in a mixture of functional and
Median 6rae	 symbolic play (F/S) and other mixtures of the four main categories, during the warm-up and second freeplay
100- 	 sessions.
Groups
Table 7.2 summarises the results for the first and second freeplay sessions in a
slightly different way. Table 7.2 presents the percentage of children in each group
engaging in each type of behaviour at least once. During the warm-up session there
was a high percentage of all groups engaging in manipulative and functional play. In
symbolic play, the percentage of children was lower in all groups, but especially low
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for the autistic groups. Fisher tests revealed that more 5-6 year olds showed
symbolic play than both the autistic children -(p<0.01) and the autistic adults
(p<0.05) during the second freeplay session. More MLD children also showed some
symbolic play than the autistic adults (p<0.05). Although close to significance in the
warm-up session there were not more 3-4 year olds showing symbolic play than
autistic children (p=0.055) and adults (p=0.08). During the second freeplay session,
more 5-6 year olds showed some functional play than autistic adults (p<0.05) and
during the warm-up session more 3-4 year olds and more 5-6 year olds both showed
some functional/symbolic play than the autistic adults (p<0.05 and p<0.01
respectively).
Table 7.2: Percentage of children in each group engaging at least once in each type of play,
during the warm-up and freeplay sessions - manipulative (Manip.), Relational (Relation.), Functional
(Function.), symbolic, mixture of functional and symbolic (F/S) and other mixtures of the four main
categories of behaviour.
Group Session Manip. Relation. Function. Symbolic F/S Other mix
3-4 years warm-up
n=10
90 40 80 50 50 90
Freeplay2
n=8
62.5 25 87.5 25 62.5 100
5-6 years warm-up
n=7
91.7 58.3 100 33 41.7 83.3
freeplay2
n=12
50 66.7 91.7 58.3 66.7 75
MLD warm-up
n=12
75 44.4 92 33 55 50
freeplay2
n=12
83.3 41.7 75 41.7 25 83.3
Yng Aut warm-up
n=8
freeplay2
62.5 37.5 87.5 12.5 0 37.5
Aut Ch warm-up
n=10
81.8 63.6 90.9 9.1 54.5 72.7
freeplay
n=10
72.7 9.1 54.5 0 27.3 63.6
Aut Adt warm-up
n=9
75 0 75 12.5 0 12.5
freeplay2 54.5 0 45.4 9.1 9.1 45.4
n=11
Additional data on the novelty effect and the number of actions and ojects per
minute can be found in Appendix 7.3 (Figures 7.5-7.7)
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so•
Elicited session:
Figures 7.8 to 7.10 illustrate the, results for the elicited sessions. The autistic
adults (n=9) spent significantly less time playing than the 5-6 year olds (n=12),
although only at the 0.05 level (K-W = 11.07). However, there were no differences
betwen the two autistic groups nor between the three non-autistic groups. Thus they
were collpased into one autistic and one non-autistic group and performance
compared. There were no significant differences, although when TROG was
controlled for, there was a significant difference, with the non-autistic spending
more time playing than the autistic groups, but this was only just significant at the
0.05 level (K-W = 3.86 p=0.046).
Figure 7.8: Median time spent in play during the elicited session for each group, espressed as a percentage of
total time available and the group medians for average time per action, during the elicited play session.
100 _
Total time
Groups
Figure 7.9: Median time (and interquartile ranges) for each group, during elicited play, expressed as a
percentage of total time played and averaged over four sets of objects - for manipulative, relational, functional
and symbolic play.
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Groups
Figure 7.9 above and 7.10 below illustrate the results for each category of play
in the elicited session. There were no group differences for manipulative and
relational types of play. There were also no statistical group differences for
functional play but there were for symbolic play. All the normal groups engaged in
symbolic play at least 10% of the total time played. Both the MLD (n=10) and the 3-
4 year olds spent more time in symbolic play than the autistic children (K-W=15.01
p<0.01; n=10). Although the adults had a lower group median than the autistic
children, one adult spent a long time in symbolic activity. This may well have biased
the statistical results. Figure 7.10 illustrates that all groups engaged in some
functional/symbolic play and in other mixtures of play types but none of the groups
differences were significant at 0.01 level. The autistic children showed more other
play actions and spend more time in other play than the MLD group at 0.05 level (K-
W = 9.79 and 10.9 respectively). The 3-4 year old children showed a slightly higher
level of functional/symbolic play than the other groups but this was not significant.
When the collapsed autistic and non-autistic groups were compared, the
differences were of a similar nature. The non-autistic children spent significantly
more time in symbolic play, and produced significantly more symbolic actions than
the autistic children (K-W=14.16 p<0.01; K-W=14.39 p<0.001). The time spent in
other play was greater for the autistic than non-autistic groups but only at 0.05 level
(K-W=6.42). The differences between the autistic and non-autistic groups on
symbolic play remained when MA was controlled for (Number of actions: K-W =
Figure 8.10: Median time (and interquartile ranges) for each group In elicited play session,
Median time	 expressed as a percentage of total time In which play occured (averaged over four sets) - for
100-	 functional/symbolic and other mixtures of the four main categories.
O 3-4 years
• 5-6 years
O MLD
OAut Child
18Aut adults
50
40 -
30 -
20 -
10
90
80
70
F/S Other mix
Chapter 7: Spontaneous, elicited and instructed play.
	 215
9.0 p<0.01; Time spent: K-W=8.26 p<0.01), although the difference was reduced to
only significant at 0.05 level when TROG was-controlled (K-W = 6.42 p< 0.05
(number of actions); K-W = 5.25 p<0.05(time spent)).
Groups
When the elicited results were compared to the warm-up and freeplay sessions
some interesting results emerged. Most of these results can be found in Appendix
7.3 but the general finding was that there were no significant differences between
sessions. Symbolic play, on the other hand, was interestingly significant. Over all
children there was a highly significant difference between the elicited session and
both the warm-up session (z = -3.69 p<0.01) and the second freeplay session (z = -
4.37 p<0.0001). This was due to the tendency towards more symbolic play in the
elicited session than the warm-up session by both the non-autistic children (z = -3.07
p<0.01) and the autistic children (z = -2.29 p<0.02). This, however, was a general
deficit and could not be attributed to any one group. For the comparison between the
elcited session and the second freeplay session the non-autistic subjects showed
more play in the elicited session (z = -3.89, p<0.01) and this can be accounted for by
both the 3-4 year old children (z = -2.39 p<0.02) and the 5-6 year old children (z = -
2.76 p<0.01). Although the difference between these two sessions was not
significant at the 0.02 level, it was significant at 0.05 level (z = -2.14, p<0.03) and
this was accounted for mainly by the autistic children who showed more symbolic
play in the elicited session (z = -2.37 p<0.02).
Figure 6.11: Group medians and interquartile ranges for each group on each type of intruction, during the
instructional session. This represents the average score, over four sets of instructions.
Functional	 F/S	 Symbolic
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1E3-4 years
N S-6 years
D MLD
▪ Aut Child
m Aut adults
Chapter 7: Spontaneous, elicited and instructed play.
	 216
The instructed session:
Figure 7.11 above, illustrates the results for the instructed sessions. Between groups
the only significant difference at 0.01 level, however, did fall in the symbolic
instruction category and this was a higher score for the 5-6 year olds than both the
autistic children and adults (main effect K-W=15.41 p<0.01). This difference
remained when the autistic/non-autistic comparison (since there were no differences
between the two autistic groups nor between the three non-autistic groups) was made
(main effect K-W=7.26 p<0.01). When MA was controlled for there was no
difference (although only just - p=0.056) and controlling for TROG raw score
reduced the difference to 0.05 level (K-W=4.73). For the autistic/non-autistic
comparison, there was also a difference at the 0.05 level for functional/symbolic
actions (K-W=4.0), which remained when the groups are matched for MA (K-W =
4.62) but disappeared when TROG raw score is controlled.
Third freeplay session:
As was explained in the introduction, there were quite a few of the older
children and adults who did not take part in this phase of the experiment. However,
of those who did, there were few group differences. The rest of the results on this
section can be found in appendix 7.3.
Chapter 7: Spontaneous, elicited and instructed play. 	 217
Summary of findings: 	 n••
Unlike the study by Lewis and Boucher (1988), this study found no deficit in
functional play in autistic children and adults relative to controls. It was predicted
that autistic groups would produce more manipulative or relational play? As far as
the children were concerned they did not. In neither the freeplay nor the elicited
conditions were there any differences in favour of autistic children for these two
behaviours. In fact, non-autistic children showed more relational play than autistic
children in some situations. The autistic adults did, however, show a tendency
towards more manipulative play but this was not significant and it was only in the
warm-up session - in the other sessions the adults did not produce much
manipulative play.
The most important results with regard to this thesis are those on symbolic
play. Autistic children and adults spent less time in symbolic play and produced
fewer symbolic actions than non-autistic children in the elicited condition. In the
freeplay conditions there were no diferences between autsitic individuals and
controls on symbolic play. In these conditions there was a paucity of symbolic play
for all groups, just as was found in the observational study (Chapter 2).
When instructed to engage in a symbolic action, the autistic children
performed more poorly on symbolic instructions than the 5-6 year olds and in
general the autistic individuals performed worse on symbolic instructions than non-
autistic individuals. They also performed slighly worse on functional/symbolic
instructions but this was not as significant as for symbolic instructions. These
results, for the most part, agree with the findings of previous studies, although the
evidence here is not as strong for a deficit universal in and specific to autism. High
variablility in all groups may have been responsible for the lack of significant
differences.
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Discussion:
With regard to the mixtures of types of play, a problem was encountered. It
appeared that the mixtures were of a different quality for some groups than they
were for others. For example, if a mixture was coded for a 3-4 year old or 5-6 year
old child then it was really a mixture of two or more types of behaviour, which
usually occured so close together and on the same object that they were almost
impossible to separate. For example, a 3-4 year old child would hold the hammer,
turn it in his hands, look at it and then hammer the nail a couple of time and then
look at the hammer again, turn it in hands and then hammer again. This would have
been coded as manipulative/functional play. The autistic children, although they did
produce this type of behaviour from time to time, also produced behaviours that
were harder to code and therefore the mixtures category was used to code actions
where the coder was uncertain about what the child was doing. For example, if the
child lifted the spoon and stared distractedly at it then banged the upturned tin, was
he just engaging in relational play or is he pretending the upturned tin is a drum?
Because of this uncertainty this would be coded as relational/symbolic Although
examples like this did occur in the normal groups, it was usually easier to judge
whether the child was pretending or not in the normal groups. In their case mixed
codes were more likely to be identifiable mixtures of two categories rather than a
case of uncertainty between categories. Language was often an important deciding
factor here.
So here again, as in the observational study, we find differences in quality,
between the play of the normal children and the play of the autistic children. For the
most part this experiment did manage to quantify some of the quality differences
seen in the observational study, but quality differences still remain. Autism could be
redefined as a disorder of quality of behaviour. Major categories of behaviours like
functional and symbolic play are not necessarily absent in all autistic children and
adults, they are just of a different quality to those we see in non-autistic children and
adults.
The elicited condition, it had been hoped, would help to improve the quality of
play in autistic children, by encouraging more symbolic play and reducing
manipulative play, which is part of the autistic children's natural repertoire of
obsessional behaviours. This was indeed what happened, although the effect for the
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autistic children was smaller than had been hoped for. Manipulative play was less
for all groups in the elicited condition, and the nowautistic children showed more of
most other activities in the elicited condition than in the warm-up session. The only
real difference for the autistic children was for symbolic play, although this was not
quite significant. However, it is encouraging that there at least was a trend towards
an improvement in the elicited condition. Perhaps autistic children should be
encouraged to pretend play, even if they are older chronologically, in order to
develop their imagination. Like imitation this behaviour can be elicited from them to
a certain extent, and may well have been more successful if the experimenter had
involved herself in the play more, thus providing occassion for imitation and
interaction. This should be born in mind for future interventions.
However, what must also be born in mind is the fact that there are huge
individual differences, not only for the autistic groups but also the non-autistic
groups. Some of the autistic children were as keen to play and to involve the
experimenter as some of the normal children. The converse was also true - some of
the normal children showed the same lack of eagerness and level of distractions as
some of the autistic children. Some of the autistic children spent as long in symbolic
or functional/symbolic play as some of the normal children and some of the normal
children spent as long in manipulative play as the autistic children and adults. These
individual differences are important as it shows that some of the autistic individuals
have the potential, at least on isolated abilities, to perform as well as non-autistic
children. On the other hand, there may be some individuals who may not be able,
even with interventions, to grasp a certain behaviour. As has so often been the case
in the past, the spectrum of disorders seen in autistic children, and as a result the
spectrum of reactions to interventions and therapies, is huge. This study tended to
show that the lower the mental age on both BPVS and TROG, the longer the child
played and the more time they spent in symbolic play. This reflects the fact those
who were older did tend to have a higher MA and thus that the task was not age
appropriate, for the most part. However, it may be that having a higher mental age in
addition to exposure to normal, age appropriate behaviours in an elicited situation,
may improve the situation of the autistic child. As with most interventions, the
earlier it is made then the more successful it is likely to be.
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Implications for Rogers and Pennington's theory - The developmental
trend.	 —
Results.
In order to examine the relationship between performance on the test and
chronological and mental age, a Spearman's Rank Correlation was carried out for
CA, MA and TROG score, over all children, and for the autistic only groups. Within
the autistic groups there was a negative correlation between CA and the total time
played in the elicited condition (r =-0.497 p<0.05; N=16) and between CA and the
percentage of the objects reproduced in the second session, from the first session
(r = -0.502 p<0.05; N=20). Over all the groups there were negative correlations
between CA and BPVS and total time played in Session 2 and in the elicited session.
There were correlations between the symbolic play produced in the elicited
condition and TROG and a negative correlation with CA. The results of these
correlation analyses can be found in Table 7.4 below.
Table 7.4: Results of Spearman's Rank Correlation tests for CA, MA and TROG raw score, 1)
across all groups and 2) for autistic only groups. (* denotes significance at 0.05 level, ** at 0.01
level).
Session CA MA TROG
warm-up session 1)
N=56
Time spent in other
mixtures r = - 0.402*
Total time spent
playing r = - 0.335 *
Time spent in other
mixtures r = - 0.348 *
2)
Session 2	 1)
N=52
Time spent in other
mixtures r-- 0.298 *
Total time played
r = - 0.345 *
Time spent in
functionaUsymbolic
r = - 0.381 **
Time spent in
manipulative play
r = + 0.342 *
2)
N=I6
Objects reproduced
from warm-up
r = - 0.497 *
Elicited session I)
N=49
Total time played
r=-0.- 450 **
Time spent in
symbolic play
r = -0.329 *
Total time played
r = - 0.329 *
Time spent in symbolic
play r = - 0.368 *
2) Total time played
r	 1
N=2 r = - 0.502 *
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Discussion
It seems then that chronological age did adversely affect performance on this
task, especially when symbolic play was examined. The older the child, the more
self-conscious they appeared to be, and the more unnatural the situation seemed to
them. The older the child, the less they played/used the objects and the more
prompting they needed, the less symbolic play they produced and the more
manipulative play they produced. The older the child the less likely they were to
engage the experimenter in play. Even with the drama class scenario, it was
observed that the oldest children were embarrassed to pretend. The autistic adults
were much less self-conscious and most were eager to comply for the experimenter -
responses were of two extremes - either they acted and played quite well, or they
simply stared at objects and named them. This naming was also common in the
oldest MLD children and in the autistic children. But the adults tended just to name,
whereas the children tended to name and then to go on and at least manipulate the
object or to use it functionally. Pretend play or other imaginative activity is not, in
general, encouraged in older children and adults.
As was illustrated in Chapter 2 by the parental questionnaire, parents did view
even their autistic children as too old to indulge in pretend play. Pretend play is not
what is expected of them by teachers or by parents. At school the MLD children did
have drama classes. Most of the adults did also, although not necessarily of the same
nature as those attended by the MLD children. However, perhaps an alternative way
to test these oldest children and adults would have been to have used the drama class
scenario, with the whole group present, and presented the objects to each child/adult
in the elicited and instructed conditions. The problem with this is immediately
obvious - imitation. There will inevitably be a tendency for the children/adults to
glance at their classmates for ideas and this would be very difficult to control for.
Another idea would be to encourage them to make up stories to see how their
imagination works.
From a theoretical point of view, these results do not present much support for
Rogers and Pennington's (1991) theory. They predicted that it would be the young
autistic children in whom a deficit in pretend play would be most noticeable. In this
study it was the younger children who did produce pretend play, which ties in to
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some extent with the normal developmental trend, obvious in the observational
study in Chapter 2. Although the autistic adults did not produce much pretend play,
neither did many of the older MLD children. In this way the deficit seen in the
autistic children was more noticeable because chronologically they were compared
to normal 3-6 year olds and younger children with learning disabilities, who did
engage in more symbolic activity than the older children and adults. So indirectly
there may be some evidence from this study for Rogers and Pennington's theory but
this is by no means conclusive. Rogers and Pennington did not predict that symbolic
play stood alone as a deficit but rather that it was part of a profile of deficits seen in
young autistic children and adults. Rogers and Pennington predicted that young
autistic children would show deficits in imitation, joint attention, pretend play and
emtion sharing, while autistic adutls would show a profile of deficits in theory of
mind, affect praxis and language pragmatics. So what about the relationship between
imitation and pretend play and other abilities often absent in autism? This question is
the topic of the next chapter.
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Chapter 8
The relationships between imitation, play, emotion sharing and
theory of mind - an evaluation of Rogers and Pennington's theory.
It is necessary once more to recall Rogers and Pennington's (1991) predictions
for the profiles of deficits seen in autism, following their developmental model.
They predicted that young autistic children would show a profile which consisted of
deficits in imitation, joint attention, pretend play and emotion sharing. Autistic
adults, on the other hand, would show deficits in theory of mind, affect praxis and
language pragmatics, compared to non-autistic controls. We have already seen that
young autistic children do indeed perform more poorly on elicited imitation tasks
than older autistic children and adults (Chapters 3 and 6). We have also seen that
there is a differentiation between elicited imitation and spontaneous imitation, the
latter more likely to be engaged in by younger children than older children and
adults, although the imitations may be less accurate (Chapters 4, 5 and 6). There was
therefore some evidence that the development of imitation follows the same pattern
in autism as in does in normal development, with the main deficit in imitation being
for the young autistic children. As such there is some evidence for Rogers and
Pennington's model.
Chapter 7 presented results for the ability to play and although some evidence
for a normal developmental pattern was observed, in that the adults did not show
less symbolic activity than the older children with learning disabilities, there was
little direct evidence that it was the youngest autistic children who showed the most
noticeable impairment in symbolic play. In order to examine the relationships
proposed by Rogers and Pennington (1991) three additional experiments were
conducted: experiment 1 tested for emotion recognition and sharing; experiment 2
tested visual perspective taking and joint attention; and experiment 3 tested for false-
belief attribution. Since I was mainly interested in investigating the relationships
between these abilities and imitation and pretend play, I shall only describe these
experiments briefly here - the majority of the background literature for these studies
can be found in Chapter 1 and the details of the experiments themselves can be
found in Appendices 8.1 to 8.8.
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1A) Experiment 1: emotion perception and sharing.
In 1986, Peter Hobson proposed that the problem in autism was one of
intersubjective relations, which were mediated by emotions. He tested autistic
children on emotion recognition tasks and he has continued this line of work for
many years. In his first experiments he showed that autistic children have problems
with recognising facial expressions of emotions, vocal expressions of emotions,
gestural expressions and context-linked emotions, relative to non-autistic children.
In later experiments, (Hobson, 1994) he tested emotion recognition in a much more
subtle way than looking at pictures of faces and videos of contexts. Using points of
light, attached to a person, dressed in black, with no face, he presented light images
of this person acting in both mechanical and emotional contexts, to autistic
individuals. These individuals could describe accurately what the person was doing
but only in a mechanical way, whereas non-autistic controls produced emotional
descriptions of the actions involving emotions. So for example, when the dots of
light sat down and put his head in his hands, the non-autistic subjects would say that
the person was sad or upset but the autistic subject would say the person was sitting
down, slouched over/head in hands.
Hobson's results seemed to be convincing that autistic children have problems
with recognising and describing emotionally relevant signals. However, there are
several studies that have disputed these results, the most relevant being that by Prior
et al. (1990). Prior et al. attempted to replicate Hobson's early work but failed to
confirm his results. Baron-Cohen, Spitz and Cross (1993) looked at three emotions -
happy, sad and surprised. They predicted that since happy and sad are simple
emotions caused by situations, autistic children would not show deficits in these
two. Surprise, however, is a "cognitive" emotion, caused by beliefs. It was here that
Baron-Cohen et al. predicted that autistic children would show deficits. Baron-
Cohen et al. point out that previous research found deficits in the cross modal
matching of emotions to sounds, pictures etc. but that autistic children did not
perform more poorly than controls, matched on verbal mental age, on simple facial
emotion recognition tasks, which is exactly the findings of Prior et al. Baron-Cohen
Chapter 8: Relationships between imitation, play and "theory of mind". 	 226
et al's study did show that autistic children performed equally well on the happy and
sad emotions as verbal MA matched non-autistic children. On surprise, however,
they did perform worse. Thus, there is still some debate about whether autistic
children are impaired in all emotion recognition tasks or just those requiring an
understanding of belief and whether this impairment is specific to autism, universal
in autism, or linked to mental age. The main aim of this experiment was to test
emotion recognition and sharing and to examine any links between emotion
recognition and imitation and Theory of mind as proposed by Rogers and
Pennington (1991). This latter aspect will be dealt with at the end of this chapter.
First of all, let us look at how the autistic children and adults features in this study
performed on tasks of emotion recognition.
The tasks used in this experiment were based on those used by Hobson (1986a,
1986b, 1993; Hobson et al., 1989) but also using some of the adaptations made by
Prior et al. (1990). Unfortunately, due to the fact that this study traveled between 7
schools/centres, and facilities for testing the subjects were not optimal, it was
impossible to use the exact tasks employed by Hobson, namely those involving
video clips. The task was redesigned to be more portable, and also presentable to the
oldest children and adults, as well as to the youngest children. Details of the tasks
and equipment can be found in Appendices 8.1-8.5.
Methods.
Subjects
The subjects used were as for the previous chapters. One MLD subject could
not be tested. Two extra 5-6 year olds were available for testing in this experiment.
The number of subjects in each group were therefore as follows:
Table 7.1: Number of children in each experimental group.
3-4 years 5-6 years MLD Autistic
children
Autistic adults
11 14 11 12 10
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Procedure:
0,
Phase I: Recognition of facial emotions, using both a naming and showing
procedure, was tested using 6 photographs of emotional expressions (plus one
neutral expression photograph) taken from Eckman and Freisen (1975). The
emotions were happy, sad, angry, frightened, surprised and disgusted. The pictures
were presented first asking the child how the woman in the pictures (Carol) was
feeling. Then they were presented again, naming each emotion and asking the child
to point to the appropriate photo. The child was corrected on any wrong response
after this second phase and then the photographs were presented one-by-one again,
asking the child to name the emotion. Finally, all the pictures were displayed and the
child asked once more to show the picture that went with the emotion spoken by the
experimenter.
Coding and analysis: Coding was done by the experimenter at the time of the
experiment on a prepared coding sheet. The experimenter also watched a video
recording to confirm the first response. In order to pass this first phase the children
had to score at least five on either the first naming procedure or on the first showing
procedure. In order to proceed to the later phases of the test the children had to score
at least five out of seven on either the second naming or showing procedures. This
was relevant for the gestures and context phases. All children were put through the
sounds procedure to see if they were any better at recognising sound mediated
emotions than facial expressions of emotions.
Phase 2: Sounds: In this phase, the children were tested on their ability to match
an emotionally relevant sound to one of the 6 emotional facial expressions. Twelve
different sounds were played, two for each facial expression. There was no sound for
the neutral photograph. The sounds were presented in a set order as detailed in
appendix 8.2. The child could respond in one of three ways. Firstly, vocally, by
stating verbally the emotional state of Carol. Secondly, they could point to a picture.
If they pointed to the wrong picture but gave the right verbal response then this was
noted as correct. Thirdly, they could simply give to the experimenter the picture that
they thought matched the sound. In this case it was important to immediately replace
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the photo on the table so that when the sound appeared again the choice was
available for the child.	 •le
The result for each subject was a score out of twelve but a score out of six was
also recorded for the first time the child heard each emotion. This was in case
hearing each emotion twice confused the child and confounded their ability to
recognise emotions by recognising human vocalisations.
Phase 3: Gestures - This was perhaps the most difficult phase of the test - it was
certainly the most difficult to design. A picture (line-drawing) of a faceless body in
a gestural position indicative of each emotion was presented to the children. All the
photographs were on the table at this point and the child was instructed to match a
face to the body to show how Carol was feeling. There were seven body pictures,
each of which are featured in Appendix 8.3. A score of seven was the maximum but
a child was said to have passed if they scored five or more on this phase.
Phase 4: Context : The children were first of all presented with 6 pictures of a
faceless body which they had to match to a verbally narrated story. If the child was
successful on five out of the six stories then they proceeded to the final stage and
were once again presented with the six facial expressions, laid out on the table. The
story pictures were presented to the child one by one and the child was asked to
match the story to a face to show how Carol would feel in the story. They were told
that they could change their decision at any time and it was the final arrangement of
pictures and stories that was noted.
Data Analysis:
The mean scores of each group were compared using one-way ANOVAS and
Newman-Keuls post-hoc tests, for each phase of the task. In addition, subgroups of
the autistic and non-autistic groups were identically matched on MA (BPVS) (n=20)
and the TROG raw score (n = 16) and matched within 12 months on CA (n=7) and
then compared in the same manner as before. Correlations between CA, MA and
TROG score and performance on each phase were also examined using a Pearson's
product moment Correlation. Finally, to examine the number of subjects actually
Figure 8.1: Mean scores and standard errors for each group on each phase of the first
emotion recognition task - facial expression.
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passing each task, the scores were recoded as a one-zero data set, with a score
greater than 5 being scored as a one. The results were then compared using a Chi-
square to show how each group performed on each phase of the task.
Results:
The results can be found in detail in Appendix 8.5. I shall give only the most
important results here. In the first phase of the experiment, recognition of facial
expressions, it was found that all children performed relatively poorly when first
asked to name the emotions, with no significant differences between groups. When
asked to point to the appropriate emotional expressions, however, it was found that
the 5-6 year old children showed a significantly better performance than the autistic
children (F=4.29 p<0.01). Although not significant the other control groups also
scored higher than both autistic groups. These results are illustrated in Figure 8.1
below.
When the groups were collapsed into autistic versus non-autistic, the non-
autistic group did better on naming than the autistic group (F=7.34 p<0.01). The
non-autistic group also did significantly better than the autistic group on the showing
procedure (p<0.0001). Even when MA and TROG score were controlled for the
differences existed at p<0.01. There was a positive correlation between TROG score
and performance on both these procedures for all children but not within the autistic
12 sounds	 6 sounds
Mean n mber of correct responses
10
O3-4 yrs
• 5-6 yrs
MLD
▪ Aut Ch
• Aut Adt
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groups only. There was also a strong correlation between CA and performance on
the showing procedure.
On the second naming and showing parts, the most noticeable result was that
by the second showing part, the MLD children were showing significantly more
recognition than the autistic adults (F=3.65 p<0.05). There was a general tendency
for all control groups to have a higher score on the showing procedure than the
autistic groups, although on the naming procedure there were few significant
differences. On this the 3-4 year old normal children scored at a similar level to the
autistic children and adults. When MA and TROG score were controlled for, the
non-autistic groups showed more imitation than the autistic groups. However,
controlling for CA did reduce the differences between the autistic and non-autistic
group for both procedures. Further detailed comparisons can be found in Appendix
8 .5.
In the second phase of the experiment - the matching of emotional sounds with
emotional expressions, it was found that there were no group differences at 0.05
level. Across all children there was a correlation between TROG score and
performance on this but not within the autistic groups. Even in the analysis of the
first presentation of each sound, there were no differences between groups. Figure
8.3 below represents these results.
Figure 8.3: mean scores and standard errors for all groups on the emotion perception - sounds task (Highest
12	 score possible is 12 on whole task, 6 on the first presentation of each emotion)
Emotion task
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Phase 3 of the experiment involved testing for any differences in matching
illustrations of gestures to emotional facial expressions. This proved to be very
difficult for all groups of children and there were no differences between groups on
this phase. The most important finding was that none of the autistic children, autistic
adults or 3-4 year old children who proceeded to this stage, passed (i.e. scored 5
correct matches).
Finally, Stage 4 examined the ability to recognise specific emotions from a
given context. This is a test of the ability to share emotions or at least to project what
one would feel in the given situation to another person. All groups were good at
matching the verbal story to a context picture, including the autistic children and
adults. However, when matching emotions to the context pictures, the overall
percentage of children passing was low in all groups. On actual score, the 5-6 year
olds, MLD and autistic children scored better than the 3-4 year olds (F=3.33
p<0.05). However, these differences were obliterated when MA, CA and TROG
score were controlled for in autistic/non-autistic comparisons. It must be
remembered, however, that the numbers used in these comparisons were small.
When the number of children passing (i.e. scoring at least 5 out of 6) was compared,
only the autistic and MLD samples had any children passing this phase.
Summary of results:
Since only those who passed the initial facial expression phase were tested on
the final two phases, raw frequencies of passing these cannot be directly compared.
Therefore, Figure 8.4 summarises the percentage of children passing each phase of
the test.
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Figure 8.5: Percentage of children in each group passing each phase of the emotion
recognotion task.
Percentage of children passing
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To summarise, fewer autistic children and adults were able to identify and
recognise facial expressions of emotion than non-autistic children. Autistic children
and adults did not improve their performance even after training. However, few
significant differences were found between the autistic and non-autistic groups on
other aspects of the tests. It seemed that those autistic children who could recognise
facial expression of emotion could also match them to sounds, gestures and
emotionally relevant contexts as well as non-autistic individuals. As is pointed out in
some detail in Appendix 8.5, the methodology was restricted by the testing
environment - it is possible that more children, in particular non-autistic children,
may have passed if it had been possible to use video clips of gestures and stories
rather than still pictures. Some interesting additional results can be found in
Appendix 8.4 but perhaps what is most interesting is that some emotions seemed
easier to recognise than others. As Baron-Cohen et al (1993) suggested, happy and
sad seem to be slightly easier for autistic children and adults, while surprised
seemed more difficult. No relationship with CA was found so we cannot say much
about the development of emotion recognition and sharing. However, for the most
part a higher mental age, at least as measured on the TROG, was correlated with a
better performance at least with regard to the non-autistic children. On the other
hand, even though the autistic adults had a slightly higher TROG score than the
autistic children, this did not enable them to perform better on these tasks of emotion
recognition and sharing. It seems that Rogers and Pennington (1991) (and Hobson,
g 3-4 years
• 5-6 years
o MLD
▪ Aut ch
▪ Aut adt
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1986;1993) were correct then, in that both autistic children and adults have problems
with affective understanding, although from the results it is not possible to say
how specific this is to autism, except for recognition of facial expressions.
1B) Experiment 2 - Visual perspective taking and joint attention:
Butterworth (1991) broke down joint attention into 3 levels - comprehension of
gaze direction (which develops in normal infants between 6 and 18 months of age),
comprehension of pointing (emerging at about 12 months) and production of
pointing (which is evident, as an intentional gesture, around 13.5 months). Around
15 months a normal infant checks to see if the mother is attending before it points
(Franco & Butterworth, 1988). Baron-Cohen (1991) reviews the literature of joint-
attention behaviours in autism - there is some evidence that joint attention
behaviours occur less frequently in autistic children (Mundy, Sigman, Ungerer and
Sherman, 1986). In joint attention behaviours Baron-Cohen included "referential
looking" (where the child looks at what the adult looks at, or tries to get the adult to
look at something using the direction of their eye gaze) and gestures such as giving,
showing and pointing. Studies by Hobson (1984), Baron-Cohen (1989), Leslie and
Frith (1988), Tan and Harris (1991), Leekam et al. (1993; in press) have shown that
autistic children can succeed on perspective-taking tasks, which require the child
simply to say what the experimenter is looking at, with head and eye movements as
the only clues. A recent study by Leekam, Baron-Cohen and Brown (1993) has
shown that autistic children perform at the same level as controls on the visual
perspective-taking task but failed the gaze-monitoring task, which measured the
ability to spontaneously follow gaze direction. In a more recent paper (Baron-Cohen
et al. (1994), which is dealt with in detail in Chapter 1) Baron-Cohen asserts the
importance of eye direction following and joint attention, not only as precursors to a
Theory of Mind ability, but as a possible fundamental basis on which a Theory of
Mind is built.
A Level 1 and Level 2 Perspective-taking task (Flavell et al., 1981; see
appendix 8.7 for the task used) was carried out during a pilot study, testing for the
effect of visual perspective on the ability to imitate. Only four of the eleven autistic
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children tested passed both levels, five failed both levels and 2 children could say
what the experimenter could see but couldn't sarif it was the right way up or upside
down. On the other hand, all but one 5-6 year old passed both levels. There were
only three 3-4 year olds who participated in both this pilot study on visual
perspective-taking and in the present experiments, and of these three children, one
child passed both parts, one child passed part 1 and failed part 2 and one child failed
part 1 but passed part 2. Visual Perspective-taking will be examined in this study,
while assessing joint attention abilities.
The results of the observational study in Chapter 2 hinted that joint attention
was not altogether absent in the autistic group. It seemed that some autistic children
would follow a point, usually with a verbalisation, of someone else to an object or
event. But they themselves rarely tried to attract someone else's attention, unless it
was to request the object or to show what they had done - usually to receive praise.
In fact, this latter joint attention behaviour was one of the most common of the
behaviours which were witnessed. This latter point is similar to other findings, for
example, by Baron-Cohen (1989), that autistic children engage in protoimperative
(i.e. to request) pointing but not protodeclarative (i.e. to share information) pointing.
However, the apparent presence of a "passive" joint attention does not tie in so well
with previous studies as mentioned above. In addition, it was often difficult to
decide whether a child was following the gaze, or even the point of another person,
or whether they were simply reacting to the vocalisation, which usually
accompanied the point or gaze. It was also difficult to know if they were just
interested in the object itself and happened to look at the object, not necessarily
because the adult/ other person was looking at it.
Since joint attention is one of the social pragmatic deficits linked to imitation
and Theory of Mind impairments in autism in Rogers and Pennington's model
(1991) and plays an important role in many other theories of autism, specifically
Baron-Cohen's latest proposals (1994), it was necessary to assess the joint attention
capacities of the autistic children in this study. Rogers and Pennington (1991)
predicted that it would be the younger autistic children in whom a deficit in joint
attention would be most noticeable. Adults on the other hand should not be impaired
relative to controls, based on Rogers and Pennington's model.
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The present study aimed to examine both the spontaneous following of head
and eye gaze and points and the ability of each child to take the perspective of
another person in order to say what they are looking at. In addition, it has been
shown that gaze behind the subject is harder for the subject to monitor than gaze to
the side in normal children aged below 2 years (Butterworth and Cochran, 1980).
Leekam et al. (in press) found that the gaze behind the subject condition was
successfully monitored by some children in all groups - of the few autistic children
who did pass the gaze-monitoring task, one of them successfully monitored gaze
behind, but very few monitored gaze consistently across all conditions. It was
decided that for this study, three conditions would be used for both perspective-
taking and spontaneous joint attention (eye gaze and head direction monitoring) -
gaze left of subject, gaze behind subject and point to the right of subject.
Method:
Subjects: The subjects for the present study were mostly those used for the
emotion perception experiment and are described in detail in Appendix 8.6 (Table
8.3). There were 11 three-four year old and 13 five-six year old normal children, 11
children with Mild to moderate Learning Disabilities (mean CA:12;3, mean
MA:5;11, and mean TROG score: 8.1), 9 autistic children (mean CA:12;1, mean
MA:4;11, and mean TROG score: 6.2), and 10 autistic adults (mean CA:23;10, mean
MA:7;0, and mean TROG score: 8.2).
Procedure: A scenario very similar to that described in Leekam et al (1993; in
press) was used for this study. Once again details are given in Appendix 8.6. In brief,
the experimenter, in the process of another session or dummy task, 1) looked intently
at a toy placed to one side of the child but with no verbal clues, except to call the
child's name to gain their attention in the first place. The response of the child was
recorded on video camera. Then the experimenter asked the child "What am I
looking at?" and the response was recorded. 2) This was repeated for an object
behind the child (i.e. both the silent stare and the verbal cue). 3) Finally, the
experimenter pointed to an object to the other side of the child and after a pause
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asked "what am I pointing at?". As far a possible the three trials were interspersed
with other activities in the hope that it would lead-to a more natural situation.
Coding and analysis:
The results were recorded on video tape and then coded by the principal
observer using a check sheet of possible responses to each presentation. In order to
analyse the results the child's responses were scored on a scale from 0 - 6 as shown
in Table 8.4 (in Appendix 8.6). A Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance for k-
independent samples test was then used to test for group differences on each part of
the task and for a total score on the task as a whole (out of 18). The total score was
only calculated for the children who completed all aspects of the task - there were 3
MLD children and 5 autistic children/adults who, for one of many reasons, did not
partake in all three components. Table 8.5 (in appendix 8.6) illustrates the number of
children in each group taking part in each part of the experiment. This analysis was
done for all five groups, for autistic vs. non-autistic children and for the sub-sets of
the autistic and non-autistic groups matched on CA, TROG raw score and MA on
BPVS (See Table 8.6 in Appendix 8.6). Pearson's Product Moment correlations
were carried out for the performance on each part of the tasks, with CA, TROG and
MA BPVS. Finally, the percentage of children in each group, scoring at least 5 out
of six (i.e. following the gaze on the first response, before any verbalisations) was
calculated and examined graphically.
Results:
The main analysis of the performance by the five groups showed no significant
difference between the groups on any of the task components. These results are
represented in Figure 8.6 below. On an analysis of overall score, between the five
groups, there was a main group effect (K-W=12.46, p<0.05) - the MLD group
showed significantly better scores than the autistic children. This result is illustrated
in Figure 8.7.
Gaze left
	
Behind
	
Point
Figure 8.7: Median Scores and interquartile ranges for each group of subjects on the joint
attention task as a whole - total of gaze to left, gaze behind and point to right scores.
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Figure 8.6:Median Scores and Interquartile ranges for each group on the three phases of the joint attention task.
Total
When the groups were collapsed into an autistic and a non-autistic group, there
were still no differences on each component of the task. On total score the non-
autistic group did better than the autistic group (K-W=5.52 p<0.05) but this
difference disappeared when MA and TROG score were controlled for. More details
of these comparisons are given in Appendix 8.6 (Figures 8.8 and 8.9).
O3-4 years
O 5-6 years
EIMLD
EtAut Ch
mitut adt
Chapter 8: Relationships between imitation, play and "theory of mind".	 238
Finally, it was found that there was a lack of consistency across all groups,
which ties in with what Leekam et al. (1993; itr press) found. Although, as Figure
8.10 below illustrated, the same percentage of autistic children passed each phase of
the task, the 33% was not the same children on each phase. This individual
inconsistency is also represented by the percentage of children scoring 15 or more on
the total score. One autistic child did acheive over 15 on the total but no autistic
adults performed consistently well across all phases of the task. There was, however,
higher consistency for the non-autistic groups although this was not as good as
might have been expected from other studies.
Further analyses and observational results can be found in Appendix 8.6.
Figure 8.10: Percentage of subjects in each group scoring five or more on the task components and 15 or more
on total score, and thus showing a consistent tendency to follow the eye gaze or point, without prompting.
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Figure 8.11: Percentage of children in each group scoring, 2, 4 or 6 on each part of joint attention task. These
scores represent a correct response to the question "What am I looking/pointing at?", thus illustrating visual
perspective taking...,
Behind
	
Left
	
Point
Phase of joint attention experiment.
Finally, to look a little at visual perspective-taking, as examined by this experiment,
we can use Figure 8.11 above. This shows the percentage of children scoring 2, 4 or
6 on each component, and as such represents the percentage of children who
correctly identify the object when asked "what am I looking/pointing at?"(See Table
8.4 for coding system). As is clearly evident a much higher percentage of children
succeed on the visual perspective taking, than on the joint attention measure. The 3-
4 year olds did equally well on all components - gaze left, behind and point. The 5-6
year olds did almost equally well on the gaze left and gaze behind conditions and all
children passed on the point condition. The MLD children did equally well on look
left and point and slightly worse on look behind, but still better than all other groups
except the 5-6 year olds. The autistic children did equally well on the look behind
and look left conditions, as was expected from the joint attention results, but all
children passed the visual perspective on the point condition. Finally, the autistic
adults performed well on look left, better than all except the MLD, but performed
worst on the point and on look behind. In order to consider the implications of these
results it is important to remember that the sample size for each group is relatively
small, for example the 10% of the MLD children not scoring 2,4 or 6 represents just
one child. However, it is clear, for example, that all the autistic children could
correctly identify the experimenter's point of reference, when the point was used,
but just over half of them could do it when just head and eye movements only were
used.
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Summary of results
From this study of joint attention we can say that both autistic children and
adults tended to perform more poorly on joint attention tasks than non-autistic
children, even those with learning disabilities. However, these differences were not
significant on any of the phases of the task. The point phase did seem to be slightly
easier for the autistic adults at least but again this was not significant. More autistic
children and adults passed the visual perspective-taking tasks than the joint attention
tasks, confirming what other people had found - that autistic individuals could
identify another person's focus of visual attention when asked to. The lack of
significant results for the joint attention means that I cannot confirm other findings
that they are specifically impaired in taking another's perspective spontaneously.
Perhaps, given the inconsistency of individual responses, larger numbers would
produce a significant effect.
Finally, we cannot from these results offer much support for Rogers and
Pennington's (1991) theory. Both autistic adults and children showed lower scores
on joint attention but neither showed significantly lower scores than controls.
Correlational analysis showed that there was no relationship between CA and score.
The only positive correlation was between TROG raw score and performance on
gaze behind, which is not surprising since this is thought to be the more difficult
concept in joint attention, even for normal children.
It could be argued, however, that the autistic children used in this test were too
old for Rogers and Pennington's predictions. Although the results were not analysed
for this chapter, the very young autistic children were tested, or at least an attempt
was made to test these children. It was found impossible, however, to get most of
these children's attention in order to administer the test. This, of course, could be
significant proof for an inability to engage in joint attention but at this point must
remain speculation.
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1C) Experiment 3: False-belief attribution
OP
Most researchers in the field would agree that autistic children tend to have
problems with false-belief and that false-belief is one of the last '`Theory of Mind"
abilities to develop. Understanding someone's false beliefs about a situation is
considered the most difficult mental state for a child to understand and only appears
in normal development after the age of four years. How specific to autism a problem
with false-belief is and how universal, is still somewhat controversial. Baron-Cohen,
Leslie and Frith (1985) found that 80 % of the autistic children in their sample failed
a false-belief task (Sally/Anne Scenario, See Chapter 1 for more details). However,
Prior et al. (1990) found that only 50% of the children in their sample failed the
same task. Baron-Cohen (1989) examined the 20% of the children from the 1985
sample again, using a second order false-belief task and found that almost all the
children now failed. He argued that failure on false-belief tasks was specific to
autism and that children with learning difficulties and normal children over four
years of age could reliably pass first order false-belief tasks. More details of
experiments in this area are given in Chapter 1. Although it is normally children
over four years who can pass this task, recent research has investigated ways of
making the task easier, and thereby getting children younger than four years to pass
this task (Eisenmajer & Prior, 1991; Parkin and Perner, 1993; see Wellman, 1993 for
further examples). One has to ask if one can help autistic children in the same way.
In order to truly investigate Rogers and Pennington's model, such a test of false-
belief was necessary. This will also allow a profile of each child to be built up in the
next chapter, to examine the links between mental state abilities, imitation, play and
various measures of mental and chronological age. The present study, although
mainly conducted to test if the subjects could attribute false-belief at all, attempted
to make it as easy as possible for the children to pass, if the ability was present in the
first place.
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Method.
Subjects:
The same children in the 5-6 year old and MLD groups, autistic children and
autistic adults were used as in the previous studies. Only three of the 3-4 year old
children, were tested by the author for false-belief The false-belief task was applied
to subjects as part of another study, conducted with Faye Zobrist and Kristina
Scheuffgen as part of their undergraduate study at the very beginning of the
academic year, whereas the majority of the present study was conducted after
Christmas. All but three of the 3-4 year olds in the first sample left the playgroup
during that first term, or during the Christmas holidays. As a result, the 3-4 year olds
will be mentioned, but a serious comparison cannot be made with such a small
number. Table 8.7 in Appendix 8.8 illustrates the subjects used for this experiment.
It must be remembered that although the mean age of the autistic children was above
4 years, half of the children had a mental age of less than 4 years on the BPVS and a
score less than five on the TROG. Most of the autistic children and adults had been
tested at least once before, usually on the Sally-Anne scenario, which was one
reason why a slightly different storyline was used in this study (see below).
Procedure:
The normal children were originally tested first by Zobrist and Scheuffgen on
a simple misleading package task. This is described in detail in Appendix 8.8.
Although ideally, all children should have been tested on the same false-belief
task, it was felt that this scenario relied on being able and willing to speak the
answer. Therefore, a different scenario was designed for the autistic children and
adults. With these children a picture sequence story, based on the displaced object
scenario of Wimmer and Pemer (1983), was used. This gave the children the option
of being able to point at the location, rather than speak the answer. It also meant that
the whole story was available for the children's reference when the questions were
being asked. It was hoped that this would act as a memory cue for the autistic
children, so that they could not fail for reasons of poor memory recall. Two reality
questions and two memory questions were asked during the task.
Chapter 8: Relationships between imitation, play and "theory of mind".
	
243
Coding and analysis: If the child named or pointed to the correct location in
the story sequence or named 'coke' as the answer his friend would give as to the
contents of the can, then they were scored as correctly answering the false-belief
question. However, in order to pass the task, they also had to answer the reality and
memory questions correctly on each occasion. If they failed the memory questions
then they could not be coded as having failed false-belief, just failed to understand
the task as a whole. The 3-4 year olds were not included in the Chi-Square analysis
of the number passing, failing and not responding in all groups, due to their small
sample size. They were, however, included in the analysis of the age of those who
passed and those who failed, in both the autistic and non-autistic groups. This was
analysed using an ANOVA, to compare the mean ages of the autistic subjects who
passed and the autistic subjects who failed and the autistic subjects who did not
respond to the false-belief question or failed the memory test. This was also done for
the non-autistic groups and across all groups.
Results:
As can be seen from Figure 8.12 below, less than 20% of the autistic children
(n=10) passed the false belief question. Of the 80% who failed, all children passed
the reality questions but only three children failed the false-belief question and
passed the memory questions. Two children gave the correct answer to the false-
belief question but one failed the memory questions about where the mother put the
bag when she was cleaning the floor and the other child pointed to several locations
in quick succession on the same memory question. Two children could not be
persuaded to answer the false-belief question and also answered one memory
question wrong. One child failed the false-belief question and then refused to answer
the memory questions. The autistic adults (n=8) did better, with 50% passing the
false-belief question, two adults failing the false-belief questions but passing
memory and two adults failing one or both the memory questions. One 5-6 year old
child (out of n=12) failed the false-belief task and he passed the memory question.
The MLD children (n=12) did well, with 2 children failing the false-belief question
but passing memory and one child (MA 2;2) failing the memory questions. Of the
Passing
	 Failing	 Fail mem	 No Resp
Result on False-belief task
O 5-6 years
MLD
▪ Aut ch
▪ Aut adt
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three 3-4 year olds, although not included in the analysis, two children passed the
false-belief question and one child failed the false:belief but passed the memory
questions.
Figure 8.12: Percentage of children in each group passing,
Percentage of children failing and failing the memory/no response.
0
On the statistical analysis, there was an overall main group effect on a Chi-
Square but this was only significant at 0.05 level (X 2 = 17.39, df 9). When the results
were analysed on the basis of pass false-belief versus any other response, the 5-6
year old children showed significantly more passes than both the autistic children
(X2 = 11.61 p<0.01 df 1) and autistic adults (X2 = 4.4 p<0.05 df 1). The MLD
children also showed more than the autistic children (X 2 = 6.6 p<0.05 dfl) but did
not show significantly more passes than the autistic adults (X 2 = 1.32 p>0.05). When
one discounted the children who failed the memory question or did not respond to
the question and only compared the numbers of those passing and failing the false-
belief question, only one significant difference emerged. Even at this level, the 5-6
year olds still showed significantly more passes and less failures than the autistic
children (X2 = 5.23 p<0.05).
To look at the developmental trend of false-belief and whether autistic children
only failed because of a low verbal or chronological age a final analysis done. This
compared the mental and chronological age of those children who passed the false-
belief, failed the false-belief and failed the memory questions or did not respond at
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all. Table 8.8 below summarises the results of this comparison. Basically there were
few significant differences when the autistic groups and non-autistic groups were
analysed separately, although the general trend for both the autistic and non-autistic
groups, was a lower MA and TROG score for those children who failed the memory
questions or did not respond at all. The autistic group also showed a lower CA for
those who failed memory questions. Those who passed the memory questions but
failed the false belief, also had a lower CA and lower TROG scores in the autistic
group and also a lower MA in the non-autistic group. However, none of these
difference were statistically significant on a one-way ANOVA. When both groups
were clumped together there was a significant difference between the MA of the
children passing and MA of the children failing memory. There was also a
significant difference between the TROG score of the children passing and the
TROG score of the children failing the memory questions or not responding (F=3.18
p=0.05) There was even a difference between the TROG of those failing false-belief
but passing memory and those failing memory/not responding (F=7.11 p<0.01), with
those failing memory questions or not responding, having a lower TROG score.
Table 9.2: ANOVA results and means for the comparison between the ages of the children who
passed the false-belief, failed the false-belief and failed the memory questions. (A significant
difference on the ANOVAs is denoted by * when significant at 0.05 level and ** when significant at
0.01 level).
Measure of
mental or
chronological
age.
ANOVA
results
Mean Age of
those who pass
false belief
Mean Age of
those who fail
false-belief,
Mean age for
those who fail
memory
questions
Overall
children - CA F=0.57 11.44 13.01 14.47
- MA F=3.18 * 6.28 5.93 4.34
- TROG F=7.11 ** 10 8.11 4.33
Non-autistic
children - CA
F=0.48 8.4 6.89 11.58
-MA F=2.79 6.21 5 2.17
- TROG F=2.13 10.42 9.25 2
Autistic
children - CA
F=1.88 22.55 17.90 14.83
-MA F=1.85 6.53 6.67 4.61
- TROG F=1.86 8.50 7.20 4.62
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Summary of false-belief results:
NO
Despite a few methodological problems due to the use of two different
scenarios and a lack of 3-4 year old children, it is clear that most autistic children are
impaired on false-belief attribution relative to non-autistic children. However, the
children in this experiment who were of a younger mental age did not only fail false-
belief questions but also failed the memory questions. As such we cannot draw as
strong conclusions as have been drawn in previous studies (Baron-Cohen et al.,
1985), although contradictory results were not found. Like Baron-Cohen et al.'s
study, about 20% of the children were able to attribute false-belief in this
experimental situation. For the autistic adults on the other hand, the percentage of
those who passed was greater - at 50% of those tested. Fewer adults also failed the
memory questions.
So what can we say from a theoretical viewpoint about these results?
Because of the nature of this experiment we can only make speculations about this -
Rogers and Pennington had predicted that deficits in theory of mind (which I tested
here in the form of false-belief) would be most debilitating for older children and
adults. Unfortunately, they do not specify what age they expected this difference to
occur but since false-belief ability doesn't usually emerge in normal development
until about 4 years, we might expect that this is the age where this ability really
begins to play an important role in interpersonal relations. Most of the children in
this study were over four years chronologically and about half of them were four
years or above on verbal mental age. Relative to controls even those children who
did not exceed this age showed problems with false-belief. In addition, even if
autistic children and adults could attribute false-belief and thus use a theory of mind
in an experimental situation most studies have found that they cannot put this ability
into practice in everyday life. They still show deficits in the ability to deceive and
understand deception, to make and understand jokes and teasing, and to show
empathy and understanding of other mental states. Some evidence of this was seen
in the Observational study in Chapter 2.
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2) The relationships between imitation, symbolic play and the ability to
understand mental states, in the form of emotion, attention and false-belief.
Rogers and Pennington (1991) predicted a profile of deficits for young autistic
children of deficits in elicited imitation, joint attention, pretend play and emotion
sharing. We have seen how young autistic children do indeed seem to be impaired in
elicited imitation. They were also impaired to some degree in elicited pretend play,
although no evidence was found for specific deficits in spontaneous pretend play.
They were impaired in recognition of emotion in facial expressions and, although
the difference was not significant, they showed lower joint attention skills than
controls. The autistic adults on the other hand did not show impairments in symbolic
play relative to age-matched controls nor in elicited imitation. They did have
problems with emotion recognition and sharing, and they did have lower scores
(although not significant) on the false-belief task. Fewer autistic adults used mental
state language than age-related controls although this was not significant (See
Chapter 2). In the experimental study there were no significant differences between
the autistic adults and older controls, although the scores were lower for the most
part. However, in the observational study both autistic children and adults showed
significantly less joint attention than non-autistic controls. Rogers and Pennington
had predicted that older autistic individuals would show a profile consisting of
deficits in theory of mind, emotion recognition and sharing and language
pragmatics. So then, apart from the results on joint attention, there seems to be some
evidence for Rogers and Pennington's theory at a cruder, group level.
To truly examine Rogers and Pennington's theory it was necessary to look at
the individual profiles. We have already seen that one of the most striking results
from this thesis has been that there are huge individual differences for autistic
subjects of all ages. I have attempted below to analyse any relationships between the
abilities tested for both the children and adults. It was not possible to include the
young autistic children in this analysis because they were not used for all the
experiments. One must simply remember that most of them had lower scores than
older autistic children and control children in almost every ability tested.
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To investigate the relationship between first of all imitation and the other
abilities, the score on the DAID, overall and again for each of the three categories,
where some impairments were found (two-handed actions, meaningful/symbolic
gestures and symbolic actions with objects) and the performance on the spontaneous
production of symbolic play and manipulative/relational play during the
observational study, was examined. This was done using a Spearman's Rank
correlation, both with raw data and controlling for both MA and CA. It was
conducted over all the autistic subjects - both children and adults. Secondly, the
relationship between the DAID scores and performance on other tasks was examined
using graphs plotted for each child (Figure 8.13 - 8.16) and Fisher tests conducted
for both the autistic children and the autistic adults. Again the median score was
used to classify subjects and those above and below the median score were
compared on whether they passed or failed the other tasks. For visual perspective-
taking, there were three parts. Parts 1 and 2 were the Flavell (1981) test, for which a
simple pass/fail coding was available, and Part 3 was the response to the question
used in the joint attention task (What am I looking at?). Part 3 also used a pass/fail
measure but since the result was taken over two measures - look left and look behind
- those who passed at least one of the measures were said to have passed, for the
purposes of the Fisher test analysis. However, for the graphs, children who only
passed one of the two measures are represented by a gray-filled point. Joint attention
was coded in the same way as visual perspective-taking, Part 3. Whether they
produced spontaneous symbolic play, was a simple yes/no coding and the results for
the perception of emotions from facial expressions, was a simple pass/fail measure,
where a pass equalled a score of at least 5 out of 7. Finally, false-belief was a little
more difficult to code as three possible outcomes were possible - a pass, a fail and
then a failed memory or no-response. Since, for the purpose of this comparison, I
was really interested in only whether the child passed the false-belief, the latter two
responses were combined as a fail.
Finally, a series of Fisher Exact tests were carried out between performance
on the "theory of mind" tasks and the other imitation tasks - spontaneous imitation,
the artificial fruit and order tasks and the deferred imitation task. This was done for
both children and adults.
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Results:	 OW
Firstly, to examine the link between the type of activity produced in a
spontaneous and elicited play situation and the score on the various aspects of the
DAID task, a Spearman's Rank correlation was carried out. It was found that there
was a strong negative correlation between the amount of manipulative/relational
play produced in the elicited situation and the overall score on the DAID (r = -0.485
p<0.05). Apart from this there were no other significant correlations. When MA and
CA were controlled for in a partial correlation, the effect was still significant with a
negative correlation (r = -0.681 p<0.01) between elicited manipulative behaviour
and overall score on the DAID.
Secondly, Figures 8.13 to 8.16 below illustrate the relationship between the
"Theory of Mind" tasks and the DAID scores. With regard to false-belief, it is
difficult to say whether there is a trend or not since only two children passed.
However, both these children did have an overall DAID score above the median for
the group (Figure 8.13). The same is true for visual perspective-taking @art 3 - VP3
i.e. the response to the question "what am I looking at?" in the Joint attention task)
However, neither of these trends are significant (Fisher test p>0.05). Visual
perspective-taking, both parts 1 and 3 (VP1 and VP3), show a significant trend in the
direction of positive interactions - those children who pass visual perspective-taking
tend to score above the median score on both meaningful/symbolic actions (Figure
8.15) and symbolic-actions-with-objects (Figure 8.16 - p<0.05 for both VP1 and
VP3 and meaningful/symbolic actions; p<0.05 for VP3 and symbolic-actions-with-
objects; p=0.06 for VP1 and symbolic-actions-with- objects). There is also a trend
for those who pass false-belief to score higher on symbolic-actions-with-objects but
this is a not significant trend (Fisher test p>0.05).
Within the adult group, there are even fewer noticeable trends. There is a slight
trend towards a relationship between joint attention and overall score and between
meaningful/symbolic actions and both emotion recognition and false belief.
However, none of these trends are significant (p>0.05 on Fisher test). None of the
adults were tested on visual perspective-taking parts 1 and 2, only part 3.
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Figure 8.13: Graph to illustrate the relationship between overall score on DAID test
and aspects of the "Theory of Mind Chain" of development for the autistic children
(a solid point means the child failed on the task, an empty point means the child
passed and a gray-filled point means the child failed one part but passed a second on
a two part task, or on the false-belief task - failed the memory questions or didn't
respond).
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N.B. Key for Figures 8.13 to 8.16:
VP1= visual perspective taking, part 1 (Flavell, 1981); VP2 = part 2 of visual-
perspective taking task (Flavell, 1981); VP3 = visual perspective task used in
Chapter 8 along with Joint attention task (JA); Symb = showed symbolic play
spontaneously during observational study; Emot = emotion perception task; FB =
false-belief.
VP3VP2
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Figure 8.14: Graph to illustrate the relationship fCrr the autistic children between
score on two-handed actions on the DAID task and aspects of the "Theory of Mind
Chain" of development (a solid point means the child failed on the task, an empty
point means the child passed and a gray-filled point means the child failed one part
but passed a second on a two part task, or on the false-belief task - failed the
memory questions or didn't respond).
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N.B. Children ranked 5 and 6 had the same score on the DAID, two-handed actions.
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Figure 8.15: Graph to illustrate the relationship for the autistic children between the
score for meaningful/symbolic actions on the DAID task and aspects of the "Theory
of Mind Chain" of development (a solid point means the child failed on the task, an
empty point means the child passed and a gray-filled point means the child failed
one part but passed a second on a two part task, or on the false-belief task - failed the
memory questions or didn't respond).
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N.B. Children ranked 5, 6 and 7 all had the same score on DAID
meaningful/symbolic actions.
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Figure 8.16: Graph to illustrate the relationship for the autistic children between
ranked score on symbolic actions with objects frorn the DAID task and aspects of
the "Theory of Mind Chain" of development (a solid point means the child failed on
the task, an empty point means the child passed and a gray-filled point means the
child failed one part but passed a second on a two part task, or on the false-belief
task - failed the memory questions or didn't respond).
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N.B. Children ranked 6 and 7 both had the same score on DAID symbolic actions
with objects.
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The final analysis involved a comparison of imitation on the deferred and
spontaneous tasks and performance on the "Theory of Mind" tasks. This was done
for the adults and children combined. There were no significant relationships on a
series of Fisher tests between performance on imitation tasks such as deferred
imitation, spontaneous imitation and performance on the artificial fruit task, and
performance on the various "theory of mind" tasks - joint attention, visual
perspective taking, emotion perception and false-belief tasks.
To look briefly at just the "Theory of Mind" (ToM) abilities themselves, it
would be reasonable to expect that there might be a relationship between
performance on false-belief tasks and on other, lower "theory of mind" abilities such
as visual perspective-taking and joint attention, as Baron-Cohen (1994) would
predict. However, on a final set of Fisher tests, none of the ToM abilities were
significantly related to any other (ToM) ability (p>0.05 on all tests).
Overall Discussion:
It was hoped that the analysis in the second part of this chapter might throw
some light on the development of autism at an individual level and in particular
which behaviours and deficits occurred together in at least the majority of autistic
children. This would have allowed some stronger conclusions to have been drawn
regarding Rogers and Pennington's model of autism. Unfortunately, the picture we
still have on the individual level is one of a mixture of behaviours that normally
coincide or precede/follow each other in normal development, occurring in autism in
no reliable pattern and rarely resembling the pattern seen in normal development.
Some children show one ability while unable to show a different, developmentally
easier ability. Even abilities such as those in the "theory of mind" chain, which occur
in a certain order in normal children, do not seem to occur in that order in the
children examined in this study. It does not seem to be the case, that if impaired in
visual-perspective taking, for example, the child must also be impaired in joint
attention, pretend play and false-belief. However, a few factors must be born in mind
when considering these results. Firstly, the group of subjects being compared was
relatively small. To examine the development of autism, larger samples of autistic
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individuals must be used. Many of the trends witnessed in this study may have been
significant with larger sample sizes. Secondly, when tested on one behaviour,
subjects may have just been having a bad day and if tested another day would have
passed. To remedy this, a longitudinal study is needed. Thirdly, the tasks which are
generally used to test for some of these behaviours may not be age-appropriate - this
might account for a lack of consistency across tasks.
One pattern did seem to emerge, however, and that was that the ability to
take another's visual perspective seems to be linked to the ability to imitate, in the
elicited situation. This has important implications for the results found in Chapter 3 -
actions which appeared to require a more complicated transformation of perspective
such as two-handed actions or those requiring of a symbolic nature, gave autistic
subjects the most difficulty. The connection with visual perspective-taking was
strongest for actions that required some symbolic activity. Performance on visual
perspective-taking was good for those children who did well on the
meaningful/symbolic gestures and the symbolic-actions-with-objects.
Visual perspective-taking and joint attention have been proposed as precursors
to a "Theory of Mind" (Baron-Cohen, 1994) and as such do come before false-belief
in the developmental chain. Although the two children who did pass the false-belief
task also tended to pass the other tests, there were no significant links between the
different aspects of the "theory of mind" chain. It cannot be said that if autistic
children produce visual false-belief, then they can automatically pass joint attention,
symbolic play and emotion recognition tasks.
Although on the level of individual profiles the relationships between the
abilities tested did not seem to resemble the pattern seen in normal development, the
picture was a little different at the group level analysis. We saw that in Chapter 6,
the pattern of development of both elicited imitation and spontaneous imitation
followed very closely the pattern seen in normal development (Piaget, 1951; Rogers
and Pennington, 1991; Nadel and Camaioni, 1993). Similar results were also found
for symbolic play (Chapters 2 and 7). As such there does some seem to be some
evidence that at least some abilities follow a pattern similar to normal development.
Of course, it may have been that if more children had been used in the profile
analysis and if the study had been longitudinal in nature as Rogers and Pennington
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suggested, more of a developmental pattern may have emerged at the detailed
analysis level. 	 --
The main aim of this chapter was to examine the relationships between
imitation, pretend play and emotion sharing and theory of mind abilities as
suggested by Rogers and Pennington (1991). Although I have not found much
support for the profile suggested by Rogers and Pennington's theory at the level of
detailed analysis, on a broad, more crude level, some evidence is available. We have
over the last 7 chapters seen evidence that some deficits may be more important at
an earlier stage in development such as imitation and pretend play while other
abilities are debilitating for older children and adults such as theory of mind deficits
and emotion recognition and sharing deficits. In addition we have seen that some
abilities do develop with age, following a normal developmental pattern. I will
discuss the implications of this in the final chapter which follows.
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Chapter 9
General Discussion and Conclusions.
Summary of findings:
1) Imitation:
As was seen in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, no general deficit in imitation was found
for older autistic children and adults. However, certain aspects of imitation were
impaired. Autistic children were worse on imitation involving some symbolic
capacity and produced more partial imitations on certain actions that have been
described here as possibly requiring a more complicated reversal of perspective or
mental rotation, particularily those gestures using two hands. The young autistic
children, on the other hand, did have more problems with all types of imitation.
From a theoretical viewpoint, these results were consistent with Rogers and
Pennington's (1991) prediction that it would be the young autistic children who
would show most problems with elicited imitation, with older children and adults
not impaired relative to controls. The development of elicited imitation seemed to
follow the pattern seen in normal development with novel actions and symbolic
actions being more difficult (Piaget, 1951). On spontaneous imitation, a normal
developmental pattern was also observed, with the younger of the autistic children
being more likely to imitate spontaneously (Nadel and Camaioni, 1993). However,
autistic children did produce less evidence of spontaneous imitation, although not
significantly so. Autistic adults also produced less spontaneous imitation, as did non-
autistic children with learning disabilities. However, for the most part their lack of
spontaneous imitation was not because they could not imitate, except perhaps for the
very young autistic children, but perhaps because it was either not an age appropriate
behaviour or because they did not want to use imitation spontaneously because of
it's social complexity.
With respect to previous literature, the results of the Do-As-I-Do experiment
confirmed some previous findings of no general deficit in gestural or procedural
imitation (Charman and Baron-Cohen, 1994; Morgan et al, 1990). The deficit in
symbolic imitation replicated previous findings by Hammes and Langdell (1981),
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Curcio and Piserchia (1978), Stone et al (1990), and Heimann et al. (1992). The
impairment in selective two-handed gestures such-as grasp thumb and T-signs,
replicated findings by Ohta (1987). The finding that autistic children tend to produce
partial imitations such as reversals of the hand position in an action or using a body
part as the object when imitating a symbolic action, provides support for the idea
that imitation might be more difficult when the mental rotation of the visual
perspective is more difficult, whether due to a theory of mind deficit (Whiten 1992)
or a perception and information processing deficit (Smith and Bryson (1994).
The experiments on deferred imitation and spontaneous use of imitation in a
problem-solving task, added a new dimension to existing research, since neither of
these tasks have been used with autistic subjects before. Although some autistic
children did imitate in these conditions and differences were rarely significant, fewer
imitated than in the non-autistic groups. It was also found that on the problem-
solving task, where both imitation and emulation of a model were possible solutions
to opening an artificial fruit, autistic children did show some signs of imitation.
However, once again the level of imitation in the autistic children was not as marked
as in the non-autistic children. More of the younger autistic children and adults on
this test of spontaneous imitation, tended to emulate the aim of the model actions,
rather than imitate the methods demonstrated. As regards sequence level imitation
(Whiten and Custance, in press; see also Byrne, 1994, 1995) quite a high percentage
of children in all groups followed the same sequence as the model in opening the
box. However, slightly more autistic subjects and young normal children did not
stick to the sequence than children in the older non-autistic groups. Although the
group differences found in this study were not significant, this method should prove
a useful tool for assessing whether human and non-human subjects use imitation in
the impersonation sense (Wood, 1989; Byrne, 1994), use program-level imitation
(i.e. imitation of the sequence of the complete act, without necessarily slavishly
copying the exact methods used in achieving each subgoal as in Byrne (1994)), or
simply emulate the final goal to get their reward.
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2) Play, joint attention, emotion recognition and "theory of mind".
In order to further investigate Rogers and Perinington's theory, abilities other
than imitation were examined. The observational study indicated that autistic
subjects preferred to engage in manipulative and relational behaviours much more
than controls. Functional behaviour did not differ from controls and although autistic
children showed less pretend play than 3-4 year old children, there were no
differences relative to older controls. This, of course, may not be surprising
considering that normal children engage less and less in pretend play as they get
older. The ability is present but it may not be considered age appropriate. The
experimental study established a deficit in pretend play for autistic children relative
to non-autistic children, but it also demonstrated that pretend play could be elicited
and instructed from autistic subjects. It was noticeable that the autistic adults did not
differ much from the MLD children or in fact the older children. This ties in with
Rogers and Pennington's predictions that it would be the youngest autistic children
for whom the deficit in pretend play would be most noticeable. Whether older
children or adults do or do not develop the ability to produce pretend play when
asked, is irrelevant here. What is important is that they do not differ spontaneously
from older non-autistic children and adults - any deficit in pretend play is less
handicapping and less noticeable in older autistic children and adults as Rogers and
Pennington predicted.
The other abilities investigated involved understanding of mental states of
varying developmental difficulty. In previous studies, autistic children had been
found to be capable of visual perspective-taking while being impaired on joint
attention (Baron-Cohen et al., 1992; Leekam et al., 1993 and in press; Hobson, 1984;
and Tan and Harris, 1991). Chapter 8 (Experiment 1B) presented similar results for
the autistic subjects used in this study. There were no significant differences between
autistic and control groups on visual-perspective-taking, although the autistic
children did respond correctly slightly less often than control groups. Joint attention
was, however, slightly impaired in both autistic groups, relative to older controls,
although the difference was not significant. Unlike other studies, the 3-4 year old
children did not perform significantly better than autistic children. In fact, these two
groups demonstrated very similar levels of abilities in almost every category
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examined in this thesis. Spontaneous following of pointing was as impaired in the
autistic children as head/eye gaze direction, although the point did make visual-
perspective taking much easier for all groups. Finally, as in other experiments there
were a small number of autistic children and adults who passed one or two parts of
the task but who did not pass consistently. Rogers and Pennington predicted that it
would be the young autistic children who would show most impairment in joint
attention. This study however, found that autistic children and adults were relatively
equally impaired in spontaneous joint attention as observed in Chapter 2 and neither
groups showed significantly lower scores during the experimental scenario (Chapter
8), although the scores did tend to be lower.
Rogers and Pennington also predicted that both autistic children and adults
would show problems with affect. The study on emotion recognition reported in
Chapter 8 found that autistic subjects were indeed worse than controls at recognising
facial expressions of emotion, replicating previous work particularly by Hobson
(1986a and 1986b). There were no significant differences on perception of gestures
and contexts but as suggested in Chapter 7, this is probably because so few autistic
children actually proceeded to the gestures and context stages of the experiment, due
to the criterion used. This study also illustrated that some emotions were harder or
less mastered by autistic individuals. Happy and sad, probably the first two emotions
mastered by the developing infant, were more often correctly identified by autistic
children and adults than emotions such as frightened, surprised, angry and
disgusted. Baron-Cohen et al. (1993) proposed that emotions such as happy and sad
are "simple emotions" and emotions such as surprise require some mental state
understanding of the beliefs of other people. However, surprise was not the only
emotion to be less easily identified. In fact, autistic subjects found fear and anger,
just as hard to recognise as surprise. Baron-Cohen et al. (1993) would probably
argue that recognition of these emotions requires only a simple understanding of the
situation, but I have proposed in Chapter 8 that these other emotions also require an
understanding, in an everyday situation, of the mental attitudes of another person
(Hobson, 1993). This may not be equivalent to an understanding of higher mental
states such as belief or knowledge, but an understanding of what the other person
likes or dislikes or finds funny or annoying is necessary to appreciate why another
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person should be happy, sad, frightened, angry or disgusted. Thus all emotions, even
happy and sad, require an understanding of other people and the ability to relate to
other people in order to understand how they are feeling. I propose that most autistic
children are impaired in emotion perception but that this ability remains intact in a
few exceptions. However, on further investigation we may find that, like Theory of
Mind abilities, the ability to correctly identify emotions from facial expressions does
not necessarily mean that the child has better interpersonal relations or can engage in
empathy with others.
Finally, Rogers and Pennington predicted that older autistic children and
adults would be impaired on "theory of mind" abilities relative to controls. This
ability was tested using a false-belief paradigm. Autistic children in this study
conformed to expectations of false-belief capacity in that 20 % of the children tested
passed. This figure replicated the results of Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985)
and other follow-up studies. The figure is lower than that found by Prior et al (1990)
but a greater number of the autistic adults, who had a slightly higher verbal mental
age than the autistic children, passed - almost 50% passed the false-belief task. This
was still less than control children of the same mental age and lower than results on
higher-functioning individuals with autism (Bowler, 1992; Tager-Flusberg and
Sullivan, 1994).
From a naturalistic viewpoint, autistic subjects showed less sophisticated use
of mental state language, less joint attention and less sophisticated examples of
mental state understanding (Chapter 2) than seen in some of the non-autistic
controls. However, due to difficulties in the observational situation and to the
generally low frequency of such behaviours for all groups, few of these naturalistic
deficits could be said to be specific to autism except for the deficit in joint attention.
3) Relationships between imitation and other abilities studies - is there
evidence for Rogers and Pennington's model.
Chapter 8 showed that, at the crude level of group analysis, the profiles offered
by Rogers and Pennington (1991) seem to have found some support in this thesis.
However, in an in-depth analysis (using individual profiles) of the links between
imitation, play, joint attention, emotion recognition and sharing and theory of mind
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as proposed by Rogers and Pennington (1991) little evidence was found for any such
relationships. Chapter 6 pointed out that a normal-developmental pattern was in
evidence in autism and that there was some consistency across imitation tasks, in
that if autistic children showed spontaneous imitation during the observational study,
they tended to show imitation on the artificial fruit task. However, few links were
found between the various other abilities except visual perspective taking and
imitation. On an individual level no consistency across "theory of mind" tasks were
found as might have been expected from Baron-Cohen's (1994) theory. The same
inconsistency was found within tasks such as the joint attention tasks. This
inconsistency is a feature of autism. We cannot generalise that if autistic children
pass a developmentally more difficult task that they will necessarily pass an easier
task, even if the group results illustrated a normal developmental pattern and
therefore we cannot generalise from group results to individuals. It is important to
bear this in mind when developing interventions.
Summary of Implications for Rogers and Pennington's theory.
As was concluded in Chapter 8, this thesis does seem to provide at a crude
level some evidence for the Intersubjectivity Theory of Rogers and Pennington
(1991). As Rogers and Pennington predicted there was no general deficit in elicited
imitation by older autistic children and adults relative to controls. The younger
autistic children did, however, have problems with elicited imitation. Unfortunately,
due to problems of language differences and a lack of motivation in these children,
we cannot say for definite that these young autistic children could not imitate. Older
autistic children were impaired to some degree on specific types of actions such as
pantomimic/fully symbolic tasks, and some of them also had problems with
symbolic actions with objects, producing partial imitations such as using body parts
as objects or closed gestures. Two-handed actions also produced lower scores,
although the differences were rarely significant, except for the young autistic
children. This was expected in that autistic children have problems with symbolic
play but also in that these types of imitation are some of the latest manifestations
seen in normal development (Piaget, 1962). These actions may also need a more
advanced mental rotation or information processing capacity, which may develop
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with age but takes longer than imitation of simple, one-handed actions and actions
with objects. Further for Rogers and Pennington's Theory came from the fact that
autistic development followed the same pattern as normal development for imitation
and play, despite the inconsistency seen at the individual level.
It was stated in Chapter 1 that Rogers and Pennington's theory is very difficult
to test and despite the evidence seen in this thesis, I still maintain that this is the
case. This thesis was a mixture of observational and experimental data and also a
mixture of spontaneous and elicited situations. But then Rogers and Pennington
(1991) drew their evidence for their model from a mixture of spontaneous and
elicited studies. While they referred mainly to elicited imitation, they referred to
joint attention, pretend play, emotion sharing and theory of mind at a spontaneous
level. As we saw there was quite some distinction between spontaneous and elicited
imitation (Chapter 6) and also that just because a person passes a false-belief task
does not mean they use a theory of mind in their everyday life (Chapter 1, 2 and 8).
This leads me to conclude that the only way that could possibly put Rogers
and Pennington's theory to the test is to do an observational study of a longitudinal
nature from birth. As any one researching this area will know this is an extremely
difficult thing to achieve, ideal as it may be. The main problem is the delay in
diagnosing autism coupled with the fact that less than 4 in every 10,000 children are
diagnosed autistic.
Rogers and Pennington's theory is difficult to really test for another reason -
how can one really test whether the underlying deficit is an impairment in the
formation and coordination of specific self/other representations (Rogers and
Pennington, 1991) or an impairment in primary intersubjectivity and the ability to
interact affectively with others (Hobson, 1993)? Both theories would predict very
similar deficits at the primary behavioural level. Even a longitudinal study would
find it difficult to differentiate between underlying deficits. What can be said is that
there is some evidence for impairments in intersubjective relations being at the
bottom of the deficits seen in autism but that these impairments manifest themselves
in different ways at different stages of development, perhaps along the lines
suggested by Rogers and Pennington (1991).
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Finally, in Chapter 1 I mentioned having reservations about Rogers and
Pennington's theory because they did not define imitation or mention the different
types/manifestations of imitation. We have seen that there is a need to take into
account different types and manifestations of imitation such as those proposed by
Piaget (1962). Not only do they illustrate particular problems faced by even older
autistic children but they also make clear the developmental pattern of imitation,
which is very similar in autism as in normal development. In order to have a true
understanding of imitation and the role it plays in autism it was essential to
investigate imitation comprehensively (Smith and Bryson, 1994) by looking at the
different types of imitation or the imitation of different types of actions
(symbolic/non-symbolic; objects/body movements; one-handed/two-handed) to
identify were specifically problems lay.
Yet at the same time as bearing in mind the different manifestations of
imitation, it is necessary to have a unitary definition by which to judge the
inclination to imitate and the accuracy of the imitation. Of course, at different stages
in development imitation is combined with other abilities to varying degrees. I think
mainly here of the ability to process the visual information one receives, to hold a
representation in the memory and to reproduce this representation when required. In
a spontaneous situation one cannot distinguish one ability from the other - they all
combine to produce imitation. Therefore, I maintain that the definition chosen for
this thesis, combined with the effective scoring system employed, is a useful one for
judging whether a child imitates or not, across many different manifestations of the
ability to imitate., and the accuracy with which they imitate. This allows the
development of imitation to be followed through childhood into adulthood.
Despite the difficulties of testing a model such as that proposed by Rogers and
Pennington (1991), I would venture to conclude that their model has some merit in
emphasising the developmental nature of autism. However, another study using the
younger age group, is essential to establish with conviction whether imitation is at a
mental age-appropriate level, or more impaired in the younger autistic child. If the
latter is the case then the intersubjectivity theories, particularly those of Rogers and
Pennington (1991) and Hobson (1993), may well have some bearing on
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understanding the development of autism. As recent studies have shown (Klin et al.,
1992; Resta11 & Magill-Evans, 1993), autistic childfen do have problems with early
social abilities - impairments that emerge long before impairments in joint attention
and symbolic play become predictors of autism at 18 months (Baron-Cohen et al.
1992).
One final criticism that I made of Rogers and Pennington's model of autism
stands for all the existing theories - they only deal with several aspects of the
disorder. Recently researchers such as Hobson (1993) and Frith (1992) have made
explicit how complicated autism really is. Following on from this, I would speculate
that autism is much too complicated for one primary "cognitive" deficit to explain.
Although Hobson (1993) offers us a more developmental account of how a problem
with interpersonal relatedness contributes to later deficits in autism such as pretend
play and understanding mental states, he still proposes one primary deficit as an
explanation of all social impairments, as in the Triad of Impairments (Wing and
Gould, 1979). The format will be very similar to that used by Rogers and
Pennington (1991) and will represent very closely Hobon's (1993) theory. In doing
this I will also draw on proposals by Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) and Frith (1992).
The theoretical speculations below are intended as just that - speculation in the hope
that they will give rise to more research into autism. They are based on, and in fact
are a summary of the results of this thesis, combined with my understanding of the
theories of other researchers, and are assisted by the intuition that comes from
working with the same autistic children (and their teachers and carers) on a one-to-
one basis over a period of three years. This, I am sure, clinical psychologists,
teachers and researchers can appreciate from their own experience.
My speculations (illustrated in Figure 9.1) very much follow the same lines as
those put forward by Rogers and Pennington (1991) that inspired this thesis in the
first place, namely that autism is a developmental disorder and must be treated as
such in any explanatory hypothesis of this disorder. Perhaps the most important
finding of this thesis has been to demonstrate just how much people with autism do
develop, even without using a longitudinal study. I propose that there are several
primary deficits, which, as in Rogers and Pennington's theory, exist along a
developmental continuum and interact to produce the triad of impairments and the
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behavioural impairments by which we recognise autism. However, by incorporating
several other theories, I hope to explain some of the deficits which are not part of the
Triad of Impairments. Rogers and Pennington proposed that older autistic
individuals would show problems with executive function tasks alongside the
deficits proposed by their model. Like Frith (1992) I suggest that multiple mediating
factors must be considered in order to explain how autism develops and how some
children show certain abilities while most autistic children do not.
In summary, I propose that problems with intersubjectivity (as described by
Hobson (1993) of which a problem with specific self-other transformation (Rogers
and Pennington; 1991) is but one aspect) are most important in infancy. Later, after
18 months, a deficit in mentalising (operating a Theory of Mind or mindreading)
may become more important, possibly even the primary deficit. This may be a result
of a problem in intersubjective relations as Hobson would propose or it could be that
this ability develops independently (as Frith and Leslie would propose). In addition
to these problems, a problem with executive function (Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994;
Ozonoff, Pennington and Rogers, 1991; Ozonoff et al. 1994) which develops
independently of the other deficits proposed may be important in affecting non-
social deficits in autism, such as perseveration, stereotypic, obsessive behaviour and
an inability to pay attention to more than one thing at a time. These three deficits,
found on the primary deficit level of Figure 9.1, combine to produce the three main
diagnostic criteria - impairments in social interaction, impairments in
communication, both verbal and non-verbal, and a restricted repertoire of activities
and interests. Which of the final behavioural deficits within each diagnostic category
emerge depends on at what stage in the biological development the problems began
(Aiken, 1991). This in turn affects the point along the developmental continuum of
each of the primary deficits impairments first are noticed, which in turn dictates
which of the behaviours on the final level are impaired and which remain intact. This
later level of the model is also affected by the amount of mental retardation that
accompanies autism and the development of certain abilities and deficits may
depend on the age, IQ, experience and education of each child.
On this later level of deficits, impairments may interact to cause other
impairments. So, for example, with impoverished social interaction skills, pretend
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play may be affected (Hobson, 1993). Pretend play may also be affected by a lack of
deferred and symbolic imitation (Piaget, 1962). These possible connections are
represented in Figure 11.1 by dotted lines. The links between primary
intersubjectivity, symbolic capacity, secondary intersubjectivity and Theory of Mind
abilities are those links proposed by Hobson (1993). If early imitation is impaired
this would have important consequences for the learning of language and pronoun
proficiency in particular (Tomasello et al., 1993; see Chapter 1). There could also be
a feedback loop from early imitation through to social interaction back to primary
intersubjectivity, in the establishment of which mother-infant imitation may play an
important role (Trevarthen, 1979; Meltzoff and Gopnik, 1993).
It should also be pointed out that by including joint attention, emotion
perception and pretend play on the lowest level, I am not suggesting that they do not
play an important role in the development of Theory of Mind. In fact, Hobson
included these abilities at various stages in the development of secondary
intersubjectivity, so that they thus affect the development of Theory of Mind as
Leslie (1987) and Baron-Cohen (1994) suggest. I have included these behaviours
explicitly on the tertiary level because they can and have been tested directly; as
such they can be regarded as behavioural deficits. Another way of looking at this
issue would be to provide further feedback loops from the tertiary deficits to the
primary deficits. So that although not having the ability to share the visual attention
of another person may arise through problems with primary intersubjectivity
(Hobson, 1993), these problems in joint attention may affect the development of
later primary deficits.
Below I have attempted to summarise these speculations, using a scheme
based on those of Frith (1992) and Rogers and Pennington (1991). One must
remember that this is simply a summary of the findings of this thesis, previous
theories and how I propose they could be integrated to better explain autism. The
model presented below, like the theory of Hobson, still needs a very important
source of evidence to be researched - a longitudinal study of a large population
studied right from birth with tests of imitation, social interaction and adaptation, eye
gaze monitoring, mutual eye gaze, joint attention behaviours and play behaviours,
given at intervals in development until autism is established. If evidence can be
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found of abnormal social development right from birth, then the importance of an
intersubjectivity account of autism in the early most,formative years, would be very
difficult to argue against. Until such times as such a longitudinal study is conducted,
the deficits first at work in autism can remain only speculative.
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Implications for future research and intervention.
Future research:
I have already mentioned the need for an extensive longitudinal study, of the
type first done by Wing et al in the 1970s and followed up by Shah in the 1980s.
However, instead of taking children with learning disabilities and establishing
which behaviours occur together in autism, it is essential to take a large sample of
children and follow them from birth and at much more frequent intervals than every
10 years. Since the prevalence of autism in the general population is so low, this
would mean exceedingly large sample sizes. However, one could adopt the strategy
used by Baron-Cohen et al. (1992) and target the expected siblings of autistic
children or families were autism is present in the family history. Following such
children would, as already suggested, provide evidence for or against early problems
in social domains. However, although the first five years will probably be the most
influential, a continuation of this longitudinal study would be essential to a full
understanding of the development of this disorder and the degrees of environmental
influence on which behaviours the children can learn or develop later, even if absent
in early childhood.
Aside from the idea of the longitudinal study, there are many other possible
experiments that lead from this thesis, either to complement and supplement the
present findings or to clarify those findings that through methodological problems or
inherent difficulties in subject recruitment were not as clear as one might have
hoped.
In the present study, there were problems with recruitment of subjects with
learning disabilities who did not have autism and this affected the ability to work
with groups matched on mental age or IQ. It was regrettable that due to unforeseen
circumstances, the autistic children in this study were not tested for non-verbal
mental age. There was also a problem inherent in working with children from a
different culture and language (French), even as a secondary project, as
straightforward comparisons could not be made. Some of the very young autistic
group were too young to motivate for most of the tasks. This, of course, was a
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methodological problem that most researchers face when trying to conduct
experiments with children of this mental age. 	 a.
A methodological problem which occurred again and again in this work, from
the observational study through to the elicited imitation study, concerned
interpretation of pretend/symbolic activity, especially in the autistic groups, where
language does not aid interpretation. This problem was discussed in Chapters 2 and
3. An experiment to clarify whether autistic children are really capable of symbolic
imitation would involve testing children's abilities to imitate a model's actions using
a substitute object, instead of the real object.
To investigate the extent of a mental rotation deficit, a series of actions with
which autistic children have shown difficulty in this study, such as grasping the
thumb and t-signs, could be presented to several subgroups of autistic children and
adults, varying the numbers of presentations and the length of presentations, with a
baseline measure of one presentation of approximately 2 seconds as in this study.
This would help to identify which factor - more time to study and attempt a
reproduction or more repetitions of the action - would help the autistic individual
most to make that mental rotation as quickly as possible, which in itself could be
essential in developing the use of imitation in education.
Educational and home interventions:
This leads on to a strand of study that has been proposed and tested with
limited samples on a short term basis - the use of imitation as an intervention
strategy. As was shown in studies by Dawson & Adams (1984) and Dawson &
Galpert (1990) (see Chapter 1), imitation of the child by an adult can help to increase
mutual eye gaze and social interaction with the imitator. Tryon and Keane (1986)
showed that being allowed to watch the play of other children, and being allowed to
imitate that play, increased appropriate play and social behaviours and decreased
inappropriate, stereotypic behaviours. Although the effect of imitation sessions on
the social interaction of autistic children was not systematically assessed in the
present study, it was noted in Chapter 3 that most of the autistic children in this
study engaged willingly in this session and seemed to enjoy it. The experimenter felt
that this session provided the best opportunity for normal social interaction with
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these children. Nadel (in press) has suggested that the most effective strategy for
using imitation as an intervention for autism woulcLbe to alternate imitation of the
children with elicited imitation by the child. She has piloted this work with a few
autistic children and did indeed find that social interaction improved in quality as
well as quantity (Nadel & Peze, 1992). An intervention of this type introduced at a
very early stage in development, i.e. as soon as social interaction was found to be
abnormal, could be very important. Meltzoff & Gopnik (1993) suggested that early
imitation plays an important role in the development of Theory of Mind. So such an
intervention might also help, either directly or indirectly via improved
intersubjective relatedness, later developing abilities such as an understanding of
mental states. It should be easy to train parents in the methods and could be used
effectively as an informal as well as a formal intervention. However, more research
is needed to work out the details of such an intervention, before it can be offered to
parents as a way of improving the prognosis for their child.
The present study, like previous studies such as Lewis and Boucher (1988),
demonstrated that autistic children can produce more pretend play and, sometimes,
more functional play in an elicited or structured environment than they do
spontaneously. It also showed that the frequency of manipulative behaviours
decreases in an elicited or structured environment. Other researchers have offered an
assessment of play and imitation as a useful diagnosis tool (Stone et al. 1990), while
Resta11 and Magill-Evans (1993) not only proposed that play is a useful tool to
evaluate the interpersonal skills of preschool autistic children, but also that play can
be used to develop these skills. Atlas (1990) proposed that play can be a useful tool
in both the diagnosis of and intervention in disorders such as autism. It may be that a
combination of play and imitation, or imitation in a playful setting, might constitute
a very effective intervention programme that could be used both at home and in
educationally based therapy sessions, usually on a one-to-one basis.
In addition to the suggestions above, there are many other areas which need to
be addressed, with regard to autism. In the course of writing this thesis I found
myself asking several questions. What affects how autistic children develop? How
big a role does the type of school attended have? Can we establish that one type of
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schooling i.e. autistic special school, is better for an autistic child showing certain
characteristics than a second type of school, say, the mixed environment of a special
education class? Are there cultural differences in autism and how is it treated in
different cultures? There has not been much research on cultural differences,
although a study comparing English and French autistic adults and adolescents
showed few differences between the two on cognitive, social and theory of mind
behaviours (Fombonne et al., 1994). Studies on autism in Japan have shown that
performance on certain tasks, for example, false-belief tasks, for example, seem to
be similar (Naito, Komatsu and Fuke (1994). Further cross-cultural studies would
help to develop interventions, as well as our understanding of environmental effects
on autistic development.
Finally, I have to ask one question that may be the true key to developing an
affective intervention for autism - what is it that allows some children to develop the
ability, for example, to pass false-belief tasks and tasks of emotion perception, yet
doesn't allow these abilities to be used spontaneously? Would autistic children be
more inclined to spontaneously use the abilities that may be present, if they were
"trained" at an early stage to follow a point and eye gaze, to show toys, to point to
objects, using a much more rigorous, deliberate training than normal children
receive, along with interventions to improve their social interaction skills? These
wide-ranging questions I leave to future research.
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Appendix 2.1:
Category Definitions:
Play/spontaneous activity: 
This general category included any of the behaviours in the following
subcategories. The general defining characteristic is that the actions, with objects or
without, with other people or solitary, were spontaneous. Because a group of adults
and older children were observed at school, this category did not have to be play in the
accepted sense of the word (i.e. involving diversion or recreation e.g. games of
mastery, games with rules, and games of make-believe and fantasy, to use Piaget's
classification (Penguin Dictionary of Psychology) - this was the case for the youngest
children of course), but could also be used of any spontaneous activity (see Functional
play, for an example).
G - General/Gross motor play/activity.
Any play/activity which consists of movement and does not fall into any specific
category. This could be, for example, running around, jumping or skipping. In gym
class movement was recorded here but was marked with "ns" when done in response
to the teachers instructions, to show that it was not spontaneous. Only spontaneously
movement of this sort was included in the results.
M - Manipulative play/activity:
Holding, turning, examining or "fiddling" with a toy, object or body part, e.g. pencil or
hair.
R - Relational play/activity:
Combining two objects/toys in some way that is not functional. This category can
include combining an object and a body part, e.g. tapping pencil on ear or chin, tapping
a building block on the table, or hitting together two pieces of a puzzle.
F - Functional play/activity:
Using a toy or object in a manner consistent with the conventional function. This can
include puzzles, painting, using a hammer to hammer in nails, beating a musical
instrument, building with blocks or Lego. Also included in this category, and especially
important when observing the older autistic subjects, is any activity which is
appropriate, for example, getting on with work without having to be prompted,
reminded, or helped by the teachers or other members of the class. Other schoolwork
was noted but with an "ns" - not spontaneous.
Symbolic play:
Originally two categories of symbolic play were used (although for the final results
these were collapsed back into one category of symbolic activity).
S - Fully Symbolic play/activity:
Any incident in which an object is used as something else (substitution play) or the
child acts as if an absent object was there. This can be for example, using a banana as a
telephone, making dolls talk (i.e. animating inanimate objects). Also included was
making noises and acting like something else, for example acting like a dog and
shooting others using fingers as a gun, or falling down dead when shot. Thus following
Leslie (1985) pretend play occurs when there is evidence that:
1) The subject is using an object as Wit were another object - deviant reference; or
2) The subject is attributing properties to an object which it doesn't have - deviant
truth; or
3) The subject is referring to absent objects as if they were present - deviant existence.
I - Intermediate play:
This category included incidences of play which fell between functional and fully
symbolic: any imaginative play where objects were used in the conventional manner
but elaborated by language and other behaviour, usually social contact. Examples of
behaviour placed in this category may include: playing Mummies and Daddies, shop,
cops and robbers etc. Also included were examples such as making tea and giving it to
another person using appropriate objects or talking on the telephone.
[Note: This category was adhered to for the school time observations but in the
analysis it was included in Symbolic play. This may- cause problems for some
researchers in this area, for whom this would still be functional play. However,
formally such acts meet the criteria for symbolic play, above: they are just conventional
and therefore raise unavoidable ambiguities about the extent to which the child
recognises its activity as pretence. It was felt that this was still a type of pretend play.
i.e. when talking on the phone, the child is pretending that someone is speaking. When
playing mummies and daddies, the children are pretending to be something they are
not. To make and give a cup of tea, the child often pretends that the empty cup has
something in it. The identification of this category was often helped by the language
used by the children. This in itself proved troublesome in the autistic groups since few
of the children possessed this sophisticated language. This is also true of fully symbolic
play. Given the low frequency of both I and S, the two were combined. ].
Social Interaction: - Interaction with others, initiated by subject. May be verbal
or touching; can be affectionate, aggressive, fighting, asking for help, asking a
question, or simply sharing a piece of information.
Adt - with adult.
Peer - with child.
Evidence of a Theory of Mind (ToM) Abiltiy: 
This Category was defined as any behaviour falling into any one of the following
categories, and implying a possible understanding of the mental states of others and
acting accordingly. Some of the following categories are viewed as precursors to a full
Theory of Mind as is in evidence in success on false-belief tasks.
MSL - Mental State Language:
Use of words either referring to self or to others such as "think", "know", "believe",
"feel", "want", "like", "happy", "sad".
JA - Joint Attention:	 10,
1) where the subject follows the point, gaze etc. of another person.
2) Subject uses gaze, pointing or words to draw someone else's attention to something
but not for the purpose of requesting the object. This included actions such as
showing.
E - Empathy:
The understanding of the emotions of another person. Can be seen most clearly in
comforting someone else, getting upset because someone else is upset or acting happy
because someone else is happy.
UMS - Use of mental state understanding:
Other actions indicating some understanding of the intentions or other mental states of
another person. Examples include, helping someone (for example, by supplying the
knowledge needed to answer a question), lying, making a joke, laughing at a joke,
being deceptive, teasing etc.
Imitation: 
Within the realm of child development, few researchers offer a definition of
imitation. It is in the animal literature where we find imitation defined but in a rather
narrow and restrictive way (See Whiten and Ham, 1991; Tomasello et al., 1994). In
order to understand spontaneous imitation in children, especially autistic children, it is
necessary to have a broader definition to work with. If imitation involves the ability to
mindread, as suggested in Whiten & Ham, 1991, then a narrow definition is needed to
rule out mimicry and other foims of social learning other than imitation. However, if
imitation does not necessarily involve mindreading but simply the ability to make and
transform self-other distinctions (Roger and Pennington, 1991), then a broader
definition suffices. In previous research in the human development area, for example
Meltzoff and Moore, 1989, the reproduction of actions was not perfect to begin with
but improved with practice and the authors concluded that imitation had taken place.
In work by Nadel (See Nadel and Camioni, 1993 for review), toddlers were scored as
imitating their play-mate if they picked up and held the same toy; this usually included
using the toy in the same way as the other child. For this study, being partly
observational in nature, it was decided to take a broader definition 7 one that could
conceivably include mimicry, which does not involve any understanding of mental
states but, at the same time, narrow enough to rule out other phenomena such as
stimulus enhancement. Therefore the definition of imitation which was adopted for this
study was as follows: Imitation occurs when the child reproduces to a some extent the
actions or vocalisations of another child or adult. This reproduction does not have to
be perfect but it should be clear that the child has not performed the action by
him/herself, without reference to another person. This was established by noting that
the child looked at the other child before or while performing the action. In addition
the action should contain at least some of the elements seen in the model's actions, to
rule out simple stimulus enhancement and here again the child should make some sort
of reference to the model, usually eye gaze. To give one example of making this
distinction - if a child approaches an object having watched another child play with it
and then picks up the object and sits down quietly on his own, with no further
reference to the model, and produces actions on the object that are not similar to the
model's use of the object (except where the object dictates a certain use, for example,
a hammer, nail and board invites the child to hammer the nail in), this would be
stimulus enhancement, not imitation.
VI - vocal imitation of both speech sounds (Words, sentences etc.) and non-speech
sounds (e.g. laugh, yawn, hiccough, cough, sigh). Includes echolalia.
w/e - vocal imitation without echolalia, which is defined as "the compulsive and
apparently senseless repetition of a word or phrase just spoken by another person".
(Penguin dictionary of Psychology). Echolalia is discarded from the evidence of
imitation since it is a product of the disorder of autism and not a sign of normality.
BIG - Body or gestural imitation:
Imitation of body actions or gestures, including facial expressions.
AONS- non-symbolic actions with objects:
Imitation of actions with objects without pretence, including manipulative, relational or
functional as described above. e.g. hits drum with stick, jumps over block.
AOS - imitation of symbolic actions with object:
As for symbolic play, but three categories of symbolic activity were noted here: 1) all
objects present but still some pretence involved.(as in intermediate play), e.g. stirs
spoon in an empty cup and then says "here is your tea". 2) One or more objects present
but pretending another object is also present - e.g. stirs imaginary spoon in a real cup.
3) All objects imagined.
Appendix 2.2
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Questionnaire given to the parents and care staff of the autistic children.
QUESTIONNAIRE (Completed by *Parent/*Care Staft * please delete where appropriate
Date:
Name of Child:
Age:
Parents only answer questions A - C
A. Has your child been diagnosed with autism?
Year of Diagnosis?
B. Where was your child before coming to Strum House?
C. When were you first concrened about your child's
development? (age of child)
Yes/No
*************************Yre******,,,c*
Ouestion 1 (N= never, S= sometimes, 0= often)
0
Does this child interact with other children? 1 	 1 1
Does this child interact with other adults? 1	 1 	 1
Does he/she ever initiate this contact?
	 1.
What is the nature of this contact?
Is it:	 affectionate? (eg hugging) 1 	 1 1
fighting? 1	 1 I.
Rough and tumble play? 1 	 1 1
Any other (please specify)
Ouestion 2 
Does this child have any obsessional behaviours? 	 Yes/No*
can you desribe these? (they may he past or present but please specify)
Is there anything in the environment to which he/she reacts strangely?
(eg specific noises)
	
Yes/No*
Please give details
N	 S	 0
Does this child throw temper tantrums?
	
I 	 1	 1
Can you give an example of why this occurs? (or when)
Question 3 
How would you describe this child's language ability?	 N	 S	 0
Is it:	 articulate?	 1 	 1	 I
meaningful?	 1 	 1	 I
repetitive?	 1 	 1	
 I
imitative?	 1 	 I	 1
:absent vocally but can communicate in other ways. 	 Yes/No*
(please give details)
N	 S	 0
Does he/she have a problem with comprehension? 	 1	 1	  I
interpretation?
	 1	 1	  I
Please give an examplg of both these problems
N	 S	 0
Does he/she ever tell stories?
	
1 	 1	  I
What sort of stories? Can you please give a recent example?
OM'
..
N	 S	 0
Does this child ever reverse pronouns? 	 1 	 1	 1
(eg uses 'you' when he/she means 'I' or 'me')
Any other details about this child's language ability?
Ouestion 4
To your knowledge does this child ever have hallucinations?
If yes, what sort?
Yes/No*
Question 5 
Have you ever seen this child imitating/copying the actions or behaviour of
another person?
	
Yes/No*
Was this: vocal imitation?
imitation of body movements or gestures?
imitation of facial expression?
imitation of an action with an object?
(tick where appropriate)
Can you give me some recent examples - perhaps from the past week/weekend?
Question 6 
Have you ever seen this child teases someone else*?
Example:
Yes/No
How does this child react to being teased?
Question 7
Have you ever seen this child be deceptive in any way?
(eg to get what they want)
Example:
Yes/No
Examples:
Do they ever: tell lies	 Yes/No
play tricks	 Yes/No
make jokes	 Yes/No
laugh at a joke	 Yes/No
comfort someone
	 Yes/No
get upset because
someone else is upset Yes/No
(if necessary, continue on a separate sheet of paper overleaf).
1s,
Question 8
N S	 0
Does this child ever request an object by pointing to it? 1 	 1 1
Does he/she point to an object just to draw your
attention to it? I 	 1 	 1
Does he/she look at an object when you point to it? 1	 1 1
Ouestion 9 
Does this child ever use words or language that shows any understanding of what
goes on in their own or someone else's head? For example does this child use any
of the following words? (please tick appropriate boxes and give an example, if
possible)
Examples
Like/Love
Want
See
Need
Feel
Happy
Sad
True
Lie
Know
Remember
Think
Mean! meant
Believe
Question 10
What opportunity does this child get to Way_ either on his/her own or with others?
What sort of toys/games are available to him/her?
ale
Which of the above does this child play with most often?
Does he/she play in any of the following way?
N	 S	 0
A: manipulating one object/toy. 	 1 	 1	 I
is this very repetitive or stereotyped?
	
1 	 1	  1
8: using two objects together, but not appropriately. eg
 lining up
toys in a repetitive, routine or unmeaningful manner, or banging toys/
objects together	 1 	 I	 1
C: using objects as they are supposed to be used. 	 1	 1	 I
eg using a toy telephone as a telephone, pouring
a cup of tea from a teapot or using building blocks to build
appropriate things.
Can you give an example of this type of play?
D: pretend play,
eg 1,	 'mummies and daddies'
N
1	
S	 0
1 	 I
'shop' 1 	 1 I
'doctors and nurses' I 	 1 I
'dressing up' 1	 1 I
'fighting games', eg 'cowboys and indians' I 	 1 	 1
eg 2,	 using an objecf as something else 1 	 1 1
- a banana as a telephone
Please give exapmles if possible
Has this child ever been 'taught' play behaviours?
	 Yes/No
Please give details	 ..-
THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP
Appendix 2.3:
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Examples of each subcategory of behaviour as observed in three of the subject groups
- the 5-6 year old children, the autistic children and the children with learning
difficulties.
Behaviour autistic children 5-6 year olds MILD children
General
motor play
1)skipping from one
end of the room to the
other, across diagonals,
repeating the same
pattern of movement.
2)rocking in the chair
or on the floor.
All	 examples	 are
usually	 obsessive
and/or repetitive.
Usually incorporated
into other types of play,
especially symbolic
play-acting as horses,
pretending to fly etc.
See below for a full
example. Also could be
seen in brief bursts as
fidgeting in the line
while waiting to see the
teacher.
Usually in play but also
fidgeting and pacing
around the room. When
the later, the behaviour
doesn't last for very long
- less than the autistic
children and slightly
more than the normal 5-6
year old children.
Manipulative
play
Mostly just
manipulating objects or
body parts - e.g. hair.
Usually very obsessive
and without any
exploratory function.
Often repetitive and
lasts for a relatively
long time (usually more
that one minute. e.g.
fiddling with thread,
not looking at it.
Manipulating	 objects
such as pencil, while
working - child often
seems to be either
thinking about work or
distracted. Never lasts
very long.
Manipulating sticks,
pencils etc. Shaking,
biting etc., usually when
working	 and	 again
doesn't last very long.
Relational
play
E.g. Putting blocks in
neat rows, banging
pencils	 and	 other
objects	 on	 table.
Mostly very
obsessional. Can last
quite a long time if
teacher doesn't stop it.
Can also be tapping
pencil on hand or
cheek, usually while
working and often
when thinking about an
answer.
Tapping animals together
while playing - not using
objects functionally. Can
last quite a long time but
usually playful and not
obsessional.
Functional Drawing with chalk on Building	 castles	 from Mostly	 involved	 doing
play a blackboard.	 Usually
involves
	 continuing
bricks,	 doing	 puzzles,
playing	 gamer,	 using
school work, colouring,
writing. Usually set by
work which they have toys	 as	 they	 were teachers at beginning of
been given at start of designed to be used. - class	 but	 the	 children
class,	 often	 matching cars,	 dolls,	 etc.	 Also carried on without any
work or jigsaws. included
	
continuing
work on their own.
prompting.	 Some	 toy
play
	 was	 also	 in
evidence.
Symbolic
play
Very	 few	 examples,
usually	 involved	 toys
such as dolls so coding
was ambiguous due to
a lack of language. An
example is quoted in
depth below.
See	 anecdotes	 below
for an example. Usually
involved	 substitution
pretence and also role-
taking games, such as
shop, or house.
Role-playing games with
self taking	 both	 parts.
Some	 language
elaborated the pretence.
Pretending	 to	 smoke
pencil as cigarette.
Social
Interaction
with adults.
Mostly verbal, to ask a
question,	 to	 get	 help
with	 work	 etc.
Sometime	 information
was shared just for the
sake	 of	 sharing
information,	 but	 this
was usually seen in the
most	 able	 children.
Sometimes	 wanted	 a
cuddle, one boy was
rather	 obsessed	 by
having contact with the
adults around him. A
few of the most able
children
	 would	 also
engage in limited eye
contact and smile or at
least return the smile of
the teacher or observer.
Mostly asking for help
with	 work	 but	 also
sharing	 information
with the teacher, in a
very appropriate way.
Sometimes affectionate,
sometimes teasing. Eye
contact	 and	 affect
sharing with observer
was common.
Asking	 questions,
sometimes	 sharing
information.	 Often eye
contact	 and	 affect
sharing was observed.
Social
interaction
with Peers.
Very little	 observed -
mostly	 verbal contact,
e.g. requesting them to
not shake the table, or
to do something. A few
examples	 of	 physical
contact, usually passive,
were observed. Rarely
aggressive	 or
retaliatory.
Very much verbal - but
discussing all sorts of
topics.	 Usually	 while
playing.	 Sometimes
contact	 was	 physical,
for example in some
games	 such	 as	 tig.
Sometimes	 aggressive
but usually friendly.
Mostly verbal and very
often	 while	 playing.
Sometimes	 aggressive,
especially	 in	 the
younger	 children.	 But
most of the fighting was
play-fighting.
Mental state
language.
Usually, very idiomatic
use of words and only
ever heard to be self-
referencing. "I think
so", "I don't know", "I
thought she was good
yesterday". Words used:
think, know, love, like,
want.
Words used: need,
think, want, like, hate,
know, re-member.
Usually used in a self-
referencing manner -
other referencing may
need to be elicited but a
few	 spontaneous
examples were
observed. One example
- "he (Teddy) thinks
he's under arrest, 'cos
he's got his hands up." 
Words used: know, like,
scared, want, hate,
think, need. As for
other groups, mostly
idiomatic phrases but
again a few examples of
other referencing was
observed. - "Mum and
dad thought he had
dome something bad."
Joint
attention.
Showing work to
teacher or observer.
Some following of a
point,	 usually
accompanied	 with
"look!". A few
examples of pointing,
usually when naming
something. Sometimes
watches what another
child is doing after
looking at the child's
face, although this is
sometimes ambiguous.
Not very frequent. 
Showing, pointing,
following a point were
all used to different
degrees. The children
constantly monitored
what each other were
looking at and often
they followed the gaze
of the observer to other
children. Working
together was very
common, so that both
children were attending
to the same object,
page etc.
Pointing to attract
attention to something.
Pointing at pictures
while a story is read,
working together on
map work and
discussing their work.
Following pointing and
gaze with no clues was
also observed, as was
showing work and
objects to other children
and adults.
Empathy None observed None observedDuring pretend play,
one child reacts
empathetically to the
story of another child -
being happy for each
other when the phone
call brings good news
etc. Also when one
child is hurt or crying,
an other child usually
tries to comfort or at
least get the teachers
attention
Use of mental
state
understandin
g.
Helping each other, one
boy only, by giving the
answer to a question or
telling them how to do
the task. Apologising
for things that should
not be done was
common in one boy, but
it often became very
annoying since he said
sorry so often, even
when told it was all
right. Laughs at jokes,
but usually only the
unsubtle, slapstick kind.
Mostly very ambiguous
examples which could
very easily be explained
by a Theory of
Behaviour rather than a
Theory of mind. Several
examples are quoted in
detail in Appendix 2.4 
Use of sarcasm,
teasing, making jokes
and laughinj at even
subtle jokes. Cheating
in games, in order to
win	 was	 quite
common, when the
teacher	 wasn't
watching.	 Lying,
deception etc. were all
observed. A few
examples are quoted in
Appendix 2.4 below.
Understanding lying and
deception in stories,
enjoying teasing, teasing
others, laughing at jokes
appropriately,
hiding/deception. For
example, one boy, who
was not suppose to use
an eraser in class, would
use it while hiding the
fact from the teacher,
first checking to see if
the	 teacher	 was
watching him.
Vocal
imitation
Few	 examples
recorded.
Mostly	 echolalia,
although sometimes
observed in the learning
situation, for example
where one boy repeats
what the teacher says to
get the pronunciation
right. Other words are
often copied but not in
an echolalic fashion.
One boy also mimicked
the teachers words and
tone of voice and also
imitated commentators,
presenters,
advertisements etc. form
the T.V.
Not observed very
frequently. Some
repetition of what
playmate has said to
another	 child,	 for
emphasis.
Body/gestural
imitation
Gym class at school as
well as music class was
most conducive to
imitation but most of
this was elicited by the
teachers. In the second
study, there was one
example of an imitative
sequence between two
boys. which is described
below.
Mostly observed in
gym class, copying
teacher before told to
do it and copying the
actions	 of	 other
children both
functionally and as a
means to misbehaving
in class. One boy, that
with the youngest MA,
copied a lot in gym
class. No imitation was
seen in the playtime
study.
Seen in classes such as
music, gym and drama,
some of which was
elicited and some was
spontaneous. One
example, is when the
teacher would say
"show me how you
wake up" and the
children would proceed
to copy the teacher,
although this was not
the purpose of the
exercise.
Non-symbolic
object
imitation
None observed.Few examples.
Sometimes in music
class some of the
children would imitate
the teachers
demonstrations before
told to do so. This
however, may be just a
problem with turn-
taking more than an
example of imitation.
Some of the children
would copy each
others use of toys
during play. One
example is quoted in
Appendix 2.4 - the
sequence of play
between the two girls.
Another example is
how one boy would
copy the way others
were taking their turn
in a board game.
Symbolic
object
imitation
none observed None observed.Not seen very often but
one or two examples
can be found in play
sequence described in
Appendix 2.4.
Appendix 2.4
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Case Records:
The following specific records come from the observational study or were passed
on by the teachers and parents in the questionnaires. These examples are selected to
illustrate particularly the most advanced cases considered for categories of specific
interest, notably pretence, imitation, and ToM. As already noted, these can be
especially difficult to interpret.
1) For autistic children:
1) Child I (CA 15,7; MA 6,8.) was asked (in Gym class) to run as if catching a
taxi - he did so by running and waving arms appropriately and with an appropriate
expression on his face. This is taken as an example of role playing and therefore
pretence. All the other children just ran around the room. In the same class, this boy
was told to get on all fours and lower head, like "a cat at cream" by the teacher. He did
this but elaborated it by using his tongue as if licking the cream out of the bowl.
2) Child A-M (CA.15,4; MA.8,3) : quite often laughed at jokes but only very
obvious, or slapstick-type humour. For example, the Teacher said "Child Al sounds as
if she is about to lay an egg" and A-M laughed.
A-M tended also to seem very moody, and she would say "I am in a bad mood
today" and would act accordingly, e.g. huffing and shouting at others, and refusing to
do what she is asked to do. However, this was mostly overacted and her teacher felt
that a lot of this moody behaviour was picked up from her sisters. She seemed to just
decide that day that she was going to be in a good or a bad mood.
3) One younger boy, A2 (CA.9,2; MA.2,2), had very limited understanding and
language. But the teachers report that he sometimes seemed to understand when
someone else was "being silly". For example, one of the assistants pointed to the bin
and said to A2 "Is that a chair". He laughed and said "no" quite emphatically.
4) Child C (CA.9,1; MA. 4) had been encouraged to play with dolls quite a lot and
this was what she did in her free play time. But this playing with dolls and teddies
became her obsession. Her play did sometimes involve symbolic activity or at least
imaginative play - e.g. making the dolls talk, hug, walk in and out of the house, kick a
ball around - but is at the same time very limited. Often she would stare at the doll,
making noises, fiddling with the doll's dress for a large part of the play time and had to
be prompted to do something different. If restarted on play she would elaborate but
only very slightly. For example, she was engrossed in manipulating the dolls dress and
one of the teachers prompted her to making the dolls talk. She sat two dolls opposite
each other and pretended to make them talk, while C. watched. The teacher then left
C. and C. continued the talking to some extent (although it was nonsensical, since C
has very little spoken language) and then made the two dolls hug and kiss each other.
Another incident involving Child C and one of the boys in the class, serves to
illustrate that spontaneous vocal imitation occurs at least to some extent. One child
screamed, the other copied, and it got louder each time. This could be argued to be
echolalia but the observer was convinced that there was something more here than just
echolalia since it continued until the teacher stopped it and appeared to be an
interaction between these two children, and they seemed to be enjoying it.
5) Child S (CA.7,11; MA 3,2) was one of the youngest children at the school and
was not one of the subjects in this project but he is worth mentioning. His ability to
imitate at least vocally seems to be intact, although it can become obsessional or
annoying, and is reinforced by laughter from another person. One example, is where
the classroom assistant, had a bad cough and was coughing at lunch time. S. picked up
on this and coughed at intervals for the rest of the day.
6) Child G (CA.7,2; MA. 3,2) also tended to pick up the habits of the other
children, especially if one of them is away for a while - he annoyed the teachers in the
same way as the absent classmate would do! This behaviour was not done in the
presence of the other child. One of the teachers commented, "We don't miss A3 much
when G. is around - it seems as if he is still here"!
7) A4 (CA.12,3; MA 5;4) had a tin that contained several small toys and
sometimes at play time he was allowed to play with the small plastic animals that he
had in there. This play was usually fighting, and he made the appropriate noises when
doing this.
In one example he had a gorilla and a parrot, which he called monsters, and which
he made fight each other, with all the appropriate noises. When asked to tidy up he
begins to do so and asks the observer to stroke the gorilla's head and say "goodbye"
before he puts it away in the tin. The request was made verbally but accompanied by
showing that he wanted the observer to stroke the animal's head.
An example which could possibly be seen as a mixture of pretence and teasing,
was when he was asked to lie down which he didn't really want to do. He began to
pretend to snore quite loudly, which made the adults in the class laugh. He continued
it. When he got told off, he began to snore even more loudly, seemingly to annoy staff.
8) Child D (CA.11,10; MA.3,7) provides us with an example of a type of
deception which most of the children engage in at some point, reported by one of the
teachers. One day D. came to school complaining of a terrible earache and asked to be
taken to the doctor's. He continued asking until one of the staff questioned him about
why he wanted to go to the doctors since he had no other symptoms. Eventually he
admitted that he wanted to go to the Doctors so that he could read the magazines in
the waiting room. Magazines and catalogues were one of his obsessions!
9) Child A3 (CA.14; MA. 7,2) was a T.V and video addict - it was his obsession
and his islet of ability. He would impersonate quite accurately celebrities such as
Tommy Cooper, Mavis form Coronation Street, Prince Charles and many more. He
sometimes mimicked staff when asked to do a chore which he didn't want to do. The
staff gave an example of how he was given a police walkie-talkie for a few minutes,
used it appropriately and made up a story pretending he was a policeman making an
emergency call. He also impersonated Michael Jackson's voice and style of dance
movements. He showed some symbolic ability when, for example, he used a hair brush
as a microphone, when impersonating a singer.
Child A3 also provided the example of deception which was discussed in the main
part of this paper.
11)According to her parents Child M (CA.15,1; MA.4) is like A3 in that she
seems to have a talent for mimicking pop stars and she imitates their use of the
microphone. She accepts teasing but gets very violent if her Mum is teased. Her
parents noted that M was very affected by sad music or sad stories and would get
upset. She would comfort little children and mother them, but never did this with dolls.
She would cry readily if a T.V. character was obviously upset or depressed. But she
did not seem to understand when her Mum and Dad, for example, were playfully
fighting and she attacked her Dad in these situations.
12) In the second observational study, a sequence of behaviour between two
autistic boys was observed. It was initiated mostly by one older boy who wanted to
play with the younger child. The first child, A.Y. (CA.9,8; MA.2,2) approached the
second child, S. (CA.7,11; MA.3;2), who was playing with the Lego. AY proceeded to
cuddle and engage S in rough and tumble play, but which from time to time included
some glimpses of symbolic behaviour and imitation, both vocal and with objects. For
example, AY took a piece of Lego and appeared to pretend to eat it. Then he picked
up a bit and put it up to the mouth of S, who proceeded to briefly "eat" it and then put
it back to the mouth of AY. Also AY tried constantly to get S to copy the noises he
made (mostly non-speech sounds). When S came even close to copying the noise AY
laughed and seemed very pleased and tried it again. This continued for 15 minutes.
2) For the 5-6 year old children: 
(Although the following example focuses on one child, the behaviour of the other
children in interaction with her is also of interest. In this example, which lasted
approximately 15 minutes, we can identify general motor play, symbolic play,
functional play, interaction with peers, understanding mental states in the form of
teasing and possibly seen in the sarcasm used by M. There is also imitation of actions
with objects and body/gestural actions. The most interesting thing is how each
behaviour links to another and flows naturally in the course of the children's play. This
variety and yet uniformity of behaviour was typical of play sequences in the normal
children but was rarely seen in the autistic children.)	 NI
"M. (CA 5,4; MA 5,4) was playing with her best friend, C. They both, had small toy
ponies. They were talking to each other. M. said "Pretend we are princesses. Pretend
this is my pony." She made horse noises, then skipped and "flew" around the garden to
the castle which some of the boys had built from bricks. She wanted to play in the
castle as a princess but then changed her mind and ran back and "flew" back to C.
"Why don't we make a nest for us" she said. So they left the horses on a rock and went
to collect grass cuttings. They carry the grass back to the rock where they make nests
for the ponies. They pretended to fly around. A boy, J. stopped M taking grass out of
the barrow he was pushing. "We need grass" she says. She skipped off to find some
elsewhere. They collected some and returned to nests. She pretended to fly around the
garden again. "We are flying horses" she said and then told C. to get more grass. "We
are going to have to go all over the place looking for more nests." M took some grass
off C., who grabbed it back. "I really do need it for my horse" M
complained 	 Another child, B, came along and destroyed their grass house. M yelled
at B, who was laughing. "We don't like it!" she shouted. C. said "It's not funny!". "It's
not funny!" repeated M. She chased B until he dropped the grass then said
sarcastically, "Thanks B
	 B you are being a pain, a very big pain." She tried to take
some grass off J but he wouldn't let her. "We need it" she pleaded. They continued to
play and rebuild nests. As B passes, M adds "Thanks B, thanks a lot! That was very
helpful of you!"
	
In the queue for a drink, they continued to play with horses. M
copied what Christina does with the horse - they both stroke the horses hair- and then
tied it up in a bow."
An example of understanding mental states is quoted in the discussion.
3) For the children with learning difficulties: 
(These examples come from both the observational study and less formal observations
in the classroom.)
1) One morning while the children were telling each other_their news from the night
before, one young boy, A (CA. 11,7; MA.2,2). begins to "copy" everything the other
boys are doing. The teacher chooses to ignore this. Most of the imitations are of
body/gestural movements, and include imitation of postures, hand movements and
noises such as coughs. Another boy, J (CA.10,9; MA.8;11), leads A on, giving him
things to copy but then pretending he is sitting still and quiet once the teacher looks in
his direction.
2) In one of the older children with learning difficulties, S (CA.14,8; MA. 5,4), some
examples of symbolic activity is observed in drama class. He pretends to be the
Penguin out of "Batman", smoking a stick as a cigar. He also pretends to drive the
batmobile, using furniture as the car. Pretends to slide down pole and runs and jumps
as if batman. Drives Batcopter etc. The same boy used to also enjoy playing with the
telephone. He would phone and listen and on one occasion he pretended he was
phoning for a job. Listens and gets ready to take down a message.
Appendix 3.1
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Lists of tasks in the imitation battery (the actions in parentheses, are the fifteen actions
not included in the analysis):
Session 1 
Puff out cheeks 7
Finger wiggle 7
Mouth pull 7
Cough
("Look!")
Make and look through spy hole 7
Sad face
Use cup as hat 2
All fingers touching 7
"Moo!" with cow
Jump twice 7
Build two brick tower 2
Ok sign
(Pretend to eat blocks as fruit )
"Beep! beep!" with car
Draw line on paper
Touch ear 7
Stirs soup in bowl (no spoon) 1
Extend both arms & touch nose 1
Give doll a drink from cup 1
Loud sigh
Pours from empty pot into imag. cup 1
Pat stomach 7
Tap pencil on table
Turn like balerina
Session 2
Shut eyes very tight
Interlinked fingers 7
Lip wobble 7
Yawn
"Oh dear" (doll falls off chair)
Roll paper in ball and flick 7
(Grin)
Drink from brick as cup
Peek-a-boo 7
"Baa!" with sheep
Sway foot to foot 7
Hold small wooden block then drop it 2
Thumbs up sign
(Park car in garage)
("hello, how are you today" with doll)
String three beads together
Touch back of head 7
Pours from imaginary teapot into cup 1
Pat top of head 7
(Brush dolls hair 3)
Giggle
(Stirs soup in imaginary bowl 1)
Grasp foot 7
Bang spoons together 5
Turn round shuffling 7
Wave goodbye2
	
Move as if brushing teeth
March
	
Pulling imaginary rope
Switch on torch and point to wall
	
Play musical instrument
Sit down and rock back and forth
	 (Sway, turn and jump).
Saw piece of wood (no saw) 	 Hammer nail into wood (no hammer)
Throw ball into box	 (Throw beanbag in air and catch it)
T-sign (1) 6	 T-sign (2) 6
Protrude tongue	 Lip-smacking
(Stirs soup in imaginary bowl, no spoon 1) (Pour tea from imag.pot to imag.cup 1)
Mouth pop	 Look up
(Turn clock hands to time)	 Build pyramid of blocks 3
Pour tea with wrong object	 Stir soup with wrong object
Move like combing hair	 move like drinking from glass
Hammer nail into wood 1
	 (Saw piece of wood 1)
Two finger clapping 7
	
Grab thumb 7
Look through tube as telescope	 Roll paper - straw for coke bottle
(Flap arms and jump 7)	 Hug self 7
Stir spoon in cup 2 & 3
	 (Feed soup to doll 1)
Roll hands 7
	
Touch index fingers 7
Extend hinged object then return flat 4 	 Press play button with nose
Hide behind cushion & go "boo!" 	 Doll shouts "help!"
(Car noise as drive car along) 	 doll goes down slide "weeee!"
Items included to control for motivational problems: 
1. Switch on torch and point to wall
2. Turn clock hands to time	 MO
3. Draw line on paper
4. Tap pencil on table
5. Play musical instrument
6. Feed doll
7. Brush dolls hair
8. Build a pyramid of blocks
9. Turn like a ballerina
10. Sit down and rock back and forth
11. String three beads together.
All these items were decided on, on the basis of observational studies, and something
which is seen as motivational for all the children and some of the adults is included here.
Sources in literature: 
Most of the actions in the battery are self-explanatory, however there are a few
which need careful definition and these shall be described below. Those from other
studies are coded as follows (This applies to the above list)
1 In Hames and Langdell (1981)
2 In Heimann et al. (1992)
3 In Stone eta!. (1990)
4 In Charman and Baron-Cohen (under review)
5 In DeMyer et al. (1972)
6 In Ohta (1997)
7 In Custance (1994)
Definitions: 
Puff out cheeks: Lips shut and cheeks filled with air
Finger wiggle : The hand is held with palm facing away from body and fingers
curled sequentially and straightened. 	 ..-
Mouth pull: Both hands are formed in fists with index finger extended. The index
fingers are hooked inside corners of mouth and pull edges of mouth wider.
Lip wobble: Lips are protruded, the right hand forms a fist with index finger
extended and places lengthways on lips and then moved up and down causing lips to
smack against each other
Spy hole : a piece of paper is folded in half and a semi-circle is torn out of middle of
edge. Paper is unfolded and the hole looked through.
Roll in ball and flick: piece of paper is rolled up into a ball, placed on palm of left
hand and then the right index finger and thumb is used to flick ball off palm.
All fingers touching: The hands are held apart, palms facing each other and fingers
bent so that their tips face each other and are splayed apart. The hands are then brought
together until the tips of all equivalent fingers are touching.
Peek-a-boo: The hands are held flat up in front of the face, small finger to small
finger with palms facing towards body. They hands are moved apart to reveal face and
then brought together again.
Jump : Standing upright, the hands held against the side of the body, the
experimenter jumps twice off the ground.
Foot to foot: Standing upright, each foot is lifted alternatively from the ground,
producing a swaying motion.
OK sign - index finger of right hand and thumb are joined to make a circle, other
three fingers are extended straight upwards.
Thumbs up sign - Four fingers make a fist with thumb touching fingers as hand is
moved towards body and then thumb is extended upwards as hand is moved to point
away from body.
Touch ear: the tip of right index finger touches ear.
Touch back of head: Flat of right hand is placed on back of head.
Pat top of head: the flat of right hand is place on head and then moved in patting
action.	 NO
Pat stomach: Flat of right hand used to pat stomach.
Grasp foot: right hand reaches to left foot while sitting and grasps it.
Turn round (shuffling): Standing upright, the hands held against the sides of body,
the demonstrator turns through 180 degrees using small jerky steps.
Turn round (like ballerina): Demonstrator turns round on tip toes with arms in the
air.
March: Knees are lifted high and arms swung alternatively.
Pulling imaginary rope: Demonstrator moves hands, which are making partial fists
(as if holding rope), in a downwards movement in front of body, using alternative hands.
This is done 3 times.
Play musical instrument: a xylephone is beaten in a six note rhythm, descending in
pitch.
Sit down & rock: Demonstrator sits down cross-legged on floor and then rocks
gently back and forth three times.
Sway, jump and turn: demonstrator sways from foot to foot twice, then turns 45
degrees while jumping once.
Protrude tongue: tongue is pointed and pushed out of mouth.
Lip-smacking: mouth is opened and closed 3 times with the lips smacking against
each other.
Mouth pop: The right hand is made into a fist with the index finger extended and
the palm facing away from body. The end of the index finger is placed against the inside
of the left cheek. The lips are closed around the finger which is kept straight and then
jerked, from the wrist, out of the mouth to make a popping noise.
Look up: Head is tipped upwards firmly and slowly.
Two finger clapping: Left hand is held palm up, with the fingers together. The right
hand is held in fist, except with the index finger and next one, extended. These are used
to clap the left palm.
:.
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Grab thumb: Left hand was held in a fist with thumb extended sideways (palm away
from body). The right hand then forms a fist around thewthumb.
Flap arms and jump: Standing upright the arms a raised and waved up and down as
if imitating a bird. Arms are waved three times and then the demonstrator jumps at the
same time as waving arms a fourth time.
Hug self: Kneeling on one knee, the arms are crossed over one another in front of
the body, grasping the opposite arm. The body is then twisted from side to side from the
waist, causing the body to rock.
Roll hands: Hands are held as fists, sideways to the body, with one in front of the
body. They are then quickly circulated around one another.
Touch index fingers: The hands are held about a foot apart, index fingers of both
hands extended and pointing to each other. The hands are then moved together until the
index fingers touch.
Extend and flatten hinge: An L-shape hinge, made of a flat rectangular base and a
wooden flap, is unfolded to its maximum angle (135 degrees) and then returned to the
flat position, using the index finger of one hand to lift the hinge and the palm of the same
hand to knock it down again.
"Oh dear!": this is said as dolly falls off her chair.
"Look!" : This is said while pointing to an object in the room.
Drink from brick (as if cup): A brick is held in the hand as you would a glass and
raised to the lips, which are open. One swallow occurs and brick is lowered.
Pretend to eat blocks as apple: Block is picked up in one hand and raised to mouth.
Demonstrator pretends to bit and then chew fruit.
Park car in garage: Cardboard box with top opening in placed on side. A car is
pushed along ground into box and then the flaps of box are closed over - as doors of
garage.
Look through telescope - a tube from wrapping paper is raised to the eye, and the
room is scanned, with the other eye closed.
Make straw and drink from bottle: A piece of paper is taken an rolled quite thinly,
to the dimensions of a drinking straw. One end is then place in an empty coke bottle and
the other end in the mouth.
"Weee!" : This is said having built a slide from three blocks and a piece of card and
small doll if pushed down the slide. - important bit is the verbal imitation in this action
although actually imitating some of the actions will also be noted.
Turn clock hands to time: Clock hands say 12.00 when the clock is picked up. The
demonstrator uses the index finger of one hand to move the hour hand to 4 and the
other index finger to keep the minute hand at twelve.
T-signs (1): Left hand is held in front of body, palm facing towards body. Right
hand is held placed at right angles to left hand, fingers touching palm of left hand, with
right hand nearest to the body.
T-signs (2): Left hand is held sideways so that fingers are pointing away from body.
Right hand is placed at right angles to left hand, palm facing towards body, fingers
touching palm of left hand.
Some of objects used in the Do-As-I-Do experiment (Photograph also included the
artificial fruit (Chapter 4)and the drawer object used for testing deferred imitation
(Chapter 5))
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Appendix 3.4
Further results on the imitation [ndividual actions.
Table 3.4: Mean percentage of total responses on which each group scored, 6,5,4,3,2 and 1, over all
actions and for three categories of actions of special theoretical interest - symbolic actions with
objects, meaninful/symbolic actions and two-handed actions.
Category Scored Scored Scored Scored Scored Scored Group
6 5 4 3 2 1
Overall 41.27 27.54 13.54 6.00 3.27 7.72 3-4 years
78.83 14.21 5.75 0.67 0.08 0.17 5-6 years
67.43 20.64 8.09 2.54 0 0.91 MLD
14.33 10.67 12.17 9.5 15.83 36.17 Yng Aut
53.09 20.36 14.73 6.73 2.8 2.81 Aut Ch
62.4 24.30 9.00 3.00 0.70 0.40 Aut Adt
Sym obj. 25 39.65 16.79 6.19 8.21 4.17 3-4 years
65.66 23.16 11.18 0 0 0 5-6 years
59.89 27.81 9.74 2.60 0 0 MLD
15 10.00 20 5 25 25 Yng Aut
37.23 18.30 29.65 2.31 6.58 5.95 Aut Ch
48.4 36.44 9.3 2.78 3.10 0 Aut Adt
MIS 38.48 16.67 26.67 6.06 0 12.12 3-4 years
73.06 20.42 6.53 0 0 0 5-6 years
67.27 11.67 10.15 10.91 0 0 MLD
14.58 0 12.50 6.25 18.75 47.92 Yng Aut
30.61 21.52 41.82 3.03 0 3.03 Aut Ch
60.67 17.67 18.00 3.67 0 0 Aut Adt
Two-
hand
43.80 26.10 15.15 5.37 1.58 7.99 3-4 years
86.55 9.16 4.29 0 0 0 5-6 years
71.69 19.63 7.85 0.83 0 0 MLD
10.9 8.89 12.78 4.05 0 57.38 Yng Aut
57.58 17.36 17.22 7.85 0 0 Ant Ch
71.52 18.94 7.80 1.74 0 0 Aut Adt
Median Score
6 -
5.5 -
5 -
4.5 -
4 -
3.5 -
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
Median Score
5.5
5 -
4 .5 -
4 -
3 .5 -
3 -
2.5 -
2
1.5
1
13-4 yes
• 5-6 yes
CIMLD
Yng Ant
• Aut Ch
DAut adt
▪ 3-4 yrs
• 5-6 yes
o MLD
▪Yng Aut
Aut Ch
DAut adt
Thum up	 Clean teeth
	 Rope pull
	 Brush hair
All fingers	 T-Sign	 Peekaboo	 Grsp thumb
Actions
Figure 3.8: Median Scores and interquartile ranges for four actions within the category of
meaningfuUsymbolic actions - thumbs up, clean teeth, rope PLIII, brush hair.
Figure 3.7: Median Scores and Interquartile ranges for four actions within the Two-handed
actions category - All fingers touching, T-sign, peekaboo and grasp thumb.
Action
Figure 3.9:Median Scores and Interqartile ranges for each group on six actions from the category
of symbolic actions with objects - hnaginary stir, imaginary pour, roll straw, pretend to
hammer, pretend to saw and pretend to dill from brick.
hnag stir
	
Inn% Pour
	
Roll Straw	 P. hammer
	
P. saw
	
P. drink
Action
The action "grasp thumb" produced a significant difference between the 5-6
year olds and the autistic children. This is one of several actions where the most
common mistakes were a reversal of either one hand or two hands. Examples of
these reversals are described in Table 3.2 and are illustrated in photographs in
Appendix 3.3. The other actions were Peekaboo and the two T-signs. Although all
groups produced the same type of errors, the autistic children tended to do it more.
However, as the results show, there was a significant difference only for grasp thumb
and it is only the 5-6 year olds who show more than the autistic children. These
actions are part of the category of two handed gestures.
If we compare the CA- and MA- matched subgroups (See Table 3.8 below for
subgroups used) on just the actions within the three categories mentioned above, we
find that when matched on CA the non-autistic group did significantly better on 1) T-
sign (T) (K-W=4.70, p=0.03), 2) Okay sign (K-W= 5.55 p=0.018), 3) Mime brush
teeth (K-W=7.2, p=0.007), 4) Mime rope pull (K-W=4.33, p=0.04), 5) Use tube as
telescope (K-W=4.2 p=0.04) and 6) stir imaginary spoon in bowl (K-W=4.72
p=0.03). When matched on TROG there were no significant differences and, when
matched on MA (BPVS), there was only one significant difference and that was on
Grasp thumb (K-W=6.03, p=0.014).
Table 3.8: Medians and interquartile ranges for the autistic and non-autistic subgroups matched on
CA, MA BPVS and TROG raw score, on those actions within the categories of two-handed actions
(BGHI-1), meaningful/symbolic gestures (BGMS) and symbolic actions with objects (AOS), for
which there was a significant difference.
Category Action CA
Autistic
CA
non-Aut
MA
Autistic
MA
non-Aut
TROG
Autistic
TROG
non-aut
BGHH T-sign (T) 5 6 6 6 5 6
(4.75->6) (6) (5->6) (4->6) (125- (4->6)
>5.75)
grasp 4 6 4.5 6 6 6
thumb (3->6) (4->6) (3->5) (4.75->6) (5->6) (5->6)
BGSM Okay 4 6 5 5.5 5 6
(4->5) (5->6) (4->6) (4->6) (4->6) (5->6)
Brush 5 6 5 6 5 6
teeth (4->5) (6) (4->6) (5->6) (4->6) (5,5->6)
Rope pull 4 6 5 5 5 5
(4->5) (5->6) (4->6) (4.5->6) (4->5.5) (5->6)
AOS Telescope 5 6 5 5 5 6
(5->5) (5->6) (5->6) (5->6) (5->6) (5->6)
Image stir 4 6 5 5 5 5.5
- spoon. (4->5) (5->6) (4->6) (4->6) (4->6) (5->6)
To verify these results, a second type of analysis was carried out on the
individual categories. When each of the 78 actions was recoded using a strict
definition of imitation (the child had to score 6 to be said to be imitating), a chi-
square analysis showed a high tendency for imitation across all groups, i.e.
significantly more children succeeded than failed. For 25 actions all groups exceded
this criterion (p<0.01). For 6 actions, all children imitated below this criterion (i.e for
these actions more subjects failed than succeeded: these were Finger Wiggle, Mime
Rope Pull, Mime combing hair, Roll and Flick, Operate Hinged flap and Pretend to
hammer - these actions were scored very stringently, in that, for example the correct
finger had to be used to score a 6 on the hinged flap and rolling and flicking a piece
of paper was a difficult action for most of the children in all groups).
However, when a slightly less stringent definition of imitation was taken, so that the
child could be said to have imitated if they scored a six or a five, then these
differences were eradicated. Almost all children in all groups could imitate at this
level. A large number of post-hoc tests would be required to analyse this
comprehensively and would not tell us much more than the Kruskal-Wallis analysis
already reported above. Instead chi-square posthoc analysis will be reported just for
those actions which on the Kruskal-Wallis analysis were significant at 0.05 but not at
0.01 level. There were 12 of these actions from a mixture of categories and these
results are presented for all groups in Table 3.9 below.
Table 3.9  Summary of chi-square analyses on those actions significant at 0.05 level on the Kruskal-
Wallis analysis but not at the 0.01 level. The analyses were performed at three levels: (1) Imitation =
Score of 6, (2) Imitation = Score of 5 or 6, and (3) Imitation = Score of anything between 3
and 6. (* denotes chi-square significance of 0.01, ** denoted significance of 0.001; N/S = not
significant)
Action Level 1
(Score 6)
Level 2
(Score 5 or 6)
Level 3
(Score 3-6)
"Oh dear!" 5-6>3-4	 ** 5-6> 3-4	 * N/S
"Hello,	 how
are you?"
MILD > autistic 	 * N/S N/S
Cough 5-6> 3-4 yr old *
MLD > 3-4	 *
Aut > 3-4	 **
N/S
N/S
N/S
N/S
N/S
N/S
All	 fingers
touching
5-6 > 3-4 yr old *
5-6> young aut **
Aut > 3-4	 *
Aut > young aut **
5-6> 3-4	 *
5-6 > young aut *
N/S
Aut >young aut **
N/S
N/S
Aut>young aut	 *
Grasp foot N/S at 0.01 N/S N/S
Jump 5-6 > 3-4	 *
5-6 > young aut *
N/S
N/S
N/S
N/S
Okay sign 5-6> 3-4	 **
MLD > 3-4
	 *
5-6 > 3-4
	 **
MLD>3-4	 *
N/S
MS
Draw	 line	 on
paper
5-6> 3-4	 *
MLD > 3-4	 **
MID >young aut *
Aut > 3-4	 **
Adults > 3-4	 **
Adults>young aut *
N/S N/S
Bang Spoons 5-6> 3-4	 **
5-6 > young aut
	 *
Aut > 3-4	 *
N/S N/S
Play xylophone 5-6> 3-4	 ** N/S N/S
Ball to box 5-6 > young aut **
Adt > young aut **
3-4> young aut	 *
Aut > young aut *
N/S
Adt>young aut **
N/S
Aut>young aut **
N/S
Adt>young aut *
N/S
Aut>young aut
	 *
Stir	 Imag
spoon
5-6> 3-4	 *
MLD > 3-4	 **
N/S N/S
For the most part, then, reducing the pass level for imitation wipes out the group
differences or at least reduces the significance level. On ncme of these actions do the
autistic children or adults perform worse than any of the control groups. In fact, the
two older autistic groups often perform significantly better on many tasks than both
the 3-4 year olds and the young autistic children. This analysis therefore supports the
results from the Kruskal-Wallis tests in that the older autistic children and adults do
not show deficits on imitation of most actions even at a lower significance level of
0.05.
Spinning the pin
Appendix 4.1
•••
1) Each of the two possible actions on each of the component of the plastic fruit, as
modelled by the experimenter. 	
-
Turning the pin
Pulling the
handle
Turning handle
1800 and pulling
out
Twisting bolts
Poking bolts
Spinning the pin
Appendix 4.2
2) The box being opened by a normal 3-4 year old bOy, who was shown spin, turn
and twist method.
Turning the handle
Twisting the bolts.
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Appendix 5.1.
Photographs of each of the two actions on the drawer - 1) Wiggle and Pull
2) Push to Side
Appendix 7.1
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List of objects to be used and the instructions to be given to the children (This
depends what the children produce in the preceding conditions. However, at least
one instruction per set of objects will be given to all children) S = predominantly
symbolic activity, F = predominantly functional activity, F/S = both interpretations
are possible:
Set 1: car,
shoebox,
piece of card
wooden block
Roadway
Petrol pump
Set 2: toy animals
blocks
fence
box
straws and string
Tree
Set 3:
doll
toy saucepan
basin
spoon
sponge cubes
tin box with lid
Can you show me:
how to park the car in the garage (S)
how the car goes up the ramp (S)
how the car drives along the road (F)
how the car fills up with petrol. (F)
the dog chases the horse (F/S)
The horse jumps the hedge/wall (F/S)
the lions sleep in their cage (S)
the monkey swings in the trees (F/S)
how dolly eats her dinner off a
plate(F/S)
how dolly washes her face (F/S)
how dolly plays the drum (S)
how dolly stirs the soup in the
saucepan. (F)
Set 4: paper
straw
telephone
Empty coke bottle
how you answer the telephone (F)
and write down a message for me. (S)
how to drink from the bottle with a
straw (F)
how you pour me a drink of coke (S)
1) Objects for Set 1
(piece of card missing)
2) Objects for Set 2
3) Objects for Set 3
I
4) Objects for Set 4
Set 1: paper
paintbrush
plate
doll
cloth
squeezy bottle
basin
Set 2: hairbrush
tape recorder
cassette
musical instrument
straw
Set 3: scarf
hairbrush
ball
stick
frying pan
Appendix 7.2
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List of objects and instructions for the adults and older children:
You are an actor/actress - these are your
props - Show me how
You would paint a picture if you were an
artist (F/S)
you would throw a frisbee for your dog to
catch. (S)
you would wash the dishes. (F/S)
you would wash the baby's face (F/S)
you act as a singer on stage and use your
microphone(S)
you would make the tape deck work (F)
how you play the xylephone in the band(F)
how the conductor conducts the orchestra.(S)
you act an old lady (F/S)
How you look through your telescope, is you
were a sailor (S)
you would signal for help if you were a
sailor (F/S)
you would play tennis.(S)
Set 6: frying pan
coke bottle
blocks
straws
spoon
cup and saucer
toilet roll tube
sponge pieces
tin box with lid
how you would be a chef and cook me
dinner (F/S)
how you would drink coke on a picnic (F)
how you pour me a drink of coke (F)
how you clean up the spilt coke. (F/S)
(Experimenter having pretended to spill coke).
Appendix 7.3
Other results from the play uperiment.
In addition to the results presented in the main part of Chapter 7, the following data
was also collected.
a) Number of actions per minute.
b) Number of objects per minute.
c) Time per object.
d) Time per action.
e) Percentage of total number of actions, accounted for by each type of action -
manipulative, relational etc.
Is there a novelty effect?
In order to examine the effects of the children being allowed to familiarise themselves
with the objects and situation and any novelty effect that might exist, it was essential
to compare the play produced by the groups in the first two sessions. When all
children were included, there was significantly more functional play in the second
session than in the warm-up session (Wilcoxin, z = -2,64 p<0.01). This pattern was
reflected in the results for the 5-6 year old children who also showed more functional
play in the second session than the warm-up session (z = -2.37, p<0.02). When the
collapsed autistic and non-autistic groups were compared, there was only one
difference that was significant and that was for the non-autistic children, who
produced less manipulative play during the second session than they had during the
warm-up session (z = -2.98, p<0.01). This can be accounted for by the results when
each individual group was examined - the 3-4 year olds and 5-6 year olds showed less
manipultive play in the second session than they did in the first session (z =-2.24,
p<0.02 and z = -2.37, p<0.02 respectively). The 5-6 year olds also played for a higher
percentage of the total time available during the second session compared to the first
(z = -2.37, p<0.02). Finally, the autistic children also played for a higher percentage of
the total time available, during the second session, when compared to the warm-up
session (z = -2.7, p<0.01).
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Further measures of the quality of play.
Figure 7.5: Objects used in both freeplay sessions by each group, expressed as a percentage of the total number
of objects used in the second freeplay session. The percentage values here represent the medians for each group
Medimpercentage	 (and interquartile ranges).
Objects in both
Groups
Figure 7.5 illustrates the percentage of objects used in second freeplay session
that were also used in the first freeplay session. The percentages were not very high
for all groups, and when tested using a Kruskall-Wallis, the only significant difference
was between the clumped autistic and non-autistic groups and only at the 0.05 level -
the non-autistic children showed more repetition of objects than the autistic children
(K-W=4.82 p<0.05). The MLD showed a slightly higher tendency for repetition of
this nature, but no significant differences were found.
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Figure 7.6: Median number of objects and actions per minute and interquartile ranges for the warm-up and
Median number of objects/actions per minute 	 second freeplay sessions.
Groups
Figure 6.7: Group medians (and interquartile ranges) for the average time spent on each action and each object,Median time
expressed as a percentage of the total time during which play occured, in the warm-up and second freeplay
50 -	 sessions.
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Groups
A comparison of the number of actions and objects used,and the time spent on
each action or object, was carried out to provide another index of the quality of the
play being engaged in. Figures 7.6 and 7.7 illustrate these results. All groups
performed fairly similarily on each measure. Although not significant for the warm-up
session, the time spent on each action and object was less for the non-autistic groups
than for the autistic groups. On the second freeplay, the autistic children spent longer
on each object than the 5-6 year old children, although only at the 0.05 level (K-
W=1 1.04). The clumped autistic group also spent longer on both objects and actions
3-4 years
m5mt
Yeats
g`Zural`cr
.Aut adults
than the non-autistic group (K-W = 8.20 p<0.01 and K-W = 7.94 p<0.01 repectively).
When MA and TROG score were controlled for, these differences still remained at the
0.05 level.
Additional results from the elicited session:
It is interesting to compare the performance on the types of play to those
produced in the warm-up and freeplay sessions. Firstly, the percentage of total time
engaged in play - when all children were used in the comparison there was a
significant difference between the elicted session and the warm-up session, with the
children playing for a higher percentage of time in the elicited session than in the
freeplay session (Wilcoxin z = -2.87, p<0.01). This pattern is echoed when the
comparison is carried out for the autistic children alone (z = -3.51 p<0.0001). This can
be accounted for by both the autistic children and the autistic adults, who both played
for a higher percentage of the time available during the elicited than they had during
the first freeplay session.
When manipulative play was examined across all children there was
significantly less manipulative play in the elicited session than in the first freeplay
session (z = -2.71 p<0.01) and this can be explained by the non-autistic children's
tendency in this direction (z = -2.4 p<0.02). This in itself is attributable mainly to the
5-6 year old children (z = -2.37 p<0.02). Functional play did not show any significant
difference between elicited play and either of the freeplay sessions and the same was
true of functional/symbolic behaviour.
So to summarise these results - is there a novelty effect? Yes, there does seem
to be a novelty effect for both autistic and non-autistic groups. Overall there was
significantly more manipulative play produced on the first, warm-up session than on
the second freeplay and the elicited conditions. There was also more symbolic play
and functional/symbolic play on the elicited situation than on the preceding sessions,
but this effect was stronger for the non-autistic groups than for the autistic groups.
What was significant was that the autistic children played for a longer time on the
second session than the first, warm-up session. There was also a slight tendency
towards less functional play on the second freeplay session than the first.
Third Freeplay Session:
There was only one significant difference at all and that was at the 0.05 level,
between the autistic group and the non-autistic group on the amount of time spent on
each object, which was longer for the autistic than non-autistic group (K-W=6.28
p<0.05). This difference remained when the children were matched on MA and
TROG raw score. This ties in with the observation that most of the oldest children and
the autistic children only played with one object in this session, or did one action (and
they often did this until the experimenter stopped them). They usually chose an object
that they had seemed to enjoy using before, or that they had shown an interest in
during the freeplay sessions.
It was thought that it would be interesting to look at whether one group more
than another reproduced actions seen, or ressembling those seen, in the
instructed/elicited sessions. Considering all children there was no significant
difference between the number of children who did and and the number who didn't
reproduce any actions from the session before. Within the autistic groups fewer
autistic subjects reproduced actions from previous sessions than did not (X' = 4.45
p<0.05). There were no other group differences. When the comparison was carried out
between groups there were no significant group differences at all. Figure 7.12
illustrates these results.
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Figure 7.12: Percentage of children in each group producing actions from the elicited and instructed sessions in
children in each group	 the final freeplay session.
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Finally, Figure 7.13 illustrates the percentage of children in each group who
involved the experimenter in their play, other than talking to her or showing an object.
As can be seen, the 3-4 year olds involve the experimenter in their play, most often,
although the autistic children did so more than might be expected. On a Fisher Exact
test, the difference between the 3-4 year old group and the 5-6 year old was shown to
be significant (p<0.01) as was the difference between the 3-4 year old group and the
autistic adults (p<0.01). The differences between the 3-4 year olds and the MLD
children and the autistic children were not significant at the 0.05 level.
nGroups
Figure 7.13: Percentage of children in each group who involved the experimenter in their play at
Percentage of children In each	 least once during the experiment,
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1) Pictures used as control stimuli.
2) Photographs of Facial Expressions, taken from Eck
—man and Friesen (1975) as used
in Phase 1 of emotion perception experiment.
NEUTRAL	 HAPPY
SAD
	
ANGRY
FRIGHTENED
	 SURPRISED
DISGUSTED
Appendix 8.2
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Sounds used to test recognition of emotion. These were recorded by an adult female
completely unknown to all subjects and were presented in the order shown below.
Sound	 Emotion
1) laugh	 Happy
2) crying	 Sad
3) trembling sound	 Frightened
4) angry grunt	 Angry
5) "yuck!"	 Disgusted
6) whistle	 Happy
7) "ooh!"	 Surprised
8) angry mumbling	 Angry
9) sigh	 Sad
10) "wow!"	 ? Surprised
11) "eueueugh!"	 Disgusted
12) scream	 Frightened.
Appendix 8.3
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Pictures of gestures used to test understanding of gestural clues to emotions.
NEUTRAL
	
HAPPY
r
SAD
	 ANGRY
FRIGHTENED
	
SURPRISED
DISGUSTED
Appendix 8.4
Pictures and stories used for each of the emotions in the context condition and the
order used to counterbalance the presentations.
HAPPY
	
SAD
ANGRY
	
FRIGHTENED
SURPRISED
	 DISGUSTED
Stories:
MO
Happy: It is Christmas time and Carol is opening her presents - this is her biggest one.
Angry: Carol is in the living room. She hears a crashing sound in the kitchen. She
run's into the kitchen and sees one of her best plates broken on the floor.
Sad: Carol's cat is sick - she is going to have to call the vet.
Disgusted: Carol smells a horrible smell in the kitchen bin. It is an old fish. She takes
it outside and puts it in the big bin outside.
Fearful: Carol is walking down the street. She looks around and sees a huge dog with
very sharp teeth.
Surprised: Today is Carol's birthday. She hear's the doorbell ring. When she answers
the door there is a man with a big bunch of flowers for her.
Order used for counterbalancing:
Child 1 & 7	 Child 2 & 8	 Child 3 & 9
happy	 angry	 disgusted
angry	 happy	 surprised
sad	 disgusted	 happy
disgusted	 fearful	 angry
fearful	 surprised	 sad
surprised	 sad	 fearful
Child 4 & 10	 Child 5 & 11	 Child 6 & 12
surprised	 sad	 ,	 fearful
fearful	 disgusted	 sad
angry	 fearful	 surprised
sad	 surprised	 happy
disgusted	 happy	 angry
happy	 angry	 disgusted
Appendix 8.5
Further details of emotion recognition and sharing experiment.
Details of equipment and procedure.
1) Changes from Hobson's original experiments.
Instead of line drawings of faces based on Ekman & Friesen (1975), as was used by
Hobson and Prior et al., the photographs themselves were used to test for recognition
of emotions from facial expression. Instead of using video-tape sequences to test for
the understanding of gestures and contexts as affecting emotions, handdrawn pictures
were used. To test for how sounds are used to recognise emotions, an audiotape of
non-speech sounds was used - as in Hobson's studies. These sounds were recorded by
a female, completely unknown to any of the subjects. A training sequence with four
non-face pictures was used as a control test and to train the children in the
experimental set-up. This was done for the picture naming, sound naming and context
questions. The objects used for the training were a car, train, dog and bird and were
simply pictures of each cut out of a magazine and clued on a piece of card.
2) Procedure
Phase I: Control: The children were presented one at a time with the four
control pictures and asked to name the object in the picture. If they correctly named at
least three out of four, then the experimenter proceded to the experimental situation.
Experimental: The subjects were presented with 6 photographs
portraying facial expressions of emotion - fear, anger, happiness, sadnes, surprise, and
disgust. One face of neutral expression was also included (The photos can be seen in
Appendix 8.1). The children were introduced to the girl in the photos as Carol and
they were asked to say how Carol was feeling in the photograph (Naming procedure).
The photographs were presented one by one to the child, The previous one was
pushed aside but left in sight of the child. If the children seemed confused by the
question, they were asked again. If they still made no reponse then they were
prompted on the first photograph with suggestions - Is she happy, sad, angry? The
response for this photograph was not counted as valid. At the end of this first
presentation, all the photographs were laid out in front of the child and the child was
asked to point to the photo where Carol was happy, sad, angry etc (Showing
procedure). Once each emotion has been responded -to, the child is made aware of
their mistakes and trained to the correct response for each photo. The Naming
procedure was then repeated, followed by the showing procedure if necessary to
obtain at least 5 correct answers.
Coding and analysis: The children's performance was noted on a prepared
check-sheet by the experimenter. The whole process was also recorded on video and
the experimenter then watched the video to confirm her first coding of the children's
responses. Unfortunately, due to technical problems the quality of the videos (light
often reflected off the photographs, making it difficult to tell which one was which)
was not good enough to test for interobserver reliability - it was necessary to observe
the actual sesssion and the video in order to code. However, this was not felt to be a
serious problem since the scoring system was very objective.
In order to pass the first phase the children had to score at least five on either the
first naming procedure or on the first showing procedure. In order to procede to the
later phases of the test the children had to score at least five out of seven on either the
second naming or showing procedures. This was relevant for the gestures and context
phases. All children were put through the sounds procedure to see if they were any
better at recognising sound mediated emotions than facial expressions of emotions.
Phase 2: Sounds: All the photographs and the control pictures were laid out in
front of the child and they were instructed to listen to the sounds that the experimenter
would play and then show which picture went with the sound. The four control sounds
were played first and then those pictures were taken away, to leave seven pictures.
The instruction was reiterated - the child was to tell the experimenter how Carol was
feeling on the tape by showing the photograph that matched the sound.
Twelve different sounds were played, two for each facial expression. There was
no sound for the neutral photograph. The subjects were informed that most of the
photographs had two sounds but one photograph didn't have any sounds.The sounds
were presented in a set order as detailed in appendix 8.2. The child could respond in
one of three ways. Firstly, vocally, by stating verbally the emotional state of Carol.
Secondly, they could point to a picture. If they pointed to the wrong picture but gave
the right verbal response then this was noted as coreect. Thirdly, they could simply
give to the experimenter the picture that they thought matched the sound. In this case
it was important to immediately replace the photo on the table so that when the sound
appeared again the choice was available for the child.
The result for each subject was a score out of twelve but a score out of six was
also recorded for the first time the child heard each emotion. This was in case hearing
each emotion twice confused the child and confounded their ability to recognise
emotions by recognising human vocalisations.
Phase 3: Gestures - This was perhaps the most difficult phase of the test, it was
certainly the most difficult to design. A picture (line-drawing) of a faceless body in a
gestural position indicative of each emotion was presented to the children. All the
photographs were on the table at this point and the child was instructed to match a
face to the body to show how Carol was feeling. There were seven body pictures, each
of which are featured in Appendix 8.3. A score of seven was the maximum but a child
was said to have passed if they scored five or more on this phase.
Phase 4: Context - The child was first presented with each of the control
pictures again and then a picture of a nest, garage, basket and station were given to the
child one at a time and they were asked to match the new pictures to one of the control
pictures. Again they had to score at least three out of four to be said to have passed the
control condition. The child was then presented with six pictures featuring a faceless
body in a simple situation and six stories were read to the child, one at a time, and the
child was asked to match the story to one of the pictures. The stories and pictures used
can be found in Appendix 8.4. If the child was successful on five out of the six stories
then they proceded to the final stage and were once again presented with the six facial
expressions, laid out on the table. The story pictures were presented to the child one
by one and the child was asked to match the story to a face to show how Carol would
feel in the story. They were told that they could change their decision at any time and
it was the final arrangement of pictures and stories that was noted.
Results:
Facial expression (All results for this phase are—represented in Figures 8.1 and
8.2 below):
1) On the first presentation of the photographs, when the children were asked to
say how Carol was feeling, all the children performed relatively poorly and there were
no significant group differences on the ANOVA. There was a strong correlation
between TROG and performance on this phase (p<0.001) over all children but not
within the autistic group. When the three non-autistic groups and the two autistic
groups were collapsed into one autistic and one non-autistic group, there was a
significant difference between them on an ANOVA, with p<0.01 F=7.34, with the
non-autistic subjects performing on average better than the autistic subjects on this
phase. The percentage of children in each group passing this phase is represented in
Figure 8.5 below and Table 8.2 illustrates the results on the chi-square for each group,
representing the phases where significantly more children passed than failed and visa
versa.
2) When the children were asked to point to the face that goes with the emotion
as spoken by the experimenter, a group difference emerged, with the 5-6 year old
group showing a better performance than the autistic groups (F=4.29, p<0.01). This
difference was accentuated by collapsing the groups into autistic and non-autistic
groups (p<0.001). When MA and TROG was controlled for, the differences still
existed at 0.01 level. The small sample of autistic and MLD children matched on CA,
did not show a significant difference, but this sample was much smaller than the
samples matched on MA and TROG. Across all children there was a correlation
between TROG and performance on this phase and also between CA and
performance, at 0.001 level and 0.05 level respectively.
Overall, the percentage of children passing this second phase was as expected by
the ANOVA results, highest for the 5-6 year olds and lowest for the autistic groups.
These results are represented in Figure 8.5 and Table 8.2 below.
Figure 8.2: Mean highest scores and standard errors for all groups on the facial emotion
recognition task (Highest score possible is 7).
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3) The final two parts of this phase served to train the children to a level of
competence in recognising the photographs, adequate to allow them to display a
understanding of other types of emotion perception, if they existed. On the second
naming procedure the 5-6 year olds showed better performance than the 3-4 year olds
(F=2.65 p<0.05) and on the second showing procedure the MLD children perform
better than the autistic adults (F=3.65 p<0.05). When a subset of autistic subjects and
a subset of non-autistic subjects were matched on MA BPVS and TROG the non-
autistic subjects did better than the autistic subjects (F=12.37 p<0.01) and this could
not be explained by either MA (F=6.64 p<0.05) or TROG raw score (F=10.01
p<0.01). Controling for CA did, however, wipe out the difference, but this was a very
small sample. There was also no correlation between any of the age related measures
and performance on either of the final parts of this phase. It is the children who pass
these final stages that contribute to the results of the gestures and context phases. The
exact numbers of children, as well as the percentages of each group, progressing to the
final phases are shown on Figure 8.5.
1
Facial recognition
4) The highest scores over the four parts of this phase are a general indication of
the failure of the younger children in all groups to recognise facial expressions, even
with a chance to learn. The autistic children also showed poorer performance overall
(F=6.69 p<0.001) than all the normal groups, even the 3-4 year olds. Since there were
no differences between the two autistic groups nor the three non-autistic groups it was
again feasible to compare the collapsed autistic and non-autistic groups. The
differences described above remained with the non-autistic children scoring higher
than the autistic children (F=14.15 p<0.001). When CPA (F=4.78), MA (F=8.54) and
TROG score (F=5.15) were controlled for, this significant difference remained at 0.05
level. There were correlations between both TROG score (r= 0.62 p<0.0001) and
BPVS MA (r = 0.27 p<0.05) and the high scores of all children. No correlation with
CA existed. Within the autistic groups there was also a correlation between BPVS and
High scores (r = 0.46 p<0.05).
Table 8.2: Chi-square results for each group on each phase of the emotion recognition task and ANOVA results for
autistic/non-autistic groups, unmatched and matched on CA, MA (BPVS) and TROG raw score.
Chi Square results for number passing/failing
(*=sig. at 0.05, **=sig.at 0.01, ***=sig at 0.001)
ANOVA
results
,
Autistic/non-autistic
matched on:
Phase of
task
3-4	 year
olds
5-6	 year
olds
MLD Autisti
c
childre
n
Autistic
adults
Aut/non
autistic
CA b MA
(BPVS
)
TROG
raw
score
Facel All fail fail>pass.
X2=10.29
**
all fail all fail All fail nonaut>
aut
F=7.34
**
not
sig
not sig. nonaut>
aut
F=4.85*
Face2 not sig. not sig. not sig. not sig. not sig. nonaut>
aut
F=12.43
***
not
sig.
nonaut
>
aut
F=8.04
**
nonaut>
aut
F=6.92
**
Face3 not sig. not sig a not sig. not sig. not sig. not sig not
sig
not sig. not sig.
Face4 not sig. all pass all pass not sig. fail>pass
X2= 5.44
*
nonaut>
aut
F=12.37
**
not
sig
nonaut
>
aut
F=6.64
*
nonaut>
aut
F=10.09
**
High
Score
not sig. all pass pass>fail
X2=4.45 *
not sig. not sig. nonau
t>aut
F=4.7
*
nonaut
>
aut
F=8.54
**
nonaut>
aut
F=5.15*
Sound
- 12
fail>pass
X2=5.4 *
not sig. not sig. fail>pa
ss
X2=5.4
*
fail>pass
X2= 6.44
*
not sig. not
sig.
not sig. not sig.
Sound
- 6
all fail not sig not sig not sig fail>pass
X2 =5.44
*
not sig. not
sig.
not sig. not sig.
Gestures all fail fail>pass
X2= 10.29
**
not sig. all fail all fail not sig. not
sig
not sig. not sig.
Contexts
a)
pass>fail
X2=4.5 *
all pass pass>fail
X2=5.44 *
not sig. all pass not sig not
sig.
not sig. not sig.
Contexts
b)
all fail all fail fail>pass
X2=4.5 *
not sig. all fail not sig not
sig.
not sig. not sig.
a Although not significant here (X 2 =3.77 p=0.052) , the 5-6 year olds did show more passes than
failures.
b This comparison was only possible with a small sample of children from the MLD and autistic
children groups (n=7 in each group).
Sounds:
e••
Figure 8.3 illustrates the results from this phase of the task. When results over
all twelve sounds were considered there were no group differences at 0.05 level,
neither on the autistic/non-autistic comparison nor on the five group comparison.
When matched on CA, MA and TROG score there were still no differences between
autistic and non-autistic children. From the chi-square test it is seen that none of the
groups scored more passes than fails, although the MLD and 5-6 year old groups both
showed no significant differences between the numbers of pass and fail. The autistic
groups and the 3-4 year olds all produced signifcantly more fails than passes (at 0.05
level). See Table 8.2. There was a correlation between TROG score and performance
on this task across all groups (r = 0.39 p<0.01) but not within the autistic groups.
In retrospect, it was decided that perhaps on the second presentation of the
emotions, some of the children could have been confused as to which photo to choose,
having already chosen most photos once. So an analysis of the data taken from the
first presentation of each emotion was conducted. There were now no significant
differences between groups on any comparison and no correlation with any of the
measures of mental or chronological age. In fact, the autistic group no longer showed
significantly more failures than passes on this task although the autistic adults
continued to do so. What is interesting is that taking just the first presentation,
actually decreased some of the children's performance in the 3-4 year old group, so
that all children in this group now failed the task.
Gestures:
(Figure 8.4 represents the mean results for this phase and Figure 8.5 illustrates
the mean percentage of children passing this phase). In this phase none of the autistic
children or adults and none of the 3-4 year olds passed (i.e. scored more than 5 out of
7). In the five to six year old group, significantly more children failed than passed
(chi-square=10.29 p<0.01). In the MLD group there was no significant difference
Gestures	 Stories	 Emotions
Emotion context task
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Figure 8.4: Mean scores (out of 7) and standard errors for all groups on the emotion perception - context
tasks.
Mean number of correct responses
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between the number passing and the number failing but the tendency was towards
more failures than passes (Table 8.2). On the ANOVA there were no group
differences but there was a correlation between performance and both MA on BPVS
and TROG score. When the autistic/non-autistic comparison was made there was no
significant difference between the two groups and this remained the case when CA,
MA and TROG score were controlled for.
Contexts (See Figures 8.4 and 8.5 and Table 8.2):
1) Stories: Overall there were no group differences for this, either across five
groups or on the autistic/non-autistic comparison. More than 80% of the children in
all groups, who got this far, passed this part of the task and proceded to the
emotionally relevant condition. All children irrespective of age, did well on this task.
2) Emotions: Here, like for the gestures condition, the overall percentage of
children passing was low for all groups. In the 3-4 year old, 5-6 year old and autistic
adult groups all children failed. The MLD group showed more failures than passes
(chi-square=4.5 p<0.05) and the autistic group actually showed no significant
difference between passes and failures. (N.B. Pass equals a score of 5 or more out of
6).
When the actual scores were compared, the 5-6 year olds, MLD and autistic
children all performed better than the 3-4 year olds, with the autistic adults
somewhere inbetween (F=3.33 p<0.05). There were correlations between performance
and both BPVS MA (r =0.57 p<0.001) and TROG (r =0.47 p<0.01) score. When the
autistic and non-autistic groups were matched on CA, MA and TROG score there
were no significant differences between the two groups, as Table 8.2 suggests.
Additional results:
Recognition of facial expression:
Of the autistic children and adults who did score on the facial expression
recognition, the emotions of happy and sad, seemed to be the most often correctly
identified. Angry and surprised also appeared regularily in the correct answers on this
phase. In response to the first request to tell me how Carol was feeling, many of the
autistic children and adults and some of the MLD children said "fine". One autistic
boy said "sick" (this was one of his obsessions - feeling "sick"). When these children
and adults were asked "how are you today" or "how are you feeling today?" their
stock answer was "fine". Perhaps it was the response they have been taught to use in
association with the word "feeling".
Matching of sounds to facial expressions:
Although the difference was not tested statistically, the autistic children did
seem to score higher on the sounds phase than on the facial expression phase, at least
when their response to the first presentation of each emotion. Some of those who did
not score at all on the facial expression phase, did score, allbeit not very high, on the
sounds tasks. This, of course, could have been by chance. There was a tendency for
some children in all groups, but especially the 3-4 year olds and the autistic children
to appear to be simply randomly matching the pictures to the sounds. Sometimes they
just pointed to them in the order they appeared on the table and sometimes they
simply pointed to a photo without really looking at it. It was to rule out the possiblility
that they were performing quite well by chance, that led +o the adoption of such a high
pass rate as the criterion for success for each phase of the task.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the autistic children, loved this part of the
experiment. In later experiments the children requested to see "that girl" again, the
one "who made the funny noises". At the end of the experiment itself, quite a few of
the children, especially the more able children, wanted to listen to the sounds again.
They found some of the sounds very amusing, even if they didn't recognise the
emotional context.
Contexts:
Almost all the children who proceded this far, accurately and reliably matched
the verbal stories to the pictures, in the first part of this phase. This showed that they
understood the language necessary to describe the pictures in mechanical terms.
However, on the second part, most children did poorly on matching an emotion to the
story pictures. The 3-4 year olds had the poorest performance and the autistic adults
were not far behind them. The autistic children, MLD children and 5-6 year olds all
did significantly better than the 3-4 year olds, although none of these groups showed
more passes than failures. This may have been due to the tendency of the 5-6 year
olds, MLD children and some of the autistic children to mix up the pictures for happy
and surprised which in itself is not suprising, due to the concurrent nature of the two
emotions. Getting both these wrong would have left the child with a score of 4 out of
5, which was not a pass. The poor results from the 3-4 year old group may be
explained by the correlation between mental age on BPVS and performance and also
between performance and TROG raw score, since the 3-4 year olds had the lowest
score on both measures. This does not, however, explain the poor results of the
autistic adults, none of whom performed above chance. Memory may have been a
problem for both the 3-4 year olds and the autistic adults and this could have been
catered for by retesting and retraining each subject on the facial recognition task
before progressing to each stage. This would, however, have made the whole
experiment too long for the youngest and least able children and adults, whose
attention was hard enough to hold as it was. Again the problem may have been ruled
out by using videos as Hobson (1986) did, or by training the child to speak the
emotion rather than poitning at the photograph. To have a higher sample of autistic
children and adults progressing to this phase, the subjects should have been trained to
a criterion of five correct identifications of photographs.
General Discussion:
There are a few pieces of observational data, not detailed elsewhere, worth
mentioning. Firstly, the youngest autistic children tended to produce much echolalia
of the instructions. Also when the experimenter would, for example, wave her hand
over the pictures to draw the child's attention to them, while giving the instructions,
some of the autistic children copied this movement. It took a lot of effort to draw
some of the children's attention to the task at hand. Secondly, on the sounds phase,
quite a few of the children named some of the easier sounds for example, crying and
laughing, but could not match this to a facial expression of sad or happy.
As suggested in the context results, quite a few children in all groups mixed up
surprise and happy emotions. This also happened in the sounds phase, where a few
children identifies the surprised sounds as happy, or sometimes as frightened, both
understandable enough. Baron-Cohen et al (1993) note that the most common mistake
made by the subjects with autism when sorting pictures in the Surprise category, was
to put the picture into the Happy file. As Baron-Cohen suggested Happy and Sad are
well recognised by most children in all groups, in each phase of the experiment
(except Gestures). And as mentioned earlier fewer autistic subjects correctly identified
the surprised face in the first part of phase 1 (in both naming and showing
procedures), than identified all the other faces. All the other emotions could be labeled
as simple emotions, in Baron-Cohen's terms, i.e. that they only require an
understanding of the situation not the person's beliefs, but in some circumstances
these simple emotions can still be ambigous. For example, fear is an emotion that
depends on the individual - what frightens one child, might not frighten another - so
the child's response may be based on a personal experience. At least a sense that the
other person's feelings may not be the same as the self's is necessary to correctly
understand the emotion. Surprise, however, does require an understanding of the
beliefs of the person, in a the natural context. Howevef, in this experiment, the child
did not need to know what Carol was believing to identify the facial expression. It
could be argued, however, that since surprise normally requires understanding of
beliefs, in order to attribute surprise, it is not an emotion autistic children will
understand if they come across it in everyday life. Happy and Sad may be drilled into
children from an early age, and are probably the first two emotions all children learn
to recognise and name. To actually surprise someone requires the knowledge of what
the other person believes about the situation. Autistic children have not been observed
to play tricks of this nature, to surprise someone else.
Overall, then, it seems that the autistic groups in this sample did seem to have
problems recognising emotions when asked to do so from facial expressions. They
were better at simple emotions, such as Happy and Sad, than they were on Theory of
mind dependent emotions such as Surprise. This, however, was not tested statistically
and is only based on observational and descriptive data. The autistic groups did not
learn as quickly as the other non-autistic groups, in that their highest scores were
significantly less than all the non-autistic groups. They were slightly better at
matching sounds to facial expressions but not significantly so. For those children who
passed the first phase and proceded to the gestures and context phases, they seemed to
do well. They certainly did not do statistically worse than their non-autistic mental
age matched counter-parts. Those who did get this far tended to be those of a higher
MA. One autistic girl passed Phase one, scored well on the sounds, did quite well on
the gestures and then passed both the context phases. In fact, while she was matching
the stories to the pictures she told the experimenter how the person in the story was
feeling, without prompting to do so. Yet there were adults with a higher mental age
than this child who did not pass the first phase, never mind the last phases.
Performance over all children was often linked with score on TROG, although within
the autistic group a higher TROG score only improved performance on the overall
high score in the facial expression phase and the emotion assignment in the context
phase. This backs up the idea that it is the children with the higher verbal MA's that
pass the first part and progress to the latter phases. Thus I would suggest that there
may be a possible link between verbal MA and performance on these emotion
.-
recognition tasks. However, this suggestion has to remain speculative, until the
experiment can be performed using better controls especially for memory problems,
and better equipment and facilities.
Appendix 8.6
Further details on the joint attention experiment
Method:
Subjects:
The subjects used were drawn from the samples described in Chapter 2. They
were the same as for the emotion recognition task described in Chapter 7, although
several children did not complete this task due to many different factors. One autistic
girl, for example, had a sight problem which allowed her to be tested using pictures
and objects close-up but not things at a distance. Another autistic boy refused to come
for the play session, during which he was to be tested. One other autistic boy's video
session was lost due to a technical problem, as was one for one of the MLD children.
However, this MLD child was replaced by another child of a very similar
chronological and mental age. This left the numbers in each group as follows:
Table 8.3: Number of children in each group who took part in the joint attention
experiment.
Group --> 3-4	 year
olds
5-6	 year
olds
MLD
children
autistic
children
autistic
adults
number	 in
group
11 13 11 9 10
Mean CA 3;4 5;4 12;3 12;1 23;10
Mean MA on
BPVS
3;4 6;0 5;11 4;11 7;0
Mean TROG
score
5
(n=5)
11.5 8.1 6.2 8.2
Procedure:
A scenario very similar to that used in Leekam et al.' s (1993; in press) study
was used in this experiment. The experimenter, in the process of another task (usually
the emotion recognition or warm-up freeplay sessions) looked intently, turning both
eyes and head, at an object placed at a specific point to the left of the child as the
experimenter sat, but with no verbal clues. The reaction of the child was recorded on
camera. The experimenter then asked" what am I looking at?". Secondly, the process
was repeated for an object behind the child. Finally, at a later stage in the dummy or
other task, the experimenter pointed at an object to the right hand side of the child.
After a short pause the experimenter asked the child "What am I pointing at?" and the
response was recorded on video. How the child interpreted the point, was evident
from the child's response. If the child looked at the object then back to the
experimenter and said something like "it is a plane" then they were interpreting the
gesture as protodeclarative. If they got up and brought the object to the experimenter
then they saw the point as protoimperative. If, however, they reached for the object
and then played with it and didn't give it to the experimenter, then this could imply a
protodeclarative interpretation. The reaction to the "what is it?" question served to
confirm that the child was looking at the right object and in doing so tested for visual
perspective taking. It was predicted that the autistic children, on the basis of previous
research, might respond more with protoimperative interpretations, than
protodeclarative, if they responded at all.
For some children, due to constrictions in the testing rooms, the point was to the
experimenter's left and the gaze to the right, but this was seen as unimportant when
analysing the results. As far as possible there was always a gap of another activity
between each phase. This was an attempt to make the whole scenario more natural.
The task was presented in the order described above - look left, look behind and point
to right. The presentations were not counterbalanced because it was felt that three
different presentations, separated by another task, would not be enough to show a
learning effect that might compromise the results, especially since each child was only
given the task once. Where possible the experimenter waited until the child looked at
her and then looked away to the object. But with some of the children, especially the
autistic children, it was necessary to call the child's name to gain their attention before
looking away.	 OW
Table 8.4: The scoring system used to code the response by each child a) to the
gaze and b) to the point.
Score a) Gaze b) point
6 Child	 follows	 gaze	 and
answers	 correctly	 on
"what" question.
Child follows point and
names object. (No verbal
prompt needed).
5 Child	 follows	 gaze	 but
answers	 question
incorrectly,
Child follows point and
picks up object (No verbal
prompt needed)
4 Child moves head slightly
and	 answers	 question
correctly.
Child follows point and
then on prompt names or
gives object.
3 Child moves head slightly
but answers incorrectly
Child	 follows	 point	 but
does not name or give
object on prompt.
2 No response to gaze only
but	 looks	 and	 answers
question correctly.
No response at first but
responds	 correctly	 to
prompt.
1 No response to gaze only;
looks • 	 but	 answers
incorrectly in response to
question.
No response to point and
answers	 incorrectly	 on
prompt.
0 No response either to gaze
or to question.
No response to either point
or to prompt question.
Table 8.5 Number of children included in each group for each part of the experiment.
Group Beg an
experiment
Gaze behind Gaze left Point Total score
3-4 years 11 11 11 11 11
5-6 years 13 13 13 13 13
MLD 11 10 10 10 8
Autistic ch 9 9 9 8 8
Autistic adt. 10 7 9 9 6
54
3 -
0
Table 8.6: Mean MA on BPVS and TROG raw scores for the autistic and non-autistic
groups as matched on these measures.
Group number
matched	 on
MA BPVS
number
matched	 on
TROG
Mean MA on
BPVS
Mean	 TROG
raw score
autistic 15 14 5;4 7.1
non-autistic 15 14 5;4 7.2
Inter-observer reliability was tested using a sample of children from the autistic
children, autistic adults, 3-4 year old and 5-6 year old groups. This sample was coded
by an independent naive observer, who was trained to apply the coding system, to the
video sessions. A Pearson's product moment correlation was calculated, giving an r
value of 0.874 p<0.0001.
Results:
Figure 8.8: Median Scores and interquartile ranges for the autistic and non-autistic groups
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on each part of the joint attention task.
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When the ANOVA (Kruskal-Wallis) was done for the autistic/non-autistic
comparison (See Figures 8.8 and 8.9) there were no "differences for the component
parts of the task but there was a difference on overall score (K-W=5.52 p<0.05), with
the non-autistic children scoring higher overall than the autistic subjects. However,
this difference disappeared when a sample of the children were matched on MA
BPVS (K-W=3.4, p=0.07) and on TROG raw score (K-W=2.53 p=0.112), suggesting
that there may be a link between MA and performance on joint attention tasks.
Unfortunately it was only possible to match a small sample of twelve children (six
autistic and six non-autistic) on MA BPVS for total score and 18 children (9 in each
group) on TROG raw score. This was due to the fact that of the children who were
matched on these measures, there were five autistic children and three non-autistic
children, who did not complete the whole task.
On the correlation analysis, only one comparison emerged significant at 0.05
level and that was for TROG and the score for "gaze behind" across all five groups (r
= 0.33), but no correlation within the autistic groups only.
Figure 8.9: Median scores and interquartile ranges for the overall joint attention score for
the
score	
collapsed autistic and non-autistic groups.Median Overall 
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Figures 8.10 and 8.11, illustrate the more interesting aspects of the non-
significant results. If we look at the number of subjects, scoring at least five out of six,
we can see that on each component part the same percentage of the autistic children
(33.3%) shows evidence of spontaneous joint attention (Figure 8.10). This extreme
consistency cannot be explained by the same children responding well on each part -
only one child (MA 3;2) scored 6 on two out of the three parts, the gaze left and point.
There were, however, children who scored high on gaze behind but low on gaze left
and point. So the apparant consistency of the groups results really was inconsistency
on an individual level and this was reflected in the percentage of children scoring 15
on the total score measure. The 3-4 year old children also showed a consistency
between the component tasks of the experiment. This time the same children did tend
to perform well on at least two out of the three components. Again this was reflected
in a higher percentage of children scoring 15 or over on total score. More autistic
adults showed evidence of joint attention in response to the point but because they
performed so poorly on the other aspects of joint attention, none of the adults showed
a consistency in their total score. A higher percentage of 5-6 year olds showed joint
attention on the gaze behind and point tasks, than the other groups, and yet they show
the second lowest, after the autistic adults, percentage on the gaze left. Possible
explanations of this result, tied in to explanations of overall low scores in the non-
autistic groups, are offered in the discussion. Finally, in respect to Figure 8.10, the
MLD children showed the most consistently high scores, as seen by the total score
figures, with 50% of children scoring 15 or more overall. Fifty percent is still a very
low figure for non-autistic children, on a behaviour normal toddlers and younger can
be shown to understand. Again, explanations for this will be offered in the
discussions. To look a little more at the group differences on overall score and each
phase of the task, a series of Fisher test were carried on the number of those who
passed in each group compared to the number of those who failed. There were no
group differences on overall score found, and none on gaze behind. On gaze left no
differences were significant at 0.01 level, but at the 0.05 level the MLD children
showed better joint attention on this phase than both the autistic adults (p=0.04) and
5-6 year old children (p=0.03). On the point condition, the 5-6 year old children
showed more spontaneous joint attention than the autistic children (p=0.01) and the 3-
4 year olds (p=0.006).
Observational points:
It was thought that how the children interpreted the point or eye gaze, i.e.
whether protoimperative or protodeclarative, would be'decipherable from the results.
And from the results it seems that all children/adults in all groups interpreted the point
as protodeclarative. Only two children, one in the 3-4 year old group and one in the 5-
6 year old group, left their seats to approach the object at which the experimenter was
pointing. However, they did not bring the object back to the experimenter but named
it in response to the "what" questions. Three of the autistic children reached and took
the object in response to the gaze behind and verbal prompt. They played with it but
did not give it to the experimenter. So the gaze and prompt just serve to attract the
child's attention to the object, not as any form of request. However, due to the
situation the autistic children were tested in they were closest to the object placed
behind them and most of the children could reach back and take the object without
leaving their seat. None of the children did this for the objects that were further away.
The results here tie in with the observational study results (Chapter 2), which showed
that some autistic children quite commonly engaged in showing things to other people
and in following other people's attention to an object or event, especially when a point
was used. Here, although the non-autistic children performed slighly better than the
autistic children, on the joint attention task this difference was not significant.
Some of the children, mostly the normal children, replied to the question by
pointing at the object, rather than naming it. This was not seen in the autistic groups -
if they did not answer verbally, then they did not respond in any other way, other than
to look at the object. Sometimes the children from all groups named the object
wrongly but were looking in the correct place. Instead they named the object
immediately behind, for example, the wall or the door. This was taken as a correct
response, as was a response such as "clock" or "musical thing" for the tambourine, if
they didn't know the correct term, or "parrot", which was the picture on the
tambourine.
This point leads on to an aspect which may bias the result in any such
experiment - a problem with language may lead the autistic and youngest children to
look but not answer, because they simply don't know what the object is called.
However, it was evident in this study that most of the children could make some sort
of verbal answer that could be easily associated with the object. In all groups it
seemed that for the most part, if they didn't name one object then they didn't name
any objects, even those with an "easy" name such as'teddy". In future experiments
this could easily be controlled for at the end of the experiment by asking the child to
name each of the objects while the experimenter gives them to the child.
Appendix 8.7:
••
Pictures used for Visual Perspective taking task (Level 1 and Level 2) - Flavell et al.
(1981)
1)"What can you see?"
lee
2)"What can I see?"
3) Can I see the sheep upsidedown or the right way round? (Card placed flat on table
with sheep facing upwards)
N.B for the older MLD children pictures of a sports car and a computer were used
instead.
Object behind
eg. tamborine
Object to right
e.g aeroplane,
Camera
-
Object to left
e.g teddy bear
Child
'Experimenter
Experimental set up for joint attention and visual perspective experiment.
Appendix 8.8
Further details on false-belief experiment.
Subjects:
Table 8.7. Numbers of children/adults in each group and mean mental age in
years and months on the BPVS and mean TROG raw score (plus standard deviations
and ranges)
5-6	 year
olds
MLD
children
Autistic
children
Autistic
adults
3-4	 year
olds
Number
in	 each
group
12 12 10 8 3
Mean MA
on BPVS
5;11 6;3 4;7 7;4 4;2
(1;2) (2;7) (1;10) (1;11) (0;6)
(3;7->7;9) (2;2->8;11) (2;2 ->8;3) (5;4->10;2) (3;7->4;5)
Mean 11.5 9 5.3 8.75 7
TROG
score
(3.6) (4.6) (3.47) (3.69) (4)
(5->17) (2->17) (1->11) (4->14) (3->11)
CA 5;4 12;6 13;0 25;8 3;6
(0;5) (3;0) (3;2) (4;10) (0;2)
(4;7->5;11) (8;6->16;4) (7;7->16;4) (19;5->33,11) (3.3->3.7)
Procedure:
The misleading package scenario involved the experimenter holding up a coke can
and asking the child "What do you think is in here?". Once the child had said coke
then a glass was produced and water was poured from the can into the glass. The child
was then asked "What is it?". If they did not immediately say 'water' - some of the
children said juice or fizzy drink, or coke - they were allowed to taste the water, or
were prompted until they said "water". They were asked the reality question "So what
is in the can?" and the memory question "What did you say was in the can when I first
showed it to you?". The water was then poured back into the can and any spillage
wiped up and the child was asked "If Jack (or another child who had not yet been in
the room) comes into the room and I hold up the can to-him, what will he say is in the
can?". The child was then asked the second reality/memory questions "What is really
in the can?".
A different scenario was used for the autistic children and adults, using a picture
sequence story as described below and illustrated in the pictures. The story involved a
young boy called Peter, who on his way home from school one day, stopped at the
corner shop and bought something to eat. He carried it home and left it under the table
in the kitchen while he went out to play football. At this point the child was asked
"Where did Peter put his bag of food?". If the child did not respond, he or she was
urged to point to or show the place. The story continued with Peter's Mum coming in
to clean the kitchen floor and in order to do so she moves Peter's bag to the cupboard.
The second reality question was then asked - "Where has Peter's mum put the bag of
food?" Finally, Peter is getting hungry so he comes in from the garden to get his food.
The child was then asked the false-belief question - "Where will Peter first look for
his bag of food when he comes into the kitchen?" Again the child was prompted to
show the position if no verbal response was given. The word FIRST was included in
the false-belief question for both tasks in an attempt to improve the autistic children's
performance, as a study by Eisenmajer and Prior (1991) suggested it would. The child
was then asked the two memory questions "Where did Peter leave his food when he
came home from the shop?" and "Where did his Mum move it to when she was
cleaning the floor?".
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Now here is Johnny at
home, in the kitchen. He
decides that he will have
his snack later, after he has
played football. He puts
his bag of food under the
table in the kitchen.
Where has Johnny left his
bag of food?
Picture story used with autistic children and adults to test false-belief.
Here is Johnny on his way
home from school. He has
just been to the little shop
to buy some food for a
snack. He has bought
crisps and a Mars bar and a
can of coke.
-And here is Johnny
outside, playing football.
While Johnny is out
playing, his mother comes
into the kitchen. She is
tidying the house.
She wants to clean the
kitchen floor so she moves
Johnny's bag of food and
puts it in the cupboard.
So where is Johnny's bag
of food now?
Where did he leave it
when he came home from
school?
Where is it really/ where
did his mum put it?
Where did Johnny put it
when he first came home
from school
..	 f
	
i. •	
	  When Johnny comes into
• •
the kitchen, where will he
first look for his bag of
food?
Here is Johnny again. Now
he is hungry and he
decided to come inside to
have his snack.
Additional Results:
When a simple autistic/non-autistic comparison is made the difference
between the number of passes and failures only reaches significance when the non-
reponses and failed memory responses are taken into account (X 2 = 10.90 p<0.01).
Because of the high number of memory failures in the autistic group in was decided to
look at this in more detail. The autistic groups combined showed more memory
failures and no responses than the non-autistic groups combined (X 2 = 8.41 p<0.01).
The autistic children also showed more no reponses and memory failures than both
the 5-6 year olds (X' = 7.76 p<0.01) and the MLD children (X 2 = 4.77 p<0.05). There
was no difference between the autistic adults and control groups.
To look at the pattern of passes and failures within each group, a second series
of chi-square analyses was carried out. The autistic children showed significantly
more failures plus no responses/memory failures than passes (X 2 = 4.45 p<0.05) but
there were no significant differences between failures, passes and no
response/memory failures. The autistic adults showed no differences between the
number of adults pasing, failing false-belief and failing memory. The 5-6 year olds
showed more passes than fails and there were no children who failed the memory
questions (X2
 = 8.33 p<0.01). Finally, the MLD children did not show significantly
more passes than other responses but did show more passes than failures (X 2
 =10.74
p<0.01) and more passes than no responses/ memory failures (X 2 = 8.4 p<0.01).
